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This	  dissertation	  explores	  self-­‐representation	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna,	  for	  
example	  in	  local	  practices	  of	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  Visual	  artists	  discussed	  include	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  the	  
composer	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  (who	  also	  painted),	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Egon	  Schiele.	  	  
Nevertheless	  this	  project	  is	  interdisciplinary,	  and	  as	  such	  other	  forms	  of	  self-­‐representation	  are	  
also	  considered	  –	  for	  example	  rhetorical	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  by	  Viennese	  figures	  
such	  as	  the	  satirical	  writer	  Karl	  Kraus,	  architect	  and	  theorist	  Adolf	  Loos,	  and	  the	  young	  
philosopher-­‐psychologist	  Otto	  Weininger.	  	  	  
The	  primary	  phenomenon	  under	  investigation	  in	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  
ugliness	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  self-­‐representation	  in	  Viennese	  modernity,	  an	  ugliness	  that	  was	  
connected	  specifically	  –	  and,	  as	  I	  detail,	  pervasively	  –	  to	  an	  affect	  of	  hate.	  	  My	  argument	  is	  first	  
and	  foremost	  that	  obsessive	  self-­‐representation	  was	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  Viennese	  
modernity,	  and	  secondly	  that	  this	  obsession	  with	  self-­‐fashioning	  and	  display	  must	  be	  
understood	  at	  least	  in	  part	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  related	  cultural	  preoccupation	  with	  ugliness	  and	  
hatred.	  	  	  
I	  analyze	  these	  cultural	  currents	  of	  hate	  and	  ugliness	  as	  they	  played	  out	  in	  philosophy,	  
medicine	  (especially	  psychology	  and	  psychoanalysis),	  politics,	  and	  of	  course	  art	  history.	  	  I	  
consider	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  scholars	  of	  the	  Vienna	  School	  of	  Art	  History	  –	  such	  as	  Franz	  
	  	  
iv	  
Wickhoff,	  who	  argued	  in	  defence	  of	  ugliness.	  	  I	  also	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  ugliness	  in	  
contemporaneous	  aesthetic	  philosophy,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  negative	  empathy	  
popularized	  first	  by	  Theodor	  Lipps	  and	  later	  by	  Wilhelm	  Worringer.	  	  Sigmund	  Freud’s	  comments	  
on	  ugliness	  and	  hate	  further	  illuminate	  a	  cultural	  milieu	  known	  both	  for	  its	  alienation	  and	  
antagonism	  and	  for	  its	  artistic	  achievements.	  	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  Viennese	  artists	  and	  thinkers	  fashioned	  oppositional	  personae	  and	  
represented	  themselves	  as	  ugly	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons:	  to	  emphasize	  the	  vanguard	  quality	  of	  
their	  art,	  to	  grapple	  with	  Vienna’s	  virulent	  antisemitism,	  to	  work	  through	  other	  identity	  issues,	  
to	  express	  a	  sense	  of	  martyrdom,	  to	  “tell	  the	  truth,”	  to	  create	  notoriety	  in	  a	  competitive	  local	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  Interested	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  x	  130	  cm,	  Kunstmuseum,	  Linz.	  Available	  from:	  Lentos	  Kunstmuseum	  Linz,	  
http://www.lentos.at/html/de/366_373.aspx	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  10.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Young	  Man	  in	  Purple	  Robe	  with	  Clasped	  Hands,	  1914,	  gouache	  and	  
pencil,	  48.3	  x	  30.5	  cm,	  private	  collection.	  Available	  from:	  Neue	  Zurcher	  Zeitung,	  Kunstler	  und	  
Propheten,	  http://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/bildstrecke/kuenstler-­‐und-­‐propheten-­‐1.18546572	  
(accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  11.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Male	  Figure	  Bending	  Forward	  (Otto	  Benesch),	  1914,	  gouache	  and	  
pencil,	  46.5	  x	  30.8	  cm,	  Georg	  Waechter	  Foundation,	  Winterthur.	  Available	  from:	  Museuma	  Art	  
Images	  
http://www.museuma.com/egon-­‐schiele/man-­‐bencind-­‐down-­‐deeply.html	  (accessed	  October	  
30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  12.	  Fritz	  Gareis,	  “Karikatur	  Mahlers	  am	  Dirigentenpult”	  [Caricature	  of	  Mahler	  at	  the	  
Podium],	  Österreichische	  Nationalbibliothek,	  Vienna	  (Bildarchiv	  12881682).	  Available	  from:	  
Bayerischer	  Rundfunk,	  Gustav	  Mahler,	  http://www.br.de/radio/br-­‐klassik/themen/gustav-­‐
mahler-­‐lebensbilder126~_image-­‐5_-­‐9c6161500b35e0212ab78451135c1de70c63511f.html	  
(accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  13.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure,	  1904/1905,	  oil	  on	  
canvas,	  170	  x	  74	  cm,	  private	  collection.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–
1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  45.	  
	  
Figure	  14.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Portrait	  of	  Alexander	  von	  Zemlinsky,	  July	  1908	  (in	  Gmunden),	  oil	  on	  
canvas,	  170	  x	  74	  cm,	  Stiftung	  Sammlung	  Kamm	  –	  Kunsthaus	  Zug,	  Switzerland.	  Signed:	  “Richard	  
Gerstl”	  Inscribed	  verso:	  “Richard	  Gerstl,	  IX,	  Nußdorferstr.	  35.”	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  
Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  109.	  
	  
Figure	  15.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background,	  1905,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  159.5	  x	  
109	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  




Figure	  16.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  [Detail],	  1905,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  
159.5	  x	  109	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  
1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  49.	  
	  
Figure	  17.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude),	  12	  September	  1908,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  140.5	  x	  
110.5	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  
Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  159.	  
	  
Figure	  18.	  Max	  Oppenheimer,	  Bleeding	  Man	  poster,	  1911,	  lithograph,	  122.5	  x	  90.5	  cm,	  Museum	  
of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (804.1983).	  Gift	  of	  the	  Lauder	  Foundation,	  Leonard	  and	  Evelyn	  Lauder	  
Fund.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  Max	  Oppenheimer,	  
https://www.moma.org/collection_ge/artist.php?artist_id=4073	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  19.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Der	  Sturm	  poster,	  1911	  (original	  version	  1910),	  colour	  lithograph,	  
Albertina,	  Vienna.	  Available	  from:	  Art	  Institute	  Chicago,	  
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/26757	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  20.	  Max	  Oppenheimer,	  The	  Deposition,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  present	  whereabouts	  
unknown	  (formerly	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  Dr	  Oskar	  Reichel,	  Vienna).	  From:	  Gemma	  Blackshaw.	  
“The	  Pathological	  Body:	  Modernist	  Strategising	  in	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  Self-­‐Portraiture.”	  Oxford	  Art	  
Journal	  30,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  377–401.	  Page	  397.	  
	  
Figure	  21.	  El	  Greco,	  The	  Entombment	  of	  Christ,	  late	  1560s,	  oil	  and	  tempera	  on	  panel,	  51.5	  x	  43	  
cm,	  National	  Gallery	  –	  Alexandros	  Soutzos	  Museum,	  Athens.	  Available	  from:	  Wikipedia,	  
National	  Gallery	  (Athens),	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Gallery_(Athens)	  (accessed	  
October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  22.	  El	  Greco,	  La	  Santisima	  Trinidad,	  1577–79,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  300	  x	  179	  cm,	  Museo	  del	  
Prado,	  Madrid.	  Available	  from:	  Museo	  Nacional	  del	  Prado,	  
https://www.museodelprado.es/typo3temp/pics/aab50f0a98.jpg	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  23.	  Albrecht	  Dürer,	  Christ	  as	  The	  Man	  of	  Sorrows,	  c.	  1493,	  oil	  on	  panel,	  30	  x	  19	  cm,	  
Staatliche	  Kunsthalle,	  Karlsruhe.	  Available	  from:	  Staatliche	  Kunsthalle	  Karlsruhe,	  
http://www.kunsthalle-­‐karlsruhe.de/en/the-­‐collection/gothic-­‐and-­‐renaissance-­‐painting.html	  




Figure	  24.	  Albrecht	  Dürer,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  1500,	  oil	  on	  wood	  panel,	  67.1	  cm	  ×	  48.9	  cm,	  Alte	  
Pinakothek,	  Munich,	  Inv.	  Nr.	  537.	  Available	  from:	  Pinakothek	  Museums	  (Alte	  Pinakothek),	  
http://www.pinakothek.de/en/albrecht-­‐duerer/self-­‐portrait-­‐fur-­‐trimmed-­‐robe	  (accessed	  
October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  25.	  Reconstruction	  of	  Gerstl’s	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure.	  From:	  Raymond	  
Coffer.	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  A	  Reassessment	  of	  their	  Relationship	  (1906–
1908).”	  PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  London,	  2011.	  Page	  73.	  
	  
Figure	  26.	  Photograph	  of	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  c.	  1905,	  in	  Schröder,	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  From:	  
Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  
1993.	  Page	  172.	  
	  
Figure	  27.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  front	  of	  a	  Blue-­‐Green	  Background,	  summer	  1907,	  oil	  on	  
cardboard,	  100	  x	  72	  cm,	  Tyrolean	  State	  Museum	  [Tiroler	  Landesmuseum/Ferdinandeum],	  
Innsbruck	  (Inv.	  No.	  Gem.	  3112).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  
Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  95.	  
	  
Figure	  28.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Die	  Familie	  Schönberg,	  late	  July	  1908	  (in	  Gmunden),	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  
88.8	  x	  109.7	  cm,	  MUMOK	  Stiftung	  Ludwig,	  Vienna.	  Signed:	  “Richard	  Gerstl.”	  Available	  from:	  
Museum	  Moderner	  Kunst	  Stiftung	  Ludwig	  Wien,	  https://www.mumok.at/de/familie-­‐
schoenberg	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  29.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  15	  September	  1908,	  pencil	  on	  paper,	  40	  x	  29.9	  cm,	  
Vienna	  Museum	  Karlsplatz	  [Historisches	  Museum	  der	  Stadt	  Wien].	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  
Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  163.	  
	  
Figure	  30.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  29	  September	  1908,	  charcoal	  and	  ink	  on	  paper,	  40	  x	  29.5	  
cm,	  Galerie	  St.	  Etienne,	  New	  York.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  
Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  165.	  
	  
Figure	  31.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  29	  September	  1908,	  ink	  on	  paper,	  38.6	  x	  28	  cm,	  
Albertina,	  Vienna	  (Inv.	  26.437).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  
Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  164.	  
	  
Figure	  32.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  no	  date	  (verso	  of	  15	  September	  Self-­‐Portrait),	  sepia	  on	  
paper,	  40	  x	  29.9	  cm,	  Vienna	  Museum	  Karlsplatz	  [Historisches	  Museum	  der	  Stadt	  Wien]	  (Inv.	  
	  	  
xiii	  
115.288).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  
Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  156.	  
	  
Figure	  33.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  possibly	  1906	  or	  1907,	  ink	  on	  paper,	  44.9	  x	  31.4	  cm,	  
Albertina,	  Vienna	  (Inv.	  41363).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  
Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993.	  Page	  79.	  
	  
Figure	  34.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  c.	  1908,	  pen	  and	  Chinese	  ink	  on	  paper,	  18	  ×	  12.6	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  2).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/index.php/en/schoenberg-­‐2/bildnerischeswerk/selbstportraits/002-­‐
9	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  35.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  c.	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  23	  ×	  17	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  10).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8607	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  36.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Satire,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  31.3	  ×	  24.2	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  111).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8874	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  37.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Critic	  I,	  1909/1910,	  oil	  on	  wood,	  45.1	  x	  31.1	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  112).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8875	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  38.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Critic	  II,	  1909/1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  30.8	  ×	  23.5	  cm,	  Arnold	  
Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  113).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8876	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  39.	  Emil	  Nolde,	  Pentecost,	  1909,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  107	  x	  87	  cm,	  Staatliche	  Museen	  zu	  Berlin,	  
Neue	  Nationalgalerie.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Red	  List,	  http://theredlist.com/wiki-­‐2-­‐351-­‐861-­‐414-­‐
1293-­‐401-­‐304923-­‐view-­‐expressionism-­‐profile-­‐nolde-­‐emil.html	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  40.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Red	  Gaze,	  May	  1910,	  oil	  on	  cardboard,	  32.2	  x	  24.6	  cm,	  Arnold	  
Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  61).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8823	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  41.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Brown	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  16	  March	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  32	  ×	  20	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  12).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
	  	  
xiv	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8609	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  42.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Green	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  23	  October	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  33.2	  x	  24.7	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  15).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8612	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  43.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Tears,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  29.3	  ×	  23.4	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  77).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/resources/pages/view.php?ref=8839	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  44.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  The	  Bearers	  of	  Dreams,	  colour	  lithograph	  from	  The	  Dreaming	  
Youths.	  1907,	  24	  x	  29.3	  cm,	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery,	  London	  (G.1978.PG.88.8).	  ©	  The	  Samuel	  
Courtauld	  Trust,	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery,	  London/DACS	  2003.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Courtauld	  
Institute	  of	  Art,	  Art	  and	  Architecture,	  
http://www.artandarchitecture.org.uk/images/gallery/78a9c007.html	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  
2015).	  
	  
Figure	  45.	  Rudolf	  Kalvach,	  Indian	  Fairy	  Tale,	  c.	  1910/12,	  oil	  on	  wood,	  60	  x	  59.3	  cm,	  private	  
collection.	  Available	  from:	  Leopold	  Museum,	  
http://www.leopoldmuseum.org/en/exhibitions/44/fantastic-­‐rudolf-­‐kalvach	  (accessed	  October	  
30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  46.	  George	  Minne,	  Adolescent	  I,	  c.	  1891,	  marble,	  43	  x	  33.5	  x	  14.3	  cm,	  The	  J.	  Paul	  Getty	  
Museum,	  Los	  Angeles.	  Available	  from:	  The	  J.	  Paul	  Getty	  Museum,	  
http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/103998/george-­‐minne-­‐adolescent-­‐i-­‐belgian-­‐
about-­‐1891/	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  47.	  George	  Minne,	  Kneeling	  Youth,	  1896,	  dated	  1905,	  pencil	  on	  paper,	  34	  x	  19.1	  cm,	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (293.1978).	  ©	  2015	  George	  Minne	  /	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  
(ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  SABAM,	  Belgium.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  
http://www.moma.org/collection/works/36048	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  48.	  George	  Minne,	  Kneeling	  Youth,	  1898,	  plaster,	  80.8	  x	  19.8	  x	  45.2	  cm	  including	  base,	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (232.1962).	  ©	  2015	  George	  Minne	  /	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  
(ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  SABAM,	  Belgium.	  Available	  from:	  Shepherd	  Galleries,	  





Figure	  49.	  Title	  Page	  &	  Dedication	  for	  Kokoschka’s	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope.	  From:	  Tobias	  
G.	  Natter	  and	  Max	  Hollein,	  eds.	  The	  Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Other	  Scandals.	  
New	  York:	  Prestel,	  2005.	  Page	  156.	  
	  
Figure	  50.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  illustration	  of	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope,	  page	  155	  of	  Der	  Sturm	  
no.	  20,	  July	  14,	  1910,	  Fine	  Arts	  Museum	  of	  San	  Francisco.	  Available	  from:	  Fine	  Arts	  Museum	  of	  
San	  Francisco,	  https://art.famsf.org/oskar-­‐kokoschka/morder-­‐hofnung-­‐der-­‐frauen-­‐der-­‐sturm-­‐
no-­‐20-­‐july-­‐14-­‐1910-­‐200011973a-­‐b	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  51.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  illustration	  of	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope,	  1908–09,	  pencil,	  ink,	  
watercolour,	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  Museum	  of	  Art.	  Available	  from:	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  Museum	  
of	  Art,	  http://collections.lacma.org/node/177832	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  52.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  illustration	  of	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope,	  Stiftung	  Sammlung	  
Kamm	  –	  Kunsthaus	  Zug,	  Switzerland.	  Available	  from:	  Stiftung	  Sammlung	  Kamm,	  
http://www.stiftungsammlungkamm.ch/katalog_k.html	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  53.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Poster	  for	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope	  (Pietà),	  1909,	  colour	  
lithograph,	  122.7	  x	  78.6	  cm,	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (343.1966).	  ©	  2015	  Artists	  
Rights	  Society	  (ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  Pro	  Litteris,	  Zurich.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  
Art,	  http://www.moma.org/collection/works/6395	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  54.	  Johann	  Amos	  Comenius,	  “Channels	  and	  Bones,”	  woodcut	  illustration	  from	  Orbis	  
Sensualium	  Pictus,	  1658.	  From:	  Claude	  Cernuschi.	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  
Epistemology	  and	  Politics	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna.	  London:	  Associated	  University	  Presses,	  2002.	  
Page	  36.	  
	  
Figure	  55.	  Nicolas	  Beatrizet,	  Anatomia,	  copperplate	  engraving	  from	  Juan	  de	  Valverde	  de	  
Hamusco’s	  La	  anatomia	  del	  corpo	  humano,	  1556.	  Available	  from:	  Der	  Neue	  Physiologus:	  
Enzyklopädie	  der	  Erfahrungen	  (website),	  http://www.physiologus.de/selbsthaeut.htm	  
(accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  56.	  Eighteenth-­‐Century	  Wax	  Anatomical	  Model	  from	  the	  Josephinum,	  the	  medical	  
history	  museum	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna,	  which	  has	  been	  open	  to	  the	  public	  since	  the	  early	  
nineteenth	  century.	  Available	  from:	  Medical	  History	  Museum	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna,	  




Figure	  57.	  Oskar	  Kokoscha,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Hand	  on	  Chest	  (Selbstbildnis,	  Hand	  auf	  der	  Brust)	  
[Poster	  Advertising	  a	  Lecture	  at	  the	  Academic	  Union	  for	  Literature	  and	  Music,	  Vienna,	  26	  
January	  1912],	  1911–12,	  colour	  lithograph,	  92.4	  x	  55	  cm,	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  
(378.1954).	  ©	  2015	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  (ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  Pro	  Litteris,	  Zurich.	  Available	  from:	  
The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  German	  Expressionism,	  
https://www.moma.org/collection_ge/browse_results.php?criteria=O%3AAD%3AE%3A36737&
page_number=1&template_id=1&sort_order=1	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  58.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  The	  Painter	  and	  His	  Model	  II	  (with	  Der	  Sturm	  Poster),	  1923,	  oil	  on	  
canvas	  on	  board,	  85.1	  x	  130.2	  cm,	  Saint	  Louis	  Art	  Museum	  (910:1983).	  Bequest	  of	  Morton	  D.	  
May.	  Available	  from:	  Saint	  Louis	  Art	  Museum,	  
http://slam.org:8080/emuseum/view/objects/asitem/13738/55/displayDate-­‐
desc;jsessionid=5D52015365FB11538953CD4D3E29F2F8	  (accessed	  October	  30,	  2015).	  
	  
Figure	  59.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Genius	  (Dead	  Mother	  II),	  1911,	  oil	  on	  wood,	  32.1	  x	  25.4	  cm,	  
presumed	  destroyed.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  
Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  
53.	  
	  
Figure	  60.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining,	  1910,	  black	  chalk	  and	  gouache,	  43	  x	  
30.7	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  
The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  
2014.	  Page	  80.	  
	  	  
Figure	  61.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Female	  Nude,	  1910,	  India	  ink,	  tempera,	  and	  watercolour,	  44.3	  x	  30.6	  
cm,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  
Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  
2014.	  Page	  55.	  
	  
Figure	  62.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Male	  Lower	  Torso,	  1910,	  black	  chalk	  and	  gouache,	  44.8	  x	  28.1	  cm,	  
Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  
Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  
2014.	  Page	  113.	  
	  
Figure	  63.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  1911,	  watercolour,	  gouache,	  and	  pencil,	  51.4	  x	  34.9	  cm,	  
Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  New	  York.	  Available	  from:	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  
http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-­‐collection-­‐online/search/483438	  (accessed	  




Figure	  64.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Black	  Cloak,	  Masturbating,	  1911,	  gouache,	  watercolour,	  
and	  pencil,	  48	  x	  32.1	  cm,	  Albertina,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  
Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  56.	  
	  
Figure	  65.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Seated	  Nude	  (Self-­‐Portrait),	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  152.5	  x	  150	  cm,	  
Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  
Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  
2014.	  Page	  58.	  
	  
Figure	  66.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Grey	  with	  Open	  Mouth,	  1910,	  black	  chalk	  and	  
gouache,	  43.8	  x	  30	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  
Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  
Halberton	  Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  108.	  
	  
Figure	  67.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self	  Portrait,	  Nude,	  1910,	  crayon	  and	  gouache,	  44.5	  x	  31	  cm,	  Leopold	  
Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  
London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  109.	  
	  
Figure	  68.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Sneering	  Woman,	  1910,	  gouache,	  watercolour,	  and	  charcoal	  with	  white	  
heightening,	  45	  x	  31.4	  cm,	  Wien	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  
Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  
Halberton	  Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  103.	  
	  
Figure	  69.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Hand	  to	  Cheek,	  1910,	  chalk	  and	  watercolour,	  44.3	  x	  
30.5	  cm,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  Reinhard	  Steiner.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Midnight	  Soul	  of	  
the	  Artist.	  Cologne:	  Taschen,	  2000.	  Page	  6.	  
	  
Figure	  70.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Male	  Nude,	  1910,	  watercolour	  and	  charcoal,	  44	  x	  31.5	  cm,	  private	  
collection	  (Kallir	  D.	  687).	  	  This	  drawing	  is	  categorized	  as	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  in	  Jane	  Kallir’s	  catalogue	  
raisonné	  of	  Schiele’s	  works,	  but	  without	  further	  comment.	  From:	  Jane	  Kallir.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  
Complete	  Works.	  New	  York:	  Harry	  N.	  Abrams,	  1998.	  Page	  425.	  	  
	  
Figure	  71.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  For	  Art	  and	  for	  My	  Loved	  Ones	  I	  will	  gladly	  endure	  to	  the	  End!,	  1912,	  
watercolour	  and	  pencil,	  48.2	  x	  31.8	  cm,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  
Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  




Figure	  72.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Kneeling	  Male	  Nude	  with	  Raised	  Hand	  (Self-­‐Portrait),	  1910,	  black	  chalk	  
and	  gouache,	  62.1	  x	  44.1	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  
Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  
Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  93.	  
	  
Figure	  73.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Splayed	  Fingers,	  1911,	  pencil	  and	  gouache,	  53	  x	  29.1	  
cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna	  (Inv.	  1383).	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  
Publishing,	  2014.	  Page	  64.	  
	  
Figure	  74.	  Egon	  Schiele	  in	  front	  of	  a	  mirror	  (double	  self-­‐portrait),	  c.	  1914,	  photograph,	  Egon	  
Schiele	  Archive,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  














“we	  overlook	  the	  interdependence	  of	  the	  different	  Viennese	  arts	  and	  sciences	  at	  our	  peril”	  
Allan	  Janik	  and	  Stephen	  Toulmin,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  
	  
	  
“perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  in	  connection	  with	  aesthetics	  is	  what	  may	  be	  called	  	  







There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  genesis	  stories	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  ugliness	  in	  modern	  Western	  culture,	  and	  like	  
all	  genesis	  stories	  each	  narrative	  probably	  leaves	  excluded	  as	  much	  as	  it	  includes.	  	  I	  propose	  
here	  to	  tell	  one	  very	  partial	  story	  amongst	  many:	  a	  story	  of	  a	  burgeoning,	  interdisciplinary	  
interest	  in	  ugliness	  as	  it	  was	  linked	  to	  hatred	  and	  self-­‐representation	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  
Viennese	  modernity.	  	  I	  further	  propose	  that	  this	  story	  about	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐
representation	  in	  Vienna	  may	  help	  us	  understand	  related	  phenomena	  in	  other	  places	  and	  
times.	  
Writings	  on	  Vienna	  1900	  have	  constituted	  a	  massive	  industry	  at	  least	  since	  Carl	  
Schorske’s	  paradigmatically	  definitive	  work,	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  on	  Viennese	  
intellectual	  history.	  	  Schorske’s	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna:	  Politics	  and	  Culture	  (1979)	  continues	  to	  be	  
highly	  influential.	  	  People	  both	  in	  and	  out	  of	  academia	  return	  obsessively	  to	  the	  history	  of	  
Vienna,	  which	  has	  been	  home	  to	  an	  almost	  implausible	  number	  of	  artists,	  innovators,	  heroes,	  
and	  villains	  –	  Wolfgang	  Amadeus	  Mozart,	  Ludwig	  van	  Beethoven,	  Franz	  Schubert,	  Gustav	  
Mahler,	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  in	  music,	  Ernst	  Mach,	  Martin	  Buber,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Karl	  
Popper,	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  in	  philosophy,	  Carl	  von	  Rokitansky,	  Theodor	  Meynert,	  Josef	  
Breuer,	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  and	  Ignaz	  Semmelweis	  in	  medicine,	  Otto	  Wagner	  and	  Adolf	  Loos	  in	  
architecture,	  Theodor	  Herzl	  and	  Adolf	  Hitler	  in	  politics,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  macabre	  Prince	  
Rudolf,	  executor	  of	  the	  gruesome	  murder-­‐suicide	  known	  as	  “The	  Mayerling	  Incident,”	  and	  the	  
doomed	  Archduke	  Franz	  Ferdinand	  –	  whose	  assassination	  set	  off	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  	  To	  name	  
only	  a	  few	  of	  many	  more,	  Vienna	  was	  also	  home	  to	  writers	  Stefan	  Zweig,	  Hugo	  von	  
Hofmannsthal,	  Arthur	  Schnitzler,	  and	  Karl	  Kraus,	  and	  to	  visual	  artists	  Gustav	  Klimt,	  Richard	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Gerstl,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Egon	  Schiele,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Vienna	  School	  and	  Ernst	  Gombrich	  in	  
art	  history.	  	  A	  dizzying	  discourse	  has	  thus	  developed	  to	  describe	  what	  is	  admittedly	  a	  somewhat	  
staggering	  situation.	  	  Schorske	  paints	  the	  situation	  thus:	  	  
The	  new	  culture-­‐makers	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Freud	  …	  repeatedly	  defined	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  
a	  kind	  of	  collective	  oedipal	  revolt.	  	  Yet	  the	  young	  were	  revolting	  not	  so	  much	  against	  their	  
fathers	  as	  against	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  paternal	  culture	  that	  was	  their	  inheritance.	  	  What	  
they	  assaulted	  on	  a	  broad	  front	  was	  the	  value	  system	  of	  classical	  liberalism-­‐in-­‐ascendancy	  
within	  which	  they	  had	  been	  reared.	  	  Given	  this	  ubiquitous	  and	  simultaneous	  criticism	  of	  
their	  liberal-­‐rational	  inheritance	  from	  within	  the	  several	  fields	  of	  cultural	  activity,	  the	  
internalistic	  approach	  of	  the	  special	  disciplines	  could	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  
A	  general	  and	  rather	  sudden	  transformation	  of	  thought	  and	  values	  among	  the	  culture-­‐
makers	  suggested,	  rather,	  a	  shared	  social	  experience	  that	  compelled	  rethinking.1	  
I’ve	  been	  researching,	  visiting,	  and	  writing	  about	  Vienna	  for	  over	  twelve	  years	  now,	  and	  I’m	  still	  
thinking.	  	  I	  have	  read	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  scholarship	  like	  Schorske,	  who	  argued	  that	  Viennese	  
modernism	  was	  apolitical,	  and	  developed	  from	  an	  inward	  turn	  –	  to	  psychic	  interiority	  –	  that	  
was	  itself	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  local	  failure	  of	  liberalism.	  	  I	  have	  read	  second-­‐wave	  literature	  like	  
Steven	  Beller,	  too;	  his	  edited	  collection	  Rethinking	  Vienna	  1900	  (2001)	  deliberately	  departed	  
from	  the	  Schorskean	  paradigm	  with	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  politics.	  	  But	  I	  have	  not	  
“rethought”	  Vienna	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  attempting	  to	  invent	  any	  unifying	  or	  unified	  theory	  that	  will	  
explain	  the	  city	  better	  than	  have	  others	  before	  me.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Carl	  E.	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna:	  Politics	  and	  Culture	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1981),	  xxvi.	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   My	  aims	  are	  more	  modest.	  	  Because	  the	  literature	  on	  Viennese	  modernism	  and	  
modernity	  is	  so	  voluminous,	  because	  the	  figures	  are	  so	  contentious,	  because	  of	  my	  own	  
interdisciplinary	  studies	  in	  philosophy,	  theory	  and	  criticism,	  and	  art	  history,	  and	  because	  of	  how	  
long	  I	  have	  been	  reading,	  I	  have	  quite	  simply	  amassed	  an	  enormous	  amount	  and	  variety	  of	  
information.	  	  And	  in	  the	  course	  of	  that	  amassing	  I	  noticed	  certain	  themes	  repeated	  over	  and	  
over	  without	  being	  developed	  into	  full,	  detailed	  discussions,	  themes	  including:	  the	  paramount	  
importance	  in	  Vienna	  of	  psychology	  and	  the	  Viennese	  obsession	  with	  selfhood,	  the	  confessional	  
aspect,	  focus	  on	  self-­‐portraiture,	  and	  ugliness	  of	  the	  Vienna-­‐based	  visual	  art	  known	  as	  “Austrian	  
expressionism,”	  the	  hysterical	  hatred	  the	  city	  often	  had	  toward	  its	  own	  inhabitants,	  the	  
disproportionate	  number	  of	  suicides	  and	  the	  endless	  enmities	  between	  colleagues,	  and	  –	  
despite	  all	  of	  that	  –	  the	  lively,	  fertile	  interpenetration	  of	  the	  arts	  and	  sciences	  locally.	  	  Gradually	  
a	  theory	  developed	  in	  my	  mind	  that	  these	  themes	  –	  of	  selfhood	  and	  self-­‐representation,	  
ugliness	  and	  hatred,	  interdisciplinarity	  and	  innovation	  –	  were	  all	  related,	  and	  that	  while	  such	  
themes	  were	  perhaps	  over-­‐mentioned	  in	  a	  very	  superficial	  way,	  more	  fundamentally	  they	  
remained	  under-­‐discussed.	  	  	  
I	  decided	  that	  we	  needed	  a	  full	  book	  on	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐representation	  in	  
Viennese	  modernity.	  	  The	  novelty	  and	  contribution	  of	  my	  work	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  almost	  no	  
one	  else	  has	  so	  closely	  combined	  philosophy,	  psychology,	  and	  art	  in	  the	  context	  of	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture.	  	  No	  one	  else	  has	  undertaken	  a	  specific	  and	  sustained	  
investigation	  of	  ugliness	  or	  self-­‐portraiture	  in	  Vienna,	  either.	  	  And	  although	  the	  broader	  themes	  
of	  Viennese	  negativity	  and	  narcissism	  are	  mentioned	  often,	  one	  would	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  find	  
books	  on	  these	  topics,	  too.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  these	  are	  strange	  scholarly	  omissions	  in	  light	  of	  the	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Viennese	  obsession	  with	  representing	  identity	  in	  overtly	  repellent	  ways.	  	  In	  all	  other	  respects,	  
however,	  I	  am	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  those	  who	  came	  before	  me.	  
	  
§	  
The	  strategic	  decision	  to	  present	  oneself	  as	  loathed,	  diseased,	  and	  ugly	  began	  to	  dominate	  
Viennese	  visual	  arts	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  But	  these	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  were	  
related	  to	  contemporaneous	  Viennese	  culture	  and	  its	  various	  discourses	  of	  hate.	  	  Hatred	  and	  
ugliness	  were	  inextricably	  intertwined	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  theory	  and	  practice,	  
with	  various	  commentators	  –	  including	  artists,	  journalists,	  scientists,	  and	  art	  historians	  –	  
pointing	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ugliness	  produces	  feelings	  of	  hate	  and	  hate	  affects	  visual	  
perception.	  	  	  
While	  individual	  Viennese	  visual	  artists	  such	  as	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  and	  Egon	  Schiele	  are	  
certainly	  notorious,	  less	  well	  known	  is	  the	  overall	  eruption	  of	  such	  a	  distinct	  practice	  of	  
unpleasant	  self-­‐representation,	  including	  an	  explosion	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐portraiture	  locally.2	  	  Artists	  
and	  academics	  –	  from	  German	  expressionist	  artists	  of	  the	  Blaue	  Reiter	  group	  to	  historians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Thus	  although	  I	  have	  certainly	  considered	  it	  incumbent	  upon	  me,	  in	  this	  project,	  to	  consult	  the	  literature	  on	  self-­‐
portraiture,	  such	  literature	  does	  not	  make	  too	  many	  overt	  appearances	  in	  these	  pages.	  	  This,	  I	  argue,	  is	  the	  
paradox	  of	  the	  Viennese	  obsession	  with	  selfhood,	  self-­‐representation,	  and	  self-­‐portraiture:	  it	  was	  a	  collective	  
cultural	  phenomenon.	  	  Accordingly	  I	  have	  tried	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  to	  keep	  my	  discussion	  specific	  to	  that	  cultural	  
context.	  	  By	  contrast	  literature	  on	  self-­‐portraiture	  often	  tends,	  not	  surprisingly,	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  monographs	  
focused	  on	  a	  specific	  artist	  prolific	  in	  that	  genre.	  	  Obvious	  examples	  include:	  Germain	  Renaissance	  master	  Albrecht	  
Dürer,	  who	  made	  both	  beautiful	  and	  ugly	  self-­‐portraits;	  Rembrandt,	  the	  Dutch	  Baroque	  artist	  who	  created	  an	  
almost	  incredible	  range	  of	  dramatic	  and	  sensitive	  self-­‐representations	  ranging	  from	  the	  tragic	  to	  the	  triumphant;	  
Frida	  Kahlo,	  the	  renowned	  Mexican	  self-­‐portraitist	  whose	  representations	  of	  her	  assorted	  –	  and	  often	  conflicting	  –	  
identities	  were	  staunchly	  personal	  and	  politically	  revolutionary.	  	  Another	  trend	  in	  the	  literature	  has	  been	  to	  
consider	  a	  selection	  of	  self-­‐portrait	  artists	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  certain	  conceptual	  themes;	  thus	  in	  the	  “Sex	  and	  
Genius”	  chapter	  of	  James	  Hall’s	  The	  Self-­‐Portrait:	  A	  Cultural	  History	  (London:	  Thames	  &	  Hudson	  Ltd,	  2014),	  Schiele	  
is	  linked	  conceptually	  to	  themes	  of	  masturbation,	  narcissism,	  and	  ambivalence	  but	  only	  very	  briefly	  –	  	  for	  fewer	  
than	  ten	  sentences.	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Schorske	  and	  William	  M.	  Johnston,	  author	  of	  the	  formative	  text	  The	  Austrian	  Mind:	  An	  
Intellectual	  and	  Social	  History,	  1848–1938	  (1972)	  –	  have	  repeatedly	  demonstrated	  their	  
aversion	  to	  tackling	  the	  topic	  of	  unpleasant	  Viennese	  self-­‐representation	  head	  on.	  	  Instead	  
artists	  and	  their	  idiosyncratic	  approaches	  and	  concerns	  tend	  to	  get	  neglected	  more	  or	  less	  
entirely,	  or	  denigrated	  as	  merely	  prurient,	  or	  dismissed	  as	  narcissistic.	  	  For	  the	  artists	  of	  the	  
Blaue	  Reiter	  group,	  for	  example,	  it	  was	  the	  confessional	  aspect	  of	  modern	  Viennese	  art	  that	  
was	  “repugnant.”3	  	  Blaue	  Reiter	  painter	  August	  Macke	  had	  an	  antipathy	  toward	  Arnold	  
Schönberg’s	  practice	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐portraiture	  and	  referred	  to	  the	  faces	  the	  composer	  painted	  as	  
“‘green-­‐eyed	  waterlogged	  breakfast	  rolls	  with	  an	  astral	  gaze.’”4	  	  Moreover	  Blaue	  Reiter	  leader	  
Wassily	  Kandinsky	  –	  who	  never	  painted	  self-­‐portraits	  and	  painted	  “only	  one	  real	  portrait”	  –	  was	  
also	  irritated	  by	  his	  friend	  Schönberg’s	  “dependence	  on	  the	  human	  face	  as	  the	  conveyor	  of	  
spiritual	  values.”5	  	  In	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  Schorske	  discusses	  neither	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  nor	  Richard	  
Gerstl’s	  art,	  much	  less	  the	  specifics	  of	  their	  representational	  strategies.	  	  And	  Johnston,	  who	  
refers	  to	  Gerstl	  as	  a	  “fauve”	  who	  “committed	  suicide	  after	  painting	  a	  number	  of	  garish	  
canvases,”	  goes	  on	  to	  gloss	  both	  Schiele	  and	  Gerstl	  thus:	  “solipsistic	  and	  prematurely	  old,	  both	  
youths	  made	  of	  every	  canvas	  a	  self-­‐portrait.”	  	  Johnston	  concludes	  that	  their	  “preoccupation	  
with	  sexuality	  reflected	  the	  prevaricating	  morality	  that	  tainted	  the	  Vienna	  of	  Freud.”6	  	  My	  
feeling	  is	  that	  such	  avoidance	  of	  and	  antipathy	  toward	  Viennese	  self-­‐representation	  constitutes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Jane	  Kallir,	  Arnold	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna	  (New	  York:	  Galerie	  St.	  Etienne/Rizzoli,	  1984),	  60–1.	  
4	  Norbert	  Wolf,	  Expressionism	  (Cologne:	  Taschen,	  2004),	  92.	  	  
5	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  60–1.	  
6	  William	  M.	  Johnston,	  The	  Austrian	  Mind:	  An	  Intellectual	  and	  Social	  History,	  1848–1938	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  1972),	  146.	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a	  kind	  of	  negative	  evidence:	  it	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  something	  unpleasant	  here,	  and	  
phenomena	  we	  are	  averse	  to	  must	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  on	  that	  very	  account.	  
	  	  
§	  
As	  these	  phenomena	  –	  preoccupations	  with	  ugliness,	  with	  hatred,	  with	  self-­‐representation,	  not	  
to	  mention	  obsessions	  with	  their	  interpenetration	  –	  were	  widespread,	  so	  too	  have	  I	  included	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  cultural	  objects	  in	  my	  own	  discussion.	  	  And	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  my	  arguments	  
about	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐representation	  take	  in	  an	  entire	  cultural	  milieu	  –	  Viennese	  
modernity	  –	  I	  have	  made	  sure	  to	  look	  at	  lots	  of	  different,	  and	  often	  oppositional,	  facets	  of	  that	  
milieu.	  	  Core	  disciplines,	  discourses,	  and	  areas	  of	  endeavour	  I	  examine	  include:	  both	  broadly	  
Germanic	  and	  specifically	  Viennese	  art	  history	  and	  philosophy,	  competitive	  local	  scenes	  in	  
visual	  arts,	  literature,	  and	  psychoanalysis,	  and	  more	  ephemeral	  Viennese	  cultural	  artefacts	  and	  
processes	  such	  as	  lectures,	  newspapers,	  and	  temporary	  art	  exhibitions	  and	  theatrical	  
productions.	  	  My	  primary	  sources	  include	  private	  art	  such	  as	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  late	  self-­‐portrait	  
drawings	  and	  public	  art	  such	  as	  Gustav	  Klimt’s	  paintings	  for	  the	  interior	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Vienna.	  	  I	  look	  at	  psychological	  and	  philosophical	  texts	  by	  eminent	  thinkers	  who	  are	  well	  known	  
(if	  not	  always	  well	  loved)	  such	  as	  local	  luminary	  Sigmund	  Freud	  or	  his	  German	  predecessor	  
Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  and	  by	  those	  who	  are	  barely	  acknowledged,	  including	  Viennese	  Otto	  
Weininger.	  	  	  
My	  primary	  sources	  are	  also	  interdisciplinary	  because	  my	  training	  and	  methodology	  is	  
itself	  interdisciplinary.	  	  In	  that	  sense	  my	  approach	  also	  deliberately	  complements	  a	  local	  scene	  
that	  was	  self-­‐consciously	  irreverent	  about	  artistic	  and	  scientific	  boundaries.	  	  In	  the	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interdisciplinary	  context	  of	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna,	  fruitful	  dialogue	  developed	  across	  
ostensibly	  discrete	  areas	  of	  endeavour.	  	  This	  model	  of	  dialogue	  –	  albeit	  often	  hostile	  –	  has	  
deeply	  informed	  my	  thinking	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  reject	  hierarchical	  divisions	  between	  disciplines,	  
as	  well	  as	  any	  absolute	  authority	  afforded	  to	  one	  school	  of	  thought.	  	  Indeed	  just	  as	  Kokoschka	  
took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  talk	  back	  to	  Freud	  and	  psychoanalysis,	  so	  too	  have	  I	  –	  an	  interloper	  
originally	  trained	  in	  philosophy	  –	  decided	  to	  enter	  into	  dialogue	  with	  both.	  	  Primary	  texts	  both	  
visual	  and	  written	  are	  not	  so	  much	  permitted	  to	  speak	  to	  one	  another	  as	  they	  are	  
acknowledged	  as	  having	  always	  already	  been	  talking.	  	  Moreover	  throughout	  my	  discussion	  
artists	  and	  other	  thinkers	  are	  treated	  as	  figures	  capable	  of	  both	  reflecting	  and	  critiquing	  
culture.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  my	  methodology	  at	  times	  includes	  treating	  cultural	  artefacts	  as,	  
simultaneously,	  primary	  and	  secondary	  documents.	  	  Thus	  a	  book	  like	  Freud’s	  Jokes	  and	  Their	  
Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious	  (1905)	  is	  read	  both	  as	  a	  “primary”	  text	  containing	  historical	  
information	  about	  the	  alienated	  personal	  and	  political	  contexts	  of	  its	  production	  and	  as	  a	  
“secondary”	  text	  with	  theoretical	  insights	  useful	  to	  aesthetic	  analysis.	  	  Some	  cultural	  
documents	  have	  lasting	  value	  in	  that	  they	  tell	  of	  being	  both	  a	  part	  and	  apart.	  
	  
§	  	  
This	  feeling	  of	  apartness,	  of	  alienation,	  permeates	  my	  entire	  discussion	  as	  it	  permeated	  
Viennese	  modernity.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Vienna	  was	  in	  turmoil.	  	  In	  their	  
seminal	  scholarly	  study	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  (1973),	  Allan	  Janik	  and	  Stephen	  Toulmin	  claim	  
that	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  “Viennese	  aestheticism	  and	  the	  mass	  political	  movements	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emerged	  alongside	  each	  other,	  but	  independently,	  as	  the	  twin	  orphans	  of	  liberalism.”7	  	  But	  
actually	  they	  weren’t	  independent	  at	  all.	  	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin	  themselves	  admit	  that	  Theodor	  
Herzl’s	  founding	  of	  modern	  Zionism	  in	  Vienna	  “involved	  translating	  [Richard]	  Wagner’s	  
Gesamtkunstwerk	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  art	  into	  that	  of	  politics.”	  	  	  They	  claim	  further:	  “the	  origin	  
of	  modern	  Zionism	  was	  yet	  another	  Viennese	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  alienation	  in	  modern	  
mass	  society,	  which	  spread	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  only	  after	  World	  War	  One.”8	  	  
Aesthetic	  and	  political	  issues	  were	  generating	  increasingly	  explosive	  debate	  in	  the	  public	  
sphere;	  and	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  private,	  internal	  states	  of	  subjectivity	  also	  garnered	  
unprecedented	  attention	  –	  especially	  in	  philosophy,	  medicine,	  and	  the	  burgeoning	  
psychoanalytic	  movement.	  	  	  
Thus	  Viennese	  political	  and	  aesthetic	  alienation	  was	  often	  represented	  through	  
strategies	  of	  ugliness	  that	  also	  reflected	  interpersonal	  frustration	  and,	  more	  fundamentally,	  
frustrated	  ego	  ideals.	  	  I	  generally	  follow	  Freud	  in	  thinking	  that	  the	  ego	  is	  essentially	  a	  projection	  
of	  our	  ideas	  about	  the	  surface	  of	  our	  own	  body.	  	  And	  our	  ideas	  about	  our	  bodies	  are	  
themselves	  formed	  in	  part	  by	  how	  we	  perceive	  and	  react	  to	  the	  bodies	  of	  those	  around	  us.	  	  
Thus	  representing	  –	  our	  selves,	  each	  other	  –	  is	  a	  self-­‐constituting	  activity	  fraught	  with	  potential	  
peril.	  	  Whereas	  literature	  on	  Vienna	  tends	  to	  mention	  narcissism	  in	  a	  largely	  passing	  and	  
pejorative	  way,	  I	  will	  be	  attending	  more	  specifically	  to	  representations	  of	  thwarted,	  traumatic	  
narcissism.	  	  Viennese	  doctors	  and	  scientists,	  writers	  and	  journalists,	  artists,	  religious	  leaders,	  
and	  politicians	  all	  used	  hatred	  and	  ugliness	  as	  tropes	  and	  tools	  in	  debates	  about	  the	  alienation	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of	  modern	  man,	  and	  these	  cultural	  conditions	  seem	  to	  have	  affected	  not	  only	  representational	  
strategies	  but	  also	  the	  self-­‐perceptions	  underpinning	  such	  strategies.	  
	  
§	  
Viennese	  self-­‐portraiture	  is	  particularly	  notable	  for	  its	  unique	  and	  often	  ugly	  representation	  of	  
skin.	  	  This	  fixation	  on	  skin	  –	  a	  corporeal	  feature	  that	  is	  both	  intra-­‐	  and	  intersubjective,	  visually	  
and	  haptically	  both	  a	  surface	  and	  a	  boundary	  –	  can	  itself	  be	  related	  to	  the	  accusation	  of	  
narcissism	  so	  frequently	  leveraged	  against	  both	  specific	  Viennese	  figures	  and	  Viennese	  
modernity	  at	  large.	  	  Moreover	  the	  important	  relationship	  between	  skin	  and	  narcissism	  is	  
thoughtfully	  parsed	  in	  Freud’s	  1914	  essay	  “On	  Narcissism.”	  	  In	  that	  essay	  Freud	  talks	  about	  the	  
subject’s	  sense	  of	  unity	  and	  cohesion	  –	  the	  ego	  –	  as	  a	  corporeal	  projection	  that	  develops	  with	  
the	  advent	  of	  primary	  narcissism.	  	  He	  continues	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  and	  in	  the	  1923	  essay	  “The	  
Ego	  and	  the	  Id”	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  ego	  as	  a	  “bodily	  ego.”	  	  These	  ideas	  are	  particularly	  
relevant	  for	  our	  purposes	  because	  they	  help	  us	  understand	  why	  frustrated	  egos	  caught	  in	  
traumatic	  identities	  and	  hateful	  subjective	  dynamics	  might	  create	  ugly	  self-­‐representations.	  	  
When	  Freud	  defines	  the	  ego	  as	  “first	  and	  foremost	  a	  bodily	  ego	  …	  not	  merely	  a	  surface	  entity,	  
but	  …	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  surface,”9	  his	  comments	  seem	  almost	  uncannily	  suited	  to	  analysis	  of	  a	  
Viennese	  culture	  obsessed	  with	  embodied	  identity,	  and	  art	  that	  repeatedly	  represented	  skin	  –	  
the	  surface	  of	  the	  body.	  	  Uncanny,	  that	  is,	  until	  we	  recall	  that	  Freud	  himself	  experienced	  and	  
contributed	  to	  this	  very	  culture.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  The	  Standard	  Edition	  of	  the	  Complete	  Psychological	  Works	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud	  XIX,	  prepared	  under	  
the	  general	  editorship	  of	  James	  Strachey	  (London:	  Hogarth	  Press,	  1960),	  25.	  	  	  
	  	  
10	  
The	  purported	  narcissism	  of	  Freud’s	  Vienna	  has	  been	  a	  source	  of	  protest	  for	  
commentators	  both	  contemporaneously	  and	  today.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  concept	  of	  Viennese	  narcissism	  
often	  gets	  invoked	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  general	  idea	  and	  used	  to	  lump	  together	  and	  dismiss	  what	  are	  
actually	  discrete,	  interesting	  cultural	  phenomena.	  	  Naturally	  scholars	  (and	  others)	  opposed	  to	  
psychoanalysis	  identify	  it	  as	  a	  narcissistic	  cultural	  development	  par	  excellence,	  but	  the	  literature	  
often	  also	  critiques	  Viennese	  narcissism	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  tremendous	  local	  popularity	  of	  
the	  feuilleton.	  	  The	  Viennese	  feuilleton	  was	  an	  ostensibly	  literary	  or	  cultural	  essay	  that	  mutated	  
into	  an	  entirely	  personal	  article.10	  	  Famed	  Viennese	  author	  Stefan	  Zweig	  says	  that	  the	  feuilleton	  
writer	  “‘sought	  to	  endow	  his	  material	  with	  color	  drawn	  from	  his	  imagination.	  	  The	  subjective	  
response	  of	  the	  reporter	  or	  critic	  to	  an	  experience,	  his	  feeling-­‐tone,	  acquired	  clear	  primacy	  over	  
the	  matter	  of	  his	  discourse.	  	  To	  render	  a	  state	  of	  feeling	  became	  the	  mode	  of	  formulating	  a	  
judgment.	  	  Accordingly	  in	  the	  feuilleton’s	  writer’s	  style,	  the	  adjectives	  engulfed	  the	  nouns,	  the	  
personal	  tint	  obliterated	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  object	  of	  discourse.’”11	  	  The	  feuilleton,	  often	  
associated	  with	  the	  decadent	  Jung	  Wien	  [Young	  Vienna]	  group	  of	  writers,	  subsequently	  became	  
a	  symbol	  of	  the	  city’s	  penchant	  for	  pointless	  affectation,	  ornamentation,	  and	  narcissism	  –	  of	  
much	  that	  was	  purportedly	  wrong	  with	  Viennese	  art	  and	  culture.	  
Joseph	  Leo	  Koerner,	  an	  American	  art	  historian	  (with	  Viennese	  ancestry)	  known	  for	  his	  
work	  on	  German	  Renaissance	  self-­‐portraiture,	  has	  things	  to	  say	  about	  narcissism	  in	  Albrecht	  
Dürer’s	  oeuvre	  that	  are	  also	  helpful	  to	  us	  here.	  	  For	  example	  Koerner	  refers	  to	  Dürer’s	  famed,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna,	  45.	  
11	  In	  ibid.,	  45–6.	  
	  	  
11	  
gorgeous	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  1500	  (Fig.	  24)	  as	  “an	  egoistic	  document	  of	  ego,”12	  by	  which	  he	  means	  
both	  “an	  ideal	  ego-­‐document	  ….	  [and]	  also,	  simultaneously,	  the	  document	  of	  an	  ‘ego-­‐ideal.’”13	  	  
Koerner	  describes	  Dürer’s	  narcissistic	  self-­‐image	  thus:	  “in	  it,	  one	  feels	  that	  the	  artist	  offers	  
himself	  to	  himself	  as	  his	  highest	  standard:	  thus	  should	  a	  man	  look,	  the	  beautiful	  likeness	  
testifies,	  and	  thus	  should	  he	  act,	  with	  talent	  and	  discipline,	  making	  things	  as	  perfect	  as	  this.”14	  	  
Koerner	  also	  points	  to	  self-­‐portraiture’s	  association	  with	  narcissism	  when	  he	  reminds	  us	  that	  
the	  concept	  “draws	  from	  the	  ancient	  myth	  the	  conceit	  of	  self-­‐love	  occurring	  accidentally	  by	  way	  
of	  a	  mirrored	  likeness.	  	  The	  ideal-­‐ego	  places	  before	  the	  subject	  a	  picture	  of	  what	  it	  wants	  to	  
be.”15	  	  But	  really	  Koerner’s	  remarks	  are	  relevant	  for	  us	  as	  a	  point	  of	  sharp	  contrast	  and	  
departure	  –	  for	  whereas	  he	  considers	  successful	  narcissistic	  moments	  in	  Dürer’s	  life	  and	  work,	  
we	  will	  mostly	  attend	  to	  the	  opposite:	  traumatic	  identity,	  failed	  narcissism,	  and	  ugly	  rather	  than	  
beautiful	  self-­‐representations.	  	  	  
The	  ugly,	  hateful	  Viennese	  self-­‐representations	  we	  will	  be	  examining	  often	  function	  as	  
unpleasant	  accusations:	  the	  ugly	  self	  railing	  hatefully	  against	  society’s	  imperfections,	  subjects	  
bound	  together	  in	  agonism.	  	  In	  such	  a	  cultural	  context,	  harmonious	  mirroring	  was	  neither	  
attainable	  nor	  desirable.	  	  Instead	  of	  reflecting	  beauty	  back	  to	  society,	  the	  Viennese	  men	  I	  look	  
at	  often	  chose	  instead	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  a	  monstrous	  threat:	  as	  harbingers	  who,	  in	  
inspiring	  fear	  and	  revulsion,	  also	  actually	  served	  as	  educators.	  	  This	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Joseph	  Leo	  Koerner,	  “Self-­‐portraiture	  Direct	  and	  Oblique,”	  in	  Self	  Portrait:	  Renaissance	  to	  Contemporary,	  ed.	  
Joanna	  Woodall	  (London:	  National	  Portrait	  Gallery,	  2005),	  68.	  





historical	  and	  etymological	  understanding	  of	  the	  monster	  as	  an	  ugly,	  fearful	  creature	  who	  
serves	  as	  an	  omen	  to	  the	  body	  politic.	  
In	  “The	  Look	  of	  Self-­‐portraiture,”	  art	  historian	  T.J.	  Clark	  dispenses	  in	  short	  order	  with	  
two	  common	  ideas	  about	  mirroring	  and	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  The	  first	  is	  self-­‐portraiture’s	  
association	  with	  narcissism,	  which	  Clark	  immediately	  dismisses	  as	  nothing	  but	  a	  platitude.	  	  The	  
second	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  as	  a	  reliable	  visual	  representation;	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  a	  
self-­‐portrait,	  Clark	  argues,	  by	  no	  means	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  artist	  “is	  necessarily	  a	  good	  judge	  of	  
what	  he	  looks	  like.”16	  	  We	  shall	  encounter	  very	  few	  realistically	  rendered	  self-­‐images	  in	  these	  
pages	  –	  instead	  we	  will	  see	  the	  meaning	  of	  accurate,	  skilful	  self-­‐representation	  acquire	  a	  
strange	  new	  valence	  in	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  More	  evocative	  of	  the	  self-­‐representational	  styles	  
we	  will	  see	  here	  is	  Clark’s	  passing	  remark	  that	  self-­‐consciousness	  itself	  often	  has	  pejorative	  
overtones,	  for	  example	  its	  association	  with	  “adolescence	  and	  bad	  skin.”17	  	  In	  fact	  adolescent	  
themes	  of	  painful	  self-­‐consciousness	  and	  bad	  skin	  rather	  precisely	  describes	  Viennese	  self-­‐
portraiture.	  	  	  
So	  it	  is	  the	  negative	  narcissism	  of	  alienated	  subjects	  and	  threatened	  egos	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  
here.	  	  In	  Vienna	  ideas	  about	  identity	  and	  selfhood	  were	  crucially	  important,	  but	  also	  constantly	  
contested.	  	  In	  his	  Critique	  of	  Cynical	  Reason	  German	  philosopher	  Peter	  Sloterdijk	  notes	  that	  
“reduced	  to	  a	  formula,	  Freudian	  analysis	  presupposes	  that	  the	  metaphysical	  dogma	  of	  the	  unity	  
of	  the	  person	  in	  its	  ego	  has	  been	  burst	  …	  Freud	  only	  finds	  this	  bursting	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  T.J.	  Clark,	  “The	  Look	  of	  Self-­‐portraiture,”	  in	  Self	  Portrait:	  Renaissance	  to	  Contemporary,	  ed.	  Joanna	  Woodall	  




does	  not	  himself	  bring	  it	  about.	  	  That	  is	  his	  place	  in	  the	  history	  of	  ideas.”18	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  unified	  
self	  is	  no	  longer	  tenable.	  	  And	  yet	  in	  both	  Freudian	  theory	  and	  Viennese	  art	  and	  culture	  the	  
discrete	  particularity	  of	  the	  individual	  is	  asserted	  more	  trenchantly	  –	  and	  perhaps	  tragically	  –	  
than	  ever.	  	  Self-­‐as-­‐ruptured-­‐ego	  becomes	  a	  real	  identity,	  seen	  not	  only	  in	  self-­‐portraits	  and	  




I	  further	  argue	  that	  the	  subjects	  of	  Viennese	  modernity	  somatized	  a	  sense	  of	  traumatic	  psychic	  
identity.	  	  Psychological	  conflicts	  were	  recast	  in	  physical	  terms.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  artists	  and	  
writers	  in	  Vienna	  represented	  hysterically	  –	  hysteria	  being,	  quite	  simply,	  the	  somatization	  of	  
psychic	  distress.	  	  	  
Hysteria	  is	  a	  fascinating	  but	  perilously	  nebulous	  topic,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  its	  enigmatic	  
and	  often	  unruly	  character.	  	  Freud	  changed	  his	  theory	  of	  hysteria	  a	  great	  deal	  over	  the	  years,	  
but	  recognized	  and	  generally	  respected	  the	  intellectual	  precociousness	  of	  the	  hysteric.	  	  One	  of	  
his	  more	  succinct	  statements	  was	  in	  Studies	  on	  Hysteria	  (1895)	  when	  he	  declared,	  referring	  to	  
himself	  and	  co-­‐author	  Breuer:	  “We	  regard	  hysterical	  symptoms	  as	  the	  effects	  and	  residues	  of	  
excitations	  which	  have	  acted	  on	  the	  nervous	  system	  as	  traumas	  …	  Now	  we	  are	  accustomed	  to	  
find	  in	  hysteria	  that	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  this	  ‘sum	  of	  excitation’	  of	  the	  trauma	  is	  transformed	  
into	  purely	  somatic	  symptoms.	  	  It	  is	  this	  characteristic	  of	  hysteria	  that	  has	  so	  long	  stood	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Peter	  Sloterdijk,	  Critique	  of	  Cynical	  Reason	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1987),	  366.	  	  	  
	  	  
14	  
way	  of	  its	  being	  recognized	  as	  a	  psychical	  disorder.”19	  	  Like	  Freud,	  then,	  I	  conceptualize	  hysteria	  
as	  the	  symbolic	  conversion	  of	  excessive,	  traumatic	  stimulation	  from	  the	  level	  of	  psyche	  to	  that	  
of	  soma.	  	  I	  likewise	  follow	  Freud	  and	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  more	  broadly	  in	  conceptualizing	  
trauma	  as	  an	  intense	  and	  excessive	  stimulation	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  unable	  to	  master,	  and	  which	  
therefore	  produces	  a	  wound	  that	  affects	  the	  whole	  psychic	  system.	  	  
Another	  difficulty	  is	  that	  specifically	  male	  hysteria	  is	  almost	  always	  overlooked.	  	  To	  date	  
cultural	  theories	  of	  hysteria	  have	  largely	  been	  explored	  within	  feminist	  literature	  focused	  on	  
women.	  	  While	  some	  authors	  detail	  the	  socio-­‐symbolic	  implications	  of	  hysteria	  as	  a	  cathartic	  
reaction	  against	  an	  oppressive,	  misogynist	  society,20	  others	  emphasize	  the	  future	  value	  of	  
hysteria	  as	  an	  essentially	  subversive	  form	  of	  embodied	  knowing	  and	  a	  foundation	  for	  écriture	  
feminine.21	  
Mark	  S.	  Micale,	  a	  historian	  who	  specializes	  in	  psychiatry,	  psychoanalytic	  studies,	  and	  
histories	  of	  masculinity,	  and	  who	  published	  the	  singular	  Hysterical	  Men:	  The	  Hidden	  History	  of	  
Male	  Nervous	  Illness	  in	  2008,	  accounts	  for	  the	  neglect	  of	  male	  hysteria	  while	  also	  arguing	  that	  
our	  view	  of	  history	  –	  as	  well	  as	  our	  discourse	  –	  needs	  to	  change.	  	  Micale	  notes	  both	  that	  
hysteria	  is	  deeply	  associated	  with	  the	  female	  body	  and	  femininity	  in	  the	  cultural	  imagination,	  
and	  that	  this	  association	  is	  at	  least	  partially	  erroneous.	  	  He	  insists	  that	  on	  the	  contrary	  hysteria	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  II,	  91.	  	  Freud	  would	  later	  shift	  the	  emphasis	  in	  his	  definition	  of	  hysteria	  away	  from	  
trauma	  toward	  so-­‐called	  “seduction.”	  	  But	  the	  core	  definition	  of	  hysteria	  –	  as	  arising	  from	  the	  somatization	  
(conversion)	  of	  excess	  stimulation	  not	  properly	  abreacted	  –	  remained.	  
20	  Dianne	  Hunter,	  “Hysteria,	  Psychoanalysis,	  and	  Feminism:	  The	  Case	  of	  Anna	  O.,”	  in	  Writing	  on	  the	  Body:	  Female	  
Embodiment	  and	  Feminist	  Theory,	  eds	  Katie	  Conboy,	  Nadia	  Medina,	  Sarah	  Stanbury	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  
University	  Press,	  1997),	  257–82.	  
21	  Hélène	  Cixous	  and	  Catherine	  Clément,	  The	  Newly	  Born	  Woman,	  trans.	  Betsy	  Wing	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  
Minnesota	  Press,	  1986).	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has	  a	  long,	  rich	  history	  as	  an	  illness	  besetting	  males,	  too.22	  	  Male	  hysteria	  is	  relevant	  to	  my	  own	  
project	  for	  several	  reasons,	  including	  the	  hysterical	  representational	  strategies	  of	  the	  figures	  
being	  discussed,	  the	  conceptual	  and	  cultural	  connections	  between	  hysteria,	  hatred,	  and	  
ugliness,	  and	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  explicit	  representations	  of	  hysteria	  in	  Viennese	  culture	  and	  
discourse.	  
Indeed	  it	  is	  male	  –	  not	  female	  –	  hysteria	  that	  played	  the	  more	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  
genesis	  of	  psychoanalysis	  in	  late-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Freud’s	  first	  publication	  in	  
psychology,	  his	  first	  two	  public	  presentations	  on	  psychopathology,	  and	  his	  first	  medical	  
translations	  all	  addressed	  male	  hysteria.23	  	  Freud’s	  etiological	  focus	  on	  the	  causes	  –	  rather	  than	  
effects	  or	  symptoms	  –	  of	  hysteria	  had	  very	  important	  consequences	  for	  how	  the	  hysterical	  
subject	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  not	  only	  in	  medical	  discourse	  but	  also	  in	  culture	  at	  large.	  	  
Conventionally	  hysteria	  was	  considered	  highly	  changeable	  and	  unpredictable,	  and	  thus	  elicited	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Juliet	  Mitchell	  frames	  the	  whole	  repressed	  history	  of	  male	  hysteria	  powerfully	  and	  succinctly	  when	  she	  says:	  
“There	  is	  no	  question	  but	  that	  men	  can	  be	  hysterics.	  	  Galen	  affirmed	  this	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  thought	  in	  the	  
first	  century	  AD;	  it	  was	  soon	  rejected.	  	  It	  was	  revived	  deliberately	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  when	  it	  was	  once	  
more	  rejected;	  the	  late	  nineteenth-­‐century	  conviction	  of	  its	  prevalence	  was	  eventually	  not	  disputed.	  	  However,	  the	  
whole	  category	  of	  hysteria	  was	  soon	  set	  to	  disappear	  …	  in	  Western	  accounts	  and	  in	  anthropological	  observations,	  
as	  in	  psychoanalysis,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  treat	  hysteria	  in	  the	  male	  as	  more	  serious	  than	  hysteria	  in	  the	  female	  
so	  that,	  if	  it	  is	  recorded	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  frequently	  labelled	  ‘hysterical	  psychosis.’	  	  More	  usual	  is	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  male	  
hysteria	  is	  rejected,	  and	  then	  other	  categories	  are	  used	  to	  encapsulate	  acute	  hysteria	  and	  its	  male	  sufferers:	  
melancholia	  and	  hypochondria	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century;	  schizophrenia	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century;	  
traumatic	  neurosis	  and	  then	  ‘borderline’	  after	  the	  two	  World	  Wars	  of	  the	  twentieth.”	  	  Juliet	  Mitchell,	  Mad	  Men	  
and	  Medusas:	  Reclaiming	  Hysteria	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2001),	  320–1.	  
23	  Mark	  S.	  Micale,	  Hysterical	  Men:	  The	  Hidden	  History	  of	  Male	  Nervous	  Illness	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  2008),	  242.	  	  Ostensibly	  rejecting	  any	  inherent	  connection	  between	  the	  female	  sex	  and	  hysteria,	  Freud	  
claimed	  that	  the	  word	  “originates	  from	  the	  earliest	  times	  of	  medicine	  and	  is	  a	  precipitate	  of	  the	  prejudice,	  
overcome	  only	  in	  our	  own	  days,	  which	  links	  neuroses	  with	  diseases	  of	  the	  female	  sexual	  apparatus”	  (Freud,	  
Standard	  Edition	  I,	  41).	  	  	  
	  	  
16	  
comparisons	  to	  chameleons	  and	  to	  the	  Greek	  god	  Proteus.24	  	  By	  contrast	  in	  his	  1888	  essay	  
“Hysteria”	  Freud	  asserts	  that	  this	  popular	  understanding	  of	  hysteria,	  as	  characterized	  by	  
“instability	  of	  will,	  changes	  of	  mood,	  increase	  of	  excitability	  with	  a	  diminution	  of	  all	  altruistic	  
feelings,”	  is	  not	  accurate.	  	  Rather,	  he	  notes,	  there	  are	  even	  “severe	  cases	  of	  hysteria	  in	  which	  a	  
psychical	  change	  of	  that	  kind	  is	  entirely	  absent;	  many	  of	  the	  patients	  who	  belong	  to	  this	  class	  
are	  among	  the	  most	  amiable,	  clear-­‐minded	  people,	  with	  the	  strongest	  will,	  who	  feel	  their	  illness	  
distinctly	  as	  something	  foreign	  to	  their	  nature.”25	  	  
	  
§	  
Micale	  notes	  that	  it	  “would	  appear	  that	  women	  and	  hysteria	  are	  found	  synonymously	  
unattractive,	  so	  a	  hysterical	  man	  is	  ‘feminine.’”26	  	  	  Masculinity	  in	  an	  age	  of	  hysteria	  thus	  
becomes	  a	  double	  bind:	  the	  very	  pressure	  to	  be	  masculine	  creates	  the	  kind	  of	  anxiety	  and	  
traumatic	  identity	  that	  can	  itself	  also	  cause	  hysteria.	  	  The	  “hysteric	  becomes	  hysterical	  because	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  intolerable	  around	  that	  threatens	  his	  unique	  existence,	  something	  
that	  prevents	  him	  from	  being	  who	  he	  is.”27	  	  Representing	  failed	  masculinity	  was	  a	  way	  to	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  III,	  262–3.	  
25	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  I,	  49.	  	  A	  noteworthy	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  bit	  of	  gossip	  in	  Freud’s	  Interpretation	  of	  
Dreams.	  	  Freud	  tells	  a	  story	  about	  Theodor	  Meynert	  –	  who	  was	  the	  director	  of	  the	  psychiatric	  clinic	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Vienna,	  Freud’s	  teacher,	  and	  a	  great	  medical	  pioneer	  in	  the	  field	  of	  neuropathology	  –	  that	  reveals	  
Meynert’s	  ambivalence	  about	  himself	  and	  about	  hysteria.	  	  Meynert	  and	  Freud,	  after	  an	  early	  period	  of	  mutual	  
enthusiasm,	  became	  enemies	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  their	  disagreement	  about	  male	  hysteria	  –	  Meynert	  insisted	  it	  
did	  not	  exist.	  	  And	  yet	  apparently	  Meynert’s	  protestations	  had	  been	  merely	  a	  ruse:	  on	  his	  deathbed	  he	  confessed	  
to	  Freud	  that	  he	  himself	  clearly	  suffered	  from	  the	  very	  male	  hysteria	  he	  had	  disavowed	  (Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  V,	  
438).	  
26	  Micale,	  Hysterical	  Men,	  321.	  
27	  Mitchell,	  Mad	  Men	  and	  Medusas,	  46–7.	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articulate	  and	  potentially	  also	  overcome	  a	  hysterical	  sense	  of	  sexual	  and	  subjective	  lack	  in	  a	  
threatening	  environment.	  	  In	  her	  book	  Mad	  Men	  and	  Medusas:	  Reclaiming	  Hysteria	  (2000)	  
Juliet	  Mitchell	  notes	  that	  for	  the	  hysteric,	  hatred	  “is	  an	  emotional	  response	  to	  the	  need	  to	  
survive	  in	  hostile	  conditions.”28	  	  In	  Viennese	  modernity	  the	  threads	  that	  bound	  failed	  
masculinity,	  femininity,	  hysteria,	  and	  hatred	  were	  tangled	  but	  tight.	  
Contemporary	  feminist	  theorist	  Elizabeth	  Grosz	  discusses	  hysteria	  as	  the	  result	  of	  
misogynistic	  representational	  regimes:	  
Hysteria	  can,	  in	  a	  way,	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  response	  to	  this	  absence	  of	  representation,	  especially	  
of	  autonomous	  representations	  of	  women.	  	  In	  much	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature,	  the	  
[Freudian]	  homunculus	  is	  explicitly	  described	  as	  male,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  what	  
this	  means	  for	  women.	  	  Hysteria	  is	  a	  somatisation	  of	  psychical	  conflict,	  an	  acting	  out	  of	  
resistance	  rather	  than	  its	  verbal	  articulation	  or	  conceptual	  representation.	  	  It	  is,	  according	  
to	  Freud,	  a	  largely	  feminine	  neurosis.	  	  This	  may	  help	  explain	  how	  anorexia,	  a	  sub-­‐branch	  
of	  hysteria,	  is	  also	  an	  overwhelmingly	  feminine	  neurosis.	  	  It	  is	  a	  form	  of	  protest	  against	  
and	  resistance	  to	  cultural	  investments	  defining	  what	  the	  ‘proper’	  body	  is	  for	  women.	  	  (It	  is	  
significant	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  ‘proper’	  image	  for	  men.	  	  A	  wide	  variety	  of	  body-­‐images	  
remain	  perfectly	  tolerable).29	  	  
Grosz	  also	  asserts	  that	  “the	  human	  subject	  is	  capable	  of	  suicide,	  of	  anorexia,	  because	  the	  body	  
is	  meaningful,	  has	  significance,	  because	  it	  is	  in	  part	  constituted	  both	  for	  the	  subject	  and	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid.,	  145.	  
29	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	  “Psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  Imaginary	  Body,”	  in	  Feminist	  Subject,	  Multi-­‐Media:	  Cultural	  
Methodologies,	  eds	  Penny	  Florence	  and	  Dee	  Reynolds	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  187,	  
emphasis	  in	  original.	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others	  in	  terms	  of	  meanings	  and	  significances.”30	  	  In	  part	  because	  I	  so	  thoroughly	  agree	  with	  
Grosz	  about	  the	  body’s	  meaningful	  materiality,	  I	  disagree	  with	  her	  other	  claim	  that	  
representational	  politics	  constrain	  women	  only.	  	  	  
For	  me	  the	  hatred	  toward	  one’s	  body	  implied	  by	  and	  involved	  in	  a	  practice	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐
representation,	  for	  example	  (and	  I	  refer	  here	  to	  both	  self-­‐directed	  hatred	  and	  hatred	  from	  
others),	  is	  of	  more	  interest	  than	  pretending	  we	  can	  parse	  out	  the	  precise	  differences	  in	  how	  
men,	  women,	  and	  others	  experience	  such	  hatred.	  	  In	  arguing	  that	  Viennese	  artists	  somatized	  a	  
sense	  of	  traumatic	  psychic	  identity,	  I	  am	  also	  in	  effect	  insisting	  that	  men	  too	  are	  susceptible	  to	  
hysterical	  self-­‐hatred,	  gender	  dissatisfaction	  and	  dysphoria,	  and	  bodily	  dysfunction.	  	  The	  salient	  
issue	  here,	  however,	  will	  not	  be	  the	  gendered	  manifestations	  of	  those	  experiences	  per	  se	  so	  
much	  as	  the	  broader	  representational	  hegemonies	  and	  the	  trauma	  sustained	  and	  somatized	  by	  
those	  who	  are	  excluded	  from,	  or	  demonized	  by,	  the	  dominant	  representational	  regimes.	  	  
Indeed	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  trauma	  and	  ambivalence	  are	  more	  significant	  factors,	  in	  hysterical	  
conversion,	  than	  sex	  and	  gender.	  
	  
§	  	  
Freud	  frequently	  asserted	  that	  neurotics	  mix	  love	  and	  hate,	  and	  hysterics	  are	  perhaps	  especially	  
prone	  to	  such	  oscillations.	  	  Not	  just	  love	  and	  hate	  in	  particular,	  but	  also	  ambivalence	  more	  
generally,	  undergirds	  hysteria	  –	  and	  ambivalence	  will	  likewise	  be	  a	  central	  facet	  of	  our	  
discussion.	  	  Ambivalence,	  far	  from	  being	  the	  general	  state	  of	  apathy	  or	  indecisiveness	  that	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.,	  186.	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often	  mistaken	  for	  in	  colloquial	  conversation,	  in	  fact	  refers	  to	  an	  intense	  internal	  feeling	  of	  
conflict.	  	  “Ambi-­‐”	  means	  two	  ways,	  and	  in	  psychology	  “valence”	  refers	  to	  either	  the	  positive	  or	  
the	  negative	  power	  an	  object	  has	  for	  the	  subject.	  	  Mitchell	  notes	  that	  although	  there	  “is	  always	  
ambivalence	  in	  human	  relationships,”	  nevertheless	  such	  ambivalence	  is	  particularly	  central	  to	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  hysteria.	  	  This	  ambivalence,	  she	  explains	  “crops	  up	  time	  and	  again	  in	  Freud’s	  
letters	  to	  Fliess.	  	  Rather	  than	  think	  through	  the	  ambivalence	  …	  the	  hysteric	  ‘becomes’	  [it].”31	  	  
According	  to	  Mitchell,	  Freud	  himself	  enacted	  the	  specifically	  “negative	  side	  of	  the	  ambivalence	  
that	  hysteria	  has	  towards	  itself	  …	  he	  could	  not	  quite	  leave	  it	  alone	  and	  oscillated	  between	  the	  
ecstasy	  of	  thinking	  he	  had	  understood	  it	  to	  a	  phobic	  avoidance	  of	  it	  as	  something	  elusive,	  
ungraspable,	  contaminating	  and	  dishonest.”32	  	  This	  kind	  of	  ambivalent	  oscillation	  between	  
attraction	  and	  repulsion	  will	  reappear	  again	  and	  again	  here.	  
Hysterical	  ambivalence	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  essentially	  intersubjective	  process	  insofar	  as	  hysteria	  
“always	  engages	  the	  other,	  inducing	  a	  reciprocity	  or	  a	  refusal.”33	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  
hysteria	  is	  compared	  to	  –	  and	  even	  referred	  to	  as	  –	  performance	  art:	  like	  performance	  art,	  
hysteria	  requires	  a	  viewer’s	  participation.	  	  The	  ugly	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  I	  discuss	  
likewise	  both	  arise	  from	  and	  induce	  ambivalence,	  and	  demand	  reciprocity	  or	  refusal.	  	  Indeed	  
ambivalence,	  as	  a	  psychological	  concept,	  is	  extraordinarily	  helpful	  in	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  
violent	  contradictions	  and	  affective	  intensity	  of	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  from	  a	  
philosophical	  perspective,	  make	  an	  observation	  pertinent	  to	  my	  own	  claims	  about	  Viennese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Mitchell,	  Mad	  Men	  and	  Medusas,	  56–7.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  47.	  
33	  Ibid.,	  59.	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ambivalence	  when	  they	  say	  that	  “after	  studying	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Habsburg	  history,	  one	  can	  
hardly	  deny	  the	  charm	  of	  [the]	  Hegelian	  dialectic,	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  historical	  explanation.”	  	  They	  
elaborate:	  “for	  in	  it	  one	  continually	  sees	  situations	  begetting	  their	  own	  opposites,”34	  and	  we	  
will	  see	  that	  kind	  of	  ambivalent	  interplay	  of	  opposites	  in	  Viennese	  tropes	  of	  spirit	  and	  body,	  
beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  Aryan	  and	  Jewish,	  healthy	  and	  sick,	  love	  and	  hate,	  honesty	  and	  dishonesty,	  
and	  male	  and	  female.	  	  
	  
§	  
No	  doubt	  in	  part	  because	  of	  this	  build-­‐up	  of	  traumatic	  stimulation	  and	  affective	  ambivalence,	  
late-­‐nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture	  developed	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  
catharsis.	  	  The	  Viennese	  catharsis	  craze	  was	  also	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  concern	  with	  mythology	  and	  
tragedy.	  	  Not	  only	  psychoanalysis	  but	  also	  other	  Viennese	  arts	  and	  sciences	  drew	  on	  mythology	  
and	  especially	  tragedy	  for	  their	  understandings	  of	  intersubjectivity,	  and	  for	  self-­‐definition	  and	  
representation.	  	  	  
In	  his	  book	  Art’s	  Emotions:	  Ethics,	  Expression	  and	  Aesthetic	  Experience	  (2012)	  Damien	  
Freeman,	  citing	  the	  noted	  American	  analytic	  philosopher	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  suggests	  that	  
catharsis	  “can	  be	  seen	  as	  something	  like	  articulation	  of	  emotion.”	  	  Based	  on	  this	  interpretation	  
Freeman	  then	  proposes	  a	  very	  interesting	  conceptual	  model	  for	  understanding	  tragic	  catharsis:	  
as	  a	  process	  constituted	  by	  “interactions	  resembling	  infection,	  communication	  and	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  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna,	  39.	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articulation.”35	  	  The	  canonical	  definition	  of	  catharsis	  comes	  from	  Aristotle’s	  Poetics,	  a	  “manual	  
for	  writing	  a	  successful	  tragedy”	  written	  around	  335	  BCE.36	  	  Before	  Aristotle	  penned	  his	  Poetics,	  
catharsis	  referred	  to	  medical	  physical	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  discharge	  of	  menstrual	  blood	  from	  
the	  body.	  	  In	  the	  Poetics	  the	  cathartic	  process	  –	  now	  the	  viewer’s	  empathetic	  identification	  with	  
the	  stage	  performer’s	  tragic	  situation	  –	  is	  no	  longer	  exclusively	  medical	  although	  it	  is	  still	  
corporeal.	  	  Moreover	  catharsis	  now	  depends	  on	  a	  psychosomatic	  intertwining.	  	  Purgation	  looms	  
large	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  medical	  understanding,	  while	  intersubjective	  identification	  is	  
foundational	  to	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  tragedy.	  	  In	  turn	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  theory	  
and	  practice	  drew	  on	  contemporaneous	  versions	  of	  these	  notions	  of	  intersubjectivity	  and	  
purgation.	  	  	  
In	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  Epistemology	  and	  Politics	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐
Siècle	  Vienna	  (2002)	  Claude	  Cernuschi	  notes,	  for	  example,	  that	  in	  1904	  Jung	  Wien	  writer	  
Hermann	  Bahr	  dedicated	  an	  aesthetic	  treatise	  to	  Gustav	  Klimt	  –	  Dialog	  vom	  Tragischen	  
[Dialogue	  on	  the	  Tragic]	  –	  that	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  Freud	  and	  Breuer’s	  Studies	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Damien	  Freeman,	  Art’s	  Emotions:	  Ethics,	  Expression	  and	  Aesthetic	  Experience	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  43.	  	  
Nussbaum,	  known	  for	  her	  work	  on	  Aristotle,	  also	  describes	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  philosopher’s	  approach	  to	  catharsis	  
in	  a	  manner	  strongly	  reminiscent	  of	  Anna	  O.’s	  description	  of	  the	  cathartic	  psychoanalytic	  talking	  cure	  as	  “chimney	  
sweeping.”	  	  
36	  Ibid.	  	  The	  Poetics	  is	  also	  an	  extremely	  contested	  text,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  its	  brevity.	  	  Only	  the	  tragedy	  portion	  
has	  survived	  but	  the	  text	  was	  originally	  in	  two	  parts,	  one	  addressing	  tragedy	  and	  one	  comedy.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
despite	  its	  fragmentary	  and	  enigmatic	  nature	  –	  or	  perhaps	  in	  part	  because	  of	  it	  –	  the	  Poetics	  has	  produced	  a	  
voluminous	  secondary	  literature	  that	  debates	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  concepts	  including	  representation,	  fear,	  and	  
catharsis.	  	  These	  same	  concepts	  are	  extraordinarily	  relevant	  to	  our	  investigation	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐




Hysteria.37	  	  Indeed	  Bahr	  used	  the	  idea	  of	  catharsis	  in	  his	  own	  interpretation	  of	  tragic	  drama,	  
contributing	  to	  explicit	  contemporaneous	  links	  between	  Aristotle	  and	  Freud,	  tragic	  catharsis	  
and	  psychoanalytic	  catharsis.	  	  In	  his	  book	  Freud,	  Biologist	  of	  the	  Mind	  (1992),	  Frank	  J.	  Sulloway	  
further	  explains	  that	  in	  Vienna	  the	  development	  of	  cathartic	  clinical	  technique	  was	  intimately	  
related	  to	  a	  burgeoning	  cultural	  interest	  in	  catharsis:	  
The	  evolution	  of	  the	  cathartic	  technique	  appears	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  another	  contemporary	  
development	  …	  Jacob	  Bernays,	  the	  uncle	  of	  Freud’s	  future	  wife,	  had	  long	  been	  concerned	  
with	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  of	  dramatic	  catharsis	  (Bernays	  1875,	  1880).	  	  In	  Vienna,	  as	  
elsewhere,	  this	  whole	  subject	  was	  much	  discussed	  among	  scholars	  and	  in	  the	  salons	  and	  
even	  assumed	  for	  a	  time	  the	  proportions	  of	  a	  craze	  …	  by	  1880	  Bernays’s	  ideas	  had	  
inspired	  some	  seventy	  German-­‐language	  publications	  on	  catharsis,	  a	  number	  that	  more	  
than	  doubled	  by	  1890.	  	  It	  seems	  very	  possible	  that	  an	  intelligent	  girl	  like	  Anna	  O.	  might	  
have	  been	  acquainted	  with	  the	  subject	  and	  unconsciously	  incorporated	  this	  knowledge	  
into	  the	  dramatic	  plot	  of	  her	  illness.	  	  And	  the	  connection	  between	  catharsis	  in	  its	  
theatrical	  and	  medical	  senses	  was	  certainly	  not	  lost	  upon	  Bernays	  and	  others.	  	  It	  is	  not	  
known	  whether	  Breuer	  and	  Freud	  were	  acquainted	  with	  Bernays’s	  ideas	  while	  they	  were	  
developing	  their	  theory	  of	  hysteria.	  	  Still,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  believe	  they	  were	  not;	  
and	  a	  year	  after	  Studies	  on	  Hysteria	  appeared	  in	  print,	  Breuer,	  who	  had	  a	  special	  interest	  
in	  Greek	  drama,	  discussed	  Bernays’s	  views	  in	  a	  letter.38	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Ideas	  about	  catharsis	  were	  so	  diffuse	  in	  Viennese	  modernity	  that	  they	  could	  influence	  even	  
those	  who	  had	  never	  read	  Aristotle,	  Bahr,	  or	  Breuer	  and	  Freud.	  	  And	  very	  often	  what	  was	  at	  
stake	  was	  the	  expression	  of	  traumatic	  identity	  through	  ugly	  self-­‐representation.	  
Regarding	  the	  fascination	  and	  function	  of	  mythology	  within	  psychoanalysis	  in	  Vienna,	  
Cernuschi	  explains	  that	  
Although	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  eventually	  developed	  a	  highly	  intricate	  and	  specialized	  
vocabulary	  of	  its	  own,	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  thinkers	  like	  Freud,	  [Havelock]	  Ellis,	  or	  
Krafft-­‐Ebing	  found	  the	  characterology	  of	  ancient	  myth	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  
disseminating	  meaning	  and	  in	  justifying	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  enterprise,	  especially	  to	  an	  
audience	  already	  well	  versed	  in	  Greek	  culture	  and	  whose	  intellectual	  assumptions	  were	  
already	  preconditioned	  (as	  Freud’s	  probably	  were)	  by	  Nietzsche’s	  ideas.	  	  And	  once	  those	  
assumptions	  were	  in	  place,	  the	  possibility	  of	  projecting	  one’s	  personality	  onto	  mythic	  
characters	  no	  longer	  qualified	  as	  fantasy	  …	  but	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  self-­‐analysis	  sanctified	  and	  
practiced	  by	  the	  “science”	  of	  the	  day.	  	  
Cernuschi’s	  observations	  can	  be	  extended	  far	  beyond	  merely	  psychoanalysis,	  however;	  more	  
broadly	  the	  idea	  of	  art	  as	  a	  conduit	  to	  self-­‐analysis	  permeates	  these	  pages,	  as	  it	  permeated	  
Viennese	  modernity.	  	  And	  because	  in	  Vienna	  such	  self-­‐analysis	  and	  representation	  often	  
produced	  ugly,	  hateful	  imagery,	  Aristotle’s	  model	  of	  catharsis	  –	  as	  the	  viewer’s	  empathetic	  
identification	  with	  a	  staged	  tragic	  situation	  –	  is	  relevant.	  	  While,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  representing	  
hateful,	  ugly	  aspects	  of	  the	  self	  could	  be	  cathartic,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  will	  also	  see	  Viennese	  





In	  the	  next	  eight	  chapters	  we	  will	  examine	  the	  themes	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐
representation	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  related	  contexts	  in	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  The	  themes	  themselves	  
have	  determined	  my	  choice	  of	  objects,	  but	  my	  methodological	  approach	  is	  a	  quite	  deliberate	  
attempt	  to	  combine	  cultural	  history	  with	  art	  theory.	  	  My	  storytelling	  strategy	  is	  straightforward:	  
by	  and	  large	  the	  information	  is	  presented	  chronologically,	  as	  I	  track	  the	  development	  of	  certain	  
manifestations	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐representation	  through	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  
Within	  that	  largely	  chronological	  structure	  I	  also	  cluster	  chapters	  around	  related	  themes,	  such	  
as	  antisemitism	  and	  ambivalent	  Jewishness,	  and	  actual	  relationships	  between	  Viennese	  players.	  	  
Throughout,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  consistently	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐
representation	  in	  the	  larger	  drama	  of	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  	  
In	  chapter	  1,	  I	  foreground	  the	  concept	  of	  ugliness	  itself	  by	  offering	  an	  overview	  of	  its	  
intersection	  with	  Viennese	  art	  and	  the	  Vienna	  School	  of	  Art	  History	  at	  the	  turn	  to	  the	  twentieth	  
century.	  	  In	  chapter	  2,	  this	  general	  consideration	  of	  ugliness	  shifts	  toward	  a	  focus,	  instead,	  on	  
relationships	  between	  hatred,	  self-­‐representation,	  and	  ambivalent	  subjectivity	  in	  one	  
particularly	  Viennese	  work:	  Otto	  Weininger’s	  hugely	  influential	  book	  Sex	  and	  Character	  (1903).	  	  
Weininger’s	  thought	  is	  essential	  to	  any	  psychological	  or	  philosophical	  understanding	  of	  
Viennese	  culture,	  and	  certainly	  to	  any	  cultural	  history	  of	  the	  period;	  yet	  despite	  this	  
foundational	  character,	  Sex	  and	  Character	  is	  routinely	  neglected	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  Such	  neglect	  
stems	  directly	  from	  the	  difficulties	  inherent	  in	  reading	  the	  work:	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
Weininger’s	  theories	  are	  so	  upsettingly	  hateful	  that	  they	  become	  difficult	  to	  read,	  and	  insofar	  
as	  Sex	  and	  Character	  is,	  more	  legitimately,	  just	  a	  difficult	  medico-­‐philosophical	  text.	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Nevertheless	  the	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  predilection	  for	  ugly,	  hateful	  self-­‐
representation	  can	  really	  be	  much	  more	  clearly	  understood	  if	  we	  first	  grapple	  with	  Weininger.	  	  
In	  fact	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  vision	  –	  of	  an	  ambivalent,	  self-­‐hating	  subject	  –	  that	  Weininger	  reveals	  in	  
Sex	  and	  Character	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐portrait.	  	  In	  chapter	  3	  I	  expand	  further	  on	  these	  themes	  of	  
hatred	  and	  ambivalence	  by	  exploring	  their	  specific	  connections	  with	  Jewishness	  in	  virulently	  
antisemitic	  Vienna,	  with	  reference	  to	  how	  such	  ambivalence	  and	  hatred	  affected	  a	  variety	  of	  
local	  representational	  practices,	  for	  example	  in	  politics,	  literature,	  psychoanalysis,	  and	  
caricature.	  	  These	  same	  emotions	  and	  psychological	  dynamics	  will	  also	  be	  relevant	  in	  
subsequent	  chapters.	  	  	  
In	  chapter	  4	  I	  examine	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  avid	  practice	  of	  self-­‐portraiture	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  
feelings	  of	  ugliness	  and	  despair	  and	  his	  1908	  suicide.	  	  Gerstl’s	  fate	  was	  entangled	  with	  that	  of	  
the	  far	  more	  famous	  Viennese	  figure	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Gerstl’s	  friend	  and	  sometime	  enemy.	  	  
In	  chapter	  5	  I	  consider	  Schönberg’s	  ugly	  self-­‐portraits	  and	  portraits	  around	  1910,	  and	  in	  the	  
process	  offer	  some	  biographical	  and	  philosophical	  interventions	  into	  the	  Schönberg	  literature.	  	  
In	  chapter	  6	  I	  examine	  the	  contested	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  Viennese	  
modernity,	  and	  the	  fanatical	  enmities	  created	  along	  both	  local	  fault	  lines	  and	  in	  subsequent	  
scholarship.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  enmities	  are	  performative:	  the	  fostering	  of	  deliberately	  hateful	  
relations	  in	  Vienna	  was	  tied	  up	  with	  attempts	  to	  enact	  new	  definitions	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness.	  	  I	  
furthermore	  investigate	  the	  ways	  that	  subsequent	  scholars	  have	  reinscribed	  –	  somewhat	  
obsessively	  –	  the	  contemporaneous	  discourses	  of	  such	  enemies.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  
the	  perpetuation	  of	  a	  division	  between	  style	  and	  idea	  that	  is	  itself,	  I	  argue,	  somewhat	  spurious.	  	  
Continuing	  with	  this	  notion	  of	  deliberate	  hatefulness,	  in	  chapter	  7	  I	  analyze	  Kokoschka’s	  early	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self-­‐portraiture	  around	  1909–10	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  contemporaneous	  Germanic	  aesthetic	  
theory	  of	  negative	  empathy	  (Einfühlung),	  which	  argues	  that	  hatred	  and	  ugliness	  are	  inextricably	  
intertwined	  in	  aesthetic	  experience.	  	  Finally,	  in	  chapter	  8	  I	  argue	  for	  an	  affirmation	  of	  ugliness	  
via	  the	  kindred	  visions	  of	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  and	  Egon	  Schiele,	  more	  specifically	  Schiele’s	  
creation	  –	  in	  his	  self-­‐portrait	  practice	  from	  1910	  –	  of	  radical	  beauty	  out	  of	  Dionysian	  ugliness.	  
These	  stories	  I	  tell	  matter	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  First,	  because	  I	  suspect	  the	  academic	  
industry	  of	  publishing	  on	  Vienna	  will	  not	  stop	  any	  time	  soon,	  and	  I	  believe	  I	  have	  fresh	  insights	  
to	  offer	  within	  the	  context	  of	  that	  industry.	  	  Second,	  because	  of	  the	  abyssal	  but	  in	  my	  opinion	  
unnecessary	  opposition	  between	  pop	  culture’s	  infatuation	  with	  prettier,	  more	  decorative	  
elements	  of	  late-­‐nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture	  (for	  example	  the	  
2015	  film	  Woman	  in	  Gold	  –	  a	  fictionalized	  family	  saga	  based	  on	  Klimt’s	  famed	  decorative	  
portrait	  of	  Adele	  Bloch-­‐Bauer	  –	  or	  the	  celebrity	  party	  held	  recently	  that	  asked	  attendees	  to	  
dress	  after	  Klimt	  and	  in	  gold)	  and	  academic	  culture’s	  denigration	  of	  this	  culture	  in	  favour	  of	  
more	  austere	  elements	  in	  Vienna.39	  	  I	  contend	  that	  these	  opposing	  camps	  should	  talk	  to,	  and	  
hopefully	  make	  some	  peace	  with,	  each	  other.	  	  And	  finally,	  these	  stories	  matter	  insofar	  as	  I	  do	  
not	  believe	  that	  real	  beauty	  comes	  from	  the	  repression	  of	  what’s	  threatening,	  of	  what	  scares	  or	  
repels	  us.	  	  I	  think	  real	  beauty	  comes	  from	  real	  happiness,	  and	  real	  happiness	  comes	  from	  real	  
acceptance	  –	  of	  ugliness,	  of	  hatred,	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  be	  both	  obsessed	  with	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  The	  recent	  exhibition	  and	  corresponding	  catalogue,	  edited	  by	  Gemma	  Blackshaw,	  Facing	  the	  Modern:	  The	  
Portrait	  in	  Vienna	  1900	  (London:	  National	  Gallery,	  2013)	  managed	  to	  combine	  both	  academic	  and	  popular	  interest	  
in	  the	  topic.	  Moreover	  the	  contributing	  authors	  also	  contest,	  to	  some	  extent,	  this	  opposition	  between	  pretty,	  
refined	  historicism	  and	  austere,	  avant-­‐garde	  modernism	  in	  Vienna.	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divided	  against	  ourselves	  –	  of,	  as	  Freud	  once	  put	  it,	  our	  right	  to	  sometimes	  linger	  at	  
























Viennese	  Art,	  Ugliness,	  and	  the	  Vienna	  School	  of	  Art	  History:	  	  
The	  Vicissitudes	  of	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  
Everything	  depends	  on	  understanding	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  fine	  arts	  is	  not	  …	  beauty.	  
–	  Alois	  Riegl	  
In	  1891	  the	  artistic	  commission	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  submitted	  to	  the	  Ministerium	  für	  
Kultus	  und	  Unterricht	  [Ministry	  of	  Culture,	  Religion,	  and	  Education]	  a	  proposal	  for	  decorating	  
the	  ceiling	  of	  the	  university’s	  great	  hall	  with	  oil	  paintings.	  	  These	  oil	  paintings	  were	  intended	  to	  
represent	  the	  four	  faculties	  of	  Theology,	  Philosophy,	  Medicine,	  and	  Jurisprudence.	  	  The	  
Ministry	  chose	  the	  theme	  of	  “The	  Victory	  of	  Light	  over	  Darkness”	  and	  selected	  artists	  Gustav	  
Klimt	  and	  Franz	  Matsch	  to	  undertake	  it.	  	  Matsch	  was	  to	  paint	  the	  centrepiece,	  representing	  the	  
university,	  as	  well	  as	  theology	  and	  six	  lunettes;	  Klimt	  was	  to	  paint	  philosophy,	  medicine,	  
jurisprudence,	  and	  ten	  lunettes.	  	  The	  project	  had	  been	  fraught	  with	  disagreement	  from	  the	  
first;	  indeed	  Peter	  Vergo	  notes	  that	  both	  “the	  artistic	  commission	  of	  the	  university	  and	  the	  fine	  
arts	  commission	  of	  the	  Ministry”	  asked	  Matsch	  and	  Klimt	  to	  “declare	  themselves	  ready	  ‘within	  
the	  limits	  of	  artistic	  freedom’	  to	  undertake	  such	  alterations	  as	  were	  deemed	  necessary.”	  	  But	  
with	  the	  exhibition	  of	  Klimt’s	  Philosophy	  at	  the	  annual	  Secession	  exhibition	  of	  1900	  the	  
controversy	  achieved	  the	  status	  of	  a	  massive	  public	  scandal.40	  	  This	  scandal	  reverberated	  
throughout	  various	  faculties	  of	  the	  university	  and	  into	  Viennese	  newspapers,	  which	  published	  
written	  protests	  against	  Philosophy	  and	  caricatures	  of	  the	  work	  that	  focused	  on	  its	  ugliness	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  literally	  sickening	  effect	  it	  purportedly	  had	  on	  the	  body	  politic.	  	  The	  art	  critic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Hermann	  Bahr	  documented	  these	  controversies	  in	  his	  Gegen	  Klimt	  [Against	  Klimt]	  (1903),	  
which	  compiled	  the	  voluminous	  negative	  reviews	  to	  which	  Klimt’s	  transgressive	  painting	  gave	  
rise.	  
	   But	  what	  was	  so	  transgressive	  about	  this	  painting?	  	  Now	  destroyed,	  in	  the	  extant	  black-­‐
and-­‐white	  photographs	  of	  the	  canvas	  we	  see	  a	  nebulous,	  almost	  gossamer	  miasma	  whose	  
swirling	  clouds	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  vague	  emergent	  apparition	  of	  a	  monumental	  female	  
figure	  (Fig.	  1).	  	  The	  viewer	  can	  discern	  her	  shadowy	  face	  and	  improbably	  large,	  spherical	  
breasts.	  	  This	  woman	  represents	  the	  world	  itself.	  	  On	  the	  left	  a	  writhing	  column	  of	  human	  
bodies	  floats	  in	  contorted	  poses	  with	  gestures	  of	  despair.	  	  These	  figures	  represent	  the	  human	  
life	  cycle	  in	  the	  most	  pessimistic	  of	  terms	  –	  those	  of	  perpetual	  confusion	  and	  suffering.	  	  	  
	   The	  “light”	  demanded	  by	  the	  commissioned	  theme	  of	  the	  victory	  of	  light	  over	  darkness	  
is	  presented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  human	  personification	  of	  knowledge,	  who	  ironically	  barely	  
appears	  within	  the	  frame,	  hovering	  in	  darkness	  in	  the	  extreme	  lower	  foreground.41	  	  Her	  
youthful	  but	  ethereal	  face	  glows	  dramatically	  –	  as	  though	  spotlit	  from	  below	  –	  and	  suffocatingly	  
thick	  black	  hair	  coils	  threateningly	  around	  her	  head	  like	  a	  serpentine	  halo.	  	  This	  dark	  hair	  also	  
obscures	  the	  woman’s	  mouth	  (an	  important	  organ	  for	  the	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge)	  and	  
lends	  dramatic	  emphasis	  to	  her	  glowing,	  upturned,	  dark-­‐rimmed	  eyes.	  	  Although	  thematically	  
she	  represents	  knowledge,	  visually	  this	  figure	  belongs	  to	  the	  iconography	  of	  the	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  
femme	  fatale,	  the	  dark	  and	  dangerous	  women	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Jan	  Toorop,	  Edvard	  Munch,	  
Alfred	  Kubin,	  and	  others.	  	  Formally	  and	  compositionally	  Klimt’s	  work	  is	  disorienting,	  presenting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  In	  a	  preparatory	  sketch	  a	  different	  young	  female	  figure	  appears	  in	  the	  same	  spot:	  she	  holds	  her	  head	  in	  her	  right	  
hand	  and	  stares	  downward.	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no	  clear	  relationship	  between	  the	  tortured	  human	  beings,	  the	  mysterious	  appearance	  of	  the	  
world,	  and	  the	  forbidding	  image	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
	   Richard	  Muther,	  a	  prominent	  German	  critic	  and	  historian	  of	  art,	  praised	  the	  
philosophical	  insight	  of	  Klimt’s	  painting,	  suggesting	  that	  its	  pessimistic	  vision	  of	  the	  struggle	  
between	  knowledge	  and	  ignorance	  was	  more	  meaningful	  than	  any	  works	  of	  art	  based	  on	  a	  
classical	  ideal.	  	  For	  Muther,	  artists	  who	  recycled	  the	  classical	  style	  contributed	  nothing	  to	  the	  
historical	  development	  of	  art,	  whereas	  Klimt	  was	  forging	  new	  visual	  forms	  that	  developed	  out	  
of	  his	  own	  perceptions	  of	  his	  time	  and	  culture.42	  	  But	  despite	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  Muther	  and	  a	  
few	  others,	  Philosophy	  nonetheless	  “unleashed	  the	  fury	  both	  of	  the	  public	  and	  of	  the	  popular	  
press.”43	  	  Attacks	  focused	  variously	  on	  several	  key	  themes;	  for	  example	  some	  abhorred	  the	  
representation	  of	  philosophy	  as	  such,	  arguing	  that	  there	  was	  no	  “‘profound	  philosophical	  
meaning’”	  behind	  the	  picture.	  	  For	  such	  commentators,	  who	  apparently	  expected	  a	  cogent	  
representation	  of	  the	  western	  philosophical	  tradition,	  Klimt’s	  rather	  esoteric	  vision	  was	  
incoherent,	  presenting	  “‘nothing	  but	  nonsense.’”44	  	  
	   Other	  critics	  focused	  their	  vitriolic	  remarks	  on	  the	  ugliness	  of	  the	  bodies	  represented.	  	  
They	  described	  Philosophy’s	  ugly	  corporeality	  in	  terms	  of	  violations	  of	  the	  canons	  of	  classical	  
beauty,	  and	  as	  Gemma	  Blackshaw	  has	  stressed,	  the	  furor	  around	  the	  depiction	  of	  ugly	  bodies	  in	  
Klimt’s	  university	  paintings	  also	  relied	  on	  antisemitic	  rhetoric.45	  	  In	  Vienna	  –	  a	  city	  renowned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Vergo,	  Art	  in	  Vienna,	  50.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  54.	  
44	  Anonymous	  reviewer	  cited	  in	  Vergo,	  Art	  in	  Vienna,	  55.	  Translation	  by	  the	  author.	  
45	  Gemma	  Blackshaw,	  “The	  Jewish	  Christ:	  Problems	  of	  Self-­‐presentation	  and	  Socio-­‐cultural	  Assimilation	  in	  Richard	  
Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐portraiture,”	  Oxford	  Art	  Journal	  29,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  44.	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around	  the	  world	  for	  its	  medical	  culture	  –	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  vague	  notions	  of	  a	  decadent	  
modernity	  and	  the	  place	  of	  diseased	  bodies	  within	  that	  modernity	  was	  disseminated,	  
increasingly,	  in	  highly	  antisemitic	  but	  pseudo-­‐medical	  terms	  of	  Jewish	  hysteria,	  Jewish	  
weakness	  and	  deformation,	  and	  Jewish	  ugliness.	  	  Bahr’s	  Gegen	  Klimt	  evinces	  the	  ease	  with	  
which	  contemporaneous	  commentators	  consistently	  moved	  from	  commenting	  on	  the	  ugliness	  
of	  modern	  art	  to	  its	  Jewishness,	  from	  the	  ugliness	  of	  a	  hunched	  back	  or	  a	  swollen	  belly	  to	  these	  
physical	  characteristics	  as	  inherently	  Jewish	  –	  rather	  than	  Germanic.	  	  Indeed	  the	  
contemporaneous	  Viennese	  tendency	  to	  regard	  both	  ugly	  bodies	  and	  ugly	  art	  as	  somehow	  
distinctively	  Jewish	  deserves	  significant	  scholarly	  attention.	  	  	  
	   Moreover,	  the	  perceived	  medicalization	  of	  art	  was	  also	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  and	  even	  
disgust	  for	  many.	  	  When	  Klimt	  exhibited	  Medicine	  the	  following	  year,	  in	  1901,	  one	  reviewer	  –	  
commenting	  that	  the	  painting	  “‘surpasses	  in	  strangeness	  and	  monstrosity	  even	  the	  much	  
disputed	  Philosophy’”	  –	  insisted	  that	  Klimt’s	  figures	  were	  suitable	  only	  for	  an	  anatomical	  
museum.46	  	  Another	  reviewer	  satirically	  described	  Medicine	  as	  an	  emetic	  –	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  
induce	  vomiting.47	  	  Throughout	  such	  controversies	  visual	  ugliness,	  and	  especially	  corporeal	  
ugliness,	  became	  the	  dominant	  organizing	  concept	  through	  which	  social	  concerns	  –	  about	  
decadence,	  Jewishness,	  and	  sickness,	  for	  example	  –	  were	  articulated.	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46	  Anonymous	  reviewer	  translated	  in	  Vergo,	  Art	  in	  Vienna,	  58.	  
47	  Anonymous	  reviewer	  in	  Hermann	  Bahr,	  Gegen	  Klimt	  (Vienna:	  J.	  Eisenstein	  and	  Co.,	  1903),	  56.	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Concepts	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  were	  employed	  discursively	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  cultural,	  
philosophical,	  psychological,	  and	  medical	  contexts	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Habsburg	  Empire	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Aesthetic	  terminology	  was	  being	  exploited	  for	  its	  
explanatory	  power	  in	  other,	  ostensibly	  non-­‐aesthetic	  contexts,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  beauty	  –	  
long	  associated	  with	  truth	  and	  the	  classical	  ideal	  –	  was	  losing	  its	  privileged	  status	  in	  art.	  	  The	  
concept	  of	  ugliness	  developed	  a	  new	  significance	  in	  both	  art	  theory	  and	  practice.	  	  Theorists	  of	  
the	  emergent	  “Vienna	  School”	  of	  art	  history,	  including	  Franz	  Wickhoff	  and	  Alois	  Riegl,48	  were	  
rejecting	  the	  scholarly	  traditions	  of	  contemporaries	  like	  renowned	  Swiss	  art	  historian	  Heinrich	  
Wölfflin,	  who	  championed	  classical	  art	  as	  the	  highest	  aesthetic	  good.49	  	  By	  contrast	  the	  Vienna	  
School	  art	  historians	  opposed	  such	  absolute	  aesthetics	  and	  the	  insistence	  that	  a	  specifically	  
classical	  beauty	  was	  the	  goal	  of	  all	  art.50	  	  At	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Wickhoff	  and	  
Riegl	  both	  presented	  radically	  new	  theories	  arguing	  for	  a	  revaluation	  of	  aesthetics,	  a	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  The	  Vienna	  School	  refers	  to	  the	  methods	  of	  art	  historical	  analysis	  developed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  art	  historians	  working	  
at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  from	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  well	  into	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  and	  beyond.	  	  
Although	  Vienna	  School	  forefather	  Rudolf	  Eitelberger	  was	  working	  at	  the	  University	  as	  early	  as	  1852,	  the	  specific	  
concept,	  and	  attendant	  phrase,	  of	  a	  “Vienna	  School”	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  the	  year	  1910.	  	  In	  this	  work	  we	  will	  
mostly	  be	  limited,	  in	  our	  consideration	  of	  Vienna	  School	  scholars,	  to	  Franz	  Wickhoff,	  Alois	  Riegl,	  later	  Max	  Dvořák	  
and	  Otto	  Benesch,	  Ernst	  Gombrich,	  and,	  briefly,	  the	  deplorable	  Nazi	  art	  historian	  Hans	  Sedlmayr.	  
49	  Wölfflin	  (1864–1945),	  a	  pioneering	  art	  historian,	  is	  known	  especially	  for	  his	  formalist	  methodology.	  	  After	  
studying	  philosophy	  with	  Johannes	  Volkelt	  Wölfflin	  developed	  an	  interest	  in	  art	  history	  and	  classicism	  through	  the	  
lectures	  of	  cultural	  historian	  Jakob	  Burckhardt.	  In	  Wölfflin’s	  own	  1886	  dissertation	  he	  invoked	  the	  theory	  of	  
Einfühlung,	  or	  empathy,	  to	  suggest	  that	  asymmetry	  in	  art	  causes	  the	  viewer	  physical	  pain	  (cf.	  Empathy,	  Form	  and	  
Space:	  Problems	  in	  German	  Aesthetics	  1873–1893,	  eds	  Harry	  Francis	  Mallgrave;	  Eleftherios	  Ikonomou	  (Chicago:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994),	  155);	  Wölfflin	  later	  rejected	  (future	  Marxist	  art	  historian)	  Max	  Raphaël’s	  
dissertation	  because	  of	  its	  modern	  subject	  matter.	  Wölfflin’s	  most	  famous	  art	  historical	  texts	  are	  Renaissance	  und	  
Barock	  (1888),	  Klassische	  Kunst	  [Classic	  Art]	  (1898),	  and	  Kunstgeschichtliche	  Grundbegriffe	  [Principles	  of	  Art	  
History]	  (1915).	  
50	  Michael	  Gubser,	  “Time	  and	  History	  in	  Alois	  Riegl’s	  Theory	  of	  Perception,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas	  66,	  no.	  3	  
(July	  2005):	  455.	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hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  so-­‐called	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  and	  art	  appropriate	  for	  the	  
age.	  	  	  
	   Ugliness	  was	  suddenly	  spotlighted	  in	  Viennese	  artistic	  practice	  as	  well.	  Klimt	  was	  the	  
undisputed	  king	  of	  the	  Viennese	  art	  scene,	  having	  inherited	  the	  throne	  from	  the	  revered	  history	  
painter,	  designer,	  and	  decorator	  Hans	  Makart	  whose	  sensual,	  decorative	  sensibility	  had	  defined	  
late-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  tastes	  in	  Vienna.	  	  The	  term	  Makartstil	  [Makart	  Style]	  was	  even	  coined	  
to	  characterize	  that	  artist’s	  pervasive	  cultural	  influence.	  	  After	  three	  years	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  
Vienna	  Secession	  movement,	  Klimt	  enraged	  sectors	  of	  both	  the	  intellectual	  and	  artistic	  
establishment	  and	  the	  general	  public	  with	  the	  purported	  ugliness	  of	  his	  representational	  style.	  	  	  
	   Yet	  shortly	  thereafter	  young	  Viennese	  artists	  eager	  to	  lead	  what	  they	  called	  the	  “new	  
art”	  movement	  began	  to	  develop	  deliberate	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  that	  shaped	  and	  buttressed	  
their	  antagonistic	  artistic	  personae.	  	  Three	  young	  Viennese	  artists	  in	  particular	  –	  Richard	  Gerstl	  
(1883–1908),	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  (1886–1980),	  and	  Egon	  Schiele	  (1890–1918)	  –	  began	  to	  produce	  
ugly	  art	  and	  especially	  ugly	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  Like	  Wickhoff,	  Riegl,	  and	  Klimt,	  these	  artists	  produced	  
work	  that	  challenged	  absolute	  aesthetics’	  teleological	  focus	  on	  beauty.	  	  	  
Implicitly	  rejecting	  the	  classical	  and	  philosophical	  association	  between	  beauty	  and	  truth,	  
the	  Viennese	  avant-­‐garde	  after	  Klimt	  seemed	  to	  connect	  truth	  with	  ugliness,	  believing	  that	  the	  
most	  truthful	  representations	  were	  ones	  that	  showed	  people	  naked,	  diseased,	  angry,	  
deformed,	  and	  in	  pain.	  	  Not	  surprisingly	  these	  representational	  strategies	  created	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  controversy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  Viennese	  culture	  that,	  although	  highly	  artistic,	  was	  also	  
Catholic,	  conservative,	  and	  increasingly	  subject	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  pan-­‐Germanic	  cult	  of	  health	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and	  beauty.51	  	  The	  refined	  prettiness	  of	  Secessionstil	  [Secession	  Style]	  and	  the	  local	  applied	  arts	  
studio,	  the	  Wiener	  Werkstätte	  [Viennese	  Workshop],	  which	  had	  defined	  the	  Viennese	  visual	  
arts,	  came	  increasingly	  under	  censure	  from	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  and	  writers.	  	  Given	  the	  
polemical	  quality	  and	  highly	  ideological	  slant	  of	  aesthetic	  debates	  in	  Vienna	  around	  this	  time,	  
the	  burgeoning	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  of	  ugliness	  deserves	  to	  be	  examined	  further.	  	  This	  chapter	  
introduces	  historical	  Germanic	  theories	  of	  ugliness,	  suggesting	  links	  between	  these	  ideas	  and	  
early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  art,	  art	  history,	  and	  culture,	  and	  analyzing	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  
ugliness	  functioned	  discursively	  as	  a	  trope	  to	  represent	  –	  variously	  –	  Jewishness,	  social	  and	  
biological	  evolution,	  modernity,	  truth,	  and	  sickness.	  
	  
§	  
It	  was	  on	  this	  issue	  of	  ugliness	  that	  eighty-­‐seven	  professors	  of	  the	  university	  alighted	  as	  they	  
formulated	  a	  petition	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  Klimt’s	  Philosophy	  from	  reaching	  its	  intended	  
destination.	  	  According	  to	  historian	  of	  Vienna	  Carl	  Schorske,	  although	  the	  protesting	  professors	  
failed	  to	  identify	  explicitly	  that	  Philosophy’s	  pessimistic	  worldview	  was	  derived	  from	  Arthur	  
Schopenhauer’s	  philosophy,	  via	  Richard	  Wagner’s	  famous	  essay	  on	  Ludwig	  van	  Beethoven	  
(1870),	  they	  nonetheless	  “showed	  in	  their	  initial	  petition	  that	  they	  understood	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Klimt’s	  painting	  of	  Philosophy.”52	  	  	  
	   The	  principal	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  protesting	  professors	  was	  Friedrich	  Jodl,	  an	  
empiricist	  and	  liberal	  professor	  of	  philosophical	  psychology	  and	  ethics	  and	  the	  leading	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  For	  more	  on	  this	  see	  Michael	  Hau,	  The	  Cult	  of	  Health	  and	  Beauty	  in	  Germany:	  A	  Social	  History,	  1890–1930	  
(Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003).	  
52	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  232.	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philosopher	  at	  the	  university	  after	  Ernst	  Mach’s	  departure.53	  	  Jodl	  was	  also	  the	  doctoral	  
supervisor	  of	  a	  young	  man	  named	  Otto	  Weininger	  who,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  text	  published	  in	  1903	  
as	  Geschlecht	  und	  Charakter:	  Eine	  prinzipielle	  Untersuchung	  [Sex	  and	  Character:	  A	  Fundamental	  
Investigation],	  produced	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  but	  egregiously	  antisemitic	  and	  misogynistic	  
documents	  of	  Viennese	  modernism.	  	  Jodl,	  unlike	  his	  young	  student,	  “championed	  women’s	  
emancipation	  and	  civil	  liberties”;	  indeed	  Schorske	  opines	  that	  Jodl	  “represented	  in	  all	  its	  
dimensions	  the	  progressivist	  phase	  of	  liberal	  rationalism	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.”54	  	  In	  order	  
to	  distinguish	  himself	  and	  his	  coterie	  from	  the	  religious	  and	  otherwise	  socially	  conservative	  
opponents	  of	  Klimt’s	  work,	  Jodl	  framed	  their	  objection	  aesthetically	  rather	  than	  politically.	  
Accusing	  Klimt	  of	  presenting	  “‘unclear	  ideas	  through	  unclear	  forms	  (Verschwommene	  Gedanken	  
durch	  verschwommene	  Formen),’”	  they	  suggested	  that	  he	  “had	  produced	  an	  aesthetic	  
failure.”55	  	  The	  ugliness	  of	  Klimt’s	  Philosophy	  was	  characterized	  as	  resulting	  not	  only	  from	  the	  
deviation	  of	  its	  figures	  from	  classical	  ideals,	  but	  also	  from	  nebulous	  renderings	  of	  ambiguous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Ernst	  Mach	  (1838–1916)	  was	  an	  Austrian	  scientist	  and	  philosopher,	  a	  forerunner	  of	  logical	  positivism	  whose	  
theories	  influenced	  figures	  as	  varied	  and	  significant	  as	  the	  Austrian	  writer	  Robert	  Musil,	  Viennese	  philosopher	  
Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  German	  physicist	  Albert	  Einstein,	  and	  contemporary	  American	  behaviourist	  B.F.	  Skinner.	  	  
From	  1895–1901	  Mach	  held	  the	  Chair	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Inductive	  Sciences	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna.	  	  He	  
propounded	  an	  anti-­‐metaphysical	  phenomenalism	  that	  rejected	  the	  concept	  of	  selfhood;	  instead	  Mach	  argued	  
that	  only	  sensations	  really	  exist.	  	  He	  famously	  declared	  “Das	  Ich	  ist	  unrettbar”	  [often	  translated	  as	  “The	  I	  cannot	  be	  
saved”	  or	  “The	  self	  is	  irretrievable”].	  	  This	  single	  sentence	  proved	  to	  be	  tremendously	  influential	  on	  Mach’s	  
younger	  contemporaries	  in	  Vienna,	  as	  John	  T.	  Blackmore	  notes	  in	  his	  Ernst	  Mach:	  His	  Work,	  Life,	  and	  Influence	  
(Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1972).	  	  	  Citing	  Bahr’s	  discussion	  in	  the	  latter’s	  Bilderbuch	  [Picture	  Book],	  
Blackmore	  offers	  the	  following	  translation	  of	  Bahr’s	  commentary:	  “‘Mach’s	  effect,	  especially	  on	  the	  youth,	  was	  
very	  great	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  indeed,	  it	  was	  actually	  based	  only	  on	  a	  single	  sentence.	  	  Mach	  had	  asserted	  that	  Das	  
Ich	  ist	  unrettbare	  [literally,	  “the	  I	  is	  unsavable,”	  i.e.	  “unreal”].	  	  With	  that	  even	  the	  ego	  was	  overthrown	  and	  the	  last	  
of	  the	  idols	  seemed	  to	  be	  smashed,	  the	  last	  refuge	  fallen,	  the	  highest	  freedom	  won,	  the	  work	  of	  annihilation	  
completed.	  	  There	  really	  remained	  nothing	  left.’”	  	  Blackmore,	  Ernst	  Mach,	  155;	  orig.	  citation	  Hermann	  Bahr,	  
Bilderbuch	  (Vienna:	  Wila,	  1921),	  37.	  	  	  
54	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  233.	  
55	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  228–32.	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thoughts.	  In	  an	  interview	  in	  the	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse	  Jodl	  claimed	  that	  they	  protested,	  not	  against	  
nude	  art	  nor	  against	  free	  art,	  but	  against	  ugly	  art.	  	  According	  to	  the	  professor	  if	  the	  Austrian	  
government	  wanted	  to	  support	  the	  odd	  direction	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  art	  it	  should	  put	  these	  
modern	  works	  in	  museums,	  not	  in	  universities.	  	  For	  Jodl	  a	  university	  was	  not	  an	  appropriate	  site	  
for	  such	  new	  art,	  which	  –	  significantly	  –	  he	  strategically	  characterized	  as	  ugly.56	  	  
	   Wickhoff,	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  Vienna	  School	  of	  Art	  History	  who	  specialized	  in	  
Roman	  art,	  objected	  to	  Jodl’s	  characterization	  of	  Klimt’s	  painting	  as	  ugly.	  	  Wickhoff	  
spearheaded	  a	  counterpetition,	  submitted	  to	  the	  Ministry,	  denying	  that	  faculty	  members	  had	  
the	  expertise	  to	  make	  judgments	  on	  aesthetic	  questions	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness.57	  	  Although	  in	  
Rome	  at	  the	  time,	  Wickhoff	  had	  already	  sent	  an	  emphatic	  telegram,	  when	  he	  first	  heard	  of	  the	  
Klimt	  debacle,	  to	  the	  rector	  of	  the	  university	  –	  a	  theologian	  named	  Wilhelm	  Neumann	  –	  
condemning	  the	  protest	  against	  Philosophy	  and	  censuring	  any	  personal	  support	  Neumann	  may	  
have	  lent	  the	  protestors.58	  	  Finally,	  in	  May	  1900	  Wickhoff	  delivered	  a	  lecture	  in	  defence	  of	  
Klimt’s	  painting.59	  	  	  
	   Wickhoff’s	  lecture	  was	  entitled	  “What	  is	  Ugly?”	  [Was	  ist	  hässlich],	  and	  newspapers	  
condemned	  it	  in	  shockingly	  antisemitic	  terms.	  	  The	  Deutsches	  Volksblatt	  in	  particular	  referred	  
to	  Wickhoff’s	  argument	  as	  “yet	  another	  example	  of	  Jewish	  impudence”	  –	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Neue	  Freie	  Press	  article,	  containing	  the	  text	  of	  the	  petition,	  reproduced	  in	  Bahr,	  Gegen	  Klimt,	  22–4.	  
57	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  234.	  
58	  Bahr,	  Gegen	  Klimt,	  27.	  
59	  Wickhoff’s	  lecture	  is	  unfortunately	  not	  included	  in	  his	  collected	  works;	  nonetheless,	  Bahr’s	  Gegen	  Klimt	  
reproduces	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  lecture	  that	  appeared	  in	  a	  Viennese	  daily	  newspaper	  (the	  Wiener	  
Fremdenblatt	  of	  May	  15,	  1900),	  31–4.	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Wickhoff	  was	  a	  Gentile,	  not	  Jewish.60	  	  The	  insistent	  discursive	  conflation	  of	  modern	  art,	  
ugliness,	  and	  Jewishness	  saturated	  Germanic	  culture	  and	  particularly	  Vienna	  in	  the	  early	  
twentieth	  century;	  decades	  later	  during	  the	  Nazi	  period	  such	  rhetoric	  was	  used	  in	  indescribably	  
nefarious	  ways,	  and	  art	  other	  than	  classically	  inflected	  kitsch	  was	  quelled.61	  
	   Refuting	  the	  idea	  that	  art	  can	  be	  judged	  according	  to	  its	  beauty	  or	  ugliness,	  Wickhoff’s	  
lecture	  also	  attests	  to	  an	  obsession	  with	  ugliness	  in	  contemporaneous	  Viennese	  discourse.	  	  In	  
his	  lecture	  Wickhoff	  suggests	  that	  human	  beings	  were	  reacting	  to	  perceived	  beauty	  or	  ugliness	  
long	  before	  they	  had	  invented	  the	  terms	  “beautiful”	  or	  “ugly.”	  	  Historically,	  he	  claims,	  humans	  
had	  rejected	  as	  ugly	  anything	  that	  they	  believed	  could	  be	  injurious	  to	  their	  own	  livelihood	  or	  to	  
the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  species.	  	  Ugliness	  was	  thus	  a	  matter	  of	  life	  and	  death,	  and	  according	  to	  
Wickhoff	  this	  ancient	  association	  remained	  influential,	  if	  latent.	  	  Judgments	  regarding	  beauty	  
and	  ugliness	  that	  had	  originated	  in	  reproductive	  drives	  came	  to	  determine	  aesthetic	  values	  as	  
well,	  and	  classical	  artists	  began	  to	  produce	  images	  of	  beauty	  that	  were	  themselves	  based	  
originally	  on	  sexual	  preferences.	  	  In	  Wickhoff’s	  analysis,	  the	  model	  of	  beauty	  passed	  down	  from	  
classical	  art	  became	  so	  hegemonic	  that	  anything	  other	  than	  classicized	  art	  was	  deemed	  ugly.	  	  	  
	   But	  both	  art	  and	  humankind	  have	  evolved	  beyond	  brute	  biological	  urges	  and	  according	  
to	  the	  art	  historian	  while	  it	  was	  now	  anachronistic	  to	  demand	  that	  art	  follow	  the	  models	  of	  
antiquity,	  the	  general	  public	  still	  rejected	  styles	  it	  could	  not	  yet	  understand.	  	  Wickhoff	  claimed	  
more	  specifically	  that	  people	  feared	  that	  which	  they	  could	  not	  comprehend,	  and	  found	  that	  
which	  they	  feared	  ugly.	  	  Now	  while	  artists	  looked	  ever	  forward,	  the	  public	  still	  looked	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Deutsches	  Volksblatt	  article	  reproduced	  in	  Bahr,	  Gegen	  Klimt,	  36.	  	  
61	  For	  more	  on	  the	  connections	  between	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture	  and	  Nazism	  see,	  for	  example,	  
Brigitte	  Hamann,	  Hitler's	  Vienna:	  A	  Dictator’s	  Apprenticeship	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999).	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past.	  	  By	  contrast,	  Wickhoff	  himself	  celebrated	  Klimt’s	  vision	  of	  philosophy,	  even	  going	  so	  far	  as	  
to	  describe	  its	  figure	  of	  knowledge	  as	  consoling.	  	  
	   The	  Vienna	  School’s	  defence	  of	  ugliness	  was	  not	  monolithic,	  however;	  only	  three	  years	  
later	  Wickhoff’s	  colleague	  Alois	  Riegl,	  in	  his	  essay	  “The	  Modern	  Cult	  of	  Monuments,”	  
characterized	  the	  relationship	  between	  modern	  taste	  and	  ugliness	  somewhat	  differently	  than	  
Wickhoff	  had	  in	  his	  lecture	  on	  the	  ugly.	  	  Riegl	  claimed	  that	  only	  “new	  and	  whole	  things	  tend	  to	  
be	  considered	  beautiful”	  whereas	  “the	  old,	  fragmentary,	  and	  faded	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  ugly.”62	  	  
He	  furthermore	  emphasized	  that	  the	  spectators	  of	  modern	  art	  find	  wholeness	  pleasing	  and	  
incompleteness	  displeasing;	  according	  to	  him,	  in	  “the	  new,	  signs	  of	  decay	  irritate	  rather	  than	  
lend	  atmosphere.”63	  	  Wickhoff	  and	  Riegl’s	  assessments	  of	  ugliness	  were	  not	  incompatible,	  but	  
whereas	  Wickhoff	  chose	  to	  emphasize	  the	  public’s	  tendency	  to	  valorize	  classical	  art	  Riegl	  
instead	  focused	  on	  the	  modern	  desire	  for	  increasingly	  new,	  perfect,	  and	  whole	  objects.	  	  Both	  
art	  historians,	  however,	  were	  deliberately	  opposing	  prejudices	  regarding	  ugliness	  that	  they	  
encountered	  within	  the	  realms	  of	  art	  theory	  and	  practice,	  and	  in	  the	  general	  public.	  	  Wickhoff’s	  
and	  Riegl’s	  different	  theories	  of	  ugliness	  notwithstanding,	  each	  scholar	  helped	  open	  up	  new	  
ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  ugly	  and	  its	  place	  in	  modern	  life.	  	  Later	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historians	  
such	  as	  Otto	  Benesch	  and	  Max	  Dvořák	  would	  build	  on	  Wickhoff’s	  and	  Riegl’s	  
reconceptualization	  of	  ugliness	  as	  a	  strategy	  rather	  than	  merely	  an	  aesthetic	  failure,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Alois	  Riegl,	  “The	  Modern	  Cult	  of	  Monuments:	  Its	  Character	  and	  Its	  Origin,”	  trans.	  Kurt	  W.	  Foster	  and	  Diane	  
Ghirardo,	  Oppositions	  25	  (Fall	  1982):	  32.	  	  Originally	  published	  as	  Der	  moderne	  Denkmalkultus:	  Sein	  Wesen	  und	  
seine	  Entstehung	  (Vienna:	  W.	  Braumuller,	  1903).	  
63	  Riegl,	  “Modern	  Cult,”	  42.	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characterize	  anti-­‐classicism	  as	  an	  artistic	  response	  to	  eras	  of	  cultural	  chaos,	  and	  connect	  the	  
purported	  ugliness	  of	  modern	  art	  to	  psychological	  and	  spiritual	  truth.	   	  
	  
§	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  what	  aesthetic	  traditions	  did	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historians	  and	  
contemporaneous	  Viennese	  artists	  build	  their	  defence	  of	  the	  ugly?	  	  In	  his	  recent	  text	  On	  
Ugliness,	  Umberto	  Eco	  noted	  that	  there	  has	  historically	  been	  very	  little	  scholarly	  discussion	  of	  
the	  ugly;	  rather	  it	  has	  been	  “relegated	  to	  passing	  mention	  in	  marginal	  works.”64	  	  Routinely	  
glossed	  as	  simply	  the	  obverse	  of	  beauty,	  the	  antithesis	  of	  the	  classical	  ideal,	  or	  a	  symbol	  of	  
moral	  failure	  or	  evil,	  philosophical	  and	  art	  historical	  analyses	  of	  ugliness	  have	  often	  been	  
notably	  brief	  and	  unperceptive.	  	  Moreover	  this	  aporia	  has	  itself	  not	  been	  much	  remarked	  upon.	  	  
So	  ugliness	  has	  been	  doubly	  discounted.	  	  	  
In	  modern	  Germanic	  philosophy,	  more	  mainstream	  discussion	  of	  ugliness	  began	  perhaps	  
with	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  comments	  on	  the	  beautiful	  versus	  the	  ugly	  and	  art	  versus	  nature	  in	  The	  
Critique	  of	  Judgment	  (1790).	  	  But	  philosopher	  and	  art	  critic	  Gotthold	  Ephraim	  Lessing’s	  earlier	  
text	  Laocoön:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Limits	  of	  Painting	  and	  Poetry	  (1766)	  had	  already	  made	  
contributions	  to	  theories	  of	  ugliness	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  unpleasant	  features	  of	  the	  classical	  
sculpture	  Laocoön	  and	  his	  Sons.65	  	  Lessing	  was	  also	  friends	  with	  German	  Jewish	  philosopher	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Umberto	  Eco,	  On	  Ugliness,	  trans.	  Alastair	  McEwen	  (New	  York:	  Rizzoli,	  2007),	  8.	  
65	  For	  more	  on	  Lessing	  and	  ugliness	  see,	  amongst	  others,	  Gretchen	  E.	  Henderson’s	  recent	  text	  Ugliness:	  A	  Cultural	  
History	  (London:	  Reaktion	  Books,	  2015).	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Moses	  Mendelssohn,	  who	  likewise	  contributed	  to	  burgeoning	  contemporaneous	  theories	  of	  
ugliness	  with	  his	  idea	  that	  ugliness	  in	  art	  and	  nature	  promotes	  progressive	  thought.66	  	  	  
In	  The	  Critique	  of	  Judgment	  Kant	  made	  important	  observations	  regarding	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  ugly	  object	  in	  nature	  and	  in	  art;	  he	  noted	  that	  what	  is	  ugly	  in	  nature	  we	  may	  find	  
beautiful	  in	  art,	  for	  example	  “the	  Furies,	  diseases,	  the	  devastations	  of	  war.”	  	  Indeed	  for	  Kant	  it	  
is	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  art	  can	  present	  what	  is	  naturally	  ugly	  as	  though	  it	  were	  beautiful	  that	  
makes	  art	  superior	  to	  nature.67	  	  The	  philosopher	  stipulated	  that	  there	  is	  “only	  one	  kind	  of	  
ugliness	  which	  cannot	  be	  represented	  in	  accordance	  with	  nature,	  without	  destroying	  all	  
aesthetical	  satisfaction	  and	  consequently	  artificial	  beauty”	  –	  the	  type	  of	  ugliness	  that	  “excites	  
disgust.”68	  	  Two	  significant	  ideas	  emerge	  from	  Kant’s	  view	  of	  ugliness,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  that	  
ugliness	  should	  be	  grand	  rather	  than	  gross,	  regal	  rather	  than	  repellent.	  	  The	  other,	  even	  more	  
important	  notion	  is	  that	  the	  determining	  factor	  in	  assessing	  whether	  a	  work	  of	  art	  is	  beautiful	  
or	  ugly,	  pleasing	  or	  disgusting	  is	  spectatorial	  reaction.	  
	   The	  sensation	  of	  disgust	  may	  commonly	  be	  held	  –	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	  –	  to	  spoil	  aesthetic	  
experience	  for	  the	  viewer	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  	  But	  either	  way,	  such	  spectatorial	  disgust	  can	  
evidently	  become	  a	  source	  of	  pleasure	  for	  a	  prickly	  artist	  making	  the	  work.	  	  In	  his	  
autobiography	  Kokoschka	  recounts	  with	  apparent	  relish	  how	  disgusted	  the	  Viennese	  art-­‐going	  
public	  was	  by	  his	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  (Fig.	  2).	  	  He	  claims	  boastfully	  that	  he	  found	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  For	  more	  on	  Mendelssohn	  and	  his	  relationship	  to	  ugliness	  –	  including	  consideration	  of	  his	  own	  personal	  ugliness	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  beauty	  –	  see	  Leah	  Hochman,	  The	  Ugliness	  of	  Moses	  Mendelssohn:	  Aesthetics,	  Religion,	  and	  Morality	  in	  
the	  Eighteenth	  Century	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2014).	  
67	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  The	  Critique	  of	  Judgment,	  trans.	  J.H.	  Bernard	  (New	  York:	  Prometheus	  Books,	  2000),	  §48,	  194–5.	  
68	  “Artificial	  beauty”	  is	  Kant’s	  name	  for	  the	  beauty	  of	  art,	  as	  contradistinguished	  from	  “natural	  beauty.”	  §48,	  195,	  
emphasis	  in	  original.	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chocolates	  and	  garbage,	  deposited	  by	  offended	  viewers,	  in	  the	  sculpture’s	  open	  mouth	  every	  
day	  it	  was	  on	  display	  at	  the	  1909	  Kunstschau.69	  	  Notably	  less	  pleasing	  in	  its	  visual	  strategies	  than	  
even	  Klimt’s	  Philosophy	  or	  Medicine,	  Kokoschka’s	  self-­‐portrait	  bust	  is	  an	  amorphous,	  lumpy	  
mass	  with	  inconsistent,	  anti-­‐naturalistic	  colouring	  and	  an	  asymmetrical	  facial	  structure	  that	  
suggests	  decomposition.	  	  Features	  seem	  to	  slide	  on	  nebulous,	  clotted	  surfaces	  of	  bone,	  tendon,	  
and	  skin,	  and	  the	  facial	  expression	  itself	  is	  at	  once	  distorted	  and	  slack,	  giving	  an	  impression	  of	  
physical	  trauma	  and	  subsequent	  death	  and	  decay.	  	  Archduke	  Franz	  Ferdinand,	  who	  vociferously	  
opposed	  modern	  art,	  was	  purportedly	  so	  repelled	  by	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  that	  upon	  seeing	  it	  he	  
proclaimed	  that	  Kokoschka’s	  bones	  should	  be	  broken.70	  	  	  
Kant’s	  observation	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  ugliness	  provoke	  spectatorial	  distaste	  as	  well	  as	  
Kokoschka’s	  ability	  to	  inspire	  antagonism	  with	  his	  art	  are	  both	  rooted	  in	  a	  recognition	  of	  
negative	  identification	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  intersubjective	  aesthetic	  experience.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  
aesthetic	  experience	  as	  reciprocal	  evokes	  the	  theory	  of	  Einfühlung,	  or	  empathy,	  which	  we	  will	  
examine	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  7.	  	  Einfühlung	  theory	  holds	  that	  aesthetic	  apprehension	  involves	  
projecting	  ourselves	  into	  –	  identifying	  with	  –	  what	  we	  see.	  	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  find	  
beautiful	  what	  we	  love	  or	  what	  makes	  us	  feel	  free,	  and	  find	  ugly	  what	  we	  hate	  or	  what	  we	  
resist.	  	  The	  former	  reaction	  is	  called	  Einfühlung,	  the	  latter,	  negativen	  Einfühlung	  [negative	  
empathy].	  	  This	  notion	  of	  Einfühlung	  constituted	  the	  dominant	  explanatory	  theory	  in	  
nineteenth-­‐century	  Germanic	  aesthetics.	  	  The	  wildly	  popular	  1908	  text	  Abstraction	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  trans.	  David	  Britt	  (New	  York:	  MacMillan,	  1974),	  21.	  
70	  Edith	  Hoffmann,	  Kokoschka:	  Life	  and	  Work	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1947),	  86,	  and	  Claude	  Cernuschi,	  
Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  Epistemology	  and	  Politics	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  (London:	  Associated	  
University	  Presses,	  2002),	  26.	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Empathy:	  A	  Contribution	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Style,71	  written	  by	  a	  then-­‐unknown	  doctoral	  
student	  named	  Wilhelm	  Worringer,	  contains	  what	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  famous	  description	  of	  
Einfühlung.	  	  Nevertheless	  this	  book	  and	  its	  wide	  dissemination	  ultimately	  sounded	  the	  death	  
knell	  for	  Einfühlung	  as	  a	  universal	  aesthetic	  theory.	  	  But	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  psychological	  
dynamics	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  negative	  empathy	  addressed	  were	  still	  very	  much	  at	  work	  in	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Austrian	  artists’	  self-­‐distortions,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  intense	  reactions	  of	  
disavowal	  that	  these	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  provoked	  in	  some	  viewers.72	  	  	  
Indeed	  Kant’s	  idea	  that	  disgust	  destroys	  aesthetic	  satisfaction	  is	  interesting	  to	  us	  
precisely	  insofar	  as	  the	  affect	  of	  disgust	  seems	  actually	  to	  have	  quite	  compelled	  the	  Viennese.	  	  I	  
refer	  here	  to	  a	  range	  of	  cultural	  figures	  and	  activities,	  including	  contemporaneous	  critics	  with	  
their	  pseudo-­‐medical	  comments	  about	  degenerate	  artists	  and	  repulsive	  art	  as	  well	  as	  young	  
artists	  who	  represented	  themselves	  with	  distorted	  grimaces,	  snarls,	  and	  abject	  laughter.	  	  
Schiele’s	  Self-­‐Portrait	  Grimacing	  (1910,	  Fig.	  3)	  is	  an	  unsettling	  example.	  	  In	  this	  intimately	  
abrasive	  self-­‐representation	  Schiele’s	  gaping	  red	  mouth	  opens	  wide	  to	  reveal	  one	  impossibly	  
long	  tooth	  and	  a	  few	  tiny	  snaggleteeth.	  	  The	  image	  itself	  poses	  questions	  about	  disgust,	  and	  
about	  aesthetic	  satisfaction:	  the	  artist	  pictures	  himself	  making	  an	  expression	  of	  disgust	  that	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  intended	  to	  create	  the	  same	  effect	  in	  the	  viewer.	  	  Regardless,	  Kant’s	  
advisories	  against	  aesthetic	  disgust	  and	  displeasure	  are	  clearly	  being	  roundly	  flouted.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Abstraktion	  und	  Einfühlung:	  Ein	  Beitrag	  zur	  Stilpsychologie.	  
72	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Schiele	  was	  given	  a	  copy	  of	  Worringer’s	  text,	  which	  was	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  Riegl,	  by	  
his	  patron	  Arthur	  Roessler.	  	  See	  Kimberly	  A.	  Smith,	  “Real	  Style:	  Riegl	  and	  Early	  20th-­‐Century	  European	  Art,”	  




Kant’s	  initial	  probing	  into	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  ugliness	  was	  continued	  by	  G.W.F.	  Hegel	  in	  his	  
Aesthetics	  (1835).	  	  Hegel’s	  aesthetic	  system	  holds	  many	  fascinations,	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  is	  
its	  ambivalent	  attitude	  toward	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  as	  well	  as	  classical	  and	  non-­‐classical	  art.	  	  
While	  both	  Kant	  and	  Hegel	  represent	  a	  philosophical	  tradition	  of	  German	  idealism,	  there	  is	  a	  
complexity	  to	  Hegel’s	  idealism	  that	  stems	  in	  part	  from	  his	  conflicted	  attraction	  to	  realism	  and	  
recognition	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  ugliness.	  	  Hegel’s	  entire	  philosophical	  system	  is	  meant	  to	  
function	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  Absolute	  Spirit	  –	  not	  the	  acceptance	  of	  corporeal	  
ugliness.	  	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  unlike	  Kant,	  who	  was	  concerned	  largely	  with	  transhistorical	  
categories	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  in	  nature,	  Hegel	  was	  quite	  concerned	  with	  art	  objects	  as	  
concrete	  expressions	  of	  historical	  subjectivities.	  	  Thus	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  Hegel	  commends	  the	  
Flemish	  school	  of	  painting,	  which	  was	  notoriously	  unpopular	  at	  the	  time,	  for	  its	  realism	  and	  
truthfulness;73	  yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  Hegel	  also	  claims	  critically	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  physical	  
details	  represented	  in	  art	  –	  such	  as	  “indentations,	  wrinkles,	  pores,	  small	  hairs,	  little	  veins,	  etc.”	  
–	  to	  meaningfully	  evoke	  the	  inner	  character,	  or	  soul,	  of	  a	  subject.74	  	  Hegel	  also	  connects	  
ugliness	  to	  evil	  and	  hate,	  and	  contrasts	  these	  with	  classical	  art,	  whose	  “religion	  of	  beauty	  does	  
not	  satisfy	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  spirit.”75	  	  This	  is	  because	  classical	  art	  understands	  nothing	  of	  
opposition.	  	  Because	  for	  Hegel	  subjectivity	  is	  achieved	  in	  part	  through	  the	  reconciliation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  See,	  for	  example,	  G.W.F.	  Hegel,	  Hegel’s	  Aesthetics:	  Lectures	  on	  Fine	  Art,	  trans.	  T.M.	  Knox	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1975),	  158,	  174,	  882–7.	  	  
74	  Ibid.,	  146.	  
75	  Ibid.,	  436.	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oppositions	  –	  including	  dark	  oppositions	  within	  the	  divided	  self	  –	  he	  is	  ambivalent	  about	  the	  
place	  of	  “the	  ugly,	  the	  hateful,	  the	  repulsive”	  in	  art.76	  
	   The	  physical	  details	  that	  Hegel	  condemned	  as	  ugly	  and	  extraneous	  to	  the	  ideal	  in	  art	  are	  
precisely	  the	  corporeal	  qualities	  that	  later	  became	  central	  to	  the	  iconography	  of	  artists	  
including	  Gerstl,	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Schiele.	  	  We	  see	  the	  detailing	  of	  ugliness,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  
lumpy,	  putrid	  vegetality	  of	  Gerstl’s	  facial	  skin	  and	  hair	  in	  his	  late	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  (1908,	  
Fig.	  4).	  	  And	  we	  see	  such	  ugly	  details	  in	  many	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  works	  around	  this	  time:	  not	  only	  in	  
the	  distorted	  indentations	  in	  the	  skin	  of	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  (1909)	  but	  also	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  
painted	  portrait	  of	  Der	  Sturm77	  editor	  Herwarth	  Walden	  (1910,	  Fig.	  5),	  with	  its	  conspicuous	  
venation	  and	  use	  of	  the	  artist’s	  own	  thumbprints,	  and	  in	  his	  double	  portrait	  of	  Vienna	  School	  
art	  historians	  Hans	  Conrat	  and	  Erica	  Tietze-­‐Conrat	  (1909;	  Fig.	  6).78	  	  The	  electrified	  leg	  hair	  in	  
Schiele’s	  Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Grimacing	  (1910;	  Fig.	  7),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  charred	  arm	  and	  bandaged	  
finger	  found	  in	  Schiele’s	  representation	  of	  a	  gynaecologist	  (Portrait	  of	  Dr.	  Erwin	  von	  Graff,	  1910,	  
Fig.	  8)	  likewise	  foreground	  the	  ugly	  particularities	  of	  corporeality	  that	  Hegel	  eschewed.	  	  These	  
physical	  details	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  idealized	  out	  of	  art	  and	  philosophy;	  to	  foreground	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Ibid.	  
77	  Der	  Sturm,	  a	  magazine	  covering	  avant-­‐garde	  and	  especially	  expressionist	  art,	  was	  founded	  by	  Walden	  in	  Berlin	  in	  
1910	  and	  ran	  at	  various	  rates	  of	  frequency	  until	  1932.	  
78	  Catherine	  Soussloff	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  double	  portrait	  shows	  the	  direct	  influence	  of	  Riegl’s	  theories	  on	  
intersubjectivity	  and	  attentiveness	  in	  Dutch	  Baroque	  portraiture.	  According	  to	  Soussloff,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  
intersubjective	  reciprocity	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  double	  portrait	  –	  both	  between	  husband	  and	  wife	  and,	  more	  
importantly,	  between	  sitters	  and	  viewer	  –	  that	  attests	  to	  Riegl’s	  influence	  not	  merely	  on	  his	  own	  student,	  art	  
historian	  Hans	  Tietze,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  young	  artist	  Kokoschka.	  See	  Soussloff,	  “Portraiture	  and	  Assimilation	  in	  
Vienna:	  The	  Case	  of	  Hans	  Tietze	  and	  Erica	  Tietze-­‐Conrat,”	  in	  Diasporas	  and	  Exiles:	  Varieties	  of	  Jewish	  Identity,	  ed.	  
Howard	  Wettstein	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2002),	  141–5,	  and,	  more	  recently,	  her	  The	  Subject	  in	  
Art:	  Portraiture	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  chapters	  2	  and	  3.	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emphasize	  them	  the	  way	  that	  Gerstl,	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Schiele	  did	  was	  usually	  interpreted	  (and	  
often	  intended)	  as	  a	  major	  aesthetic	  affront.	  	  	  
	   But	  for	  Hegel	  insofar	  as	  the	  purpose	  of	  painting	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  classic	  sculpture	  –	  was	  
to	  reveal	  “living	  subjective	  character”	  rather	  than	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  ideal,	  it	  could	  not	  “entirely	  
dispense	  with	  the	  ugly.”79	  	  An	  increased	  concern	  with	  subjectivity	  necessitated	  a	  likewise-­‐
increased	  tolerance	  of	  ugliness.	  	  Hegel	  also	  suggested	  more	  specifically	  that	  Flemish	  and	  
German	  art	  was	  intrinsically	  attuned	  to	  pain	  and	  “the	  ugliness	  of	  the	  world	  generally.”80	  	  This	  
racialist	  conception	  of	  discrete	  classical	  and	  anti-­‐classical	  artistic	  drives	  became	  increasingly	  
influential,	  and	  by	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  uniquely	  “northern”	  artistic	  
sensibility	  –	  one	  that	  originated	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  grapple	  with	  pain,	  ugliness,	  and	  fear	  and	  was	  
expressed	  through	  so-­‐called	  “gothic”	  style	  –	  had	  virtually	  become	  dogma.	  	  	  
The	  increasing	  interest	  in	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  ugly	  in	  Germanic	  culture	  also	  culminated	  in	  
the	  first	  philosophy	  text	  focused	  entirely	  on	  ugliness.	  	  In	  Aesthetics	  of	  Ugliness	  (1853)	  Karl	  
Rosencranz,	  a	  student	  of	  Hegel’s,	  presented	  a	  view	  of	  the	  ugly	  as	  highly	  protean	  and	  defined	  by	  
negativity	  –	  a	  deformed	  Doppelgänger	  of	  positive	  values	  like	  the	  sublime,	  “‘the	  agreeable,’”	  and	  
“‘absolute	  beauty.’”	  	  According	  to	  Rosencranz	  the	  ugly	  “‘transforms	  the	  sublime	  into	  the	  
vulgar’”	  and	  “‘absolute	  beauty	  into	  caricature.’”	  	  Thus	  for	  Rosencranz,	  caricature	  is	  “‘the	  acme	  
of	  formal	  ugliness	  but	  precisely	  because,	  thanks	  to	  its	  reflection	  determined	  by	  the	  positive	  
image	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  distortion,	  it	  slips	  over	  into	  comedy.’”81	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Hegel,	  Aesthetics,	  864.	  
80	  Ibid.,	  884.	  
81	  In	  Eco,	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  154.	  	  	  
	  	  
46	  
In	  Hegel’s	  view	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  subjectivity	  was,	  increasingly,	  the	  essential	  
characteristic	  of	  painting;	  modernization	  became	  associated	  with	  not	  just	  the	  more	  significant	  
presence	  of	  ugliness,	  but	  also	  the	  more	  significant	  need	  for	  it	  –	  not	  unlike	  in	  Worringer	  later.	  	  
Worringer,	  a	  German	  art	  historian	  who	  finished	  his	  PhD	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Bern	  in	  1907,	  
argued	  for	  a	  vision	  of	  human	  artistry	  suspended	  between	  empathetic	  naturalism	  (which	  for	  him	  
defined	  classicism)	  and	  abstraction.	  	  According	  to	  Worringer	  abstraction	  best	  expressed	  the	  
alienation	  of	  humanity	  and	  was	  an	  increasingly	  important	  expression	  of	  the	  modern	  spirit.	  	  
Abstraction	  and	  Empathy	  was	  Worringer’s	  dissertation-­‐turned-­‐trade-­‐edition;	  he	  subsequently	  
became	  a	  major	  theorist	  of	  expressionism	  as	  the	  visual	  articulation	  of	  spiritual	  necessity.	  
	  
§	  
While	  the	  art	  historians	  of	  the	  Vienna	  School	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  unified	  front	  when	  it	  came	  to	  
theories	  of	  ugliness,	  they	  did	  represent	  an	  important	  new	  phase	  in	  the	  burgeoning	  Germanic	  
interest	  in	  ugliness.	  	  The	  Vienna	  School’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  classical	  imperative	  –	  indeed	  of	  all	  
universalizing	  aesthetic	  categories	  –	  was	  certainly	  revolutionary,	  and	  led	  to	  further	  
reassessments	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness.	  	  Moreover	  the	  psycho-­‐philosophical	  
orientation	  of	  the	  Vienna	  School	  complemented	  extant	  philosophical	  approaches	  to	  ugliness,	  as	  
well	  as	  reflecting	  the	  local	  Viennese	  tendency	  to	  psychologize	  everything.	  	  Riegl’s	  views	  on	  
ugliness	  changed	  over	  time;	  nonetheless	  in	  Late	  Roman	  Art	  Industry	  (1901)	  he	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  
declare:	  “everything	  depends	  on	  understanding	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  fine	  arts	  is	  not	  completely	  
exhausted	  with	  what	  we	  call	  beauty	  …	  the	  Kunstwollen	  may	  also	  be	  directed	  toward	  other	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forms	  of	  objects.”82	  	  The	  concept	  of	  Kunstwollen	  [literally	  “artistic	  will”]	  is	  translated	  variably,	  
and	  is	  cryptic	  enough	  that	  even	  Riegl	  scholars	  have	  not	  reached	  a	  firm	  consensus	  about	  its	  
proper	  translation	  and	  exact	  meaning.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Kunstwollen	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  artistic	  
“desire,”	  “need,”	  or	  “drive,”	  and	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  historically	  specific	  artistic	  will	  that	  
engenders	  the	  development	  of	  a	  particular	  visual	  style	  or	  form	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  and	  time.	  	  
Whereas	  previous	  theorists	  had	  looked	  to	  the	  beauty	  of	  classical	  art	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  good	  
society,	  Riegl’s	  concept	  of	  a	  historically	  specific	  artistic	  will,	  or	  Kunstwollen,	  implied	  that	  all	  
periods	  and	  types	  of	  art	  were	  worth	  studying.	  	  Schorske	  observes	  that	  Riegl	  and	  Wickhoff	  were	  
“developing	  a	  new	  view	  of	  art	  history	  peculiarly	  suitable	  to	  creating	  understanding	  for	  
innovation	  in	  art”83;	  accordingly,	  their	  approaches	  to	  the	  question	  of	  aesthetic	  ugliness	  differed	  
from	  those	  of	  both	  their	  philosophical	  ancestors	  and	  their	  classically	  oriented	  art	  historical	  
peers.	  	  
	   At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  debacle	  over	  Klimt’s	  university	  paintings	  art	  history	  had	  only	  recently	  
grown	  out	  of	  philosophy	  and	  established	  itself	  as	  an	  independent	  academic	  discipline.84	  	  And	  as	  
Mitchell	  Schwarzer	  has	  noted,	  attempts	  by	  Heinrich	  Wölfflin,	  art	  theorist	  Konrad	  Fiedler,	  and	  
sculptor	  and	  theorist	  Adolf	  Hildebrand	  to	  sever	  discussions	  of	  art	  from	  a	  tradition	  of	  German	  
idealist	  aesthetic	  philosophy	  produced	  “largely	  ahistorical	  visual	  categories”	  85	  that	  were	  clearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Alois	  Riegl,	  Introduction	  to	  Late	  Roman	  Art	  Industry,	  ed.	  and	  trans.	  Rolf	  Winkes	  (Rome:	  Giorgio	  Bretschneider	  
Editore,	  1985),	  11.	  
83	  Schorske,	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  234.	  
84	  Moshe	  Barasch,	  Theories	  of	  Art,	  2:	  From	  Winckelmann	  to	  Baudelaire	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  
148.	  
85	  Mitchell	  Schwarzer,	  “Cosmopolitan	  Difference	  in	  Max	  Dvořák’s	  Art	  Historiography,”	  The	  Art	  Bulletin	  74,	  no.	  4	  
(December	  1992):	  673.	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unsatisfying	  for	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historians.	  	  Great	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  identify	  Riegl’s	  
influences	  in	  particular:	  whereas	  Ernst	  Gombrich,	  Wolfgang	  Kemp,	  Michael	  Podro,	  Michael	  Ann	  
Holly,	  and	  Margaret	  Iversen	  have	  all	  charted	  affinities	  between	  Hegelian	  thought	  and	  Riegl’s	  art	  
history,86	  Moshe	  Barasch	  and	  Michael	  Gubser	  have	  both	  noted	  the	  anti-­‐Hegelian	  mood	  in	  
Vienna	  around	  1900.87	  	  Similarly,	  Diana	  Graham	  Reynolds	  has	  contested	  the	  idea	  that	  Hegel	  was	  
a	  major	  source,	  documenting	  Schopenhauer’s	  and	  Nietzsche’s	  influence	  on	  Riegl	  instead.88	  	  
Nietzsche’s	  own	  attitude	  toward	  the	  ugly	  is	  notably	  inconsistent:	  at	  times	  he	  condemns	  the	  ugly	  
as	  a	  symptom	  of	  decadence	  and	  decline,	  and	  at	  other	  times	  he	  exalts	  ugliness	  under	  the	  banner	  
of	  what	  he	  calls	  Dionysian	  man,	  for	  whom	  “what	  is	  evil,	  absurd,	  and	  ugly	  seems	  …	  permissible,	  
owing	  to	  an	  excess	  of	  procreating,	  fertilizing	  energies.”89	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  trying	  
to	  secure	  which	  historical	  and	  philosophical	  traditions	  influenced	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Vienna	  
School	  at	  this	  time,	  what	  remains	  significant	  is	  that	  in	  their	  turn	  from	  classicism	  they	  negotiated	  
between	  tradition	  and	  innovation,	  combining	  emergent	  psychological	  and	  philosophical	  
interest	  in	  ugliness	  with	  rigorous	  formal	  and	  historical	  analyses	  of	  works	  of	  art.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  See	  Gombrich’s	  “In	  Search	  of	  Cultural	  History,”	  in	  Ideals	  and	  Idols:	  Essays	  on	  Values	  in	  History	  and	  in	  Art	  (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1979);	  Kemp’s	  introduction	  to	  The	  Group	  Portraiture	  of	  Holland,	  trans	  Evelyn	  M.	  Kain	  and	  
David	  Britt	  (Los	  Angeles:	  Getty	  Research	  Center	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Art	  and	  the	  Humanities,	  1999);	  Podro’s	  Critical	  
Historians	  of	  Art	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1982);	  Holly’s	  Panofksy	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Art	  History	  
(Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1984)	  and	  “Spirits	  and	  Ghosts	  in	  the	  Historiography	  of	  Art,”	  in	  The	  Subjects	  of	  Art	  
History:	  Historical	  Objects	  in	  Contemporary	  Perspectives,	  eds	  Mark	  A.	  Cheetham,	  Michael	  Ann	  Holly,	  and	  Keith	  
Moxey	  (Cambridge,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  52–71;	  and	  Iversen’s	  Alois	  Riegl:	  Art	  History	  and	  
Theory	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1993).	  
87	  Barasch,	  Theories	  of	  Art,	  152,	  and	  Gubser,	  “Time	  and	  History,	  453.	  
88	  Diana	  Graham	  Reynolds,	  “Alois	  Riegl	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Art	  History:	  Intellectual	  Traditions	  and	  Austrian	  Identity	  
in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna”	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  California,	  1997).	  	  	  
89	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  trans.	  Walter	  Kaufmann	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1974),	  §370,	  “What	  is	  
romanticism.”	  	  All	  citations	  for	  Nietzsche’s	  texts	  refer	  to	  sections,	  rather	  than	  page	  numbers,	  in	  accordance	  with	  





It	  is	  well	  understood	  that	  the	  formal	  terms	  Wickhoff	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  perceived	  quality	  of	  
ugliness	  in	  modern	  art	  –	  he	  referred	  to	  blurriness,	  indistinct	  shapes,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  clear	  lines	  –	  
align	  more	  with	  Impressionism	  than	  any	  other	  modern	  style.90	  	  And	  although	  Wickhoff	  was	  
clearly	  engaging	  with	  contemporary	  art	  in	  his	  defence	  of	  Klimt,	  he	  is	  most	  known	  as	  a	  historian	  
of	  Roman	  and	  early	  Christian	  art.	  	  But	  later	  Vienna	  school	  art	  historians	  directly	  aligned	  their	  
discussions	  of	  ugliness	  with	  contemporaneous	  local	  art.	  	  Notable	  examples	  include	  Egon	  
Schiele’s	  staunch	  supporter	  Otto	  Benesch,	  renowned	  for	  his	  work	  on	  Rembrandt	  and	  position	  
as	  director	  of	  the	  famed	  Albertina	  museum	  in	  Vienna	  (1947–62),	  and	  Wickhoff’s	  Vienna	  School	  
successor	  Max	  Dvořák,	  whose	  enthusiasm	  for	  expressionism	  is	  well	  documented.	  	  Whereas	  
Riegl	  and	  Wickhoff	  had	  defended	  the	  presence	  of	  ugliness	  in	  art	  with	  “arguments	  of	  historicism	  
and	  scientific	  neutrality,”91	  Benesch	  and	  Dvořák	  championed	  the	  ugly	  details	  of	  
contemporaneous	  Austrian	  expressionist	  art	  in	  a	  more	  personal,	  even	  subjectivist,	  manner.	  	  The	  
rise	  of	  ugliness	  in	  Viennese	  art	  and	  theory	  no	  doubt	  had	  many	  causes,	  including	  increasing	  anti-­‐
classicism,	  what	  Riegl	  scholar	  Margaret	  Iversen	  has	  called	  an	  “aesthetic	  of	  disintegration”	  at	  the	  
Vienna	  School,	  and	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  alienation	  in	  Viennese	  culture	  and	  polemical	  public	  
debate.	  	  And	  more	  and	  more	  ugliness	  was	  understood	  to	  represent	  something	  significant	  about	  
the	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  society.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Barasch,	  Theories	  of	  Art,	  148.	  
91	  Reynolds,	  “Alois	  Riegl	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Art	  History,”	  22.	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   Benesch	  commented	  consistently	  on	  ugliness	  and	  perceived	  ugliness	  in	  Schiele’s	  work,	  
and	  faithfully	  supported	  the	  young	  artist	  over	  the	  years.	  	  In	  1915,	  when	  Benesch	  himself	  was	  
only	  eighteen,	  he	  wrote	  a	  foreword	  for	  the	  catalogue	  published	  to	  accompany	  a	  Schiele	  
exhibition	  at	  the	  Galerie	  Arnot.92	  	  Focusing	  specifically	  on	  the	  ugliness	  of	  Schiele’s	  expressionist	  
turn,	  Benesch	  delineated	  Schiele’s	  clear	  development	  from	  what	  he	  called	  “a	  proficient	  Klimt	  
imitator”	  into	  an	  artist	  whose	  initially	  “sensuously	  pleasing	  colours”	  now	  “pass	  away	  into	  
insensuous	  pallor.”93	  	  Likening	  Schiele’s	  artistic	  breakthrough	  to	  spirit	  breaking	  through	  its	  own	  
skin,	  Benesch	  represented	  Schiele	  as	  a	  child	  born	  to	  a	  new	  era	  to	  create	  pictures	  of	  and	  for	  that	  
era.	  	  	  
Benesch	  also	  claimed	  that	  Schiele	  had	  an	  extraordinary	  gift	  for	  anatomical	  accuracy.	  	  
This	  gift	  allowed	  him	  to	  articulate,	  visually,	  insights	  about	  often-­‐overlooked	  details	  –	  in	  
particular	  the	  details	  of	  the	  insignificant,	  the	  unattractive,	  and	  the	  psychological.	  	  Therefore	  
Benesch	  stressed	  that	  although	  a	  layperson	  might	  not	  recognize	  it,	  the	  distortions	  that	  Schiele	  
imposed	  on	  the	  human	  body	  in	  fact	  revealed	  the	  “highest	  correctness	  and	  truth.”94	  	  Admittedly	  
somewhat	  cryptic,	  Benesch’s	  rhetoric	  seems	  to	  characterize	  the	  value	  of	  Schiele’s	  strategies	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Schiele	  was	  acquainted	  with	  Otto	  Benesch	  through	  the	  patronage	  of	  Otto’s	  father	  Heinrich,	  and	  used	  him	  as	  a	  
model	  for	  several	  of	  his	  works.	  	  The	  first	  was	  a	  double	  portrait	  of	  Heinrich	  and	  Otto,	  Father	  and	  Son	  (1913,	  Fig.	  9).	  	  
Frenetic	  geometrics	  animate	  the	  painting;	  the	  father	  blocks	  the	  son	  with	  his	  left	  arm	  while	  the	  son’s	  hands	  are	  
clasped	  rigidly	  in	  front	  of	  his	  groin	  area.	  	  The	  next	  year	  Schiele	  used	  Otto	  for	  a	  series	  of	  drawings	  beginning	  with	  
Young	  Man	  in	  Purple	  Robe	  with	  Clasped	  Hands	  (Fig.	  10).	  	  The	  mournful	  Male	  Figure	  Bending	  Forward	  (Otto	  
Benesch)	  (Fig.	  11)	  looks	  like	  Schiele	  himself,	  grieving	  or	  perhaps	  poised	  in	  monastic	  concentration.	  
93	  “Eines	  tüchtigen	  Klimt-­‐Epigonen	  …	  sinnlich	  erfreuenden	  Farben	  …	  sie	  zu	  unsinnlicher	  Fahlheit	  erstarben,”	  Otto	  
Benesch,	  “Vorwort”	  [Foreword],	  in	  Christian	  M.	  Nebehay,	  ed.,	  Egon	  Schiele:	  1890–1918:	  Leben,	  Briefe,	  Gedichte	  
(Salzburg:	  Residenz,	  1979),	  317.	  	  My	  translation.	  
94	  “Höchste	  Richtigkeit	  und	  Wahrheit,”	  Benesch	  in	  Nebehay,	  ed.,	  Egon	  Schiele,	  318.	  	  My	  translation.	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ugliness	  in	  almost	  heuristic	  terms,	  emphasizing	  how	  strategic	  ugliness	  can	  truthfully	  illuminate	  
cultural	  and	  psychological	  problems.	  
	   Dvořák	  made	  comparable	  assessments	  in	  his	  foreword	  for	  Kokoschka’s	  collection	  
Variationen	  über	  ein	  Thema	  [Variations	  on	  a	  Theme]	  (1921).	  	  Variationen	  consists	  of	  
photographs	  Kokoschka	  took	  of	  a	  selection	  of	  drawings	  he	  had	  made	  the	  previous	  year	  
depicting	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historian	  Karl	  Maria	  Swoboda’s	  wife	  Kamilla	  listening	  to	  music.	  	  
Dvořák	  began	  his	  foreword	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  Monet	  and	  Impressionism,	  and	  suggested	  that	  
art	  became	  soulless	  when	  it	  aimed	  at	  achieving	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  a	  camera	  without	  attending	  to	  
the	  real	  fountainhead	  of	  art,	  the	  spirit.95	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  art	  that	  treated	  the	  psychological	  as	  a	  
mere	  accessory	  to	  the	  physical,	  wrote	  Dvořák,	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  works	  the	  physical	  was	  now	  being	  
used	  to	  represent	  the	  spiritual.96	  	  Indeed	  Kokoschka’s	  works	  ostensibly	  heralded	  the	  approach	  
of	  a	  state	  that	  Dvořák	  described	  as	  “the	  future	  realm	  of	  the	  new	  German	  idealism.”97	  	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Dvořák	  in	  Reinhold	  Graf	  Bethusy-­‐Huc,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka:	  Das	  Konzert:	  Variationen	  über	  ein	  Thema	  (Salzburg:	  
Galerie	  Welz,	  1988),	  29.	  
96	  Ibid.,	  32.	  	  The	  original	  passage	  reads:	  “Es	  ist	  das	  geistig	  transitorische	  und	  fluktuierende,	  dem	  Kokoschka	  darin	  
mit	  fieberhafter	  Spannung	  nachgeht,	  wie	  einst	  die	  Künstler	  der	  Florentiner	  Renaissance	  in	  Reihenfolgen	  von	  
Kōrperstudien	  die	  Gesetze	  der	  physischen	  Bewegung	  zu	  ergründen	  sich	  bemühten.	  	  Bei	  ihnen	  war	  das	  psychische	  
nur	  akzessorisch,	  eine	  Erläuterung	  für	  den	  unkundigen	  Beschauer,	  in	  Kokoschkas	  Geistesstudien	  ist	  dagegen	  das	  
körperliche	  nur	  eine	  Spiegelung	  des	  geistigen	  und	  deshalb	  ein	  unselbständiger	  und	  variabler	  Ausdruck	  des	  auf	  der	  
geistigen	  Bewegung	  bestehenden	  und	  einzig	  entscheidenden	  Lebenstromes.”	  	  N.B.:	  In	  German	  “geistig”	  can	  mean	  
spiritual,	  mental,	  and/or	  intellectual,	  while	  “psychische”	  can	  mean	  psychological,	  mental,	  and/or	  emotional.	  	  
Additionally	  the	  meanings	  of	  “seelisch,”	  from	  the	  German	  “Seele”	  for	  soul,	  include	  those	  of	  both	  “geistig”	  and	  
“psychische,”	  and	  can	  even	  include	  psychic	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  telepathic.	  	  These	  irresolvable	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  
German	  language,	  which	  often	  consternate	  non-­‐native	  speakers,	  are	  actually	  valuable	  insights	  in	  and	  of	  
themselves.	  
97	  “Das	  Zukunftsreich	  des	  neuen	  deutschen	  Idealismus,”	  ibid.	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Benesch’s	  review	  of	  this	  foreword,	  written	  three	  years	  later,	  he	  referred	  to	  Kokoschka	  and	  
Dvořák	  as	  “deeply	  related	  spirits.”98	  	  
	   More	  than	  three	  decades	  after	  his	  Galerie	  Arnot	  catalogue	  essay,	  Benesch	  was	  still	  
writing	  about	  Schiele.	  	  He	  was	  by	  then	  in	  a	  position	  to	  assess,	  with	  hindsight,	  important	  shifts	  in	  
the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  ugliness	  since	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Klimt	  scandal,	  when	  Wickhoff	  had	  
defended	  not	  only	  the	  painting	  of	  philosophy	  itself,	  but	  also	  the	  purportedly	  ugly	  style	  of	  
modern	  art	  in	  general.	  	  In	  his	  1950	  essay	  “Egon	  Schiele	  as	  a	  Draughtsman”	  Benesch	  pronounced	  
that	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  aesthetic	  “was	  more	  important	  for	  its	  outcome	  than	  for	  its	  own	  
achievements.	  	  This	  outcome	  was	  Expressionism.”	  	  Identifying	  Kokoschka	  and	  Schiele	  as	  the	  
heirs	  of	  this	  legacy,	  Benesch	  stressed	  that	  what	  “distinguished	  the	  two	  young	  artists	  from	  the	  
aesthetic	  culture	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  they	  grew	  up”	  was	  “the	  spiritual	  and	  therewith	  also	  the	  
artistic	  importance	  of	  the	  acrid	  and	  the	  ugly”	  in	  their	  works.99	  	  In	  remarkably	  similar	  terms	  to	  
those	  used	  in	  his	  1915	  catalogue	  foreword,	  Benesch	  again	  noted	  that	  the	  “intensified,	  
exaggerated	  nature”	  and	  “withered	  surfaces”	  of	  Schiele’s	  forms	  were	  nonetheless	  
“anatomically	  and	  biologically	  correct.”100	  	  For	  Benesch	  “that	  bony,	  spiny,	  ugly	  and	  rather	  
repellent	  world	  of	  forms	  …	  intermingled	  …	  with	  its	  graceful	  aspect”	  constituted	  the	  essence	  of	  
early	  expressionism.101	  	  Ugliness	  was	  therefore	  redeemed	  not	  only	  by	  this	  “graceful	  aspect”	  but	  
also	  by	  its	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  a	  new	  art.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Otto	  Benesch,	  Collected	  Writings,	  vol.	  4,	  ed.	  Eva	  Benesch	  (New	  York:	  Phaidon,	  1973),	  177.	  
99	  Ibid.,	  189.	  
100	  Ibid.,	  192.	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  Ibid.,	  195.	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   Benesch	  also	  suggested	  that	  although	  Schiele’s	  contemporaries	  saw	  his	  deformed	  
figures	  in	  terms	  of	  “shocking	  caricature,”	  in	  fact	  the	  artist’s	  works	  “brought	  to	  light	  …	  an	  almost	  
oppressive	  effect	  of	  psychical	  reality.”	  	  Both	  Schiele’s	  and	  Kokoschka’s	  art	  had	  “met	  with	  violent	  
opposition	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  conservative	  majority	  of	  the	  Austrian	  public,”	  Benesch	  claimed,	  
with	  only	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  colleagues	  and	  “progressive	  art	  lovers”	  nourishing	  their	  artistic	  
development.102	  	  This	  recollection	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  much	  more	  recent	  comment	  in	  The	  
Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Other	  Scandals	  (2005)	  that	  Schiele’s	  representation	  
of	  his	  models	  was	  “for	  a	  long	  time	  interpreted	  as	  ‘ugly’”	  because	  the	  artist	  “did	  not	  require	  his	  
models	  to	  adopt	  classical	  poses	  or	  to	  simulate	  classical	  movement.”103	  	  For	  Wickhoff,	  Riegl,	  
Dvořák,	  and	  Benesch,	  as	  for	  the	  artist	  himself,	  ersatz	  classicism	  was	  more	  disturbing	  than	  
deformation	  and	  caricature,	  while	  the	  appearance	  of	  ugliness	  was	  somehow	  more	  modern	  than	  
the	  appearance	  of	  beauty,	  and	  even	  more	  truthful.	  
	   In	  The	  History	  of	  Art	  as	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas	  (1924)	  Dvořák	  insisted	  that	  a	  “great	  artist	  
never	  stands	  absolutely	  outside	  the	  spiritual	  and	  intellectual	  ferment	  of	  his	  time	  and	  if	  the	  
threads	  binding	  him	  to	  it	  are	  invisible	  to	  us	  then	  it	  means	  that	  we	  have	  failed	  to	  look	  deeply	  
enough	  either	  into	  his	  art	  or	  into	  the	  age	  in	  which	  he	  lived.”104	  	  Dvořák	  therefore	  sought	  to	  
illuminate	  these	  invisible	  and	  multivarious	  ties	  that	  bind	  artist	  to	  culture	  and	  theory	  to	  practice.	  	  
The	  way	  to	  do	  art	  history	  was	  to	  bring	  such	  ties	  to	  light	  –	  not	  to	  subject	  works	  of	  art,	  or	  artists,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Benesch,	  Collected	  Writings,	  192.	  
103	  Tobias	  G.	  Natter	  and	  Max	  Hollein,	  eds.,	  The	  Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Other	  Scandals	  (New	  
York:	  Prestel,	  2005),	  213.	  
104	  Max	  Dvořák,	  The	  History	  of	  Art	  as	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas,	  trans.	  John	  Hardy	  (London,	  Boston:	  Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  
Paul,	  1984),	  71.	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to	  tendentious	  scrutiny	  under	  some	  arcane	  and	  arbitrary	  rubric	  of	  aesthetic	  rules.	  	  A	  historical	  
artist	  like	  El	  Greco	  was	  thus	  understood,	  for	  example,	  as	  expressing	  a	  broader	  cultural	  turn	  
from	  materialism	  to	  spirituality	  in	  a	  specific	  new	  pictorial	  form	  –	  a	  turn	  that	  necessitated	  the	  
rejection	  of	  classical	  naturalism	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  anti-­‐naturalistic	  style.	  	  Perhaps	  reflecting	  on	  the	  
similarly	  anti-­‐naturalistic	  style	  of	  contemporaneous	  expressionism,	  Dvořák	  explicitly	  compared	  
the	  “‘apparent	  chaos’”	  of	  El	  Greco’s	  era	  to	  Dvořák’s	  own	  age,	  which	  likewise	  appeared	  
chaotic.105	  	  	  
Vienna	  School	  historian	  Matthew	  Rampley	  has	  also	  stressed	  how	  an	  interest	  in	  
contemporaneous	  art	  practice	  “distinguishes	  Viennese	  art	  historians	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  
early	  twentieth	  centuries	  from	  their	  contemporaries	  in	  Germany	  or	  Switzerland,”	  who	  
preferred	  serene	  classicism	  and	  “remained	  ill	  at	  ease	  with	  contemporary	  art.”106	  	  The	  scholars	  
of	  the	  Vienna	  School,	  by	  contrast,	  could	  invest	  themselves	  just	  as	  easily	  in	  the	  Kunstwollen	  of	  
their	  own	  time	  as	  in	  that	  of	  late	  Roman	  antiquity	  or	  the	  Spanish	  Renaissance.	  	  And	  whether	  
their	  objects	  of	  analyses	  came	  from	  the	  cultures	  of	  antiquity,	  the	  Renaissance,	  or	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  modernity,	  the	  Vienna	  School	  historians	  discussed	  here	  evinced	  no	  
aversion	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  ugliness	  in	  art.	  
	  
§	  
Art	  historians	  of	  the	  second	  Vienna	  School	  did	  not	  necessarily	  maintain	  this	  early	  interest	  in	  and	  
tolerance	  of	  ugliness,	  however.	  	  For	  example	  Hans	  Sedlmayr,	  in	  his	  1948	  Verlust	  der	  Mitte	  [Loss	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  Dvořák	  in	  Rampley,	  “Max	  Dvořák:	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  History	  and	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  Crisis	  of	  Modernity,”	  Art	  History	  26,	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  (April	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of	  the	  Centre],	  translated	  into	  English	  as	  Art	  in	  Crisis:	  The	  Lost	  Center,	  followed	  Dvořák’s	  view	  
that	  art	  develops	  forms	  paralleling	  the	  forms	  of	  culture,	  but	  condemned	  the	  sense	  of	  chaos	  in	  
modernity	  and	  expressionism	  alike.	  	  Unlike	  the	  other	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historians	  whose	  
theories	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  Sedlmayr	  castigated	  expressionism,	  caricature,	  and	  any	  style	  that	  he	  
believed	  expressed	  the	  sickness	  of	  the	  age	  through	  ugliness.	  	  Sedlmayr	  also	  claimed	  that	  
representing	  circus	  folk,	  or	  even	  refugees,	  in	  art	  was	  pathological,	  as	  such	  images	  “cast	  a	  doubt	  
on	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  man.”107	  	  So	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  “inhuman”	  visions	  of	  modern	  art	  –	  the	  “boiling	  
chaos”	  of	  expressionism,	  the	  “deadness”	  of	  Cubism,	  or	  the	  “cold	  demonism”	  of	  Surrealism	  –	  
“natural	  man,”	  he	  said,	  was	  right	  to	  be	  disgusted	  by	  ugliness.108	  	  	  
	   Sedlmayr’s	  trope	  of	  “natural	  man”	  here	  acts	  as	  an	  exact	  antithesis	  to	  Wickhoff’s	  earlier	  
notion	  of	  “historical	  man,”	  who	  allowed	  changing	  cultural	  conditions	  to	  influence	  his	  
understanding	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness.	  	  Whereas	  Wickhoff,	  Riegl,	  Dvořák,	  and	  Benesch	  all	  
encouraged	  encounters	  with	  the	  ugly,	  in	  Verlust	  der	  Mitte	  Sedlmayr	  not	  only	  did	  not	  encourage	  
such	  open-­‐minded	  encounters,	  he	  also	  condemned	  visual	  ugliness	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  crisis.	  	  But	  by	  
barring	  representations	  of	  ugliness,	  crisis,	  sickness,	  and	  other	  woes	  we	  in	  no	  way	  immunize	  
ourselves	  against	  –	  much	  less	  cure	  or	  outright	  eradicate	  –	  such	  problems.	  	  The	  repressed	  will	  
return,	  in	  outbreaks	  of	  social	  violence	  and	  unrest,	  in	  illness	  and	  malaise,	  in	  ugly	  art,	  writing,	  
music,	  and	  more.	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  certain	  key	  points	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  rich	  dialogue	  between	  
art	  theory	  and	  practice	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture,	  noting	  in	  particular	  the	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  Hans	  Sedlmayr,	  Art	  in	  Crisis:	  The	  Lost	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  trans.	  Brian	  Battershaw	  (Chicago:	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  Regnery	  Co.,	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strategic	  visual	  and	  discursive	  invocation	  of	  ugliness	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  other	  concepts	  and	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  modernity,	  Jewishness,	  truth,	  and	  sickness.	  	  It	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  
this	  image	  of	  Viennese	  theory	  and	  practice	  looks	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  dominant	  Schorskean	  
paradigm,	  which	  argues	  that	  Vienna	  was	  fundamentally	  ahistorical	  and	  used	  aesthetics	  to	  
retreat	  from	  public	  life.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  throughout	  these	  chapters	  we	  will	  see	  Viennese	  
figures	  with	  a	  peculiar	  concern	  with	  the	  relationships	  between	  their	  own	  identities	  and	  history,	  
aesthetics,	  and	  contemporaneity.	  
	  
	  
























Vienna’s	  “Climax	  of	  Distastefulness”109:	  
The	  Explosive	  Popularity	  of	  Otto	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  Character	  	  
However	  deep	  he	  may	  delve	  into	  himself,	  he	  will	  find	  himself	  turbid	  and	  stained,	  and	  what	  he	  
seeks	  will	  present	  itself	  to	  him	  nowhere	  in	  white,	  immaculate	  purity.	  And	  yet	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  
he	  needs	  more	  urgently,	  nothing	  that	  he	  longs	  for	  more	  fervently,	  than	  being	  himself	  and	  only	  
himself.	  	  
–	  Otto	  Weininger	  
	  
There	  are	  three	  possibilities	  for	  me	  –	  the	  gallows,	  suicide,	  or	  a	  future	  so	  brilliant	  that	  I	  don’t	  dare	  
to	  think	  of	  it.	  
	   	   –	  Otto	  Weininger	  	  
	  
The	  choice	  that	  Weininger’s	  theory	  offers	  is	  a	  bleak	  and	  terrible	  one	  indeed:	  genius	  or	  death.	  	  
–	  Ray	  Monk,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein:	  The	  Duty	  of	  Genius	  
Besides	  ugliness,	  hate	  became	  another	  important	  facet	  of	  Viennese	  public	  life	  in	  the	  early	  
twentieth	  century.	  	  And	  there	  is	  one	  book	  in	  particular	  we	  should	  examine	  if	  we	  want	  to	  try	  to	  
understand	  the	  importance	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐representation	  in	  Viennese	  modernity:	  
Otto	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  A	  Fundamental	  Investigation.	  	  Despite	  the	  tremendous	  
impact	  of	  this	  book	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  European	  society	  –	  particularly	  Vienna	  –	  too	  
often	  Sex	  and	  Character	  is	  passed	  over	  quite	  quickly.	  	  And	  often	  it	  is	  not	  examined	  at	  all.	  	  To	  
discuss	  Sex	  and	  Character	  is,	  admittedly,	  doubly	  difficult:	  Weininger	  is	  voracious	  in	  his	  hatreds	  –	  
infamously,	  misogyny	  and	  antisemitism	  –	  but	  also	  difficult	  to	  follow.	  	  His	  intellectual	  influences	  
were	  almost	  impossibly	  varied:	  Weininger	  had	  an	  impressively	  thorough	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
“history	  of	  research	  on	  sex-­‐gland	  functions	  …	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  of	  self-­‐consciousness	  …	  the	  
history	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  European	  feminist	  movements	  …	  [and]	  the	  psychological	  theories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  “The	  peculiarity	  of	  the	  Jewish	  nature	  attains	  for	  us	  its	  climax	  of	  distastefulness,”	  Richard	  Wagner,	  “Jewishness	  
in	  Music,”	  1850/69.	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of	  Ernst	  Mach.”110	  	  What	  Weininger	  made	  of	  all	  this	  erudition	  was	  a	  boldly	  hateful	  document	  of	  
Viennese	  modernism,	  at	  once	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  the	  author	  and	  a	  mirror	  reflecting	  the	  darkest	  
currents	  of	  his	  culture.	  
	  
§	  
Born	  in	  1880	  in	  Vienna,	  Otto	  Weininger	  was	  the	  first	  son	  of	  Jewish	  parents	  Adelheid	  and	  
Leopold.	  	  Leopold,	  a	  highly	  respected	  goldsmith	  with	  commissions	  from	  the	  aristocracy	  and	  
exhibitions	  at	  the	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,111	  was	  self-­‐educated,	  severe,	  and	  antisemitic.	  	  
But	  his	  antisemitism	  must	  have	  been	  at	  least	  somewhat	  ambivalent:	  according	  to	  Otto’s	  older	  
sister	  Rosa,	  Leopold	  was	  nevertheless	  “‘angry	  when	  Otto	  wrote	  against	  Judaism,’”112	  and	  
likewise	  objected	  when	  his	  son	  wanted	  to	  convert	  to	  Protestantism.	  	  Information	  about	  
Adelheid,	  whom	  Otto	  never	  referred	  to	  in	  letters,	  is	  more	  scarce;	  Rosa	  suggests	  that	  she	  was	  
unhappy	  with	  her	  husband,	  who	  treated	  her	  like	  a	  servant	  and	  nanny,	  and	  that	  despite	  a	  “talent	  
for	  languages”	  she	  lived	  	  “simply	  as	  a	  housewife.”113	  	  Brought	  up	  in	  a	  household	  steeped	  in	  
ambivalent	  Jewishness	  and	  the	  music	  of	  flagrant	  antisemite	  Richard	  Wagner,114	  Weininger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Chandak	  Sengoopta,	  Otto	  Weininger:	  Sex,	  Science,	  and	  Self	  in	  Imperial	  Vienna	  (Chicago,	  London:	  The	  University	  
of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2000),	  4.	  
111	  Daniel	  Steuer,	  Introduction:	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away:	  Otto	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  Character”	  in	  Weininger,	  
Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation	  of	  Fundamental	  Principles,	  eds.	  Daniel	  Steuer	  and	  Laura	  Marcus,	  trans.	  
Ladislaus	  Löb	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  xiii.	  





converted	  to	  Protestantism	  and	  was	  baptized	  on	  19	  July	  1902,	  the	  day	  he	  gained	  his	  
doctorate.115	  	  Barely	  over	  a	  year	  later	  he	  would	  be	  dead,	  killed	  by	  his	  own	  hand.	  
	   Weininger’s	  life	  is	  poorly	  documented.	  	  Nevertheless	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  his	  
story	  and	  oeuvre	  were	  –	  simultaneously	  –	  both	  discrete,	  individualized	  phenomena	  and	  
representative	  products	  of	  the	  self	  in	  and	  as	  society.	  	  Like	  other	  figures	  discussed	  here,	  
Weininger	  is	  therefore	  of	  interest	  both	  as	  an	  idiosyncratic	  individual	  and	  also	  as	  a	  producer	  and	  
reproducer	  of	  contemporaneous	  Viennese	  culture.	  	  The	  very	  tension	  between	  trenchant	  
individualism	  and	  the	  entropy	  of	  the	  collective	  is	  itself	  part	  of	  the	  tale	  of	  Viennese	  modernism,	  
of	  which	  Weininger	  is	  a	  strange	  and	  strangely	  telling	  example.	  	  Daniel	  Steuer,	  in	  his	  introduction	  
to	  the	  long-­‐awaited	  2005	  translation	  of	  Weininger’s	  infamous	  text	  Sex	  and	  Character,	  
accurately	  and	  succinctly	  assesses	  the	  situation	  when	  he	  says	  that	  “Weininger’s	  short	  life	  saw	  
the	  end	  of	  a	  long	  phase	  of	  social	  and	  political	  stability,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  modernity	  which	  seems	  
to	  be	  identical	  with	  its	  own	  crisis	  …	  But	  …	  [w]hile	  others	  around	  him	  wrote	  eloquent	  
lamentations	  about	  their	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  language116	  and	  discussed	  Mach’s	  unsalvageable	  self,	  
Weininger	  postulated	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  establishing	  concepts,	  for	  having	  a	  self,	  and	  
for	  making	  clear	  judgments.”117	  	  Yet	  despite	  attempts	  at	  originality	  –	  and,	  arguably,	  attempts	  to	  
invent	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  paranoid	  prisons	  of	  his	  own	  self-­‐image	  and	  Viennese	  culture	  at	  large	  
–	  Weininger’s	  case	  was	  actually	  uncannily	  common.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xii.	  
116	  This	  could	  refer	  to	  “The	  Letter	  of	  Lord	  Chandos,”	  a	  fictional	  missive	  penned	  by	  Hugo	  von	  Hofmannsthal	  in	  1902,	  
written	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  writer	  named	  Lord	  Philip	  Chandos	  and	  addressed	  to	  Francis	  Bacon.	  	  This	  letter,	  
fictionally	  dated	  August	  1603,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  preeminent	  document	  representing	  the	  language	  crisis	  as	  it	  was	  
understood	  and	  experienced	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  
117	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xii.	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   Indeed	  from	  his	  overweening	  obsession	  with	  Richard	  Wagner	  to	  his	  violent	  and	  symbolic	  
1903	  suicide	  in	  the	  house	  where	  Beethoven	  had	  died	  (in	  1827),	  to	  his	  concern	  with	  philosophy	  
and	  psychology,	  and	  certainly	  in	  his	  antisemitism,	  Weininger	  was	  a	  young	  man	  disturbingly	  
representative	  of	  his	  time	  and	  place.	  	  The	  painter	  Richard	  Gerstl	  (whose	  life	  is	  similarly	  ill-­‐
documented)	  was	  born	  only	  three	  years	  later	  than	  Weininger,	  was	  also	  obsessed	  with	  music,	  
and	  killed	  himself	  only	  five	  years	  after	  Weininger.	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  flatten	  Weininger	  into	  a	  
Doppelgänger	  of	  the	  visual	  artist,	  or	  even	  into	  a	  symbol	  of	  Viennese	  culture	  more	  broadly.	  	  But	  I	  
do	  hope	  to	  show	  –	  through	  a	  closer	  and	  more	  extended	  examination	  of	  author	  and	  text	  than	  is	  
conventionally	  undertaken	  in	  books	  on	  Vienna,	  either	  in	  art	  theory	  or	  in	  cultural	  history118	  –	  
that	  Weininger	  and	  his	  Sex	  and	  Character	  can	  help	  illuminate	  darkly	  Vienna’s	  obsession	  with	  
different	  identities	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  including	  the	  identities	  of	  its	  artists.	  	  In	  fact	  I	  
would	  argue	  that	  there	  might	  be	  no	  starker	  vision	  of	  the	  prevalence	  of	  ambivalent	  Jewishness,	  
antisemitism,	  and	  a	  hostile,	  paranoid	  attitude	  toward	  self–other	  relations	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Patrick	  Werkner,	  in	  Austrian	  Expressionism:	  The	  Formative	  Years	  (Palo	  Alto:	  Society	  for	  the	  Promotion	  of	  
Science	  and	  Scholarship,	  1993),	  mentions	  Weininger	  briefly,	  as	  an	  influence	  on	  Gerstl	  (31);	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna:	  
Politics	  and	  Culture	  Carl	  Schorske	  does	  not	  mention	  Weininger	  at	  all;	  Peter	  Vergo,	  in	  Art	  in	  Vienna,	  1898–1918:	  
Klimt,	  Kokoschka,	  Schiele	  and	  their	  Contemporaries	  mentions	  Weininger	  once	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Vienna’s	  
extraordinary	  and	  appalling	  legacy	  of	  suicide;	  and	  Jane	  Kallir’s	  Austria’s	  Expressionism	  (New	  York:	  Galerie	  St.	  
Etienne:	  Rizzoli,	  1981)	  does	  not	  reference	  Weininger.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Claude	  Cernuschi’s	  more	  recent	  
Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  Epistemology	  and	  Politics	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  discusses	  Weininger	  
extensively,	  and	  Jacques	  Le	  Rider	  makes	  Weininger	  one	  of	  the	  main	  subjects	  of	  his	  book	  Modernity	  and	  Crises	  of	  
Identity:	  Culture	  and	  Society	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  trans.	  Rosemary	  Morris	  (New	  York:	  Continuum,	  1993).	  	  
Chandak	  Sengoopta’s	  Otto	  Weininger:	  Sex,	  Science,	  and	  Self	  in	  Imperial	  Vienna	  (Chicago,	  London:	  The	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  2000)	  is	  the	  first	  and	  only	  monograph	  on	  Weininger,	  although	  Slavoj	  Žižek’s	  The	  Metastases	  of	  
Enjoyment:	  Six	  Essays	  on	  Women	  and	  Causality	  (London:	  Verso,	  2006)	  includes	  a	  chapter	  on	  Weininger	  and	  a	  small	  
handful	  of	  anthologies	  have	  been	  published	  addressing	  Weininger	  in	  relation	  to:	  Jews,	  gender,	  Wittgenstein,	  and	  
Viennese	  intellectual	  history.	  	  Jane	  Kallir’s	  most	  recent	  book	  on	  Schiele,	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  Women	  (Munich:	  Prestel,	  
2012)	  mentions	  Weininger	  several	  times,	  which	  I	  believe	  reflects	  an	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  and	  interest	  in	  the	  
problematic	  thinker.	  	  But	  even	  if	  scholars	  are	  beginning	  to	  take	  Weininger	  and	  his	  writing	  seriously	  as	  objects	  of	  
cultural	  inquiry,	  he	  nevertheless	  remains	  extremely	  neglected	  in	  art	  history	  and	  theory.	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century	  in	  Vienna	  than	  that	  found	  in	  Sex	  and	  Character.	  	  These	  qualities	  were	  also,	  as	  we	  shall	  
see,	  central	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  ugly	  Viennese	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  Thus,	  envisioning	  Weininger	  and	  
his	  opus	  will	  also	  help	  us	  read	  Vienna’s	  paranoid	  predilection	  for	  ambivalent	  selfhood	  –	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  ugly,	  hateful	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  to	  which	  such	  conflicted	  identities	  gave	  rise.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Otto	  Weininger	  was	  the	  first	  member	  of	  his	  family	  to	  enter	  academic	  studies.119	  	  The	  budding	  
scholar	  had	  already	  penned	  an	  article	  on	  Homeric	  etymology	  at	  age	  sixteen,	  and	  by	  age	  
eighteen	  he	  was	  studying	  in	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Philosophy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna.	  	  During	  his	  
first	  years	  at	  university	  Weininger	  focused	  at	  least	  as	  much	  on	  science	  as	  on	  philosophy;	  in	  
addition	  to	  his	  classes	  in	  logic	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  he	  took	  courses	  in	  physics,	  
chemistry,	  botany,	  zoology,	  a	  number	  of	  medical	  subjects,	  and	  mathematics.120	  
	   Weininger’s	  epistemological	  orientation	  would	  change	  significantly	  in	  those	  first	  three	  
years	  before	  he	  submitted	  a	  “first	  draft”	  of	  his	  dissertation,	  originally	  titled	  Eros	  und	  Psyche.	  
Eine	  biologisch-­‐psychologische	  Untersuchung	  [Eros	  and	  Psyche:	  A	  Biological	  and	  Psychological	  
Investigation]	  to	  the	  Archive	  of	  the	  Austrian	  Academy	  of	  Science	  in	  1901.	  	  The	  next	  year	  
Weininger	  submitted	  Geschlecht	  und	  Charakter.	  Eine	  biologische	  und	  psychologische	  Studie	  [Sex	  
and	  Character:	  A	  Biological	  and	  Psychological	  Study]	  as	  the	  final	  draft	  of	  his	  doctoral	  
dissertation.121	  	  Both	  versions	  testify	  to	  the	  young	  scholar’s	  rather	  triumphant	  transition	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xiii.	  
120	  Ibid.,	  xiv.	  
121	  The	  dissertation	  has	  not	  survived.	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the	  Machian	  phenomenalism	  prevalent	  at	  the	  time	  to	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐favour	  Kantian	  idealism.	  	  In	  a	  
letter	  of	  2	  March	  1902	  Weininger	  declared:	  “Most	  importantly,	  I	  have	  given	  up	  the	  
epistemology	  of	  Mach-­‐Avenarius	  completely.	  	  The	  self	  is,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  necessary	  to	  salvage	  
it.”122	  	  	  
The	  book	  form	  of	  Weininger’s	  work	  was	  published	  in	  May	  1903	  as	  Geschlecht	  und	  
Charakter.	  Eine	  prinzipielle	  Untersuchung	  [Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation	  of	  Fundamental	  
Principles].	  	  Initially	  it	  was	  received	  without	  much	  fanfare.	  	  But	  after	  the	  author’s	  flamboyantly	  
theatrical	  suicide	  the	  book	  gained	  very	  rapidly	  in	  popularity;	  it	  is	  truly	  difficult	  to	  overstate	  how	  
popular	  Sex	  and	  Character	  became.	  	  The	  book	  went	  through	  twenty-­‐five	  editions	  in	  the	  first	  
twenty	  years	  after	  its	  publication,123	  and	  a	  new	  edition	  was	  published	  “almost	  every	  year	  
between	  1903	  and	  1932.”124	  	  To	  give	  just	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  the	  significant	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  
nature	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character’s	  influence:	  Freud	  read	  and	  commented	  on	  Weininger’s	  text	  (he	  
was	  quite	  skeptical	  of	  its	  value),	  Hitler	  read	  the	  text,	  too,	  and	  Sex	  and	  Character’s	  influence	  on	  
noted	  Austrian	  writer	  Robert	  Musil’s	  modernist	  opus	  The	  Man	  Without	  Qualities	  has	  already	  
been	  discussed	  in	  depth	  by	  other	  scholars.125	  	  In	  Hitler’s	  Vienna	  Brigitte	  Hamann	  refers	  to	  Sex	  
and	  Character	  as	  a	  testimony	  to	  “man’s	  fear	  of	  woman”	  and	  to	  “a	  profound	  Jewish	  identity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xvi.	  
123	  Toews,	  “Refashioning	  the	  Masculine	  Subject	  in	  Early	  Modernism,”	  31.	  
124	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xix.	  
125	  Cf.	  for	  example	  Gisela	  Brude-­‐Firnau,	  “A	  Scientific	  Image	  of	  Woman?	  	  The	  Influence	  of	  Otto	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  
Character	  on	  the	  German	  Novel,”	  in	  Jews	  and	  Gender:	  Responses	  to	  Otto	  Weininger,	  eds	  Nancy	  A.	  Harowitz	  and	  
Barbara	  Hyams	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  178.	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crisis	  in	  the	  gruelling	  battle	  between	  assimilation	  and	  Zionism.”126	  	  Despite	  its	  notoriety,	  
scholars	  often	  reference	  and	  refute	  Weininger’s	  work	  without	  actually	  addressing	  the	  
intellectual	  and	  cultural	  context	  for,	  or	  development	  of,	  the	  young	  scholar’s	  ideas.	  	  When	  
authors	  do	  deal	  with	  Weininger’s	  opus,	  they	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  anonymous	  1906	  translation	  
that	  was	  very	  poor	  –	  and	  was,	  until	  recently,	  the	  only	  available	  English	  version	  of	  the	  text.	  	  
Austro-­‐American	  philosopher	  Allan	  Janik,	  known	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  global	  scholars	  
on	  Viennese	  intellectual	  history,	  references	  a	  letter	  of	  23	  August	  1931	  from	  Wittgenstein	  to	  the	  
English	  analytic	  philosopher	  G.E.	  Moore	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein,	  bemoaning	  this	  “beastly”	  
translation	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character,	  says	  that	  the	  book’s	  conclusions	  –	  though	  incorrect	  –	  are	  
nevertheless	  great.	  	  Indeed,	  Wittgenstein	  states,	  if	  we	  simply	  bracket	  Weininger’s	  entire	  work	  
as	  a	  falsehood	  then	  we	  shall	  see	  that	  it	  also	  manages	  to	  speak	  a	  great	  truth.	  	  Having	  excerpted	  
this	  letter	  for	  the	  reader	  Janik	  then	  opines	  rather	  disappointingly	  that	  it	  is	  “unfortunate	  that	  the	  
complexities	  of	  Weininger’s	  work	  are	  such	  that	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  obtain	  any	  clear	  idea	  
of	  what	  Wittgenstein	  may	  have	  meant	  by	  negating	  the	  whole	  book.”127	  	  	  
My	  own	  argument	  is	  that	  Weininger	  exemplifies	  the	  Viennese	  tendency	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  
primacy	  of	  selfhood	  yet	  nevertheless	  be	  drawn	  ultimately	  toward	  such	  gestures	  of	  radical	  self-­‐
negation	  as	  suicide	  or	  exile.	  	  In	  life	  Weininger	  took	  the	  self-­‐destructive	  path	  of	  suicide,	  but	  
earlier,	  in	  his	  book,	  he	  advanced	  a	  kind	  of	  symbolic	  social	  exile	  instead.	  	  Weininger	  exiled	  the	  
feminine,	  Woman	  and	  the	  feminine	  contagion	  within,	  and	  he	  likewise	  jettisoned	  –	  or	  tried	  to	  –	  
the	  Jew	  within	  himself.	  Working	  from	  the	  established	  binary	  logic	  at	  play	  in	  heteronormative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Hamann,	  Hitler’s	  Vienna,	  227.	  
127	  Allan	  Janik,	  Essays	  on	  Wittgenstein	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  Weininger	  (Amsterdam:	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gender	  roles	  and	  in	  discourses	  of	  Aryan	  superiority	  and	  Jewish	  degeneracy,	  he	  pushed	  it	  to	  a	  
breaking	  point	  where	  difference	  became	  so	  rigid	  that	  it	  could	  do	  nothing	  but	  collapse	  in	  on	  
itself.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  Weininger’s	  politico-­‐philosophical	  strategy	  of	  absolutely	  
separating	  Woman	  from	  Man	  and	  Jew	  from	  Aryan	  was	  a	  creative,	  if	  defensive	  and	  hateful,	  
splitting	  manoeuvre	  that	  allowed	  him	  to	  both	  address	  and	  repress	  his	  ambivalence	  about	  his	  
own	  identity	  and	  sexuality	  and	  the	  reputed	  threats	  of	  Jewishness	  and	  feminism.	  	  Sex	  and	  
Character	  can	  thus	  be	  read	  as	  a	  grisly	  self-­‐portrait:	  a	  portrait	  of	  what	  Weininger	  believed	  was	  




In	  the	  recent	  Wittgenstein	  Reads	  Weininger	  (2004)	  authors	  Stern	  and	  Szabados,	  commenting	  
on	  the	  reception	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character,	  describe	  the	  book	  as	  	  
a	  little	  like	  a	  highbrow	  version	  of	  Men	  are	  from	  Mars,	  Women	  are	  from	  Venus	  for	  turn	  of	  
the	  century	  Vienna,	  with	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  racism,	  homophobia,	  and	  sexism	  thrown	  in.	  	  
However,	  among	  Weininger’s	  avid	  readers	  could	  be	  counted	  not	  only	  Wittgenstein,	  but	  
also	  many	  of	  the	  leading	  literary	  figures	  of	  the	  years	  from	  1903	  to	  1939,	  including	  such	  
luminaries	  as	  Ford	  Maddox	  Ford,	  James	  Joyce,	  Franz	  Kafka,	  Karl	  Kraus,	  Charlotte	  Perkins-­‐
Gilman,	  Gertrude	  Stein,	  and	  August	  Strindberg.128	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Precisely	  because	  of	  its	  logical	  fallacies	  and	  its	  ideological	  and	  affective	  distastefulness,	  and	  
certainly	  in	  light	  of	  its	  immense	  popularity,	  Sex	  and	  Character	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  cultural	  
Baedeker	  of	  sorts.	  	  Indubitably	  Weininger’s	  text	  is	  a	  document	  of	  its	  time.	  	  The	  book	  is	  divided	  
“between	  a	  first	  empirical-­‐physiological	  and	  a	  second	  philosophical	  and	  psychological	  part.”129	  	  
The	  first	  part	  proceeds	  inductively,130	  with	  Weininger	  nevertheless	  following	  established	  
scientific	  method.	  	  Sex	  and	  Character	  is	  perhaps	  representative	  of	  Viennese	  modernism	  in	  this	  
respect,	  too,	  for	  several	  of	  Weininger’s	  contemporaries	  would	  also	  use	  traditional	  methods	  to	  
create	  eccentric	  new	  theories	  and	  practices.	  	  More	  significantly	  Sex	  and	  Character	  also	  attests	  
to	  the	  precociously	  expansive	  intelligence	  but	  tragically	  limiting	  negativity	  of	  one	  of	  many	  
young	  Jewish	  Viennese	  men.	  	  Of	  course	  there	  were	  many	  Gentile	  and	  Aryan	  readers	  of	  Sex	  and	  
Character,	  but	  going	  through	  the	  literature	  I	  get	  the	  impression	  that	  Jewish	  thinkers	  were	  
especially	  influenced	  by	  Weininger’s	  condemnatory	  text.131	  	  Schönberg	  praised	  Weininger’s	  
sincerity	  and	  encouraged	  members	  of	  his	  entourage	  like	  Gerstl	  to	  read	  Sex	  and	  Character.	  	  Karl	  
Kraus	  championed	  Sex	  and	  Character	  tirelessly	  –	  even	  publicly	  defending	  Weininger	  from	  
accusations	  that	  he	  had	  stolen	  his	  ideas	  about	  bisexuality.	  	  Adolf	  Loos	  was	  also	  a	  fan.	  	  And	  
clearly	  Wittgenstein	  was	  still	  convincing	  people	  to	  read	  the	  book	  –	  reputedly	  one	  of	  his	  
favourites	  –	  many	  years	  later	  at	  Cambridge.	  	  Part	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  Weininger,	  
whom	  he	  praised	  as	  a	  “‘remarkable	  genius,’”	  was	  “because	  Weininger	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Ibid.	  
130	  Weininger’s	  arguments	  are	  inductive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  lead	  only	  to	  conclusions	  that	  are	  probable,	  never	  
certain	  –	  unlike	  deductive	  reasoning	  which,	  when	  valid,	  leads	  to	  conclusions	  that	  are	  definitely	  true.	  
131	  For	  more	  on	  this	  see	  Sherry	  Lee,	  “A	  Florentine	  Tragedy:	  Woman	  as	  Mirror,”	  Cambridge	  Opera	  Journal	  18,	  no.	  1	  
(2006):	  37;	  Blackshaw,	  “The	  Jewish	  Christ,”	  21.	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people	  outside	  Freud’s	  inner	  circle	  to	  see	  ‘the	  future	  importance	  of	  the	  ideas	  which	  Freud	  was	  
putting	  forward.’”132	  	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  intriguing	  historical	  detail	  given	  Wittgenstein’s	  well-­‐
known	  criticism	  of	  Freud	  and	  psychoanalysis.	  	  Sex	  and	  Character	  also	  exerted	  a	  more	  diffuse	  
influence	  on	  Viennese,	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  Germanic	  culture	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  
reflecting	  and	  extending	  major	  political	  and	  psychological	  debates	  of	  the	  time.	  	  
	  
§	  
The	  first,	  or	  so-­‐called	  “preparatory,”	  part	  of	  Weininger’s	  book	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  sexual	  
diversity,	  and	  its	  introduction	  could	  surprise	  readers	  who	  know	  Weininger	  only	  as	  a	  misogynist	  
or	  conservative:	  he	  begins	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  concepts	  “man”	  and	  “woman”	  as	  hopelessly	  
inaccurate	  and	  in	  desperate	  need	  of	  reform.	  	  Finally	  he	  asks	  provocatively:	  “Might	  it	  perhaps	  be	  
wiser	  in	  the	  end	  not	  to	  distinguish	  between	  men	  and	  women	  at	  all?”133	  	  For	  Weininger	  not	  only	  
individuals	  but	  even	  all	  parts	  of	  all	  individuals	  are	  constituted	  in	  an	  idiosyncratic	  relation	  to	  
ideal	  masculinity	  and	  femininity,	  which	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  poles	  of	  “M”	  and	  “W.”	  	  On	  this	  basis	  
Weininger	  makes	  the	  compelling	  conclusion,	  evoking	  Aristophanes’	  famous	  speech	  in	  Plato’s	  
Symposium,134	  that	  all	  beings	  are	  ultimately	  searching	  for	  an	  exact	  and	  infinitesimally	  specific	  
complement	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  universal	  sexual	  spectrum.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  In	  Stern	  and	  Szabados,	  Wittgenstein	  Reads	  Weininger,	  8.	  	  Cf.	  also	  Wittgenstein’s	  Lectures	  and	  Conversations,	  
25–6,	  41–52.	  
133	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  11.	  
134	  Aristophanes	  attempts	  to	  explain,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  somewhat	  comical	  “myth,”	  why	  people	  claim	  a	  feeling	  of	  
completeness	  when	  they	  fall	  in	  love,	  and	  also	  why	  there	  are	  different	  sexual	  orientations.	  	  According	  to	  
Aristophanes’	  creation	  story	  once	  upon	  a	  time	  people	  had	  bodies	  double	  their	  current	  size,	  with	  two	  sets	  of	  faces,	  
limbs,	  etc.	  	  Some	  were	  all	  male,	  some	  all	  female,	  and	  the	  androgynous	  beings	  were	  half	  male,	  half	  female.	  	  After	  
Zeus	  split	  all	  of	  these	  beings	  in	  two	  to	  punish	  them	  for	  impudence,	  they	  were	  destined	  to	  forever	  roam	  in	  search	  of	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   Following	  on	  from	  this	  premise,	  Weininger	  becomes	  inventive,	  with	  arguments	  about	  
“arrhenoplasm”	  and	  “thelyplasm.”	  	  Arrhenoplasm,	  which	  represents	  the	  masculine,	  and	  
thelyplasm,	  which	  represents	  the	  feminine,	  are	  neologisms	  Weininger	  invented	  in	  order	  to	  
explain	  his	  idea	  that	  every	  single	  part	  of	  the	  body,	  literally	  “every	  single	  cell	  possesses	  a	  
sexuality	  located	  at	  some	  point	  between	  arrhenoplasm	  and	  thelyplasm.”	  	  Weininger	  goes	  on	  to	  
clarify	  that	  the	  proof	  of	  this	  all-­‐determining	  arrheno/thelyplasmic	  spectrum	  of	  sexuality	  “can	  
easily	  be	  supplied	  through	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  in	  the	  same	  organism	  the	  sexual	  characteristics	  of	  
the	  different	  cells	  are	  not	  always	  identical	  and	  very	  often	  differ	  in	  strength	  …	  some	  cells	  of	  the	  
same	  body	  may	  even	  be	  situated	  on	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  point	  of	  indifference	  between	  these	  
poles.”	  135	  	  These	  ideas	  may	  strike	  many	  contemporary	  readers	  as	  most	  implausible,	  
nevertheless	  “Weininger’s	  effort	  to	  ground	  sexuality	  in	  the	  cells	  …	  was	  a	  legitimate	  scientific	  
hypothesis	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  his	  era.”136	  	  Weininger	  ensured	  that	  he	  knew	  the	  scientific	  
methods	  of	  his	  time	  –	  and	  initially	  at	  least,	  he	  even	  adhered	  to	  them.	  
Weininger	  also	  insists,	  however,	  that	  “no	  science	  is	  bound	  to	  become	  shallow	  as	  quickly	  
as	  psychology	  if	  it	  parts	  with	  philosophy”	  –	  hence	  the	  impoverishment	  of	  contemporary	  
psychology.	  137	  	  He	  presents	  his	  understanding	  of	  universal	  bisexuality,	  which	  got	  him	  into	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
their	  missing	  half.	  	  We	  are	  those	  lost	  beings	  torn	  asunder.	  	  Creatures	  from	  an	  all-­‐male	  being	  became	  homosexual	  
men,	  those	  from	  an	  all-­‐female	  whole	  became	  homosexual	  women,	  and	  the	  androgynous	  beings	  became	  
heterosexuals.	  	  Only	  when	  you	  find	  your	  other	  half	  do	  you	  recover	  your	  true	  and	  complete	  nature,	  a	  state	  you	  
never	  want	  to	  lose	  again.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  Aristophanes	  cautions	  us,	  we	  must	  respect	  the	  gods	  –	  lest	  they	  punish	  
us	  further.	  
135	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  20,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
136	  Sengoopta,	  Otto	  Weininger,	  9.	  
137	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  71.	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rather	  convoluted	  plagiarism	  controversy138	  with	  Freud	  and	  Freud’s	  estranged	  friend	  Fliess	  –	  an	  
otolaryngologist	  based	  in	  Berlin	  –	  then	  complains	  about	  “the	  slogan	  that	  ‘everything’	  is	  nothing	  
but	  ‘sublimated	  sex	  drive,’	  which	  is	  so	  popular	  today.”139	  	  This	  comment	  presumably	  alludes	  to	  
the	  contemporaneous	  activities	  of	  Dr	  Freud	  and	  company,	  and	  foreshadows	  Weininger’s	  
aversion	  to	  sex.	  	  	  
Rejecting	  Freud’s	  sex-­‐drenched	  theory	  of	  subjectivity	  Weininger	  instead	  relies	  on	  a	  
strategy	  of	  subjective	  splitting.	  	  He	  exiles	  undesirable	  sexual	  instincts	  onto	  Woman	  and	  pins	  
humanity’s	  ostensibly	  nobler	  qualities	  onto	  Man:	  
For	  Woman	  the	  state	  of	  sexual	  arousal	  only	  means	  the	  greatest	  intensification	  of	  her	  
whole	  existence,	  which	  is	  always	  and	  absolutely	  sexual.	  W’s	  existence	  revolves	  entirely	  
around	  her	  sexual	  life,	  the	  sphere	  of	  copulation	  and	  reproduction,	  i.e.	  in	  her	  relationship	  
with	  a	  man	  and	  with	  children	  …	  While	  W,	  then,	  is	  fully	  occupied	  and	  absorbed	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  I	  refer	  here	  to	  an	  infamous	  but	  complicated	  muddle	  of	  a	  story	  in	  which	  Fliess,	  estranged	  from	  Freud	  for	  years,	  
resumed	  correspondence	  with	  his	  former	  friend	  only	  to	  accuse	  Freud	  of	  somehow	  imparting	  Fliess’s	  own	  theory	  of	  
universal	  bisexuality	  to	  Weininger,	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  Hermann	  Swoboda,	  a	  psychologist	  friend	  of	  
Weininger’s	  who	  was	  also	  one	  of	  Freud’s	  patients.	  	  Freud	  admitted	  that	  the	  topic	  had	  come	  up	  in	  sessions	  with	  
Swoboda,	  although	  he	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  theory,	  which	  Fliess	  claimed	  as	  his	  own	  but	  had	  yet	  to	  publish	  on,	  
had	  in	  fact	  been	  circulating	  in	  various	  publications	  for	  years.	  	  Generously	  Freud	  even	  offered	  Fliess	  his	  own,	  not-­‐
yet-­‐published	  “Three	  Essays	  on	  the	  Theory	  of	  Sexuality,”	  which	  discussed	  bisexuality,	  in	  order	  that	  Fliess	  might	  be	  
able	  to	  strike	  any	  passages	  that	  he	  felt	  infringed	  on	  his	  own	  theoretical	  territory.	  	  Freud	  also	  offered	  to	  delay	  
publication	  so	  that	  Fliess	  might	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  publish	  his	  own	  work	  first.	  	  What	  Freud	  did	  not	  initially	  
admit	  to,	  however,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  had	  indeed	  met	  with	  Weininger	  directly	  and	  read	  his	  dissertation	  
manuscript.	  	  So	  desperate	  was	  Freud,	  it	  seems,	  to	  exonerate	  himself	  that	  he	  even	  wrote	  to	  Karl	  Kraus	  to	  ask	  for	  
public	  support,	  a	  plea	  that	  –	  somewhat	  predictably	  given	  Kraus’s	  skepticism	  toward	  Freud	  and	  psychoanalysis	  –	  
backfired.	  	  	  
139	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  77.	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sexuality,	  M	  knows	  a	  dozen	  other	  things:	  fighting	  and	  playing,	  socializing	  and	  feasting,	  
discussions	  and	  learning,	  business	  and	  politics,	  religion	  and	  art.140	  	  
Noting	  that	  Man	  has	  “an	  equal	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  Don	  Juan	  or	  a	  saint,”	  Weininger	  clarifies	  that	  
while	  Man,	  therefore	  “has	  the	  penis	  …	  the	  vagina	  has	  Woman.”141	  	  	  
	   Such	  binaric	  bombast	  notwithstanding,	  Weininger	  is	  also	  fully	  committed	  to	  describing	  
his	  theory	  of	  sexual	  diversity	  with	  obsessive	  specificity.	  	  Indeed	  at	  times	  Weininger’s	  
descriptions	  scale	  vertiginous	  heights	  of	  rococo	  detail.	  	  Certain	  passages	  are	  worth	  quoting	  at	  
length	  for	  that	  very	  reason,	  so	  that	  –	  translation	  notwithstanding	  –	  one	  can	  get	  some	  taste	  of	  
the	  real	  flavour	  of	  Weininger’s	  speculative	  philosophy	  and	  his	  compulsive	  concern	  with	  pinning	  
down	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  sexual	  identity,	  and	  identity’s	  relation	  to	  not	  only	  the	  “character”	  
referred	  to	  in	  the	  book’s	  title,	  but	  also	  appearance	  and	  representation.	  	  Weininger	  suggests	  the	  
seemingly	  endless	  diversity	  of	  universal	  sexuality:	  
If,	  instead	  of	  always	  spelling	  out	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  as	  such,	  we	  choose	  different	  
algebraic	  signs	  for	  each	  and	  allocate,	  without	  any	  deeper	  and	  underhand	  ulterior	  motives	  
at	  this	  stage,	  a	  plus	  to	  the	  male	  and	  a	  minus	  to	  the	  female,	  the	  proposition	  can	  be	  
rephrased	  thus:	  the	  sexuality	  of	  the	  cells	  in	  the	  same	  organism	  may	  not	  only	  differ	  in	  
absolute	  quantity	  but	  may	  also	  be	  positive	  or	  negative.	  	  There	  are	  some	  otherwise	  fairly	  
distinctive	  males	  with	  quite	  weak	  beards	  and	  muscles,	  or	  almost	  typical	  females	  with	  
small	  breasts,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  rather	  feminine	  men	  with	  strong	  beards	  and	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women	  who	  have	  abnormally	  short	  hair	  and	  a	  clearly	  visible	  beard	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
well	  developed	  breasts	  and	  a	  spacious	  pelvis.142	  
The	  author	  casually	  comes	  to	  the	  surreal	  conclusion	  that	  he	  even	  knows	  people	  “with	  a	  
masculine	  thigh	  and	  feminine	  lower	  leg,	  or	  a	  feminine	  right	  hip	  and	  a	  masculine	  left.”143	  	  One	  
likewise	  marvels	  at	  the	  paranoid	  inventiveness	  of	  his	  suggestion	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  blood	  
transfusion	  doctors	  should	  “demand	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  masculinity	  or	  femininity	  of	  any	  blood	  
used	  should	  be	  as	  similar	  as	  possible.”144	  	  	  
	   Given	  this	  preoccupation	  with	  precision	  about	  sexual	  diversity	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  a	  
surprise	  that	  Weininger	  has	  much	  to	  say	  about	  the	  laws	  of	  sexual	  attraction,	  including	  a	  
consideration	  of	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  us	  here.	  	  He	  notes	  how	  “often	  does	  
one	  man	  happen	  to	  be	  completely	  enraptured	  by	  a	  certain	  woman	  …	  beside	  himself	  over	  her	  
‘extraordinary,’	  ‘enchanting’	  beauty,	  while	  another	  man	  ‘would	  like	  to	  know	  what	  he	  can	  see	  in	  
her’	  because	  she	  is	  not	  also	  his	  sexual	  complement	  …	  one	  may	  say	  that	  a	  person	  in	  love	  will	  
regard	  as	  beautiful	  something	  that	  from	  the	  purely	  aesthetic	  point	  of	  view	  is	  not	  merely	  
indifferent	  but	  downright	  ugly.”145	  	  Weininger	  apparently	  tested	  his	  sexual	  “law”	  that	  “It	  is	  
always	  a	  complete	  Man	  (M)	  and	  a	  complete	  Woman	  (W)	  who	  strive	  to	  join	  in	  sexual	  union”146	  
by	  “conducting	  a	  survey	  based	  on	  a	  collection	  of	  photos	  of	  aesthetically	  impeccable	  women,	  
each	  of	  whom	  corresponded	  to	  a	  certain	  W	  content	  …	  presented	  to	  a	  number	  of	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acquaintances,”	  whom,	  Weininger	  gloats:	  “I	  deceitfully	  asked	  to	  ‘choose	  the	  most	  beautiful.’”147	  	  
Apparently	  men	  always	  chose	  the	  woman	  Weininger	  expected	  them	  to,	  based	  on	  their	  own	  M-­‐
W	  content.	  	  What	  this	  obviously	  leaves	  unaddressed	  is	  the	  certainty	  of	  Weininger’s	  own	  
calculations	  (of	  relative	  beauty,	  ugliness,	  and	  M-­‐W	  content)	  –	  but	  he	  is	  not	  the	  first	  philosopher	  
to	  forget	  his	  own	  contributions	  to	  the	  phenomena	  under	  investigation.	  	  Perhaps	  in	  part	  because	  
of	  his	  youth,	  though,	  Weininger’s	  authorial	  voice	  is	  aggressively	  arrogant.	  	  His	  tone	  paints	  a	  
picture	  of	  an	  ambivalent	  youth	  who	  sees	  himself	  as	  both	  above	  and	  below	  the	  people	  of	  whom	  
he	  speaks	  –	  as	  though	  Weininger	  had	  an	  inferiority	  complex,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  conceit	  about	  it.	  	  
	  
§	  
Weininger’s	  sense	  of	  the	  divided	  subject	  is	  likewise	  apparent	  in	  his	  discussions	  of	  sexual	  
orientation.	  	  Operating	  from	  the	  thesis	  that	  “the	  principle	  of	  intermediate	  sexual	  forms	  will	  
provide	  the	  strongest	  support	  for	  the,	  as	  yet,	  unfulfilled	  scientific	  task	  of	  a	  characterology,”148	  
his	  hope	  is	  that	  this	  principle	  will	  become	  a	  heuristic	  device	  for	  a	  more	  effective	  differential	  
psychology,	  or	  “psychology	  of	  individual	  differences.”149	  	  	  By	  this	  Weininger	  means	  both	  the	  
study	  of	  differences	  between	  individuals	  –	  known	  as	  differential	  psychology	  –	  and	  the	  different	  
portions	  of	  male	  and	  female,	  heterosexual	  and	  homosexual,	  within	  each	  individual.	  	  When	  he	  
discusses	  homosexuality	  and	  pederasty	  in	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  Weininger	  makes	  the	  pleasingly	  
provocative	  statement	  that	  “just	  as	  all	  organisms	  are	  also	  heterosexual	  they	  are	  all	  also	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homosexual.”	  	  As	  Weininger	  explains	  it,	  the	  “connection	  between	  homosexual	  phenomena	  and	  
the	  bisexual	  predisposition	  of	  every	  embryo	  in	  the	  animal	  or	  plant	  kingdom”	  has	  been	  
accepted.	  	  The	  novelty	  of	  his	  own	  account	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  “does	  not	  see	  
homosexuality	  as	  a	  regression	  or	  an	  incomplete	  development.”150	  	  This	  conviction	  produces	  
unexpectedly	  progressive	  conclusions,	  like	  Weininger	  excoriating	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  “late	  as	  1900	  a	  
professor	  of	  psychiatry	  in	  a	  German	  university	  seriously	  recommended	  that	  homosexuals	  
should	  simply	  be	  castrated.”151	  	  Weininger	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  wryly	  that	  many	  instances	  of	  good	  
will	  in	  male	  relationships	  are	  actually	  unconsciously	  sexual	  in	  nature.152	  	  But	  ultimately	  
Weininger	  declares	  that	  the	  question	  his	  book	  is	  “above	  all	  else	  intended	  to	  solve	  in	  theoretical	  
and	  practical	  terms”	  is	  “the	  woman	  question.”153	  	  This	  is	  in	  a	  chapter	  on	  “emancipated	  
women,”	  which	  ends	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character.	  	  
It	  seems	  somewhat	  disingenuous,	  however,	  to	  consider	  differential	  psychology	  and	  “the	  
woman	  question”	  compatible	  since	  the	  entire	  aim	  of	  differential	  psychology	  is	  to	  find	  
differences	  between	  individuals,	  including	  between	  individuals	  of	  the	  same	  sex.	  	  Instead	  
Weininger	  offers	  sophistries	  from	  the	  absurd:	  “Historical	  research	  is	  obliged	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  
popular	  saying	  …	  ‘The	  longer	  the	  hair,	  the	  smaller	  the	  brain’”154	  to	  the	  enigmatic:	  “a	  
homosexual	  love	  honors	  a	  woman,	  in	  particular,	  more	  than	  heterosexual	  relationships.”155	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Weininger’s	  overarching	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  Woman,	  as	  such,	  neither	  
wants	  nor	  needs	  emancipation;	  indeed,	  “all	  those	  women	  who	  really	  strive	  for	  emancipation,	  all	  
those	  women	  who	  have	  some	  genuine	  claim	  to	  fame	  and	  intellectual	  eminence,	  always	  display	  
many	  male	  properties,	  and	  the	  more	  perceptive	  observer	  will	  always	  recognize	  in	  them	  some	  
anatomically	  male	  characteristics,	  an	  approximation	  to	  the	  physical	  appearance	  of	  a	  man.”156	  	  
The	  enemy	  of	  women’s	  emancipation	  is	  thus	  Woman	  herself.157	  	  It	  is	  only	  the	  element	  of	  Man	  
within	  Woman	  that	  compels	  her	  toward	  emancipation	  and	  achievement.158	  
	  
§	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  second	  –	  or	  main	  –	  part	  of	  Weininger’s	  tract	  that	  the	  dynamic	  of	  subjective	  splitting	  
is	  most	  aggressively	  developed,	  and	  it	  is	  here,	  too,	  that	  his	  most	  distasteful	  observations	  are	  
presented.	  	  Sex	  and	  Character	  was	  published	  in	  May	  1903,	  Weininger	  shot	  himself	  in	  October,	  
and	  in	  the	  public	  controversy	  that	  ensued	  Weininger’s	  former	  doctoral	  supervisor	  Jodl	  felt	  it	  
necessary	  to	  publish	  a	  statement,	  on	  25	  October	  in	  the	  Neues	  Wiener	  Journal159	  clarifying	  that	  
almost	  the	  entire	  main	  portion	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character	  had	  been	  added	  to	  the	  original	  submitted	  
dissertation.	  	  Indeed	  Jodl	  stressed	  that	  Weininger’s	  “academic	  teachers	  had	  no	  influence	  on	  
most	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  Sex	  and	  Character.”160	  	  Jodl	  especially	  wanted	  to	  distance	  himself	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  newspaper	  published	  in	  Vienna	  from	  1893	  to	  1939.	  
160	  Steuer,	  “A	  Book	  That	  Won’t	  Go	  Away,”	  xiv.	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and	  his	  colleagues	  from	  Weininger’s	  comments	  on	  women	  and	  Jews,161	  which	  he	  considered	  
“monstrous.”162	  	  	  But	  it	  was	  that	  monstrous	  second	  part	  of	  Weininger’s	  treatise	  that	  the	  author	  
felt	  best	  represented	  him	  and	  his	  philosophy.	  	  Weininger	  himself	  was	  the	  monster	  Jodl	  descried	  
and	  decried.	  
While	  contemporaneous	  Austrian	  intellectual	  culture	  embraced	  psychology,	  positivism,	  
and	  language	  critique	  [Sprachkritik]	  over	  the	  tradition	  of	  Germanic	  idealism	  to	  which	  Kant	  
belonged,	  Weininger	  audaciously	  insisted	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  Kantian	  intelligible	  self	  –	  but	  only	  
for	  Aryan	  Man.	  	  And	  yet	  Weininger	  knew	  he	  could	  not	  be	  this	  Aryan	  Man.	  	  Certainly,	  as	  
Sengoopta	  notes	  astutely,	  Weininger’s	  “Kantian	  salvage	  of	  the	  self	  was	  a	  political	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
intellectual	  act”163	  –	  but	  it	  was	  also	  personal	  and	  performative.	  	  We	  have	  little	  biographical	  
information	  about	  Weininger,	  but	  I	  think	  Sengoopta	  is	  right	  to	  propose	  that	  we	  read	  
Weininger’s	  philosophical	  and	  religious	  allegiance	  as	  grounded	  partly	  in	  his	  hostility	  to	  local	  
culture:	  Weininger’s	  espousal	  of	  Kantianism	  was	  “guided	  by	  his	  own	  chosen	  identity	  as	  an	  
intellectual	  representative	  of	  a	  Greater	  Germany	  …	  a	  gesture	  of	  defiance	  toward	  Austrian	  
academic	  orthodoxy,	  just	  as	  his	  later	  adoption	  of	  Protestantism	  symbolized	  a	  defiance	  of	  
Judaism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Catholic	  culture	  of	  Vienna.”164	  	  At	  every	  turn	  Weininger	  contested	  his	  
identity.	  	  How	  uncomfortable	  he	  must	  have	  been	  in	  his	  own	  skin!	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  Ibid.	  
162	  Sengoopta,	  Otto	  Weininger,	  18.	  





Discussing	  Kant’s	  important	  influence	  on	  Weininger	  historian	  of	  science	  and	  medicine	  Chandak	  
Sengoopta	  emphasizes	  that	  within	  Kant’s	  philosophical	  system,	  “morally,	  women	  could	  not	  be	  
their	  own	  masters.”165	  	  Weininger	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Kant’s	  misogyny	  in	  
Anthropology	  from	  a	  Pragmatic	  Point	  of	  View	  (1796–97),	  in	  which	  the	  Königsbergian	  
philosopher	  acknowledges	  woman’s	  “loquacity	  and	  eloquence	  full	  of	  affect”166	  but	  also	  declares	  
that	  “regardless	  of	  age”	  woman	  is	  “immature	  in	  civil	  matters;	  her	  husband	  is	  her	  natural	  
curator.”167	  	  For	  Weininger,	  Woman’s	  nothingness	  and	  ontological	  subservience	  to	  Man	  actually	  
define	  her	  humanity	  because	  humanity	  itself	  is	  composed	  of	  a	  complement	  of	  being	  and	  non-­‐
being:	  “only	  Man	  and	  Woman	  together	  constitute	  the	  human	  being.”168	  	  Who	  constituted	  a	  
“real”	  subject	  in	  modern	  Vienna	  was	  as	  caustically	  contested	  as	  what	  counted	  as	  “real	  art,”	  and	  
obsessive	  self-­‐representation	  and	  strategic	  ugliness	  became	  both	  aspects	  of	  and	  reactions	  to	  
this	  cultural	  concern.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Sengoopta,	  Otto	  Weininger,	  29.	  	  Weininger’s	  discussion	  of	  memory,	  logic,	  and	  ethics	  posits	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  
Practical	  Reason	  (1788)	  as	  “the	  most	  sublime	  book	  in	  the	  world,”	  132.	  	  He	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  psychological	  
philosophies	  of	  contemporaneous	  Germanic	  psychologist-­‐philosophers	  including	  Franz	  Brentano,	  Carl	  Stumpf,	  and	  
Theodor	  Lipps	  in	  favour	  of	  Kant’s	  transcendental	  critical	  thought,	  124.	  
166	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Anthropology	  from	  a	  Pragmatic	  Point	  of	  View,	  ed.	  Robert	  B.	  Louden	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2006),	  205.	  
167	  Ibid.,	  103.	  
168	  Likewise	  Weininger	  may	  have	  been	  thinking	  of	  Kant’s	  Lectures	  on	  Metaphysics	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  ontology	  
section	  of	  Kant’s	  “Metaphysik	  Vigilantius”	  lecture	  (1794–95)	  and	  its	  discussion	  of	  nothingness	  –	  in	  his	  formulations	  
of	  Woman’s	  ontological	  nullity.	  	  He	  does	  read	  a	  bit	  like	  a	  nasty	  Kant	  when	  he	  asserts	  that	  whereas	  “unadulterated	  
man	  is	  the	  image	  of	  God,	  of	  the	  absolute	  something,”	  by	  contrast	  “Woman,	  including	  Woman	  in	  Man,	  is	  the	  
symbol	  of	  nothingness:	  that	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  Woman	  in	  the	  universe,	  and	  that	  is	  how	  Man	  and	  Woman	  
complement	  and	  condition	  each	  other,”	  268,	  all	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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Despite	  the	  pains	  that	  the	  young	  philosopher	  took	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  his	  book	  to	  establish	  
Man	  and	  Woman	  as	  absolute	  types	  only	  –	  and	  not	  representative	  of	  real	  people,	  who	  always	  
combined	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  traits	  –	  Weininger	  now	  suddenly	  claims	  that	  one	  is	  “either	  a	  
man	  or	  a	  woman.”	  	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  while	  men	  could	  be	  psychically	  female,	  women	  could	  
not	  be	  psychically	  male.169	  	  So	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  feminine	  evil	  is	  an	  encroaching	  threat	  for	  self	  and	  
society	  alike.	  
Weininger’s	  total	  denial	  of	  female	  intelligence,	  agency,	  or	  even	  a	  soul	  must	  be	  
considered	  in	  the	  pernicious	  context	  of	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  European	  misogyny,	  and	  alongside	  
his	  insistence	  that	  no	  real	  individual	  was	  either	  an	  absolute	  Man	  or	  an	  absolute	  Woman.	  	  What	  
was	  particularly	  paradoxical	  about	  the	  objections	  to	  and	  popular	  discourses	  around	  feminism	  
was	  the	  pervasive	  quality	  of	  double	  bind	  in	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  definitions	  of	  what	  it	  actually	  
meant	  to	  be	  a	  woman:	  to	  be	  a	  woman	  was	  terrible,	  but	  to	  not	  be	  a	  real	  woman	  was	  really	  
terrible.	  	  The	  woman	  who	  could	  transcend	  the	  designated	  boundaries	  and	  frailties	  of	  her	  sex	  
was	  often	  even	  more	  reviled	  than	  the	  woman	  who	  could	  not.	  	  For	  example	  the	  notoriously	  
hateful	  Möbius	  cautioned,	  in	  his	  tract	  On	  the	  Physiological	  Feeble-­‐Mindedness	  of	  Women	  [Über	  
den	  physiologischen	  Schwachsinn	  des	  Weibes	  (1900/1908)],	  that	  the	  creatively	  intelligent	  
woman	  was	  degenerate,	  not	  gifted.170	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  Ibid.,	  163,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  	  
170	  Not	  only	  philosophy	  and	  religion,	  but	  also	  feminism	  played	  out	  differently	  in	  Austria	  than	  in	  Germany:	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  Germany	  had	  more	  feminist	  organizations,	  but	  on	  the	  other,	  women	  had	  earlier	  access	  to	  education	  in	  
Austria	  –	  for	  example	  women	  were	  permitted	  to	  attend	  Austrian	  universities	  for	  arts	  degrees	  by	  1897	  and	  for	  
medical	  degrees	  by	  1900	  whereas	  in	  Germany	  women	  were	  not	  permitted	  to	  attend	  university	  at	  all	  until	  1901.	  In	  
this	  regard	  both	  countries	  were	  conservative	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  where	  from	  its	  inception	  in	  1833	  
Oberlin	  College	  in	  Ohio	  accepted	  female	  and/or	  black	  students.	  	  Moreover	  by	  1864	  a	  black	  American	  woman	  
named	  Rebecca	  Crumpler	  had	  even	  attained	  a	  medical	  degree,	  whereas	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna,	  which	  opened	  its	  
medical	  faculty	  to	  women	  thirty-­‐six	  years	  later	  in	  1900,	  did	  so	  only	  “after	  a	  protracted	  controversy.”	  	  Ibid.,	  31–2.	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By	  contrast	  Weininger’s	  theories	  would	  even	  seem	  to	  predict	  later	  concepts	  of	  gender	  
as	  symbolically	  and	  socially	  constructed.	  	  For	  example	  the	  youthful	  Viennese	  author	  seems	  to	  
have	  articulated,	  avant	  la	  lettre,	  similar	  observations	  to	  French	  psychoanalyst	  Jacques	  Lacan’s	  
dictum	  that	  “Woman	  does	  not	  exist.”171	  	  Weininger	  asserts:	  “Woman	  is	  nothing,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  
reason,	  the	  only	  reason,	  why	  she	  can	  become	  everything.”	  	  He	  elaborates:	  “Women	  do	  not	  
have	  this	  or	  that	  quality:	  their	  peculiarity	  is	  having	  no	  qualities	  at	  all.”172	  	  Despite	  the	  slip	  in	  the	  
second	  part	  of	  the	  quotation	  into	  the	  general	  “women”	  rather	  than	  typical	  “Woman,”	  
Weininger	  like	  Lacan	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  phantasmatic	  quality	  of	  “Woman”	  in	  the	  
phallocentric	  cultural	  economy	  of	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  Weininger	  notes	  that	  men	  create	  ideas	  
of	  “Woman”	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  needs	  –	  specifically,	  their	  sexual	  needs	  –	  and	  then	  project	  these	  
notions	  onto	  actual	  women,	  who	  are	  then	  expected	  to	  sustain	  and	  support	  such	  male	  fantasies.	  	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  Lacanian	  philosopher	  Slavoj	  Žižek,	  “Weininger	  hauled	  into	  the	  light	  of	  day	  the	  
‘sexist’	  phantasmatic	  support	  of	  the	  dominant	  ideology.”173	  	  Weininger	  details	  his	  views	  
regarding	  man’s	  relationship	  to	  woman’s	  “ontological	  falseness,”	  claiming	  for	  example	  that	  “by	  
becoming	  sexual,	  Man	  posits	  Woman	  and	  calls	  her	  into	  being	  …	  And	  she	  would	  be	  dead	  the	  
moment	  man	  overcame	  his	  sexuality	  …	  Woman,	  all	  the	  way	  through,	  is	  only	  an	  object	  created	  
by	  the	  drive	  of	  man	  as	  its	  own	  goal,	  as	  a	  hallucination	  that	  his	  delusion	  is	  eternally	  laboring	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  First	  proposed	  in	  the	  seminar	  of	  1970–71,	  and	  reformulated	  in	  the	  seminar	  of	  1972–73	  as	  “there	  is	  no	  such	  
thing	  as	  Woman.”	  	  
172	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  265,	  all	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
173	  Slavoj	  Žižek,	  “Otto	  Weininger,	  or,	  ‘Woman	  Doesn’t	  Exist,’”	  New	  Formations:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Culture/Theory/Politics	  
23	  (1994):	  97.	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capture.”174	  	  Weininger’s	  obsessive	  reiteration	  of	  Man’s	  all-­‐consuming	  desire	  for	  Woman	  reads	  
as	  a	  reaction	  to	  his	  own	  lack	  of	  it.	  	  	  
Paradoxically	  there	  is	  also	  a	  strong	  ethical	  component	  to	  Weininger’s	  convictions	  
regarding	  the	  war	  of	  the	  sexes.	  	  He	  views	  coitus	  as	  intimately	  related	  –	  psychologically,	  
biologically,	  and	  ethically	  –	  to	  murder,175	  and	  finishes	  his	  book	  advocating	  for	  universal	  
abstinence.	  	  That	  this	  would	  prevent	  reproduction	  did	  not	  disturb	  Weininger,	  who	  declares	  that	  
“fecundity	  is	  nothing	  if	  not	  disgusting.”176	  	  
In	  keeping	  with	  his	  paranoid	  fear	  of	  femininity	  Weininger	  also	  sees	  femininity	  
everywhere.	  	  Reminding	  the	  reader	  of	  Woman’s	  “lack	  of	  intellectual	  conscience”	  and	  
“deficiency	  in	  conceptual	  thinking”	  he	  explains	  that	  “this	  habit	  of	  wallowing	  in	  purely	  emotional	  
resonances,	  of	  dispensing	  with	  conceptuality	  and	  comprehensibility,	  of	  drifting	  without	  striving	  
for	  any	  depth,	  characterizes	  the	  iridescent	  style	  of	  so	  many	  modern	  writers	  and	  painters	  as	  an	  
eminently	  feminine	  one.	  	  Male	  thinking	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  female	  thinking	  by	  its	  desire	  
for	  solid	  forms,	  and	  thus	  any	  ‘atmospheric	  art’	  is	  necessarily	  a	  formless	  art.”177	  	  Such	  discourse	  
strongly	  echoes	  the	  discourses	  regarding	  the	  formlessness	  of	  Klimt’s	  Philosophy	  –	  which,	  
according	  to	  Weininger’s	  doctoral	  supervisor	  Jodl,	  had	  made	  Klimt’s	  painting	  ugly.	  
Other	  contemporaneous	  commentators,	  including	  fans	  of	  Weininger’s	  philosophy	  such	  
as	  acerbic	  journalist	  Karl	  Kraus,	  also	  lampooned	  the	  purported	  femininity	  of	  Vienna’s	  artists.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  270,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
175	  Ibid.,	  223.	  
176	  Ibid.,	  311,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
177	  Ibid.,	  164,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
	  	  
79	  
Kraus	  railed	  repeatedly	  against	  the	  femininity	  of	  the	  feuilleton	  culture	  in	  Vienna,	  and	  the	  so-­‐
called	  Jung	  Wien	  writers	  in	  particular.	  	  He	  felt	  that	  their	  impressionist,	  emotional	  styles	  were	  
narcissistically	  self-­‐indulgent	  and	  histrionically	  feminine.	  	  And	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Weininger	  
garnered	  Kraus’s	  –	  ostensibly	  austere,	  hyper-­‐masculine	  –	  approval	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  find	  
Weininger	  himself	  histrionic	  when	  he	  declares:	  “one	  looks	  in	  vain	  for	  thoughts	  in	  anything	  ever	  
created	  by	  women	  artists,”	  “the	  imagination	  of	  Woman	  consists	  of	  errors	  and	  lies,”	  a	  “female	  
philosopher	  is	  a	  most	  unlikely	  notion,”	  and	  “it	  is	  entirely	  out	  of	  the	  question	  that	  a	  woman	  
should	  suffer	  from	  problems.”178	  
Conveniently,	  Weininger	  theorizes	  Woman	  as	  incapable	  of	  true	  nakedness	  –	  which	  is	  to	  
say	  vulnerability,	  for	  example	  to	  attacks	  like	  his	  –	  because	  of	  her	  purported	  inability	  to	  feel	  
shame.179	  	  Possibly	  picturing	  himself	  Weininger	  also	  goes	  on	  to	  assert	  that	  whereas	  an	  ugly	  man	  
feels	  his	  own	  ugliness	  as	  “a	  painful	  reality,”	  an	  ugly	  woman	  will	  “try	  to	  deceive	  herself	  and	  
others	  about	  it	  till	  the	  very	  end.”180	  	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  though,	  for	  Weininger,	  Woman	  is	  ugly	  
because	  she	  is	  nothing	  whereas	  a	  man	  such	  as	  himself	  might	  be	  ugly	  because	  he	  was	  too	  much:	  
too	  much	  consciousness	  stained	  by	  too	  much	  Jewishness,	  femininity,	  confusion	  and	  
desperation.	  “It	  has	  been	  comprehensively	  proven,”	  Weininger	  declares,	  “that	  W	  is	  soulless	  and	  
has	  neither	  self	  nor	  individuality,	  neither	  personality	  nor	  freedom,	  neither	  character	  nor	  will	  …	  
The	  psychic	  life	  of	  W	  can	  be	  described	  in	  purely	  empirical	  terms,	  while	  any	  psychology	  of	  M	  must	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target	  the	  self	  as	  the	  topmost	  gable	  of	  the	  building,	  as	  Kant	  realized.”181	  	  One	  can	  almost	  feel	  
Weininger’s	  desperation	  in	  constructing	  this	  towering	  yet	  flimsy	  edifice	  that	  is	  “Man.”	  	  He	  
shores	  up	  his	  hopeful	  conclusions	  with	  aggressive	  statements	  about	  the	  ineffability	  of	  Man’s	  
essence	  versus	  the	  aggregate	  quality	  of	  Woman,	  who	  can	  be	  dismantled.	  	  But	  as	  it	  eventually	  
turns	  out	  –	  after	  three	  more	  chapters	  discussing	  woman’s	  essential	  nonexistence	  as	  seen	  
through	  the	  lenses	  of	  motherhood,	  prostitution,	  eroticism,	  and	  hysteria	  –	  Jewish	  men	  also	  lack	  
the	  same	  core	  features	  absent	  from	  women.	  	  	  
Both	  “Jews	  and	  women	  are	  nothing	  and	  therefore	  can	  become	  everything.”182	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  
preoccupation	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  selfhood	  that	  prompts	  Weininger	  to	  comment	  
suggestively:	  “a	  completely	  naked	  living	  woman	  gives	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  unfinished,	  of	  
reaching	  for	  something	  outside	  herself,	  and	  this	  is	  incompatible	  with	  beauty	  …	  and	  thereby	  
causes	  the	  beholder	  displeasure	  rather	  than	  pleasure.”183	  	  Weininger	  goes	  on	  to	  strenuously	  
disagree	  with	  Schopenhauer’s	  claim	  that	  men	  regard	  women	  as	  beautiful	  only	  because	  they	  are	  
blinded	  by	  their	  own	  sex	  drive.	  	  Were	  this	  true,	  Weininger	  claims,	  then	  female	  genitals	  would	  
be	  considered	  gorgeous;	  yet	  on	  the	  contrary,	  he	  insists,	  “no	  man	  …	  finds	  the	  female	  genitals	  as	  
such	  beautiful	  …	  every	  man	  actually	  finds	  them	  ugly.”184	  And	  yet	  a	  page	  later,	  apparently	  
unaware	  of	  how	  he	  exposes	  himself	  with	  his	  developing	  commentary,	  Weininger	  notes	  how	  “in	  
aesthetics,	  beauty	  is	  created	  by	  love	  …	  just	  as	  ugliness	  derives	  from	  hate,	  beauty	  derives	  from	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love.”185	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  aspect	  of	  Weininger’s	  attitude	  toward	  sexuality	  in	  general	  is	  
indeed	  its	  overall	  hatefulness.	  	  Nevertheless	  his	  ambivalence	  about	  his	  sexuality	  is	  such	  that	  a	  
little	  later	  on	  in	  the	  book	  he	  also	  declares	  that	  the	  penis	  “makes	  a	  naked	  man	  ugly	  …	  it	  
represents	  the	  most	  unpleasant	  thing	  of	  all,	  in	  its	  erect	  state.”186	  	  Thus	  does	  Weininger’s	  
analysis	  become	  strangely	  both	  ham-­‐fistedly	  reductive	  and	  oddly	  complex,	  for	  his	  own	  theories	  
seems	  to	  instantiate	  the	  very	  conflicts	  he	  writes	  about,	  and	  ultimately	  he	  perhaps	  reveals	  
exactly	  what	  he	  means	  to	  conceal.	  	  	  
	  
§	  	  
A	  chapter	  on	  male	  and	  female	  consciousness	  brings	  on	  topics	  that	  truly	  obsess	  Weininger:	  
talent,	  genius,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  –	  and	  difference	  between	  –	  the	  two.	  	  And	  here,	  too,	  the	  
polyvalence	  of	  the	  ambivalent	  self	  will	  be	  maintained,	  even	  lionized.	  	  Weininger’s	  arguments	  
regarding	  endowment,	  genius,	  and	  memory	  are	  bizarre	  but	  compelling,	  and	  occasionally	  even	  
convincing.	  	  He	  opines	  early	  on	  that	  the	  “ideal	  of	  a	  genius,	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  artistic	  kind,	  is	  to	  
live	  in	  all	  human	  beings,	  to	  lose	  himself	  in	  all,	  and	  to	  emanate	  into	  the	  multitude,	  while	  the	  
philosopher	  has	  the	  task	  of	  finding	  all	  the	  others	  again	  in	  himself	  …	  to	  absorb	  them	  into	  a	  
unity.”187	  	  Weininger	  asserts	  that	  the	  artistic	  genius,	  therefore,	  has	  many	  selves	  –	  selves	  who	  
dominate	  at	  different	  times.	  	  Moreover,	  Weininger	  claims	  that	  when	  “Goethe	  once	  spoke	  of	  the	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‘recurrent	  puberty’	  of	  artists”	  he	  was	  describing	  something	  very	  similar.188	  	  One	  gets	  the	  strong	  
impression	  when	  reading	  such	  passages	  that	  Weininger	  was	  drawn	  to	  theories	  that	  could	  help	  
him	  make	  sense	  of,	  and	  perhaps	  redeem,	  his	  own	  conflicted	  impulses	  and	  contradictory	  self-­‐
perceptions.	  
Weininger’s	  suicide	  is	  melancholically	  forecast	  in	  his	  conclusions	  about	  genius.	  	  
Weininger	  insists	  that	  the	  genius	  “comprehends	  things	  only	  through	  suffering	  from	  them,	  and	  
he	  understands	  human	  beings	  only	  through	  suffering	  with	  them.”	  	  Weininger	  notes,	  moreover,	  
“he	  who	  feels	  his	  own	  personality	  also	  feels	  it	  in	  others.”	  	  He	  then	  makes	  the	  alarming	  albeit	  
somewhat	  enigmatic	  assessment	  that	  “he	  who	  kills	  himself	  kills	  the	  whole	  world	  at	  the	  same	  
time.”189	  	  Weininger	  absorbed	  and	  refracted	  sex	  and	  gender	  panic,	  psychological	  ambivalence,	  
and	  philosophical	  pessimism	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  at	  least	  in	  hindsight	  seems	  quintessentially	  
Viennese	  –	  above	  all	  in	  its	  obsessive	  concern	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  self	  and	  the	  conviction	  that	  
the	  self	  contains	  the	  whole	  world,	  all	  of	  its	  perils	  and	  possibilities,	  within	  it.	  
Weininger’s	  idea	  that	  artists	  and	  geniuses	  were	  protean	  played	  a	  principal	  role	  in	  the	  
larger	  drama	  of	  Viennese	  selfhood	  and	  representation.	  	  Whereas	  the	  dangerously	  labile	  
qualities	  of	  modernity,	  hysteria,	  and	  Jewishness	  were	  denigrated	  in	  Sex	  and	  Character	  as	  
feminine	  decadence	  or	  inherent	  inferiority,	  Weininger	  lauds	  the	  lability	  of	  the	  man	  of	  genius	  as	  
a	  positive	  phenomenon	  of	  consciousness	  resulting	  from	  authentic	  selfhood	  and	  creativity	  –	  and	  
this	  ambivalent	  dynamic	  played	  out	  in	  contemporaneous	  Viennese	  society	  as	  well.	  	  The	  same	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  Ibid.	  
189	  Ibid.,	  157,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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quality	  –	  of	  changeability,	  multiplicity	  –	  was	  represented	  as	  negative	  or	  positive,	  depending	  
who	  was	  embodying	  it.190	  	  	  
The	  prevalence	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐representation	  in	  Vienna	  attests,	  I	  think,	  to	  both	  the	  popular	  
interpretation	  of	  inconsistency	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  “pathology,”	  and	  the	  interpretation	  of	  it	  as	  a	  
sign	  of	  “genius.”	  	  And	  regardless	  of	  the	  dubious	  veracity	  of	  his	  ideas,	  Weininger’s	  theory	  
regarding	  the	  changeability	  of	  the	  genius’s	  face	  evokes	  the	  expressivity	  of	  Viennese	  self-­‐
portraiture	  specifically.	  	  For	  example	  when	  Weininger	  comments	  on	  the	  “striking	  phenomenon	  
that	  the	  expressions	  on	  the	  faces	  of	  more	  endowed	  people	  change	  much	  more	  frequently	  than	  
on	  that	  of	  people	  without	  any	  endowment,	  and	  indeed	  …	  at	  different	  times	  they	  can	  have	  
incredibly	  different	  faces,”	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  picture	  the	  theatrical	  self-­‐portrait	  grimaces	  of	  
Weininger’s	  contemporaries	  Gerstl,	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Schiele.	  	  Weininger	  even	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  
conclude	  that:	  “The	  number	  of	  faces	  an	  individual	  has	  can	  actually	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  
physiognomical	  indicator	  of	  his	  endowment.”191	  	  So	  depending	  on	  who	  was	  doing	  –	  or	  
discussing	  –	  the	  changing,	  the	  ability	  to	  mask,	  mute,	  and	  mutate	  one’s	  identity	  could	  be	  viewed	  
in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna	  as	  an	  exalted	  capacity	  of	  higher	  human	  beings	  or	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  decadent	  degeneration	  of	  modern	  man	  into	  nervous	  weakness	  and	  effeminacy.	  	  
Changeability	  was	  a	  highly	  charged	  concept,	  and	  the	  charge	  or	  cathexis	  in	  question	  was	  a	  
deeply	  ambivalent	  one.	  	  The	  often-­‐antagonistic	  diversity	  of	  the	  Empire	  mirrored	  the	  internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Yet	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  contradiction	  also	  Weininger	  claims	  –	  without	  elaboration	  or	  evidence	  –	  that	  “cases	  of	  
‘duplex’	  or	  ‘multiplex	  personality,’	  that	  is,	  a	  duplication	  or	  multiplication	  of	  the	  self,	  have	  been	  observed	  only	  in	  
women,”	  185,	  all	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
191	  Ibid.,	  95,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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squabbling	  of	  one’s	  various	  selves	  –	  be	  they	  the	  levels	  of	  the	  Freudian	  psyche	  or	  Weiningerian	  
“genius	  selves.”	  
	   Throughout	  his	  discussions	  of	  genius	  Weininger	  invokes	  local	  luminaries	  such	  as	  
Beethoven	  and	  canonical	  Germanic	  genius-­‐types	  such	  as	  Kant,	  Goethe,	  Schopenhauer,	  Wagner,	  
and	  Nietzsche,	  and	  in	  a	  typically	  Viennese	  fashion	  unites	  science,	  art,	  and	  philosophy.	  	  
Weininger	  insists	  that	  whereas	  talent	  is	  inherited	  (for	  example	  the	  Bachs),	  genius	  –	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  total	  consciousness	  –	  is	  radically	  individual.	  	  He	  concludes	  the	  chapter	  with	  the	  observation	  
that	  “woman	  lives	  unconsciously,	  man	  lives	  consciously,	  but	  a	  genius	  lives	  most	  consciously.”192	  	  
This	  question	  of	  consciousness	  leads	  Weininger	  back	  around	  to	  once	  again	  lambaste	  modernity	  
for	  its	  lability:	  the	  genius’s	  absolute	  consciousness	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  his	  nobly	  protean	  
aspect	  from	  the	  ignobly	  protean	  qualities	  of	  modernity,	  hysteria,	  and	  Jews.	  	  Weininger	  boldly	  
and	  bizarrely	  states	  that	  “the	  human	  being	  is	  completely	  himself	  only	  when	  he	  is	  completely	  
logical;	  indeed	  he	  does	  not	  exist	  until	  he	  is	  nothing	  but	  logic,	  throughout	  and	  absolutely.”193	  	  
This	  absolute	  consciousness	  evidently	  also	  divides	  the	  self;	  according	  to	  Weininger	  duality	  “is	  
always	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  noticing	  and	  understanding.”194	  	  	  
Weininger’s	  oppositional	  logic,	  however	  culturally	  apropos,	  was	  not	  ultimately	  
successful.	  	  He	  became	  bound	  by	  a	  binary	  from	  which	  there	  was	  no	  escape	  –	  certainly	  not	  in	  his	  
major	  lifework,	  and	  evidently	  not	  in	  his	  own	  short	  life	  either.	  	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  I	  have	  no	  
doubt	  that	  Weininger’s	  paranoia,	  desperation,	  and	  ambivalence	  have	  contributed	  to	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  Ibid.,	  100.	  
193	  Ibid.,	  all	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
194	  Ibid.,	  96,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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tremendous	  posthumous	  popularity.	  	  People	  are	  not	  just	  passively	  titillated	  by	  tragedy;	  we	  are	  
also	  lost	  –	  haunted	  searchers	  desperate	  for	  answers	  ourselves.	  	  	  
Referring	  to	  “the	  birth	  of	  the	  Kantian	  ethic”	  –	  which	  he	  characterizes	  as	  the	  supreme	  
and	  exclusive	  duty	  to	  serve	  oneself	  –	  as	  “the	  most	  heroic	  act	  in	  world	  history,”	  Weininger	  
elaborates:	  “Truthfulness,	  purity,	  fidelity,	  sincerity	  toward	  oneself:	  that	  is	  the	  only	  conceivable	  
ethic.	  	  According	  to	  Weininger	  this	  existential	  state	  of	  affairs	  creates	  a	  “tremendous	  loneliness,”	  
which	  he	  characterizes	  as	  “so	  horrifying	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  so	  great.”195	  	  For	  Weininger	  the	  
self-­‐appointed	  duty	  to	  be	  “Kant’s	  loneliest	  human	  being”	  precludes	  the	  freedom	  to	  laugh,	  to	  
dance,	  to	  roar,	  to	  cheer;	  to	  say	  “yes”	  to	  this	  absolute	  sobriety	  is,	  according	  to	  Weininger,	  the	  
Dionysian	  element	  in	  Kant.196	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  ascetic	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  self,	  which	  
characterizes	  much	  Viennese	  cultural	  activity	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  is	  so	  austere	  that	  
the	  austerity	  itself	  becomes	  decadent.	  	  And	  it	  is	  displayed	  at	  its	  fullest	  effect	  here,	  with	  
Weininger	  styling	  himself	  as	  the	  loneliest	  man	  on	  the	  planet	  and	  implying	  that	  he	  has	  the	  
fidelity	  to	  self	  required	  for	  such	  a	  monumental	  duty.	  
In	  a	  cultural	  milieu	  already	  preoccupied	  with	  precisely	  this	  topic,	  Weininger’s	  discussion	  
of	  the	  problems	  of	  self	  and	  genius	  no	  doubt	  made	  the	  strongest	  of	  impressions	  on	  his	  readers.	  	  
He	  represents	  the	  reactionary	  idea	  that	  the	  self	  is	  not	  only	  real,	  it	  also	  determines	  the	  nature	  
and	  degree	  of	  genius.	  	  Unlike	  the	  ugly	  self-­‐representations	  in	  Vienna	  that	  foreground	  selfhood	  
but	  highlight	  it	  as	  a	  fractured,	  incomplete,	  protean	  process	  –	  rather	  than	  a	  coherent,	  unified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  Ibid.,	  141,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
196	  Ibid.,	  142.	  	  Unfortunately	  Weininger	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  such	  an	  affirmation	  is	  Dionysian	  nor	  what	  sense	  of	  
the	  term	  he	  is	  relying	  on.	  	  Certainly	  Weininger’s	  direct	  repudiation	  of	  dance,	  in	  particular,	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  
that	  he	  is	  invoking	  any	  Nietzschean	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  here.	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total	  being	  –	  Weininger	  attempts	  to	  assert	  the	  positive,	  formidable	  existence	  of	  absolute	  
character.	  	  Such	  absolute	  character	  is	  also	  totally	  self-­‐aware,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  phenomenon	  
Weininger	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “event	  of	  the	  self.”	  	  This	  event	  of	  the	  self	  is	  the	  moment,	  which	  
purportedly	  all	  exceptional	  people	  experience,	  when	  a	  man	  “becomes	  absolutely	  certain	  that	  
he	  has	  a	  self	  of	  a	  higher	  kind.”197	  	  Weininger	  opines:	  “the	  event	  of	  the	  self	  is	  the	  root	  of	  all	  
Weltanschauung,	  that	  is,	  of	  all	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  whole,	  for	  the	  artist	  no	  less	  than	  for	  
the	  philosopher.”198	  	  Weltanschauung	  translates	  to	  a	  “world	  view”	  or	  “perspective,”	  and	  for	  
Weininger	  it	  is	  our	  personal	  stance	  toward	  the	  world–	  which	  results	  from	  how	  we	  see	  and	  
experience	  ourselves,	  in	  particular,	  and	  also	  other	  people	  generally.	  	  Weininger	  insists	  that	  
“great	  men	  enter	  into	  a	  more	  vital,	  more	  understanding	  relationship,	  not	  only	  with	  the	  people	  
around	  them,	  but	  also	  with	  all	  the	  personalities	  in	  history	  who	  lived	  before	  them,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
only	  reason	  why	  the	  great	  artist	  can	  grasp	  historical	  individuality	  better	  and	  more	  intensively	  
than	  the	  mere	  professional	  historian.”199	  	  Viennese	  approaches	  to	  history	  already	  tended	  to	  
emphasize	  idiosyncratic	  creative	  interpretation	  more	  than	  historical	  accuracy;	  such	  
interpretations	  were	  often	  constructed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  continuous	  lineage	  of	  exceptional	  men	  and	  
their	  great	  acts,	  which	  transcended	  the	  otherwise	  mundane	  march	  of	  quotidian	  history.	  	  If	  not	  
in	  his	  body	  then	  in	  his	  work,	  certainly,	  Weininger	  presents	  himself	  as	  heir	  to	  this	  greatness,	  and	  
his	  philosophy	  of	  genius	  helped	  contemporaries	  paint	  themselves	  with	  a	  similarly	  grandiose	  
brush.	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  Ibid.,	  144.	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  Ibid.,	  146,	  emphasis	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  original.	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  Ibid.,	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In	  his	  infamous	  chapter	  on	  Judaism	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book,	  Weininger	  attacks	  the	  
ostensible	  Jewishness	  and	  effeminacy	  of	  contemporaneity	  at	  length.	  	  For	  Weininger,	  Germanic	  
culture	  was	  mired	  in	  this	  “age	  which	  believes	  that	  its	  character	  is	  best	  expressed	  in	  vague,	  
indistinctly	  shifting	  moods.”200	  	  In	  Weininger’s	  view	  the	  ultimate	  error	  of	  the	  era	  is	  that	  it	  is	  “an	  
age	  that	  has	  declared	  genius	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  madness,	  but	  which	  no	  longer	  has	  one	  great	  artist	  
or	  one	  great	  philosopher.”201	  	  You	  can	  almost	  see	  his	  struggle	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  own	  
genius,	  so	  palpable	  is	  Weininger’s	  sense	  of	  being	  tainted,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  gifted	  on	  the	  
other.	  	  And	  as	  a	  reader	  one	  gets	  the	  strong	  but	  uncomfortable	  feeling	  that	  although	  in	  a	  way	  
Weininger	  is	  coming	  to	  know	  himself	  through	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  book,	  he	  is	  nonetheless	  exactly	  
mistaken	  about	  where	  his	  own	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  lie.	  	  As	  he	  concludes	  a	  discussion	  of	  
endowment	  Weininger	  takes	  a	  different	  pot	  shot,	  decreeing	  abruptly	  that	  “today	  the	  history	  of	  
art	  is	  as	  full	  of	  the	  most	  erroneous	  evaluations	  as	  [is]	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.”202	  
	  
§	  	  
Every	  body	  of	  work,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  solve	  some	  kind	  of	  creative	  problem	  –	  but	  
Sex	  and	  Character	  is	  a	  particularly	  ardent,	  anxious	  body.	  	  What	  worried	  Weininger	  about	  
femininity	  worried	  him	  even	  more	  about	  Jewishness.	  	  Together	  it	  was	  altogether	  too	  much	  to	  
bear,	  and	  he	  declared	  that	  even	  “the	  most	  manly	  Jew	  is	  more	  feminine	  than	  the	  most	  feminine	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Aryan.”203	  	  For	  this	  troubled	  young	  man,	  as	  for	  several	  other	  assimilated	  Jewish	  figures	  now	  
hailed	  as	  great	  luminaries	  of	  Viennese	  modernism,	  Judaism	  was	  “the	  hardest	  and	  most	  
formidable	  enemy.”204	  	  Because	  of	  this	  Weininger	  goes	  on	  to	  opine	  that	  	  
one	  may	  almost	  say	  that	  the	  most	  important	  and	  most	  conspicuous	  question	  in	  the	  
official	  forms	  that	  everybody	  is	  obliged	  to	  complete	  for	  public	  use	  today	  is	  that	  asking	  
whether	  or	  not	  he	  is	  a	  Jew,	  and	  that	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  the	  most	  common	  
criterion	  of	  classification	  used	  by	  civilized	  people.205	  
This	  is	  a	  chilling	  comment	  not	  only	  in	  hindsight	  –	  that	  is,	  chilling	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Nuremberg	  laws	  of	  1935,	  which	  introduced	  new	  (and	  inaccurate)	  methods	  of	  identifying	  who	  
was	  Jewish	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  imposition	  of	  increasingly	  discriminatory	  policies	  towards	  
German	  Jews.	  	  Weininger’s	  approving	  observation	  is	  also	  distressing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
contemporaneous	  antisemitic	  prejudice	  so	  prevalent	  in	  Vienna.	  	  With	  one	  tautology	  after	  
another	  Weininger	  attempts	  to	  prove	  that	  “the	  more	  exceptional	  individuals	  have	  almost	  
always	  been	  antisemites	  (Pascal,	  Voltaire,	  Herder,	  Goethe,	  Kant	  …	  Schopenhauer	  …	  Wagner)”	  –	  
and	  this	  because	  “they	  also	  understand	  Judaism	  better.”	  	  To	  know	  Judaism	  is	  to	  be	  repelled	  by	  
it	  according	  to	  Weininger,	  taking	  a	  page	  out	  of	  Wagner’s	  infamous	  “Jewishness	  in	  Music”	  essay.	  	  	  
Yet	  with	  characteristically	  Viennese	  ambivalence	  Weininger	  also	  acknowledges	  that	  just	  as	  we	  
“love	  in	  others	  only	  what	  we	  would	  like	  to	  be	  completely	  but	  never	  are	  completely,”	  so,	  too,	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character	  (New	  York:	  Howard	  Fertig,	  Inc.,	  2003),	  306.	  	  Reprint	  of	  1906	  translation	  published	  
by	  G.P	  Putman	  and	  Sons.	  	  This	  quote	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  new	  translation,	  which,	  while	  still	  virulently	  
antisemitic	  and	  sexist,	  is	  significantly	  less	  so	  than	  this	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  translation.	  
204	  Weininger,	  Sex	  and	  Character:	  An	  Investigation,	  273.	  
205	  Ibid.,	  274.	  
	  	  
89	  
we	  “hate	  in	  others	  only	  what	  we	  never	  want	  to	  be,	  but	  always	  are	  in	  part.”206	  	  When	  we	  hate	  
someone	  it	  is	  often	  because	  we	  recognize	  in	  them	  “ugly	  and	  mean	  features	  we	  have	  in	  
ourselves.”207	  	  It’s	  our	  own	  ugliness	  we	  often	  see	  in	  others,	  and	  our	  own	  fear	  and	  self-­‐hatred	  we	  
project	  onto	  others.	  	  This	  is	  why	  Jews	  themselves	  are	  often	  “the	  most	  rabid	  antisemites,”	  
according	  to	  Weininger.	  	  Showing	  some	  real	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  hatred,	  disavowal,	  
projection,	  and	  prejudice,	  Weininger	  notes	  that	  the	  antisemitic	  Jew	  persecutes	  perceived	  
Jewishness	  in	  the	  other	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  remove	  that	  same	  Jewishness	  from	  himself.208	  	  It	  is	  an	  
idiosyncratic	  peculiarity	  of	  his	  intelligence	  that	  Weininger	  perceives	  this	  error	  while	  
simultaneously	  also	  committing	  it	  himself.	  
	   Defining	  Jewishness	  as	  neither	  a	  race	  nor	  a	  nation	  but	  rather	  a	  psychic	  constitution	  –	  a	  
type	  –	  Weininger	  trots	  out	  all	  sorts	  of	  prejudices	  of	  the	  age	  while	  simultaneously	  revealing	  
insight	  into	  subjective	  ambivalence	  by	  claiming,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  that	  “the	  aggressive	  
antisemite	  …	  always	  exhibits	  certain	  Jewish	  peculiarities.”	  	  According	  to	  Weininger	  this	  can	  even	  
include	  physiological	  manifestations	  of	  Jewishness	  when	  there	  is	  no	  actual	  Jewish	  heritage	  
present.209	  	  But	  Weininger	  did	  have	  real	  Jewish	  heritage	  –	  he	  is,	  in	  practice,	  the	  antisemitic	  Jew	  
he	  himself	  theorizes.	  	  According	  to	  the	  monstrous	  psycho-­‐philosophical	  edifice	  that	  he	  built,	  the	  
self	  that	  Weininger	  loved	  but	  could	  never	  be	  was	  the	  Aryan,	  heterosexual	  subject	  “Man.”	  	  
Sengoopta	  discusses	  how	  although	  we	  “have	  no	  unequivocal	  proof,	  it	  is	  strongly	  likely”	  that	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Weininger	  attempted	  to	  medically	  treat	  himself	  for	  homosexuality.210	  	  All	  of	  these	  aspects	  of	  
selfhood	  represented	  abysses	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  times	  he	  might	  try	  to	  climb	  to	  that	  
topmost	  Kantian	  gable,	  threatened	  to	  suck	  Weininger	  back	  down	  and	  swallow	  him	  in	  
overwhelming,	  all-­‐consuming	  darkness.	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book	  Weininger	  refers	  to	  himself	  as	  “cleansed	  and	  armed”211;	  he	  
seems	  to	  accept	  –	  with	  terrifying	  temerity	  –	  a	  self-­‐appointed	  duty	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  monster	  
within.	  	  He	  declares:	  “I	  cannot	  understand	  life	  as	  long	  as	  I	  live	  …	  It	  is	  only	  when	  I	  have	  overcome	  
it	  that	  I	  shall	  understand	  it,	  and	  therefore	  only	  death	  can	  teach	  me	  the	  meaning	  of	  life.”212	  	  Yet	  
Weininger	  was	  clearly	  ambivalent:	  before	  he	  could	  kill	  himself	  and	  learn	  this	  meaning	  of	  life,	  he	  
first	  felt	  compelled	  to	  write	  a	  book	  –	  a	  book	  that	  does,	  in	  fact,	  present	  arguments	  about	  the	  
meaning	  of	  life.	  	  Weininger’s	  book	  documents	  a	  desperate	  striving	  to	  discern	  the	  dangerous	  
nature	  of	  life	  and	  identity,	  of	  sex	  and	  character.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  paradox	  of	  life	  and	  especially	  
selfhood:	  when	  one	  is	  this	  conflicted,	  this	  ambivalent	  about	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  environment,	  
one	  is	  compelled	  to	  represent	  it	  –	  to	  represent	  oneself	  no	  matter	  how	  contradictory,	  
convoluted,	  or	  constantly	  changing	  the	  images	  might	  be.	  	  Weininger	  tried	  –	  but	  evidently	  failed	  
–	  to	  define	  himself	  according	  to	  a	  rigorous	  Kantian	  intellectuality	  that	  might	  allow	  him	  to	  live,	  
but	  every	  avenue	  of	  thought	  he	  pursued	  seemed	  to	  lead	  to	  necessary	  self-­‐sacrifice.	  	  
Weininger’s	  strategic	  splitting	  of	  Woman	  from	  Man	  and	  Jew	  from	  Aryan	  was	  a	  form	  of	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repression	  that,	  initially	  at	  least,	  gave	  him	  some	  space	  to	  pontificate	  –	  but	  the	  repressed	  will	  
return.	  	  Thus	  I	  read	  Sex	  and	  Character	  as,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  a	  man	  trying	  
and	  failing	  to	  save	  his	  own	  life	  as	  a	  subject.	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  however,	  Weininger	  represents	  
himself	  as	  strong	  enough	  to	  welcome	  death.	  
He	  marvels	  at	  humanity’s	  “strange	  fear,	  which	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  most	  horrifying	  
thing	  would	  be	  the	  extinction	  of	  the	  species.”	  	  By	  contrast,	  for	  Weininger	  such	  a	  fear	  “reveals	  an	  
extreme	  lack	  of	  belief	  in	  individual	  immortality	  and	  in	  the	  eternal	  life	  of	  the	  moral	  individual,”	  
and	  “is	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  faint-­‐heartedness	  and	  of	  the	  inability	  to	  live	  outside	  the	  herd.”213	  	  This	  
“herd,”	  for	  Weininger,	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  humanity	  as	  such.	  	  In	  writing	  Sex	  and	  Character	  
Weininger	  represented,	  for	  posterity,	  the	  aspects	  of	  his	  identity	  that	  he	  had	  believed	  were	  
beautiful	  and	  worthy	  of	  love,	  and	  in	  committing	  suicide	  he	  sacrificed	  the	  parts	  of	  his	  humanity	  
that	  he	  felt	  were	  hateful	  and	  ugly.	  	  According	  to	  Weininger	  “love	  itself	  is	  only	  a	  desire	  for	  
redemption,	  and	  any	  desire	  for	  redemption	  is	  immoral.”214	  	  
In	  Weininger’s	  worldview	  not	  only	  is	  love	  impossible	  for	  Jewish	  people,	  any	  respectful,	  
dignified	  social	  intercourse	  is	  impossible	  because	  “the	  genuine	  Jew	  is	  deficient	  in	  the	  inner	  
nobility	  that	  generates	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  self	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  self	  of	  another.”215	  	  He	  
concludes	  with	  a	  bleak	  forecast	  of	  the	  global-­‐historical	  role	  of	  Jewish	  people	  as	  not	  much	  more	  
than	  a	  cautionary	  omen.	  	  For	  him	  the	  Jew	  is	  a	  true	  “monster,”	  etymologically	  monstrum,	  from	  
the	  Latin	  moneō	  meaning	  “to	  warn”:	  	  the	  Jew	  warns	  the	  happy,	  healthy,	  beautiful	  Aryan	  what	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he	  must	  never	  become.	  	  According	  to	  Weininger	  “the	  world-­‐historical	  significance	  and	  the	  
immense	  merit	  of	  Judaism	  is	  perhaps	  none	  other	  than	  that	  it	  persists	  in	  making	  the	  Aryan	  
conscious	  of	  his	  own	  individuality	  and	  reminding	  him	  of	  himself.	  	  That	  is	  what	  the	  Aryan	  owes	  to	  
the	  Jew.	  	  Thanks	  to	  the	  Jew	  he	  knows	  what	  he	  must	  be	  aware	  of:	  Judaism	  as	  a	  possibility	  within	  
himself.”216	  	  In	  Weininger’s	  trenchantly	  individualistic	  worldview	  there	  was	  no	  hope	  to	  be	  




























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“Our	  Loathed	  and	  Beloved	  Vienna”:	  
Ambivalent	  Jewishness	  in	  Antisemitic	  Vienna	  	  
Self-­‐mirroring	  is	  allowed	  when	  the	  self	  is	  beautiful;	  it	  becomes	  a	  duty	  when	  the	  mirror	  is	  good.	  
–	  Karl	  Kraus	  
	  
Oh	  no,	  I’m	  not	  a	  bellyacher.	  	  My	  hatred	  of	  Vienna	  is	  not	  love	  gone	  astray.	  	  It’s	  just	  that	  I’ve	  
discovered	  a	  completely	  new	  way	  of	  finding	  it	  unbearable.	  
–	  Karl	  Kraus	  
	  
Having	  so	  closely	  attended	  to	  ambivalence	  and	  hostility	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  one	  man,	  it	  behoves	  us	  
to	  now	  consider	  these	  themes	  in	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  metropolitan	  Vienna.	  	  An	  extremely	  
ambivalent,	  often	  hostile	  attitude	  toward	  the	  native	  city	  –	  perhaps	  best	  exemplified	  by	  
Schönberg’s	  casual	  reference	  to	  “our	  loathed	  and	  beloved	  Vienna”	  in	  a	  1910	  letter	  to	  Mahler	  –	  
was	  very	  common	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Hatred	  of	  Vienna	  was	  often	  framed	  in	  terms	  
of	  feelings	  of	  persecution,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  justified.	  	  In	  his	  letter	  Schönberg	  references	  not	  
only	  Mahler’s	  prior	  persecution	  in	  Vienna	  but	  also,	  and	  paradoxically,	  the	  Viennese	  citizens’	  
ardent	  desire	  to	  have	  their	  esteemed	  composer	  (Mahler)	  back	  at	  home	  soon.217	  	  Mahler	  had	  
been	  driven	  from	  an	  antagonistic,	  antisemitic	  Vienna	  to	  New	  York	  in	  1908.	  	  	  
Likewise,	  in	  a	  particularly	  embittered	  letter	  to	  Fliess	  Freud	  once	  exclaimed:	  “‘Otherwise	  
Vienna	  is	  Vienna,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  extremely	  revolting	  …	  I	  hate	  Vienna	  with	  a	  positively	  personal	  
hatred.’”218	  	  Yet	  critics	  have	  nevertheless	  insisted	  that	  “Freud’s	  frequent	  attacks	  on	  Vienna”	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should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  “unmitigated	  hatred	  for	  the	  city.”	  	  In	  fact,	  “expressing	  a	  
critical	  attitude	  towards	  Vienna	  is	  a	  typical	  Viennese	  trait.	  	  The	  Viennese	  are	  known	  to	  both	  
love	  and	  abominate	  their	  city.”219	  	  And	  in	  1938,	  after	  Freud	  had	  found	  refuge	  from	  the	  Nazis	  in	  
London,	  he	  said	  of	  Vienna	  and	  his	  sense	  of	  loss	  at	  leaving	  that	  “in	  spite	  of	  everything	  I	  still	  love	  
the	  prison	  from	  which	  I	  have	  been	  released.”	  	  Martin	  Freud,	  the	  psychoanalyst’s	  son,	  even	  
proclaimed	  in	  1957:	  “‘I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  Sigmund	  Freud’s	  often-­‐expressed	  dislike	  of	  
Vienna	  was	  either	  deep-­‐seated	  or	  real.’”220	  	  Martin	  Freud’s	  comment	  highlights	  the	  potentially	  
ambivalent	  nature	  of	  his	  father’s	  hatred.	  	  A	  theatrical	  sense	  of	  hatred	  and	  love	  as	  emotions	  to	  
be	  performed	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  encouraged	  Viennese	  citizens	  to	  take	  dramatic	  attitudes	  
toward	  local	  issues.	  	  Ambivalent,	  people	  nevertheless	  struck	  a	  pose	  on	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  city.	  	  	  
The	  theatricality	  of	  these	  poses	  probably	  resulted	  at	  least	  in	  part	  from	  a	  pervasive	  sense	  
of	  lack:	  Vienna	  seems	  to	  have	  felt	  itself	  acutely	  as	  missing	  a	  worthwhile	  metropolitan	  identity	  in	  
early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  modernity.	  	  Cernuschi	  suggests	  that	  “the	  popularity	  of	  myth	  in	  Vienna	  
1900”	  was	  due	  at	  least	  in	  part	  to	  “myth’s	  ability	  to	  alleviate	  Viennese	  cultural	  insecurities.”221	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  Viennese	  identity	  crisis	  certainly	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fading	  glory	  of	  the	  Austro-­‐
Hungarian	  Empire,	  and	  cultural	  rivalries	  played	  a	  role	  as	  well.	  	  In	  Hermann	  Bahr’s	  1923	  
autobiography	  –	  tellingly	  titled	  Self-­‐Portrait	  [Selbstbildnis]	  –	  he	  said	  of	  Vienna’s	  inferiority	  in	  the	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face	  of	  neighbouring	  Berlin:	  “‘They	  had	  [the	  Battle	  of]	  Sedan	  [1870],	  Bismarck	  and	  Wagner.	  	  
What	  did	  we	  have?’”222	  	  	  
Another,	  and	  related,	  cultural	  identity	  issue	  in	  Vienna	  was	  that	  so-­‐called	  “Jewish	  
question.”	  	  To	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Jewish	  self-­‐perception	  and	  virulent	  antisemitism	  
that	  characterized	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna	  we	  must	  examine	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  
Vienna	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  economic	  crash	  of	  1873	  –	  which	  was	  widely	  
blamed	  on	  “the	  Jews.”	  	  As	  British	  literary	  critic	  John	  Carey	  explains	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  Freud’s	  
Jokes	  and	  their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious:	  	  
Jewish	  immigration	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  was	  increasingly	  resented	  in	  the	  Vienna	  of	  
Freud’s	  youth.	  	  Between	  1857	  and	  1880	  the	  proportion	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  city’s	  population	  
rose	  from	  2	  to	  10	  percent.	  	  The	  stock-­‐market	  crash	  of	  9	  May	  1873	  (‘Black	  Friday’)	  led	  to	  an	  
orgy	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism.	  	  Jewish	  bankers	  were	  blamed	  for	  the	  catastrophe.	  	  A	  rash	  of	  anti-­‐
Jewish	  propaganda	  hit	  the	  popular	  press,	  with	  cartoons	  depicting	  hook-­‐nosed	  financiers.	  	  
This	  was	  the	  year	  Freud	  went	  up	  to	  university.223	  
This	  economic	  crash	  was	  only	  a	  generation	  after	  the	  revolutionary	  movements	  of	  1848–49,	  
which	  had	  threatened	  the	  Empire,	  and	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  Austria’s	  decisive	  military	  defeat	  
in	  the	  Austro-­‐Prussian	  war	  of	  1866	  –	  which	  signalled	  the	  twilight	  of	  the	  Habsburg	  kingdom.	  	  
First	  the	  faded	  glories	  of	  the	  monarchy,	  then	  the	  promise	  of	  liberal	  capitalism	  come	  to	  nought.	  	  
Meanwhile	  in	  Vienna	  ambivalence	  and	  anxiety	  seem	  to	  have	  hardened	  into	  hostility	  and	  ever-­‐
greater	  extremism,	  with	  burgeoning	  antisemitism	  a	  major	  source	  of	  motive	  power.	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It	  would	  be	  simplistic	  and	  inaccurate	  to	  equate	  a	  general	  Viennese	  hostility	  and	  
ambivalence	  with	  the	  specific	  struggles	  of	  Jewish	  people	  –	  the	  intolerance	  they	  faced	  and	  the	  
pressures	  they	  experienced	  to	  assimilate	  or	  disappear	  entirely.	  	  Likewise	  it	  would	  be	  false	  to	  
reduce	  the	  Viennese	  preoccupation	  with	  ugliness	  to	  an	  aspect	  of	  or	  reaction	  to	  local	  
antisemitism.	  	  For	  example	  we	  know	  that	  Kokoschka	  and	  Schiele,	  who	  were	  of	  Catholic	  
extraction	  and	  are	  infamous	  for	  the	  ugliness	  of	  their	  art,	  both	  described	  feeling	  persecuted	  in	  –	  
and	  by	  –	  Vienna,	  just	  like	  Jewish	  figures	  such	  as	  Schnitzler,	  Schönberg,	  and	  Freud.	  	  Nevertheless	  
I	  do	  want	  to	  examine	  how	  in	  Vienna	  noxious	  antisemitism	  and	  ambivalent	  Jewishness	  both	  
contributed	  to	  and	  exemplified	  the	  hostile	  tenor	  of	  the	  city,	  a	  paranoid	  obsession	  with	  conflict,	  
and	  an	  ambivalent	  sense	  of	  local	  cultural	  identity.	  	  These	  phenomena	  in	  turn	  encouraged	  
divisive	  theories	  and	  practices	  and	  extreme	  strategies	  of	  representation,	  including	  strategies	  of	  
ugliness	  and	  discourses	  of	  hate.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
In	  his	  essay	  “Jewishness	  in	  Music”	  Wagner	  declares	  that	  he	  aims	  at	  “explaining	  that	  
unconscious	  feeling	  which	  proclaims	  itself	  among	  the	  people	  as	  a	  rooted	  dislike	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
nature.”224	  	  More	  specifically	  he	  wants	  to	  discuss	  the	  Germanic	  hatred	  of	  Jewishness	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  deleterious	  effect	  of	  Jewishness	  on	  Germanic	  art.	  	  But	  Wagner’s	  essay	  is	  more	  accurately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  Richard	  Wagner,	  “Judaism	  in	  Music,”	  in	  Judaism	  in	  Music	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  trans.	  William	  Ashton	  Ellis	  (Lincoln:	  
University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  1995),	  79.	  	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  essay	  by	  the	  title	  “Jewishness	  in	  Music”	  in	  the	  main	  text	  
because	  it	  is	  a	  more	  accurate	  translation,	  I	  think,	  of	  “Das	  Judenthum	  in	  der	  Musik”	  –	  but	  even	  more	  importantly,	  
because	  it	  better	  captures	  the	  more	  psychological	  and	  not	  at	  all	  religious	  nature	  of	  Wagner’s	  antisemitic	  
understanding	  of	  Jewish	  identity.	  “Das	  Judenthum	  in	  der	  Musik”	  was	  first	  published	  under	  a	  pseudonym	  in	  
September	  1850	  in	  Leipzig’s	  Neue	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Musik	  [New	  Journal	  of	  Music]	  and	  an	  expanded	  version	  was	  
published	  under	  Wagner’s	  own	  name	  in	  1869.	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described,	  I	  think,	  as	  his	  own	  articulation	  of	  the	  larger	  cultural	  phenomenon	  of	  Verjudung:	  “the	  
fear	  of	  ‘passing,’	  that	  these	  works	  of	  Jewish	  art	  may	  be	  mistaken	  for	  real,	  German	  artworks.”225	  
Wagner	  states:	  the	  “public	  Art-­‐taste	  of	  our	  time”	  has	  been	  brought	  “between	  the	  busy	  
fingers	  of	  the	  Jew.”226	  	  Indeed	  he	  claims	  aggressively	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  need	  to	  first	  substantiate	  
the	  be-­‐Jewing	  of	  modern	  art;	  it	  springs	  to	  the	  eye,	  and	  thrusts	  upon	  the	  senses.”227	  	  For	  
Wagner,	  the	  Jew	  is	  an	  “unpleasant	  freak	  of	  Nature”	  whose	  outward	  appearance	  is	  so	  strikingly	  
ugly	  that	  “instinctively	  we	  wish	  to	  have	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  a	  man	  who	  looks	  like	  that.”228	  	  
Wagner	  is	  saying	  that	  Jews	  are	  monsters	  –	  freaks	  of	  nature	  who	  disgust	  and	  threaten	  other	  
people,	  making	  them	  anxious	  about	  physical	  appearance	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  individual	  and	  
collective	  identity.	  	  According	  to	  Wagner	  “a	  man	  whose	  appearance	  we	  must	  hold	  unfitted	  for	  
artistic	  treatment	  —	  not	  merely	  in	  this	  or	  that	  personality,	  but	  according	  to	  his	  kind	  in	  general	  
—	  neither	  can	  we	  hold	  him	  capable	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  artistic	  utterance	  of	  his	  [inner]	  essence.”229	  	  
Such	  statements	  are	  patently	  offensive,	  but	  they	  had	  even	  more	  dire	  implications	  for	  the	  theory	  
and	  practice	  of	  self-­‐representation	  by	  any	  Jewish	  artist.	  	  It	  was	  damning	  enough	  if	  Jews	  were	  
subjects	  whose	  physical	  appearance	  was	  so	  repulsive	  that	  it	  was	  somehow	  inappropriate	  –	  or	  
even	  impossible	  –	  to	  represent	  it	  in	  art.	  	  Wagner	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  more	  specifically,	  though,	  
that	  a	  Jewish	  person	  is	  incapable	  of	  artistically	  articulating	  any	  sense	  of	  essence,	  interiority,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225	  K.M.	  Knittel,	  Seeing	  Mahler:	  Music	  and	  the	  Language	  of	  Antisemitism	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  (Burlington:	  
Ashgate,	  2010),	  60.	  
226	  Wagner,	  “Judaism	  in	  Music,”	  81.	  
227	  Ibid.,	  82.	  
228	  Ibid.,	  83.	  
229	  Ibid.,	  83–4.	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personal	  identity	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  his	  or	  her	  “exterior	  can	  never	  be	  thinkable	  as	  a	  subject	  for	  
the	  art	  of	  re-­‐presentment.”230	  	  	  
But	  interestingly,	  in	  his	  essay	  Wagner	  insists	  that	  the	  reader	  –	  presumed	  Gentile	  –	  
should	  turn	  inward	  and	  get	  to	  know	  the	  source	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  “instinctive	  repugnance	  
against	  the	  Jew’s	  prime	  essence,”	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  “what	  we	  hate	  in	  that	  essence.”231	  	  
The	  specific	  logic	  of	  Wagner’s	  antisemitism	  is	  deeply	  psychological	  and	  fundamentally	  
intersubjective.	  	  According	  to	  Wagner	  what	  is	  particularly	  repulsive	  is	  contact	  with	  Jews,	  rather	  
than	  any	  abstract	  notion	  of	  Judaism	  –	  which	  he	  claims	  can	  in	  fact	  marshal	  some	  sympathy.	  	  
Wagner	  explains:	  
When	  we	  strove	  for	  emancipation	  of	  the	  Jews,	  however,	  we	  virtually	  were	  more	  the	  
champions	  of	  an	  abstract	  principle,	  than	  of	  a	  concrete	  case	  …	  we	  went	  for	  freedom	  of	  the	  
Folk	  without	  knowledge	  of	  that	  Folk	  itself	  [or]	  any	  real	  sympathy;	  for,	  with	  all	  our	  
speaking	  and	  writing	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Jews’	  emancipation,	  we	  always	  felt	  instinctively	  
repelled	  by	  any	  actual,	  operative	  contact	  with	  them.232	  	  
What	  Wagner	  aims	  to	  explore,	  then,	  is	  the	  “involuntary	  repellence”	  that	  a	  Gentiles	  ostensibly	  
experiences	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  Jew.233	   	  
Wagner’s	  claims	  had	  extraordinary	  resonance,	  disseminating	  widely	  and	  diffusively	  in	  
early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Some	  who	  had	  not	  necessarily	  read	  “Jewishness	  in	  Music”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	  Ibid.,	  83.	  
231	  Ibid.,	  82,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
232	  Ibid.,	  80.	  
233	  Ibid.,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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could	  nevertheless	  be	  found	  reproducing	  its	  style	  of	  rhetoric.	  	  Others,	  including	  Weininger,	  
were	  clearly	  influenced	  directly.	  	  And	  certainly	  Vienna’s	  illustrious	  community	  of	  Jewish	  
composers	  –	  Mahler,	  Schönberg,	  Alexander	  von	  Zemlinsky,	  etc.	  –	  knew	  this	  tract,	  too.	  	  	  
What	  an	  affront	  to	  be	  of	  Jewish	  descent	  reading	  that	  kind	  of	  vicious	  yet	  common	  and	  venerated	  
commentary!	  	  What	  must	  it	  have	  felt	  like?	  	  In	  a	  famous	  passage	  Schnitzler	  –	  a	  gifted	  the	  novelist	  
and	  playwright	  who	  was	  more	  outspoken	  than	  most	  about	  local	  antisemitism	  –	  describes	  the	  
way	  that	  he	  experienced	  his	  own	  subhuman	  status	  as	  a	  Jew	  in	  Vienna,	  how	  utterly	  impossible	  it	  
was	  to	  escape	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  atmosphere	  of	  hatred.	  	  He	  says	  that	  in	  Vienna	  a	  Jewish	  person	  
had	  the	  choice	  of	  being	  counted	  as	  insensitive,	  obtrusive	  and	  fresh;	  or	  of	  being	  
oversensitive,	  shy	  and	  suffering	  from	  feelings	  of	  persecution.	  	  And	  even	  if	  you	  somehow	  
managed	  to	  conduct	  yourself	  so	  that	  nothing	  showed,	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  remain	  
completely	  untouched;	  as	  for	  instance,	  a	  person	  may	  not	  remain	  unconcerned	  whose	  skin	  
has	  been	  anaesthetized	  but	  who	  has	  to	  watch,	  with	  his	  eyes	  open,	  how	  it	  is	  scratched	  by	  
an	  unclean	  knife,	  even	  cut	  into	  until	  the	  blood	  flows.234	  
And	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  antisemitism	  was	  such	  a	  pervasive	  part	  of	  quotidian	  Viennese	  life	  
that	  it	  cropped	  up	  everywhere	  and	  was	  usually	  thoroughly	  normalized	  –	  and	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
pernicious	  ways.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
The	  consistent	  conflation	  of	  hatred	  and	  ugliness	  in	  antisemitic	  discourse	  also	  very	  much	  
affected	  how	  people	  saw	  one	  another	  and	  themselves.	  	  Alma	  Mahler	  –	  a	  great	  source	  of	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  In	  Hannah	  S.	  Decker,	  Freud,	  Dora,	  and	  Vienna	  1900	  (Toronto:	  Collier	  Macmillan	  Canada,	  1991),	  37.	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historical	  information	  because	  of	  her	  voluminous	  diaries235	  and	  correspondence	  –	  describes	  her	  
own	  husband	  in	  atrociously	  antisemitic	  ways.	  	  She	  had	  also	  prevaricated	  prejudicially	  about	  
dating	  Zemlinsky	  because	  of	  his	  Jewishness.	  	  Her	  antisemitic	  ambivalence	  regarding	  Zemlinsky	  
included	  an	  obsessive	  concern	  with	  his	  so-­‐called	  ugliness;	  she	  referred	  to	  him	  in	  her	  diary	  as	  
“‘dreadfully	  ugly,	  almost	  chinless.’”	  	  And,	  when	  contemplating	  their	  possible	  future	  marriage,	  
declared:	  “‘how	  ridiculous	  it	  would	  look	  …	  he	  so	  ugly,	  so	  small	  –	  me	  so	  beautiful,	  so	  tall.’”	  	  Later	  
Alma	  decided	  not	  to	  marry	  Zemlinsky	  in	  part	  because	  of	  her	  horror	  at	  the	  idea	  “‘of	  bearing	  his	  
children	  –	  little	  degenerate	  Jew-­‐kids	  [kleine	  degenerierte].’”236	  	  	  
Clearly	  the	  Viennese	  take	  on	  “Jewish	  ugliness”	  was	  paranoid,	  and	  saw	  things	  –	  including	  
ugliness	  –	  that	  were	  not	  there.	  	  In	  Seeing	  Mahler:	  Music	  and	  the	  Language	  of	  Antisemitism	  in	  
Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  (2010)	  K.M.	  Knittel	  lists	  a	  variety	  of	  aspects	  of	  Mahler’s	  corporeality	  that	  
Alma	  obsesses	  over	  in	  her	  diaries,	  and	  discusses	  how	  distorted	  her	  descriptions	  can	  be.	  	  
Enumerating	  the	  contradictory	  range	  of	  Alma’s	  antisemitic	  concepts,	  Knittel	  concludes	  that	  
what	  we	  are	  seeing	  “looks	  more	  like	  a	  laundry	  list	  of	  Jewish	  traits	  than	  a	  description,	  a	  way	  of	  
voicing	  her	  own	  anxieties	  rather	  than	  necessarily	  describing	  Mahler	  himself.”237	  	  Such	  an	  
analysis	  has	  much	  broader	  applicability.	  	  Indeed	  the	  circularity	  of	  hateful	  Viennese	  discourse	  we	  
have	  seen	  thus	  far	  is	  striking:	  the	  paranoid	  person	  views	  the	  hated	  object	  –	  woman,	  Jew	  –	  as	  
both	  everything	  and	  nothing,	  which	  hopelessly	  muddles	  questions	  of	  causality.	  	  Jews	  have	  
taken	  over	  art,	  but	  not	  because	  they	  are	  creative,	  only	  because	  they	  are	  mimics;	  they	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	  The	  diaries	  chronicle	  the	  years	  1898–1902.	  
236	  Knittel,	  Seeing	  Mahler,	  39–40.	  
237	  Ibid.,	  42.	  	  Cf.	  also	  pp.	  35–46.	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therefore	  a	  clandestine	  threat	  capable	  of	  “passing”	  and	  convincing	  us	  they	  are	  true	  Germans.	  	  
Except	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  you	  can	  spot	  a	  Jew	  because	  he	  is	  marked	  by	  inferiority	  both	  inside	  
and	  out;	  his	  difference	  is	  repulsive	  and	  ugly	  because	  he	  is	  ignoble	  and	  incapable	  of	  the	  good.	  	  So	  
he’s	  ugly	  but	  so,	  so	  close,	  and	  you	  hate	  him	  like	  you	  hate	  the	  darkest	  parts	  of	  yourself.	  	  	  
This	  is	  a	  heady	  brew	  of	  hate	  here,	  presumably	  also	  a	  most	  disorienting	  draught	  for	  all	  –	  
and	  not	  only	  those	  directly	  attacked.	  	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  when	  Klimt’s	  faculty	  paintings	  
for	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  too	  ugly,	  they	  were	  called	  “Jewish”	  –	  even	  
though	  Klimt	  was	  not	  a	  Jew.	  	  We	  likewise	  know	  that	  Viennese	  art	  historian	  Franz	  Wickhoff	  was	  
incorrectly	  identified	  as	  Jewish	  when	  he	  delivered	  his	  defence	  of	  Philosophy,	  Klimt’s	  
purportedly	  ugly	  painting.	  	  Caricature	  constituted	  a	  pervasive	  cultural	  representation	  of	  so-­‐
called	  “Jewish	  ugliness”	  in	  Vienna.	  	  The	  Viennese	  popular	  press	  in	  was	  saturated	  with	  vicious	  
antisemitic	  sentiment,	  and	  caricature	  disseminated	  this	  message	  of	  hate	  –	  often	  with	  the	  
strategic	  use	  of	  ugliness.	  	  Viennese	  caricature	  also	  evinced	  the	  circularity	  of	  local	  discourse;	  for	  
example	  in	  the	  local	  humour	  magazine	  Floh	  a	  caricature	  titled	  “Lesson	  in	  Darwinian	  Evolution”	  
showed	  the	  composer	  Wagner	  developing,	  in	  stages,	  out	  of	  a	  stereotyped	  Jewish	  man.	  	  The	  
caricature	  barely	  makes	  sense:	  an	  unsympathetic	  –and	  evidently	  unimaginative	  –	  critic	  
transforms	  Wagner,	  a	  virulent	  antisemite,	  into	  part	  of	  the	  Jewry	  simply	  as	  a	  form	  of	  attack	  that	  
would	  be	  highly	  legible	  in	  contemporaneous	  culture.	  
	  
§	  
We	  have	  witnessed	  already	  the	  importance	  of	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  Character	  as	  a	  document	  of	  
self-­‐representation	  in	  Viennese	  modernism,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  anxieties	  about	  Jewish	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and	  sexed	  identity.	  	  In	  his	  article	  “Refashioning	  the	  Masculine	  Subject	  in	  Early	  Modernism:	  
Narratives	  of	  Self-­‐dissolution	  and	  Self-­‐construction	  in	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Literature,	  1900–
1914,”	  John	  E.	  Toews	  makes	  complex,	  insightful	  statements	  about	  Sex	  and	  Character	  that	  are	  
quite	  relevant	  to	  my	  own	  analysis	  as	  well.	  	  Toews	  refers	  to	  Sex	  and	  Character’s	  “distorting	  and	  
simplifying	  mirror,”	  which	  he	  says	  “welded	  together”	  the	  following	  three	  issues:	  “the	  
production	  of	  masculine	  identity	  out	  of	  universal	  bisexuality,”	  “the	  definition	  of	  the	  boundaries	  
of	  community	  or	  ‘home’	  through	  the	  projection	  of	  psychic	  division	  on	  to	  the	  relations	  between	  
social	  and	  cultural	  groups,”	  and	  “the	  problematic	  resolution	  of	  the	  intractable	  polarities	  of	  
historical	  existence	  in	  aesthetic	  or	  philosophical	  transcendence,	  in	  the	  translation	  of	  life	  into	  
art,	  of	  impure	  material	  and	  historical	  existence	  into	  abstract,	  spiritual	  form.”238	  
That	  middle	  term	  –	  the	  boundaries	  of	  community	  or	  “home”	  being	  set	  through	  a	  
splitting	  of	  the	  individual	  psyche	  and	  the	  projection	  of	  psychic	  divisions	  onto	  group	  identities	  
and	  relations	  –	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  problematic	  part	  of	  Viennese	  modernism.	  	  One	  
solution	  to	  this	  problem	  was	  Zionism,	  a	  movement	  of	  Jewish	  renewal	  that	  began	  in	  Vienna	  and	  
aimed	  at	  establishing	  an	  independent	  Jewish	  state.	  	  The	  artists,	  writers,	  and	  scientists	  discussed	  
here	  were	  largely	  averse	  to	  Zionism;	  Martin	  Buber	  was	  one	  of	  few	  exceptions,	  and	  even	  he	  
embraced	  Zionism	  in	  an	  individualistic	  and	  idiosyncratic	  way.	  	  Overall	  Zionism	  represented	  the	  
imagined	  future-­‐self	  of	  a	  people	  increasingly	  threatened	  with	  destruction.	  	  If	  we	  compare	  
Buber’s	  and	  Theodor	  Herzl’s	  forms	  of	  Zionism	  we	  see	  two	  different	  visions	  of	  salvation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  John	  E.	  Toews,	  “Refashioning	  the	  Masculine	  Subject	  in	  Early	  Modernism:	  Narratives	  of	  Self-­‐dissolution	  and	  Self-­‐
construction	  in	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Literature,	  1900–1914,”	  Modernism/Modernity	  4,	  no.	  1	  (1997):	  32.	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Buber	  was	  born	  in	  Vienna	  in	  1878,	  eight	  years	  after	  Weininger.	  	  He	  was	  brought	  up	  in	  
Lemberg	  (now	  Lviv,	  in	  the	  Western	  Ukraine),	  and	  returned	  to	  Vienna	  in	  1897	  to	  attend	  
university.	  	  Unlike	  so	  many	  Jewish	  contemporaries	  we	  examine	  here,	  Buber	  was	  born	  into	  a	  
family	  of	  observant	  rather	  than	  assimilated	  Jews.	  	  At	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  Buber	  worked	  
under	  the	  same	  philosophy	  professors	  who	  had	  supervised	  Weininger’s	  doctoral	  thesis.	  	  
Buber’s	  choice	  to	  study	  philosophy	  was	  somewhat	  unusual	  (for	  an	  observant	  Jew),	  and	  
reflected	  his	  intellectual	  precociousness	  and	  his	  early	  struggles	  with	  his	  Jewish	  heritage.	  	  	  
While	  at	  university	  Buber	  had	  aligned	  himself	  temporarily	  with	  the	  Jung	  Wien	  literary	  
aesthetes	  who,	  influenced	  by	  impressionism,	  symbolism,	  and	  –	  locally	  –	  by	  Mach’s	  theory	  of	  
sensation	  and	  critique	  of	  the	  self,	  developed	  a	  form	  of	  literary	  modernism	  that	  questioned	  the	  
nature	  of	  identity	  and	  reality.	  	  Karl	  Kraus	  was	  briefly	  associated	  with	  the	  group;	  its	  most	  well-­‐
known	  members	  are	  perhaps	  de	  facto	  spokesperson	  Bahr	  as	  well	  as	  Schnitzler,	  Peter	  Altenberg,	  
Richard	  Beer-­‐Hofmann,	  Hugo	  von	  Hofmannsthal,	  and	  Felix	  Salten.	  	  Buber	  and	  Kraus	  each	  
declared	  their	  independence	  from	  the	  Jung	  Wien	  group	  in	  1897,	  both	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  essay	  
criticizing	  the	  group’s	  psychology	  and	  style.239	  	  Buber’s	  essay,	  “On	  Viennese	  Literature,”	  
addressed	  a	  “crisis	  of	  personality”	  that	  he	  saw	  in	  Vienna	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  
Altenberg,	  von	  Hofmannsthal,	  Schnitzler,	  and	  Bahr.240	  	  Buber	  wrote	  an	  article	  on	  Nietzsche	  in	  
1900,	  and	  was	  tremendously	  influenced	  by	  the	  German	  philosopher’s	  ideas	  about	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  Kraus’s	  satirical	  essay	  was	  titled	  “The	  Demolished	  Literature”	  [Die	  demolirte	  Literatur]	  and	  disparaged	  the	  group	  
using	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  recent	  destruction	  of	  the	  Café	  Griensteidl	  where	  the	  members	  had	  coalesced.	  	  Kraus	  did	  not	  
name	  the	  men	  he	  was	  mocking	  but	  they	  were	  readily	  recognizable.	  	  Edward	  Timm,	  Karl	  Kraus,	  Apocalyptic	  Satirist:	  
Culture	  and	  Catastrophe	  in	  Habsburg	  Vienna	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  5.	  	  	  
240	  Gilya	  Gerda	  Schmidt,	  Martin	  Buber's	  Formative	  Years:	  From	  German	  Culture	  to	  Jewish	  Renewal,	  1897–1909	  
(Tuscaloosa:	  University	  of	  Alabama	  Press,	  1995),	  6–7.	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overcoming	  and	  self-­‐creation.	  	  Although	  Buber	  shared	  the	  Jung	  Wien	  concern	  with	  the	  
problems	  of	  selfhood	  and	  individuality	  –	  his	  dissertation	  was	  entitled	  “Contributions	  to	  the	  
History	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  Individuation”	  –	  Buber’s	  solutions	  were	  dialogical	  rather	  than	  
solipsistic,	  and	  ultimately	  he	  was	  community	  oriented.	  	  By	  1902	  Buber	  was	  editing	  Die	  Welt,	  the	  
Zionist	  paper	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  writer	  Theodor	  Herzl	  had	  founded	  in	  1897,	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  
what	  Buber	  called	  a	  “Jewish	  renaissance.”241	  	  
Herzl,	  who	  was	  born	  eighteen	  years	  earlier	  than	  Buber	  into	  an	  assimilated	  Jewish	  family,	  
had	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  his	  1896	  text	  Der	  Judenstaat	  [translated	  as	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Jews	  or	  The	  
Jewish	  State]	  that	  he	  considered	  the	  Jewish	  question	  to	  be	  neither	  a	  social	  nor	  a	  religious	  
question,	  but	  rather	  a	  national	  one.	  	  Whereas	  Herzl’s	  political	  Zionism	  emphasized	  a	  separate	  
Jewish	  state	  –	  Israel	  –	  over	  and	  above	  religious	  or	  cultural	  concerns,	  Buber’s	  cultural	  Zionism	  
did	  just	  the	  opposite:	  	  cultural	  Zionists	  were	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent	  accepting	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  
the	  Jewish	  diaspora,	  and	  emphasized	  common	  concerns	  (for	  example	  language	  and	  art)	  and	  
religious	  identity	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  Zionism.	  	  When	  Herzl	  died	  in	  1904,	  Ahad	  Ha’am,	  
representative	  of	  the	  cultural	  Zionist	  movement,	  took	  a	  leadership	  role	  in	  the	  World	  Zionist	  
Organization	  and	  cultural	  Zionism	  gained	  in	  power	  and	  popularity.	  	  	  
In	  Buber’s	  collected	  writings	  The	  Jewish	  Movement	  –	  Collected	  Essays	  and	  Speeches	  
1900–1915	  [Die	  jüdische	  Bewegung	  –	  	  gesammelte	  Aufsätze	  und	  Ansprachen	  1900–1915],	  
published	  in	  1916,	  the	  author	  jubilantly	  exhorts:	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  Jacques	  Le	  Rider,	  Modernity	  and	  Crises	  of	  Identity:	  Culture	  and	  Society	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,	  trans.	  Rosemary	  
Morris	  (New	  York:	  Continuum,	  1993),	  289.	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Create!	  	  The	  Zionist	  who	  feels	  all	  the	  sanctity	  of	  that	  word,	  and	  lives	  by	  it,	  is	  a	  man	  of	  the	  
highest	  stature	  in	  my	  eyes.	  	  To	  create	  new	  works	  out	  of	  the	  depths	  of	  an	  ancestral	  
singularity,	  the	  unique	  and	  incomparable	  force	  of	  blood,	  so	  long	  in	  chains	  and	  reduced	  to	  
unproductiveness,	  that	  is	  the	  ideal	  we	  must	  lay	  before	  the	  Jewish	  people.242	  	  
But	  Buber’s	  positive	  vision	  of	  a	  collective	  affirmation	  of	  Jewish	  identity	  did	  not	  convince	  many	  
Viennese	  Jews	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  On	  the	  contrary	  many	  Jewish	  figures	  represented	  
themselves	  not	  jubilantly	  like	  Buber	  but	  rather	  with	  self-­‐sacrificing	  tones,	  like	  Weininger	  –	  
whom	  the	  Nazi	  politician	  Dietrich	  Eckart	  would	  later	  praise	  as	  the	  only	  decent	  Jew.243	  	  
	  
§	  
Some,	  like	  Freud,	  still	  hoped	  for	  the	  success	  of	  assimilation	  and	  the	  political	  liberalism	  of	  the	  
past,	  despite	  the	  increasingly	  antisemitic	  and	  conservative	  climate.	  	  Karl	  Lueger,	  the	  insistent	  
yet	  boldly	  inconsistent	  antisemite	  who	  infamously	  declared:	  “I	  decide	  who	  is	  a	  Jew,”	  became	  
the	  mayor	  of	  the	  city	  in	  1897,	  the	  same	  year	  Herzl	  founded	  his	  Zionist	  paper	  Die	  Welt.	  	  In	  a	  
classic	  instance	  of	  Viennese	  antagonism,	  Franz	  Joseph	  refused	  to	  ratify	  the	  1895	  vote	  for	  the	  
antisemitic	  Lueger	  until	  1897.	  	  Freud	  famously	  lit	  a	  cigar	  in	  celebration,	  but	  the	  future	  was	  
bleak.	  	  When	  Lueger	  was	  finally	  ratified	  as	  mayor	  he	  described	  the	  Jewish	  threat	  to	  society	  by	  
comparing	  Jewish	  people	  unfavourably	  to	  predatory	  animals:	  “‘Wolves,	  lions,	  panthers,	  
leopards,	  and	  tigers	  are	  human	  next	  to	  these	  beasts	  of	  prey	  in	  human	  form.’”244	  	  And	  Hitler,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  In	  Le	  Rider,	  Modernity	  and	  Crises	  of	  Identity,	  292.	  
243	  Hamann,	  Hitler’s	  Vienna,	  230.	  
244	  in	  Cernuschi,	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka,	  133.	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who	  would	  later	  “credit”	  Vienna	  as	  the	  city	  that	  taught	  him	  how	  to	  be	  an	  antisemite,	  relocated	  
to	  Vienna	  in	  1905.245	  	  In	  this	  hostile	  context,	  it	  was	  not	  only	  Weininger,	  who	  projected	  his	  own	  
traumatic	  Jewish	  identity-­‐as-­‐destiny	  onto	  others,	  but	  also	  more	  ambivalently	  Jewish	  men	  such	  
as	  Freud,	  Schnitzler,	  and	  Schönberg	  who	  eschewed	  Zionism.	  	  	  
It	  was	  not	  until	  1926,	  in	  a	  famous	  letter	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Lodge	  of	  B’nai	  B’rith	  on	  the	  
occasion	  of	  the	  psychoanalyst’s	  seventieth	  birthday,	  that	  Freud	  finally	  explicitly	  addressed	  the	  
issue	  of	  his	  Jewishness	  and	  his	  sense	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  Jewish	  identity	  both	  personally	  and	  
collectively.	  	  Rejecting	  a	  religious	  or	  national	  basis	  for	  his	  connection	  with	  Jewry,	  Freud	  claimed	  
instead	  that	  what	  made	  Judaism	  and	  Jews	  “irresistible”	  to	  him	  was	  “the	  clear	  consciousness	  of	  
an	  inner	  identity,	  the	  familiarity	  of	  the	  same	  psychological	  structure.”246	  	  And	  four	  years	  later	  
Freud	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Dr	  Chaim	  Koffler	  at	  the	  Keren	  Hayesod	  (the	  Foundation	  Fund	  for	  Israel)	  
explicitly	  stating	  that	  he	  would	  not	  support	  political	  Zionism’s	  goal	  to	  make	  Palestine	  a	  Jewish	  
state.	  	  He	  stated	  that	  while	  he	  was	  “proud”	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Jewish	  University	  of	  
Jerusalem	  and	  “delighted	  with	  our	  settlement’s	  prosperity,”	  that	  he	  could	  “raise	  no	  sympathy	  
at	  all	  for	  the	  misdirected	  piety	  which	  transforms	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  Herodian	  wall	  into	  a	  national	  relic,	  
thereby	  offending	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  natives.”	  	  This	  comment	  makes	  clear	  that	  while	  Freud	  may	  
have	  become	  sympathetic	  to	  Buber’s	  notion	  of	  “ancestral	  singularity,”	  he	  was	  not	  partial	  to	  
Herzl’s	  political	  Zionism.247	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Adolf	  Hitler,	  Mein	  Kampf	  (Boston:	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  1998),	  64.	  
246	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  XX,	  271–4.	  
247	  The	  letter	  (26	  February	  1930)	  is	  not	  in	  the	  Standard	  Edition,	  and	  has	  therefore	  been	  reproduced	  on	  the	  website	  
of	  the	  Freud	  Museum,	  London:	  http://www.freud.org.uk/education/blog/40082/the-­‐arab-­‐israeli-­‐conflict/.	  	  
Accessed	  28	  December	  2014.	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By	  contrast	  Schnitzler’s	  novel	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  [Der	  Weg	  ins	  Freie]	  “was	  
immediately	  perceived	  as	  a	  ‘Jewish’	  novel	  and	  appropriated	  for	  the	  Zionist	  cause.”248	  	  	  This	  was	  
an	  ironically	  inappropriate	  appropriation	  in	  light	  of	  Schnitzler’s	  at-­‐best	  skeptical	  attitude	  toward	  
Zionism.	  	  Schnitzler,	  whose	  father	  was	  a	  doctor	  and	  mother	  a	  doctor’s	  daughter,	  was	  born	  in	  
1862,	  six	  years	  after	  Freud	  –	  who	  famously	  described	  Schnitzler	  as	  his	  own	  Doppelgänger.	  	  The	  
young	  Schnitzler	  began	  studying	  medicine	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  in	  1879	  at	  the	  age	  of	  
seventeen,	  and	  by	  1885	  had	  received	  his	  doctorate	  of	  medicine	  and	  was	  working	  in	  the	  city’s	  
general	  hospital.	  	  Although	  they	  came	  from	  different	  class	  backgrounds	  and	  ultimately	  pursued	  
different	  careers,	  there	  is	  much	  to	  link	  Schnitzler	  and	  Freud	  –	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  is	  their	  
frank	  treatment	  of	  sexuality	  and	  pessimistic	  but	  penetrating	  insights	  into	  human	  nature.	  	  
Schnitzler	  also	  read	  Freud	  avidly.249	  	  	  Schnitzler’s	  written	  works	  can	  be	  considered	  
psychoanalytic	  documents	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  so	  richly	  detailed	  and	  insightful	  are	  his	  
characters’	  psychological	  “case	  histories.”	  	  Evidently	  Freud	  also	  read	  Schnitzler	  and	  noted	  this,	  
as	  he	  ruefully	  commented	  that	  Schnitzler	  was	  instinctively	  aware	  of	  psychological	  principles	  
that	  Freud	  himself	  had	  worked	  laboriously	  to	  bring	  to	  light.250	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248	  Iris	  Bruce,	  “Which	  Way	  Out?	  Schnitzler’s	  and	  Salten’s	  Conflicting	  Responses	  to	  Cultural	  Zionism,”	  in	  A	  
Companion	  to	  the	  Works	  of	  Arthur	  Schnitzler,	  ed.	  Dagmar	  C.G.	  Lorenz	  (Rochester:	  Camden	  House,	  2003),	  103.	  
249	  Lorenzo	  Belletini,	  “Freud’s	  Contribution	  to	  Arthur	  Schnitzler’s	  Prose	  Style,”	  Rocky	  Mountain	  Review	  61,	  no.	  2	  
(Fall	  2007):	  11.	  
250	  In	  a	  14	  May	  1922	  letter	  Freud	  wrote	  to	  Schnitzler	  on	  Schnitzler’s	  sixtieth	  birthday.	  	  In	  Ernest	  Jones,	  The	  Life	  and	  
Work	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  Volume	  3:	  The	  Last	  Phase	  1919–1939	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1957),	  Appendix	  A	  443–4.	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In	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  Schnitzler	  represents	  both	  self	  and	  society.	  	  Ostensibly	  the	  main	  
character	  in	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  is	  Georg,	  a	  dilettantish	  Gentile	  composer	  who	  spends	  
much	  of	  his	  time	  in	  the	  company	  of	  Vienna’s	  artistic	  assimilated	  Jews.	  	  Georg	  is	  
characteristically	  ambivalent	  about	  the	  Jewishness	  of	  his	  friends	  –	  as	  they	  very	  often	  are	  about	  
their	  own	  Jewishness	  as	  well.	  	  Georg	  views	  his	  Jewish	  writer	  friend	  Heinrich,	  for	  example,	  with	  a	  
mixture	  of	  “sympathy	  and	  revulsion.”251	  	  He	  is	  repelled	  by	  Heinrich’s	  moments	  of	  emotional	  
vulnerability,	  and	  his	  reactions	  are	  consistently	  inflected	  by	  an	  ambivalent	  antisemitism.	  	  This	  
ambivalence	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  corollary	  of	  Heinrich’s	  own	  ambivalent	  Jewishness.	  	  Rather	  
than	  rejecting	  his	  friend’s	  prejudice,	  Heinrich	  internalizes	  Georg’s	  feelings	  of	  disgust	  and	  
lambastes	  himself	  intently	  whenever	  he	  feels	  he	  has	  betrayed	  his	  desire	  for	  acceptance.	  
Heinrich	  constantly	  vacillates	  between	  trying	  to	  open	  up	  emotionally	  to	  his	  friend	  Georg,	  and	  
rejecting	  his	  –	  and	  indeed,	  all	  –	  human	  fellowship.	  	  For	  both	  characters,	  the	  very	  question	  of	  
who	  deserves	  to	  be	  loved	  and	  why,	  versus	  who	  deserves	  to	  be	  hated	  and	  why,	  is	  inextricably	  
intertwined	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  Jewish	  question.	  	  In	  a	  long	  passage	  worth	  quoting	  in	  its	  entirety	  
Heinrich	  muses	  to	  Georg	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  race	  itself,	  and	  insists:	  
“Every	  race	  as	  such	  is	  naturally	  repulsive.	  	  Only	  the	  individual	  is	  able	  sometimes,	  through	  
personal	  strengths,	  to	  reconcile	  himself	  to	  the	  repulsiveness	  of	  his	  race.	  	  But	  that	  I’m	  
particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  failings	  of	  Jews,	  I	  will	  not	  at	  all	  deny.	  	  Possibly	  it	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  I,	  we	  all,	  we	  Jews	  I	  mean,	  have	  been	  systematically	  raised	  with	  this	  sensitivity.	  	  From	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





our	  youth	  on	  we	  have	  been	  driven	  to	  see	  precisely	  Jewish	  characteristics	  as	  especially	  
comical	  or	  repulsive,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  equally	  comical	  or	  repulsive	  
characteristics	  of	  others.	  	  And	  I	  won’t	  conceal	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  a	  Jew	  behaves	  crudely	  or	  
comically	  in	  my	  presence,	  sometimes	  such	  a	  painful	  feeling	  seizes	  me	  that	  I	  want	  to	  die,	  
to	  sink	  into	  the	  earth	  …	  Perhaps	  the	  whole	  thing	  is	  just	  egotism.	  	  It’s	  exasperating	  that	  
one	  is	  continually	  made	  responsible	  for	  the	  mistakes	  of	  others,	  that	  one	  must	  atone	  for	  
every	  offense,	  for	  every	  crudity,	  for	  every	  thoughtless	  act	  that	  any	  Jew	  in	  the	  world	  makes	  
himself	  guilty	  of.	  	  Naturally	  one	  easily	  becomes	  unjust.	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  nervousness,	  
sensitivity,	  nothing	  more.	  	  One	  comes	  to	  one’s	  sense	  again.	  	  Once	  can’t	  call	  that	  anti-­‐
Semitism.	  	  But	  there	  are	  Jews	  who	  I	  really	  hate,	  hate	  as	  Jews.	  	  They	  are	  those	  who	  behave	  
in	  front	  of	  others,	  and	  sometimes	  among	  themselves,	  as	  if	  they	  weren’t	  Jews	  at	  all.	  	  Who	  
try	  to	  appease	  their	  enemies	  and	  despisers	  in	  a	  cheap,	  cringing	  manner	  and	  think	  they	  
can	  ransom	  themselves	  like	  this	  from	  the	  eternal	  curse,	  which	  weighs	  on	  them,	  or	  from	  
that	  which	  they	  only	  feel	  as	  a	  curse.	  	  They	  are,	  by	  the	  way,	  almost	  always	  the	  kind	  of	  Jews	  
who	  go	  around	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  their	  own	  highly	  personal	  worthlessness,	  and	  consciously	  
or	  unconsciously	  want	  to	  make	  their	  race	  responsible	  for	  it.	  	  Naturally	  it	  doesn’t	  help	  
them	  in	  the	  slightest.	  	  What	  has	  ever	  helped	  the	  Jews	  at	  all?	  The	  good	  and	  the	  bad.	  	  
Naturally	  I	  mean,”	  he	  added	  quickly,	  “those	  who	  need	  something	  like	  outward	  or	  inward	  
help.”	  	  And	  with	  a	  deliberately	  light	  tone	  he	  broke	  off.	  	  “Yes,	  my	  dear	  Georg,	  the	  matter	  is	  
rather	  complicated,	  and	  it’s	  quite	  natural	  that	  all	  those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  to	  deal	  directly	  
with	  the	  question	  lack	  the	  right	  understanding	  for	  it.’	  ‘Well,	  one	  may	  not	  so	  ...	  ”	  	  Heinrich	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interrupted	  him	  immediately.	  	  “One	  may	  indeed,	  dear	  Georg.	  	  That’s	  the	  way	  it	  is.	  	  You	  
don’t	  understand	  us.”252	  
So	  sure	  is	  Heinrich	  that	  he	  cannot	  be	  understood	  and	  is	  not	  worthy	  of	  love	  that	  he	  decides	  it	  is	  
better	  to	  seek	  “no	  one’s	  trust,	  no	  one’s	  sympathy.”253	  	  The	  points	  of	  resonance	  between	  
Heinrich’s	  description	  of	  ambivalent	  Jewishness	  in	  antisemitic	  Vienna	  and	  Weininger’s	  
discussion	  of	  Jewishness	  and	  society	  in	  Sex	  and	  Character	  are	  striking,	  and	  sad.	  	  	  
As	  Iris	  Bruce	  points	  out,	  in	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  the	  solution	  of	  radical	  individualism	  
“may	  seem	  politically	  naïve	  for	  readers	  today	  in	  view	  of	  the	  Final	  Solution	  thirty	  years	  later.”254	  	  
But	  failure	  –	  political	  and	  aesthetic,	  personal	  and	  collective	  –	  is	  part	  of	  the	  point,	  and	  	  “in	  the	  
telling	  of	  this	  unresolved	  cyclical	  story	  Schnitzler	  also	  told	  a	  story	  of	  its	  cultural	  and	  social	  
contexts,	  of	  the	  conditions	  which	  made	  the	  ambivalences	  and	  apparent	  failures	  of	  his	  
characters	  understandable.”255	  	  Schnitzler	  also	  “clearly	  imagines	  [Georg]	  Wergenthin	  and	  
[Heinrich]	  Bermann	  as	  two	  variations	  on	  modern	  art”	  in	  Vienna,	  although	  –	  notably	  –	  “he	  does	  
not	  condemn	  or	  promote	  either.”256	  	  Georg,	  the	  musician,	  represents	  the	  unconscious	  aspect	  of	  
art	  and	  culture	  that	  so	  consternates	  Weininger:	  his	  artistic	  consciousness	  is	  impressionistic,	  
experiential,	  and	  his	  creativity	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  “primordial,	  maternal	  sensuality.”257	  	  Heinrich	  lives	  
in	  the	  world	  of	  logos,	  and	  is	  motivated	  by	  “incessant	  analysis,”	  “total	  consciousness,”	  and	  the	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“self-­‐confidence	  [that]	  comes	  from	  the	  conviction	  that	  he	  is	  ‘able	  to	  see	  into	  the	  human	  
soul.’”258	  	  Loosely	  speaking	  Georg	  represents	  the	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  artistic	  style	  of	  the	  Jung	  Wien	  
writers	  or,	  in	  visual	  art,	  of	  the	  Secession	  –	  the	  diffuse,	  “feminine”	  aspect	  of	  modernity	  –	  
whereas	  Heinrich	  represents	  the	  critical	  focus	  and	  trenchant	  masculinity	  of	  figures	  like	  
Weininger	  or	  Kraus.	  	  Schnitzler	  himself	  contained	  both	  kinds	  of	  impulse	  and	  ability,	  and	  this	  is	  
perhaps	  the	  quality	  he	  does	  share	  with	  Buber:	  his	  dialogism.	  
Without	  being	  didactic	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  poignantly	  portrays	  how	  affected	  
everyone	  was	  by	  Viennese	  antisemitism.	  	  Through	  his	  characters	  Schnitzler	  explores	  a	  variety	  of	  
critical	  political	  positions	  in	  response	  to	  malignant	  Viennese	  modernism.	  	  Several	  different	  
scenes	  in	  the	  novel	  detail	  impassioned	  arguments	  between	  Jewish	  protagonists	  about	  the	  rise	  
of	  Zionism,	  and	  characters	  evince	  a	  real	  fear	  that	  Zionism	  will	  destroy	  what	  little	  liberty	  and	  
tolerance	  they	  currently	  enjoy	  as	  Viennese	  Jews.	  	  Buber’s	  joyful	  call	  for	  collective	  Jewish	  
identity	  and	  community	  falls	  largely	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  
I	  want	  to	  underscore	  Toews’s	  observation	  that	  “although	  Schnitzler’s	  literary	  reputation	  
in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  had	  been	  built	  on	  his	  short	  stories	  and	  dramas,”	  Schnitzler	  
himself	  considered	  The	  Road	  into	  The	  Open	  “the	  culminating	  work	  of	  his	  literary	  career.”259	  	  
Already	  in	  1906,	  two	  years	  before	  he	  finished	  his	  novel,	  Schnitzler	  “imagined	  it	  as	  a	  
representative	  epic	  of	  his	  age,	  a	  work	  that	  would	  take	  its	  place	  in	  the	  line	  of	  great	  German	  
novels	  from	  Wilhelm	  Meister	  to	  Buddenbrooks.”	  	  Apparently	  Schnitzler	  also	  became	  
increasingly	  unable	  to	  separate	  his	  own	  identity	  from	  those	  of	  his	  characters,	  his	  own	  life	  from	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the	  life	  of	  the	  novel.	  	  “Reading	  parts	  of	  it	  in	  progress	  to	  his	  wife,	  he	  found	  himself	  choking	  back	  
his	  tears,	  and	  when	  he	  was	  finished	  he	  noted	  not	  only	  his	  pride	  in	  his	  accomplishment,	  but	  also	  
his	  yearning	  to	  ‘return’	  to	  the	  novel,	  as	  if	  it	  was	  his	  only	  satisfactory	  home	  in	  a	  homeless	  world.”	  	  
Toews	  argues	  that	  “as	  in	  Freud’s	  case	  studies,”	  Schnitzler’s	  identification	  with	  his	  subject	  
“emerged	  from	  the	  attempt	  to	  work	  through	  and	  master	  his	  own	  experience.”	  	  Toews	  
concludes	  persuasively:	  “Schnitzler’s	  autobiography	  and	  recently	  published	  diaries	  reveal	  
remarkable	  personal	  analogies	  …	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  novel	  worked,	  again	  like	  Freud’s	  case	  
studies,	  as	  a	  process	  of	  both	  therapeutic	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  self-­‐construction.”260	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In	  Freud,	  Dora,	  and	  Vienna	  1900	  Hannah	  Decker	  emphasizes	  the	  local	  hostility	  to	  Zionism.	  	  
Decker	  repeats	  renowned	  Viennese	  writer	  Stefan	  Zweig’s	  observations	  regarding	  “‘the	  general	  
astonishment	  and	  annoyance	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  Jewish	  circles	  of	  Vienna’	  at	  the	  publication	  of	  
Herzl’s	  The	  Jewish	  State	  …	  It	  was	  labelled	  ‘this	  piece	  of	  nonsense,	  this	  obtuse	  tract.’”	  	  According	  
to	  Decker	  no	  fewer	  than	  500	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Jewish	  communities	  even	  “petitioned	  the	  
emperor	  to	  outlaw	  Zionism	  as	  a	  godless	  movement.”261	  	  In	  his	  autobiography	  The	  World	  of	  
Yesterday	  Zweig	  also	  made	  notably	  nostalgic	  comments	  –	  comments	  that	  are	  now	  invoked	  
repeatedly	  in	  debates	  about	  Vienna’s	  antisemitism	  –	  that	  as	  a	  Jew	  he	  lived	  “well,	  lightly,	  and	  
without	  a	  care”	  in	  the	  capital	  city.	  	  Some	  scholars	  hold	  such	  comments,	  as	  well	  as	  gestures	  like	  
the	  aforementioned	  petitioning,	  up	  as	  proof	  that	  there	  was	  no	  antisemitism	  problem	  in	  Vienna.	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And	  yet	  is	  it	  really	  that	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  such	  comments,	  and	  those	  500	  petitions,	  as	  gestures	  
of	  self-­‐protection?	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  these	  were	  dark	  days;	  Zweig	  began	  his	  
autobiography	  in	  1934,	  and	  he	  and	  his	  wife	  committed	  suicide	  the	  day	  it	  was	  posted	  to	  Zweig’s	  
publisher	  in	  1942.262	   	  
Conflict	  and	  contradiction	  were	  inevitable	  in	  a	  city	  in	  which	  citizens	  frequently	  could	  not	  
communicate.	  	  Indeed	  Allan	  Janik	  observes:	  “it	  is	  not	  wholly	  accidental	  that	  Franz	  Kafka’s	  The	  
Trial	  was	  written	  under	  the	  Dual	  Monarchy.”	  	  The	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  monarchy	  of	  Habsburgs	  
ruled	  over	  an	  “empire	  of	  fifty	  million	  speaking	  eleven	  official	  languages,	  not	  to	  mention	  
dialects.”263	  	  And	  although	  Holy	  Roman	  Emperor	  Joseph	  II	  had	  “proclaimed	  German	  the	  
universal	  language	  of	  the	  empire”	  in	  1784,	  his	  “insistence	  that	  local	  languages	  disappear	  only	  
guaranteed	  their	  survival.”264	  	  Yiddish	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “kitchen	  language,”265	  and	  Sander	  
Gilman	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  Vienna	  specifically	  the	  slang	  term	  for	  clitoris	  was	  “little	  Jew”	  and	  
the	  slang	  phrase	  for	  masturbation	  was	  “playing	  with	  the	  Jew.”266	  	  In	  both	  examples	  –	  Yiddish	  
being	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “kitchen	  language”	  and	  the	  trope	  of	  “the	  Jew”	  being	  used	  in	  sexual	  slang	  
–	  we	  see	  the	  misogynistic	  feminization	  of	  Jewishness.	  	  The	  Viennese	  psychoanalyst	  Otto	  
Fenichel	  opined	  that	  the	  “‘average	  German	  regards	  Jewish	  language	  and	  dress	  not	  only	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262	  For	  more	  on	  Zweig	  and	  nostalgia	  see	  Steven	  Beller,	  “The	  World	  of	  Yesterday	  Revisited:	  Nostalgia,	  Memory,	  and	  
the	  Jews	  of	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna,”	  Jewish	  Social	  Studies	  2,	  no.	  2	  (Winter	  1996):	  37–53.	  
263	  Allan	  Janik,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  Revisited	  (New	  Brunswick:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  2001),	  3,	  emphasis	  added.	  
264	  Johnston,	  The	  Austrian	  Mind,	  17.	  
265	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‘strange,’	  but	  as	  a	  caricature,	  a	  ridiculing	  of	  his	  own	  language	  and	  dress.’”	  	  Indeed	  Fenichel	  said	  
that	  Jewish	  language	  was	  viewed	  as	  “‘German	  in	  an	  ugly	  disguise.’”267	  	  	  
Without	  a	  common	  language	  or	  co-­‐operation	  between	  government	  and	  monarchy	  in	  
Vienna,	  parliamentary	  procedure	  became	  a	  bad	  joke.	  	  The	  cosmopolitan	  and	  diverse	  yet	  
xenophobic	  and	  paranoid	  imperial	  capital	  became	  the	  base	  for	  an	  urgently	  needed	  language	  
critique	  [Sprachkritik]	  –	  out	  of	  which	  Viennese	  figures	  such	  as	  Kraus	  and	  Wittgenstein	  made	  
celebrated	  careers.	  	  And	  Freud	  made	  his	  vocation	  out	  of	  the	  Viennese	  identity	  crises	  that	  
likewise	  resulted,	  in	  part,	  from	  all	  this	  chaotic	  diversity.	  	  But	  Freud	  usually	  refrained	  from	  
referencing	  antisemitism	  directly	  in	  his	  works.	  	  	  
Nevertheless	  Freud’s	  1905	  text	  Jokes	  and	  their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious	  functioned	  in	  
significant	  respects	  as	  his	  covert	  response	  to	  the	  antisemitism	  of	  his	  native	  city.	  	  There	  is	  a	  
notorious	  story	  from	  Freud’s	  childhood	  in	  which	  he	  goes	  out	  for	  a	  walk	  with	  his	  father,	  who	  
wants	  to	  convince	  him	  how	  much	  the	  situation	  has	  improved	  for	  Viennese	  Jews	  by	  way	  of	  a	  
personal	  recollection	  of	  prior	  persecution.	  	  As	  a	  young	  man,	  Freud’s	  father	  tells	  the	  young	  
Sigmund,	  he	  set	  out	  on	  a	  Saturday	  walk	  with	  a	  new	  fur	  hat	  feeling	  very	  pleased	  with	  himself.	  	  
But	  his	  ebullience	  was	  soon	  trounced	  when	  a	  Christian	  came	  up	  to	  him,	  knocked	  his	  hat	  off	  his	  
head	  “into	  the	  muck,”	  and	  yelled:	  “Jew,	  off	  the	  sidewalk!”268	  	  Although	  this	  story	  was	  intended	  
to	  be	  encouraging,	  it	  made	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  Freud	  –	  and	  understandably	  so.	  	  Apparently	  as	  
a	  boy	  Freud	  was	  repelled	  by	  his	  father’s	  cowardice	  in	  this	  incident,	  and	  so	  the	  story	  is	  usually	  
brought	  up	  in	  connection	  with	  Freud’s	  own	  Oedipal	  struggles.	  	  But	  Freud’s	  subsequent	  fantasies	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of	  revenge	  and	  omnipotence	  –	  fantasies	  that	  played	  important	  parts	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  
psychoanalysis	  itself	  –	  were	  also	  inextricably	  intertwined	  with	  his	  specific	  experience	  as	  an	  
ambivalent	  Jewish	  person	  in	  antisemitic	  Vienna.	  
	  
§	  
Jokes	  and	  their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious	  is	  the	  least	  known	  of	  Freud’s	  books,	  as	  Freud’s	  
biographer	  Ernest	  Jones	  has	  noted.269	  	  The	  book	  developed	  out	  of	  Freud’s	  collection	  of	  Jewish	  
jokes,	  and	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  Fliess’s	  complaint	  that	  the	  draft	  of	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams	  he	  
was	  reading	  contained	  too	  many	  jokes.	  	  Fliess’s	  comment	  spurred	  the	  contrarian	  Freud	  to	  
devote	  an	  entire	  book	  to	  jokes.	  	  But	  it	  was	  a	  jocular	  sort	  of	  contrarianism	  because	  really,	  in	  a	  
brilliant	  marriage	  of	  form	  and	  content,	  “Freud’s	  theory	  of	  jokes	  is	  itself	  a	  kind	  of	  joke.”	  	  Unlike	  
many	  of	  Freud’s	  other	  texts,	  Jokes	  was	  never	  significantly	  revised.	  	  In	  fact	  he	  returned	  to	  the	  
topic	  only	  once	  more	  in	  his	  career,	  in	  a	  short	  1927	  essay	  on	  humour.	  	  Thus	  like	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  
and	  Character	  Freud’s	  1905	  text	  serves	  as	  an	  interesting	  historical	  record	  of	  Viennese	  culture	  
and	  society	  and	  gives	  us	  insight	  into	  contemporaneous	  associations	  between	  identity,	  hostility,	  
humour,	  and	  ugliness.	  
John	  Carey	  says	  that	  Freud	  describes	  “humour	  as	  our	  way	  of	  obtaining	  pleasure	  despite	  
distressing	  feelings.”270	  	  Actually	  Freud	  claims	  even	  more	  specifically	  that	  we	  produce	  humour	  
“instead	  of	  getting	  angry.”271	  	  This	  psychological	  reaction	  is	  necessary,	  according	  to	  Freud,	  in	  a	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civilization	  that	  is	  “more	  and	  more	  robbing	  us	  …	  of	  the	  capacity	  for	  feeling	  angry.”272	  	  In	  
response	  to	  antisemitic	  discourses	  about	  the	  parsimony	  of	  Jews,	  for	  example,	  “Freud’s	  reply	  
was	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  laughter	  is	  itself	  parsimony,	  a	  saving	  of	  the	  effort	  usually	  spent	  on	  
emotions	  or	  inhibitions.”273	  	  	  
Jokes	  thus	  make	  “aggressiveness	  or	  criticism	  possible,”	  and	  are	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  
fundamentally	  rebellious	  gestures.274	  	  The	  pessimist,	  individualist	  Freud	  links	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  
community	  to	  coercion	  and	  compromise	  in	  Jokes.	  	  He	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  negative	  
affects	  to	  identity	  formation	  even	  more	  clearly	  five	  years	  later,	  in	  a	  panel	  discussion	  of	  the	  
Vienna	  Psychoanalytic	  Society	  on	  the	  prevalence	  of	  student	  suicide.	  	  Here	  Freud	  bitterly	  blamed	  
schools	  for	  punishing	  and	  repressing	  “individuals	  who	  cannot	  be	  denied	  a	  right	  to	  linger	  at	  
certain	  stages	  of	  development	  and	  even	  at	  certain	  disagreeable	  ones.”275	  
Acknowledging	  Freud’s	  use	  of	  generally	  misanthropic	  and	  often	  specifically	  antisemitic	  
jokes	  in	  Jokes	  and	  Their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious,	  Carey	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  jokes	  Freud	  
collected	  were	  	  
from	  the	  outset	  …	  jokes	  about	  Jews,	  and	  though	  he	  does	  not	  restrict	  his	  treatise	  to	  these,	  
his	  specimen	  jokes	  reflect	  a	  society	  dominated	  by	  money,	  resentment,	  disparagement,	  
scandal,	  insult,	  cruelty,	  social	  rank	  and	  –	  in	  its	  figuration	  of	  Jews	  –	  offensive	  racial	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stereotypes.	  	  It	  is	  a	  living	  proof	  of	  the	  “saving	  of	  expenditure	  on	  feeling”	  that,	  in	  his	  
theory,	  underlies	  humour	  –	  not	  least	  anti-­‐Jewish	  humour.276	  
In	  addition	  to	  hate	  and	  hostility,	  physical	  ugliness	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  Freud	  
discusses	  in	  the	  production	  of	  laughter.	  	  Deformity,	  obesity,	  age,	  disability,	  and	  the	  
exaggeration	  of	  other	  allegedly	  unappealing	  physical	  characteristics	  undergird	  Freud’s	  entire	  
joke	  theory.	  	  	  
Notably,	  many	  of	  his	  examples	  of	  ugliness	  parallel	  contemporaneous	  stereotypes	  
regarding	  the	  ugliness	  of	  Jews.	  	  He	  states	  that	  	  
staring	  eyes,	  a	  hooked	  nose	  hanging	  down	  to	  the	  mouth,	  ears	  sticking	  out,	  a	  hump-­‐back	  –	  
all	  such	  things	  probably	  only	  produce	  a	  comic	  effect	  in	  so	  far	  as	  movements	  are	  imagined	  
which	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  bring	  about	  these	  features.277	  
In	  one	  discussion	  of	  caricature	  Freud	  even	  seems	  to	  be	  specifically	  referencing	  local	  antisemitic	  
caricatures	  of	  Mahler,	  who	  was	  known	  (and	  ridiculed)	  for	  his	  physically	  dramatic	  conducting	  
style:	  Freud	  claims	  that	  “the	  passionate	  movements	  of	  a	  modern	  conductor	  seem	  comic	  to	  any	  
musical	  person	  who	  cannot	  understand	  their	  necessity.”278	  	  Mahler,	  whom	  Gerstl	  once	  
approached	  as	  a	  total	  stranger	  asking	  to	  paint	  the	  composer’s	  portrait	  (Mahler	  refused),	  was	  a	  
local	  luminary.	  	  But	  despite	  his	  celebrated	  status	  as	  director	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Opera,	  Mahler	  was	  
also	  the	  target	  of	  relentless	  antisemitic	  caricature.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  composer	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targeted	  his	  supposedly	  Jewish	  movements	  –	  an	  idea	  that	  was	  itself	  related	  to	  the	  ubiquitous	  
belief	  that	  Jews	  were	  inherently	  more	  prone	  to	  madness	  and	  hysteria	  than	  Christians.279	  	  
	  
§	  
Caricature	  made	  visible	  –	  and	  accessible	  to	  the	  Viennese	  public	  –	  antisemitic	  discourse	  that	  was	  
medically	  inflected,	  however	  unscientifically.	  	  The	  theory	  that	  Jews	  were	  “especially	  prone	  to	  
hysteria	  and	  neurasthenia	  because	  of	  a	  weakening	  of	  the	  nervous	  system	  due	  to	  inbreeding	  
appeared	  in	  canonical	  form	  in	  French	  neurologist	  and	  pathologist	  Jean-­‐Martin	  Charcot’s	  
Tuesday	  Lesson	  for	  23	  October	  1888”280	  and	  was	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  psychiatric	  community	  
thereafter.	  	  The	  comparatively	  liberal	  Austro-­‐German	  psychiatrist	  Richard	  Krafft-­‐Ebing281	  
discussed	  hysteria	  and	  connected	  it	  to	  Jewishness	  in	  his	  Text-­‐Book	  of	  Insanity	  (1905).	  	  As	  K.M.	  
Knittel	  notes	  in	  Seeing	  Mahler,	  so-­‐called	  “‘Jewish’	  movements”	  came	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  
“visible	  signs	  of	  the	  wild,	  uncontrolled	  movements	  of	  the	  hysteric.”282	  	  Thus,	  in	  Mahler’s	  Vienna	  
“charges	  of	  nervousness	  and	  overt	  references	  to	  gestures	  and	  movement	  were	  anything	  but	  
neutral	  observations;	  rather,	  they	  were	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  stereotypes	  that	  …	  
defined	  the	  Jew’s	  body	  as	  different.”283	  	  An	  undated	  caricature	  of	  Mahler	  by	  Fritz	  Gareis	  (Fig.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279	  Cf.	  K.M.	  Knittel,	  “Ein	  hypermoderner	  Dirigent:	  Mahler	  and	  Anti-­‐semitism	  in	  ‘Fin-­‐de-­‐siècle’	  Vienna,”	  19th	  Century	  
Music	  18,	  no.	  3	  (Spring	  1995):	  passim.	  
280	  Sander	  Gilman,	  Difference	  and	  Pathology:	  Stereotypes	  of	  Sexuality,	  Race,	  and	  Madness	  (New	  York:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1985),	  154–5.	  
281	  Krafft-­‐Ebing	  is	  famous	  for	  his	  text	  Psychopathia	  Sexualis:	  eine	  Klinisch-­‐Forensische	  Studie	  (1886)	  –	  a	  clinical	  and	  
forensic	  reference	  book	  noted	  now	  (and	  notorious	  at	  the	  time)	  for	  its	  vanguard	  discussion	  of	  such	  controversial	  
topics	  as	  sadism,	  masochism,	  and	  homosexuality.	  
282	  Knittel,	  Seeing	  Mahler,	  264–5.	  
283	  Ibid.,	  258.	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12)	  spares	  no	  effort	  making	  the	  composer	  look	  as	  ridiculous	  as	  possible:	  Mahler’s	  kicks	  threaten	  
to	  topple	  over	  the	  music	  stand,	  his	  long	  hair	  and	  glasses	  are	  all	  askew,	  his	  admittedly	  large	  
forehead	  is	  nevertheless	  significantly	  exaggerated,	  his	  arms	  flail	  wildly	  and	  pointlessly.	  	  
Caricature	  functioned	  as	  a	  popular	  visual	  index	  of	  contemporaneous	  medical	  theories	  that	  were	  
themselves	  influenced	  by	  the	  antisemitic	  prejudices	  of	  the	  populace.	  
Buttressed,	  no	  doubt,	  by	  the	  institutionalized	  antisemitism	  of	  the	  scientific	  community,	  
antisemitic	  caricatures	  often	  used	  evolutionary	  discourse	  strategically	  and	  nonsensically	  –	  as	  we	  
saw	  already	  with	  the	  Wagner	  caricature	  above.	  	  When	  the	  notoriously	  antisemitic	  Kikeriki!	  
Vienna’s	  Humorous	  People’s	  Paper	  [Kikeriki!	  Wiener	  humoristisches	  Volksblatt]284	  published	  a	  
caricature	  with	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  Jew	  as	  a	  hydra-­‐headed,	  world-­‐conquering	  vampire,	  they	  
referred	  to	  it	  as	  “Kikeriki’s	  latest	  zoological	  discovery.”285	  	  But	  there	  is	  no	  zoological	  discovery	  
here,	  only	  the	  familiar	  insinuation	  that	  Jews	  are	  predatory,	  enervating,	  and	  ultimately	  inhuman.	  	  
Scientifically	  tinged	  discourse	  is	  again	  used	  to	  create	  a	  thoroughly	  unscientific	  image	  of	  Jewish	  
identity	  as	  monstrous	  –	  just	  as	  it	  was	  in	  Weininger’s	  Sex	  and	  Character.	  	  	  
In	  the	  tremendous	  influence	  of	  Wagner’s	  “Jewishness	  in	  Music	  essay,”	  in	  Alma	  Mahler’s	  
personal	  writing,	  and	  in	  caricatures	  of	  Mahler	  and	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  caricature	  we	  have	  seen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284	  Kikeriki’s	  publication	  history	  is	  itself	  an	  object	  lesson	  in	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  Jewish	  life	  and	  identity	  in	  late-­‐
nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Founded	  in	  1861,	  Kikeriki	  was	  initially	  a	  socially	  liberal	  magazine;	  
printed	  in	  Vienna,	  it	  was	  popular	  with	  a	  larger	  audience	  as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  however,	  the	  
paper	  established	  a	  pernicious	  precedent,	  becoming	  the	  first	  publication	  known	  to	  focus	  on	  antisemitic	  caricature.	  	  
Kikeriki	  circulated	  until	  1933,	  when	  the	  German	  Nazis	  shut	  the	  magazine	  down	  –	  not	  because	  of	  any	  question	  of	  
the	  magazine’s	  liberality	  but	  rather	  due	  to	  its	  support	  for	  Austrian,	  rather	  than	  German,	  fascist	  Engelbert	  Dollfuss.	  	  
Cf.	  Erez	  Uriely,	  “Jew-­‐Hatred	  in	  Contemporary	  Norwegian	  Caricatures,”	  Jerusalem	  Center	  for	  Public	  Affairs,	  1	  
November	  2006.	  http://jcpa.org/article/jew-­‐hatred-­‐in-­‐contemporary-­‐norwegian-­‐caricatures/.	  	  Accessed	  29	  
December,	  2014.	  
285	  Kikeriki,	  26	  May	  1898,	  1.	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how	  antisemitism	  encouraged	  discourses	  of	  hate	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  We’ve	  
also	  glimpsed	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  ambivalence	  affected	  Jewish	  identity	  and	  practices	  self-­‐
representation,	  and	  contributed	  to	  larger	  social	  forces	  such	  as	  Zionism	  and	  local	  literary	  and	  
psychoanalytic	  writing.	  	  The	  artists	  and	  thinkers	  I	  am	  considering	  here	  were	  bound	  both	  by	  their	  
ambivalent	  perceptions	  of	  self	  and	  society	  and	  by	  the	  controversies	  in	  which	  they	  found	  
themselves	  enmeshed.	  	  There	  is	  perhaps	  no	  better	  example	  of	  such	  existential	  bondage	  than	  
the	  painter	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  who	  by	  turns	  disavowed	  then	  exaggerated	  his	  corporeal	  identity	  and	  
ugliness,	  and	  who	  defined	  his	  artistic	  identity	  with	  discourses	  of	  hate	  and	  despair.	  	  
	  
















Richard	  Gerstl,	  Ugliness,	  and	  “the	  Laughter	  of	  Despair”	  
He	  was	  conscious	  of	  his	  appearance	  and	  he	  laughed	  about	  it,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  laughter	  of	  despair.	  
–	  Viktor	  Hammer,	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  only	  friend	  
The	  little-­‐known	  Viennese	  artist	  Richard	  Gerstl286	  executed	  at	  least	  two	  laughing	  self-­‐portraits	  
during	  his	  short	  and	  unhappy	  life.	  	  Gerstl’s	  oil-­‐on-­‐canvas-­‐on-­‐board	  painting	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  
Laughing	  (Fig.	  4)	  is	  quite	  small	  (39	  x	  30.4	  cm),	  and	  intimate	  not	  only	  because	  of	  its	  size	  but	  also	  
because	  of	  its	  close	  foregrounding	  of	  the	  spotlighted	  subject.	  	  Yet	  the	  frenetic,	  dissonant	  image	  
is	  too	  chaotic	  to	  present	  a	  clear,	  singular	  sense	  of	  identity.	  	  Instead	  we	  see	  a	  contorted	  visage	  
with	  a	  cryptic	  laugh	  that	  arguably	  connotes	  monstrosity	  as	  much	  as	  mirth.	  	  	  
Particularly	  when	  viewing	  the	  painting	  up	  close	  –	  “in	  the	  flesh”	  –	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
striking	  aspects	  of	  the	  work	  is	  its	  ambiguous	  representational	  and	  mimetic	  status.	  	  For	  example	  
the	  application	  of	  impastoed	  green,	  yellow,	  and	  white	  paint	  initially	  looks	  like	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  
represent	  facial	  hair,	  until	  one	  notices	  that	  paint	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  right	  side	  of	  Gerstl’s	  chin287	  
but	  not	  the	  left.	  	  Another	  unsettling	  feature	  of	  the	  work	  is	  the	  notably	  asymmetrical	  eyes:	  his	  
right	  eye	  is	  larger,	  light	  blue,	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  both	  higher	  and	  less	  deeply	  set	  than	  the	  grey	  left	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  Raymond	  Coffer’s	  valuable	  dissertation	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  A	  Reassessment	  of	  their	  
Relationship	  (1906–1908),”	  completed	  in	  2011,	  may	  facilitate	  a	  more	  rapid	  burgeoning	  of	  Gerstl’s	  reputation,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  world	  where	  formerly	  there	  was	  no	  major	  source	  of	  information	  on	  Gerstl’s	  life	  
and	  work.	  	  Coffer’s	  thesis	  employs	  new	  archival	  evidence	  to	  establish	  an	  amended	  chronology	  of	  Gerstl’s	  works,	  
one	  that	  differs	  importantly	  from	  that	  of	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder’s	  earlier	  German-­‐language	  catalogue	  raisonné	  for	  
the	  exhibition	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908	  (Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993),	  which	  has	  generally	  been	  
considered	  the	  authoritative	  text	  on	  Gerstl.	  	  In	  deference	  to,	  and	  appreciation	  of,	  Coffer’s	  extremely	  thorough	  
primary	  research	  and	  detailed	  chronology,	  I	  have	  generally	  adopted	  or	  at	  least	  acknowledged	  his	  new	  dates	  for	  
Gerstl’s	  works	  here.	  
287	  The	  artist’s	  right,	  not	  the	  viewer’s.	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eye.	  	  The	  artist	  also	  depicts	  his	  neck	  as	  unnaturally	  long	  and	  lumpy,	  and	  one	  orange	  ear	  projects	  
dramatically	  from	  his	  head.	  	  Seemingly	  frantic	  daubs,	  lines,	  and	  scribbles	  agitate	  the	  surface	  of	  
the	  canvas,	  both	  in	  the	  background	  and	  on	  Gerstl’s	  person.	  	  Light	  accents	  that	  would	  normally	  
function	  as	  modelled	  highlights	  instead	  serve	  to	  fragment	  the	  face	  further	  here,	  rendering	  it	  as	  
incoherent	  zones	  of	  thick,	  gooey	  messiness.	  Indeed	  Gerstl’s	  whole	  face	  looks	  like	  it	  has	  been	  
smeared	  with	  potentially	  noxious	  substances	  –	  which	  can	  induce	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐protective	  
anxiety	  in	  the	  viewer.	  	  It’s	  almost	  as	  if	  a	  vegetal	  substance	  is	  growing	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  Gerstl’s	  
skin;	  this	  representational	  strategy	  effectively	  robs	  him	  of	  his	  humanity,	  as	  vegetal	  existence	  
overtakes	  him.	  	  	  
	   While	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  Gerstl	  unpleasantly	  deconstructed	  his	  visage,	  in	  the	  
other	  laughing	  self-­‐portrait	  he	  defaced	  his	  own	  face	  (Fig.	  4).	  	  Around	  1904–05288	  Gerstl	  painted	  
a	  rather	  pleasing	  full-­‐figure	  image	  of	  himself	  laughing,	  the	  reverse	  of	  which	  was	  later	  used	  to	  
paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  Zemlinsky	  (Fig.	  14).	  	  But	  at	  some	  point	  Gerstl	  attacked	  his	  own	  face	  with	  dark	  
blue	  paint	  –	  an	  act	  that	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder,	  director	  of	  the	  Albertina	  museum,	  refers	  to	  as	  
an	  “auto-­‐aggression.”	  	  Schröder	  also	  suggests	  that	  this	  auto-­‐aggression	  foreshadows	  Gerstl’s	  
later	  suicide.289	  	  Viktor	  Hammer,	  who	  was	  Gerstl’s	  friend	  and	  colleague	  at	  the	  Academy	  of	  Fine	  
Arts	  [Akademie	  der	  bildenden	  Künste]	  in	  Vienna	  and	  his	  studio-­‐mate,	  also	  owned	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  
caricature	  by	  Gerstl.	  	  Hammer	  contextualized	  the	  themes	  of	  ugliness,	  self-­‐caricature,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288	  The	  Stiftung	  Sammlung	  Kamm	  [Kamm	  Collection	  Foundation]	  gives	  the	  date	  for	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  known	  as	  
Fragment	  eines	  lachenden	  Selbstbildnisses	  in	  ganzer	  Figur	  [Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure,	  
referred	  to	  here	  as	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait]	  as	  1904–05,	  which	  accords	  with	  Schröder’s	  information	  in	  
Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  	  In	  his	  dissertation	  Coffer	  offers:	  “ca.	  1904”	  for	  the	  work.	  
289	  “Eine	  Autoaggression,	  die	  wie	  eine	  Vorahnung	  des	  späteren	  Selbstmordes	  anmutet,”	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder,	  
Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908	  (Vienna	  :	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  1993),	  45.	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laughter	  in	  Gerstl’s	  life	  and	  work	  this	  way:	  “he	  was	  conscious	  of	  his	  appearance	  and	  he	  laughed	  
about	  it,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  laughter	  of	  despair.”290	  	  Gerstl	  believed	  he	  was	  ugly.	  
	  
§	  
Gerstl	  scholar	  Raymond	  Coffer	  opines	  persuasively	  that	  Hammer’s	  recollections	  are	  noteworthy	  
because	  they	  reveal	  not	  only	  “Gerstl’s	  apparent	  disaffection	  with	  his	  appearance,	  but	  that	  he	  
may	  have	  represented	  …	  [this	  disaffection]	  in	  caricature.”291	  	  Coffer	  argues,	  moreover,	  that	  
both	  Gerstl’s	  “uneasy	  relationship	  with	  himself”292	  and	  the	  artist’s	  frequent	  experiences	  of	  
rejection	  haunt	  his	  body	  of	  self-­‐portraiture.293	  	  Indeed	  Coffer	  devotes	  a	  chapter	  of	  his	  
dissertation	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  rejection	  in	  Gerstl’s	  early	  self-­‐portraits,	  and	  emphasizes	  
that	  the	  artist’s	  biography	  “certainly	  appears	  to	  indicate	  that	  Richard’s	  weak	  frame	  and	  
physique	  may	  have	  been	  a	  source	  of	  insecurity	  from	  an	  early	  age.”294	  	  Coffer	  buttresses	  this	  
analysis	  of	  Gerstl’s	  traumatic	  physicality	  with	  previously	  suppressed	  aspects	  of	  Gerstl’s	  
biography,295	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  around	  age	  eighteen	  the	  artist	  was	  rejected	  from	  the	  army	  
“because	  of	  physical	  weakness.”296	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  “Es	  war	  sich	  seiner	  Ersch.[einung]	  bewusst	  und	  er	  hat	  d[a]rueber	  gelacht,	  es	  war	  aber	  das	  Lachen	  der	  
Verzweiflung,”	  Hammer	  in	  Raymond	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  A	  Reassessment	  of	  their	  
Relationship	  (1906–1908)”	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  London,	  2011),	  62.	  	  My	  translation.	  
291	  Ibid.	  
292	  Ibid.	  
293	  Ibid.,	  75.	  
294	  Ibid.,	  61.	  
295	  Ibid.,	  64.	  
296	  “Wegen	  Körperlicher	  Schuäche,”	  60–1.	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   Gemma	  Blackshaw,	  in	  her	  2006	  article	  “The	  Jewish	  Christ:	  Problems	  of	  Self-­‐presentation	  
and	  Socio-­‐cultural	  Assimilation	  in	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐portraiture,”	  also	  examines	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐
portraits	  –	  but	  with	  a	  notably	  different	  focus.	  	  Blackshaw	  decries	  what	  she	  argues	  has	  been	  a	  
trenchant	  scholarly	  “reluctance	  to	  bring	  the	  question	  of	  Jewish	  identity	  into	  an	  analysis	  of	  
modernist	  art	  practice”	  in	  Vienna.297	  	  She	  is	  also	  interested	  in	  how	  Gerstl’s	  own	  Jewish	  heritage	  
“seems	  to	  be	  rejected	  by	  the	  artist	  in	  his	  Self-­‐Portrait	  against	  a	  Blue	  Background,”298	  which	  was	  
originally	  titled	  Lazarus	  (Fig.	  15).299	  	  The	  blue	  background	  in	  this	  self-­‐portrait	  begins	  at	  the	  outer	  
edges	  of	  the	  composition	  as	  a	  dark	  indigo	  or	  even	  blue-­‐black	  and	  gradually	  lightens	  as	  it	  
progresses	  toward	  the	  artist.	  	  Gerstl,	  pictured	  from	  approximately	  the	  knees	  up,	  wears	  only	  a	  
white	  sheet	  and	  stands	  in	  a	  full	  frontal	  position.	  	  In	  effect	  the	  artist	  surrounds	  himself	  with	  a	  full	  
blue	  halo.	  	  He	  represents	  his	  body	  as	  unrealistically	  attenuated,	  and	  his	  very	  pale	  skin	  has	  a	  
slightly	  blue	  translucent	  luminosity	  to	  it.	  	  A	  strange	  marking	  that	  looks	  almost	  like	  the	  tip	  of	  a	  
penis	  pokes	  out	  of	  the	  top	  of	  the	  sheet	  near	  the	  artist’s	  left	  hip	  (Fig.	  16).300	  	  He	  has	  no	  belly	  
button,	  and	  his	  hands	  are	  barely	  there.	  	  The	  only	  part	  of	  Gerstl	  that	  is	  not	  ghostly	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  Blackshaw,	  “The	  Jewish	  Christ,”	  27.	  
298	  Ibid,	  28.	  	  Unfortunately	  this	  self-­‐portrait	  has	  many	  titles,	  which	  risks	  further	  obscuring	  Gerstl’s	  already	  
neglected	  life	  and	  work.	  	  The	  painting,	  which	  is	  housed	  in	  the	  Leopold	  Museum	  in	  Vienna,	  is	  referred	  to	  there	  as	  
both	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  and	  Semi-­‐Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  1904–05,	  Inv.	  637.	  	  Coffer	  refers	  to	  it	  with	  
its	  German	  title	  of	  blau/Selbstbildnis.	  	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  painting	  as	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background.	  
299	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  71.	  
300	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Peter	  Vergo	  for	  his	  observation	  and	  for	  our	  subsequent	  conversation.	  	  Coffer,	  disputing	  
another	  scholar’s	  suggestion	  that	  this	  wound	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  wound	  in	  the	  side	  of	  the	  risen	  Christ,	  suggests	  
that	  a	  similar	  mark	  “appears	  in	  a	  near-­‐identical	  position”	  in	  Gerstl’s	  naked	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  1908,	  and	  might	  
therefore	  be	  considered	  a	  scar.	  (70)	  	  I	  find	  both	  of	  these	  interpretations	  somewhat	  unsatisfying,	  as	  the	  mark	  is	  
actually	  very	  far	  from	  the	  traditional	  spot	  on	  Christ’s	  side	  and	  likewise	  somewhat	  different	  from	  the	  placement	  of	  
the	  mark	  in	  the	  naked	  self-­‐portrait.	  	  Coffer,	  noting	  that	  Gerstl’s	  father	  Emil	  had	  ordered	  Gerstl’s	  naked	  self-­‐portrait	  
of	  September	  1908	  removed	  from	  Richard’s	  brother	  Alois’s	  bedroom,	  also	  considers	  the	  possibility	  that	  Gerstl	  may	  
have	  originally	  painted	  himself	  naked	  in	  this	  picture	  and	  added	  a	  sheet	  later.	  (68)	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insubstantial	  is	  his	  much	  darker	  and	  more	  realistically	  painted	  (albeit	  very	  small)	  face,	  which	  
looks	  out	  at	  the	  viewer	  with	  a	  somewhat	  defiant	  expression.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  work	  is	  
somewhat	  uncanny	  but	  the	  artist	  nevertheless	  represents	  himself	  as	  more	  sacred	  than	  
monster.	  
	   Coffer	  acknowledges	  that	  Blackshaw’s	  article	  is	  “thought-­‐provoking”	  but	  dismisses	  her	  
arguments	  about	  Gerstl’s	  Jewish	  identity.	  	  According	  to	  Coffer	  Blackshaw’s	  “key	  findings	  …	  
often	  bear	  little	  relationship	  to	  the	  new	  biographical	  details”301	  that	  Coffer	  himself	  has	  provided	  
in	  his	  more	  recent	  2011	  text.	  	  Coffer	  repudiates	  the	  significance	  of	  Jewishness	  to	  Gerstl’s	  life	  
and	  work,	  generally,	  and	  to	  his	  practice	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐portraiture	  in	  particular.	  	  Moreover,	  
according	  to	  Coffer	  Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  was	  produced	  in	  1902	  rather	  
than	  the	  Leopold	  Museum’s	  commonly	  reproduced	  date	  of	  1904–05	  or	  Blackshaw’s	  date	  of	  
1905.	  	  If	  Coffer’s	  1902	  date	  is	  correct	  then	  the	  semi-­‐nude	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  
and	  Gerstl’s	  naked	  self-­‐portrait	  painting	  of	  12	  September,	  1908	  (Fig.	  17)	  –	  which	  together	  
constitute	  the	  artist’s	  only	  known	  self-­‐portraits	  in	  a	  state	  of	  undress	  –	  “can	  be	  seen	  as	  
bookends	  in	  his	  apparently	  inveterate	  search	  for	  self-­‐representation	  and	  exploration	  of	  sexual	  
self-­‐awareness.”302	  	  That	  is,	  if	  Coffer’s	  date	  for	  the	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  is	  
correct	  then	  Gerstl’s	  two	  naked	  or	  semi-­‐nude	  self-­‐portraits	  constitute	  his	  first	  extant	  
independent	  –	  i.e.,	  post-­‐Academy	  –	  work,	  and	  his	  final	  work;	  Gerstl’s	  artistic	  career	  thus	  begins	  
and	  ends	  with	  a	  searching	  visual	  self-­‐assessment.	  	  And	  in	  between,	  the	  laughter	  of	  despair.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  67.	  
302	  Ibid.,	  69.	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   Coffer	  also	  disputes	  the	  accepted	  dates	  for	  Gerstl’s	  two	  laughing	  self-­‐portraits;	  he	  
provocatively	  insists,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  artist’s	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing,	  which	  most	  scholars	  
understand	  as	  having	  been	  executed	  shortly	  before	  Gerstl’s	  suicide	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1908,	  at	  
the	  age	  of	  twenty-­‐five,	  was	  actually	  painted	  in	  the	  summer–autumn	  of	  1907.	  	  Yet	  despite	  the	  
ostensible	  incompatibility	  of	  Blackshaw’s	  arguments	  about	  Jewishness	  and	  Coffer’s	  arguments	  
about	  rejection	  and	  physical	  unattractiveness,	  I	  want	  to	  put	  them	  into	  dialogue	  here.	  	  I	  contend	  
that	  we	  can	  indeed	  make	  productive	  and	  illuminating	  connections	  between	  Jewishness,	  
rejection,	  and	  ugliness	  if,	  for	  example,	  we	  examine	  them	  through	  lenses	  of	  caricature	  and	  
laughter.	  	  Even	  if	  they	  cannot	  be	  proven	  to	  obtain	  indisputably	  to	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  own	  life,	  such	  
connections	  are	  nevertheless	  demonstrably	  relevant	  to	  Viennese	  artistic,	  cultural,	  and	  
psychological	  discourses	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  In	  turn	  these	  discourses	  can	  help	  us	  
make	  some	  sense	  out	  of	  practices	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐representation	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  	  
	   I	  want	  to	  examine	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐portraits	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  their	  attitude	  toward	  
ugliness	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recollection	  of	  Gerstl’s	  “laughter	  of	  despair”	  at	  his	  own	  appearance	  –	  
not	  to	  concur	  with	  or	  conclude	  either	  Blackshaw’s	  or	  Coffer’s	  line	  of	  interpretation,	  but	  rather	  
to	  help	  keep	  the	  conversation	  about	  this	  under-­‐discussed	  artist	  going.	  
	  
§	  
Gerstl	  was	  only	  one	  of	  many	  who	  might	  have	  been	  infected	  by	  the	  pernicious	  association,	  in	  
discourse	  and	  visual	  culture,	  between	  hatred	  of	  Jews	  and	  hatred	  of	  bodies	  considered	  ugly	  in	  
early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Likewise	  his	  practice	  of	  self-­‐portraiture	  may	  represent	  some	  of	  
the	  many	  different	  ways	  that	  Viennese	  individuals,	  both	  Jewish	  and	  Gentile,	  tried	  to	  grapple	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with	  their	  experiences	  of	  traumatic	  identity	  and	  corporeality.	  	  Whereas	  Gerstl’s	  early	  Self-­‐
Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  implied	  an	  avoidance	  of	  corporeal	  substance,	  his	  later	  Self-­‐
Portrait,	  Laughing	  seems	  to	  focus	  on	  precisely	  those	  abject	  aspects	  of	  the	  ugly	  body,	  and	  
specifically	  the	  ugly	  body	  coded	  “Jewish,”	  that	  the	  earlier	  self-­‐portrait	  disavowed.	  	  These	  
different	  representational	  strategies	  may	  have	  been	  part	  of	  Gerstl’s	  larger	  attempt	  to	  negotiate	  
an	  identity	  he	  could	  live	  with,	  an	  attempt	  that	  evidently	  failed.	  	  While	  such	  subjective	  
disturbances	  should	  not	  be	  entirely	  attributed	  to	  Vienna’s	  rancorous	  antisemitism	  I	  would	  
nonetheless	  argue	  that	  being	  surrounded	  by	  constant,	  vociferous	  hatred	  would	  likely	  
exacerbate	  anyone’s	  psychic	  struggles,	  and	  may	  have	  influenced	  Gerstl’s	  increasing	  turn	  to	  
distorted,	  abstract,	  and	  even	  ugly	  and	  monstrous	  imagery.	  	  For	  example	  Gerstl’s	  stylistic	  
trajectory	  might	  have	  begun	  with	  a	  disavowal	  of	  the	  “ugly”	  Jewish	  body,	  progressed	  to	  a	  
strident	  display	  of	  precisely	  those	  ugly	  or	  Jewish	  qualities	  –	  be	  they	  corporeal	  or	  painterly	  –	  that	  
were	  previously	  disavowed,	  and	  finally	  terminated	  with	  increasingly	  abstract	  images	  of	  identity	  
dissolved,	  the	  absence	  of	  selfhood.	  	  Indeed	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Gerstl’s	  entire	  oeuvre	  and	  
particularly	  his	  self-­‐portraits	  evince	  an	  ambivalence	  about	  identity,	  especially	  corporeal	  
identity,	  that	  may	  have	  been	  related	  to	  feelings	  about	  his	  Jewishness.	  	  
	   It	  was	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  crash	  of	  1873	  –	  that	  so	  exacerbated	  Viennese	  antagonism	  
toward	  local	  Jewish	  people	  –	  and	  antisemitism	  was	  still	  on	  the	  rise	  when	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  Jewish	  
father	  Emil	  married	  Maria	  Pfeifer	  in	  a	  Jewish	  ceremony	  after	  she	  converted	  from	  Roman	  
Catholicism	  scant	  weeks	  before	  Richard’s	  birth	  on	  14	  September	  1883.	  	  Maria’s	  conversion	  to	  
Judaism	  was	  not	  required,	  and	  was	  atypical	  in	  an	  antisemitic	  city	  filled	  increasingly	  with	  Jewish	  
people	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  their	  culture.	  	  Her	  conversion	  to	  Judaism	  could,	  therefore,	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suggest	  Emil’s	  strong	  feelings	  about	  his	  own	  Jewishness	  and	  the	  Jewishness	  of	  his	  last	  son.	  	  But	  
Gerstl’s	  two	  older	  brothers	  August	  and	  Alois	  had	  been	  born	  prior	  to	  Marie’s	  conversion,	  and	  in	  
1884	  Maria	  separated	  again	  from	  the	  Jewish	  community	  –	  entering	  a	  ‘konfessionslos,’	  or	  non-­‐
denominational,	  classification	  very	  common	  in	  Vienna	  at	  this	  time.	  	  Moreover,	  Gerstl	  –	  despite	  
being	  born	  into	  this	  apparently	  Jewish	  marriage	  –	  was	  nonetheless	  baptized	  a	  Roman	  Catholic.	  	  
The	  date	  of	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  baptism	  is	  not	  known,	  but	  in	  January	  1904,	  when	  Gerstl	  was	  twenty	  
years	  old,	  his	  father	  converted	  to	  Roman	  Catholicism	  and	  his	  mother	  was	  accepted	  back	  into	  
the	  Church.303	  	  Jewish	  Viennese	  identity	  at	  the	  time	  was	  generally	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  
degree	  of	  ambivalence,	  but	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Gerstl	  family	  was	  perhaps	  even	  more	  extreme	  in	  its	  
vacillations	  than	  average.	  
	   As	  Hannah	  Decker	  has	  stressed	  in	  Freud,	  Dora,	  and	  Vienna	  1900,	  in	  the	  years	  between	  
1890	  and	  1900	  the	  number	  of	  Viennese	  Jews	  who	  formally	  renounced	  their	  legal	  Jewish	  
affiliation	  doubled.	  	  And	  it	  was	  overwhelmingly	  the	  young	  who	  were	  repudiating	  Judaism	  –	  
single	  men	  and	  women	  in	  their	  twenties	  and	  thirties.	  	  We	  have	  to	  linger	  for	  a	  moment	  on	  those	  
facts	  and	  numbers	  to	  imagine	  the	  tumult	  and	  turmoil	  they	  imply.	  	  Gerstl’s	  complex	  personal,	  
cultural,	  and	  religious	  situation	  developed	  during	  a	  highly	  dynamic,	  troubling	  period	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  Jewish	  Viennese	  modernity,	  with	  Gerstl	  coming	  of	  age	  at	  precisely	  the	  time	  young	  
Jews	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  convert.	  304	  	  Indeed	  Blackshaw	  argues	  that	  Gerstl	  may	  have	  painted	  his	  
Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  to	  commemorate	  his	  family’s	  conversion	  to	  Roman	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303	  For	  Gerstl’s	  biography	  see	  Schröder,	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908,	  173–8,	  and	  for	  details	  regarding	  the	  religious	  
history	  of	  the	  Gerstl	  family	  see	  Blackshaw,	  “Jewish	  Christ,”	  27–8,	  and	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  
Schönberg,”	  45	  and	  passim.	  
304	  Decker,	  Freud,	  Dora,	  and	  Vienna	  1900,	  152.	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Catholicism.	  	  Blackshaw	  interprets	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐representation	  as	  “the	  baptised,	  or	  perhaps	  
newly	  resurrected,	  Christ.”305	  	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  theme	  is	  quite	  different	  
from	  cherished	  Germanic	  resurrection	  scenes	  such	  as	  Matthias	  Grünewald’s	  exuberant	  
Renaissance	  vision.	  	  
	  
§	  
Gerstl’s	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  must	  also	  be	  sharply	  distinguished	  from	  those	  of	  
contemporaries	  in	  Vienna	  such	  as	  Max	  Oppenheimer	  (aka	  “MOPP”)	  who	  likewise	  had	  Jewish	  
heritage	  and	  who	  used	  notably	  agonized	  and	  ugly	  Catholic	  imagery	  in	  his	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  In	  
1911	  Oppenheimer	  created	  a	  lithograph	  poster	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  bleeding	  martyr	  for	  an	  exhibition	  
of	  his	  work	  at	  Munich’s	  prestigious	  Galerie	  Thannhauser.	  	  A	  swooning	  figure,	  with	  a	  visage	  
perhaps	  more	  Frankensteinian	  than	  Christ-­‐like,	  MOPP	  represents	  himself	  with	  a	  violently	  
elongated	  torso	  that	  veers	  dangerously	  to	  the	  left	  –	  as	  though	  the	  artist	  might	  fall	  right	  out	  of	  
the	  frame	  (Fig.	  18).	  	  All	  grey,	  black,	  and	  red,	  the	  poster	  shows	  Oppenheimer	  bleeding	  profusely	  
from	  a	  wound	  in	  his	  chest	  that	  he	  claws	  at	  as	  though	  trying	  to	  open	  it	  further.	  	  
	   Kokoschka,	  whose	  bellicosity	  could	  be	  counted	  as	  extreme	  even	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  
always	  already	  hostile	  Vienna,	  condemned	  Oppenheimer’s	  poster	  as	  an	  imitation	  of	  his	  own	  
poster	  for	  Der	  Sturm	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  Kokoschka’s	  poster	  was	  also	  a	  lithograph	  self-­‐portrait	  
and	  the	  artist	  had	  likewise	  shown	  himself	  bleeding	  from	  the	  chest	  and	  touching	  the	  wound	  (Fig.	  
19).	  	  But	  Kokoschka’s	  face	  is	  even	  more	  monstrous	  than	  MOPP’s,	  with	  a	  massive	  underbite,	  
leering	  grin,	  bald	  head,	  and	  dark	  scars	  and	  blemishes.	  	  In	  order	  to	  buttress	  his	  accusation	  that	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  “The	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  Christ,”	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Oppenheimer	  deliberately	  plagiarized	  him,	  Kokoschka	  mobilized	  other	  influential	  figures	  in	  
Vienna	  and	  Berlin	  against	  MOPP	  as	  well.	  	  For	  example	  the	  noted	  poet	  Else	  Lasker-­‐Schüler	  wrote	  
a	  letter	  to	  Oppenheimer,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  Der	  Sturm,	  in	  which	  she	  accused	  MOPP	  of	  not	  
only	  copying	  Kokoschka’s	  imagery	  but	  also	  being	  “in	  love”	  with	  him.306	  	  	  
The	  above	  information	  is	  reiterated	  frequently,	  especially	  in	  the	  Kokoschka	  literature.	  	  
Less	  often	  noted	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  year	  before	  Oppenheimer	  made	  that	  Galerie	  Thannhauser	  
poster	  he	  had	  already	  created	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  painting	  representing	  himself	  as	  the	  deposed	  
Christ.	  	  Oppenheimer’s	  Deposition	  (Fig.	  20)	  –	  a	  group	  portrait	  featuring	  several	  local	  Viennese	  
luminaries	  –	  borrows	  stylistically	  from	  visionary	  El	  Greco	  paintings	  such	  as	  The	  Entombment	  of	  
Christ	  (c.	  1567–70,	  Fig.	  21)	  or	  La	  Santísima	  Trinidad	  (1577–79,	  Fig.	  22),	  which	  was	  itself	  actually	  
based	  on	  an	  engraving	  by	  Albrecht	  Dürer.	  So	  this	  work	  –	  Oppenheimer’s	  Deposition	  that	  is	  so	  
different	  from	  Kokoschka’s	  Der	  Sturm	  image	  –	  suggests	  that	  Oppenheimer	  had	  his	  own	  interest	  
in	  Christological	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  The	  style	  of	  MOPP’s	  1911	  self-­‐portrait	  lithograph	  (like	  
Kokoschka’s	  1910	  self-­‐portrait	  for	  Der	  Sturm)	  is	  more	  comparable	  to	  Albrecht	  Dürer’s	  iconic	  
self-­‐portrait	  Christ	  as	  the	  Man	  of	  Sorrows	  (Fig.	  23).	  	  All	  three	  could	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  a	  
Germanic	  tradition	  of	  grotesque	  self-­‐representation	  as	  martyrs,	  and	  it	  seems	  like	  Gerstl	  
specifically	  shied	  away	  from	  this	  tradition.	  
	   Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  follows	  none	  of	  the	  iconographical	  
precedents	  one	  might	  expect:	  his	  image	  lacks	  the	  vitality	  of	  Grünewald’s	  resurrected	  Christ,	  the	  
visionary	  mysticism	  of	  an	  El	  Greco	  scene,	  and	  the	  corporeal	  grotesqueness	  of	  Dürer’s	  1493	  
Christ	  as	  the	  Man	  of	  Sorrows	  –	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  self-­‐assurance	  and	  beauty	  of	  Dürer’s	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famously	  Christological	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  1500	  (Fig.	  24).	  	  Notably,	  unlike	  MOPP	  and	  Kokoschka	  
Gerstl	  seems	  to	  present	  himself	  here	  as	  more	  spiritual	  than	  corporeal.	  	  In	  fact,	  although	  his	  
body	  is	  distorted	  and	  unidealized	  he	  eschews	  the	  use	  of	  the	  viscerally	  ugly	  corporeality	  that	  his	  
slightly	  younger	  peers	  would	  focus	  on	  so	  trenchantly	  –	  even	  obsessively	  –	  in	  their	  self-­‐
representations.	  	  If	  Gerstl’s	  painting	  is	  indeed	  ugly,	  the	  ugliness	  seems	  due	  to	  crude	  and	  
awkward	  handling	  not	  a	  histrionic	  and	  tormented	  self-­‐representational	  stance.	  	  Gemma	  
Blackshaw	  puts	  the	  matter	  succinctly	  when	  she	  notes	  that	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  
Background	  represents	  “a	  retreat	  from	  the	  body.”307	  	  Thus	  even	  if	  Gerstl	  shared	  with	  
Kokoschka,	  MOPP,	  and	  other	  contemporaries	  the	  strategy	  of	  using	  the	  body	  to	  represent	  the	  
psyche,	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  stark	  contrast	  between	  Gerstl’s	  retreat	  from	  the	  body	  in	  Self-­‐
Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  and	  the	  abject	  embodiment	  seen	  in	  martyrly	  self-­‐portraits	  
produced	  by	  Gerstl’s	  peers	  shortly	  thereafter.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Blackshaw	  regards	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  embodiment,	  ugliness,	  and	  self-­‐representation	  
as	  reflective	  of	  larger	  social	  issues	  around	  Jewishness	  and	  antisemitism.	  	  She	  notes:	  “Gerstl’s	  
rejection	  of	  the	  ‘bodily’	  aspects	  of	  the	  body,	  in	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  context	  which	  clearly	  valued	  its	  
devotional	  power,	  is	  therefore	  somewhat	  unusual.	  	  It	  can	  perhaps	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
although	  Christ’s	  wounded,	  bleeding,	  and	  peculiarly	  feminised	  body	  was	  revered	  in	  Roman	  
Catholic	  visual	  culture,	  the	  same	  trope	  of	  the	  body	  –	  ‘ugly,’	  ‘distorted,’	  ‘effeminate’	  –	  was	  used	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in	  Vienna’s	  antisemitic	  rhetoric	  to	  denote	  the	  Jew.”308	  	  Referring	  to	  Mahler	  and	  Schnitzler,	  both	  
of	  Jewish	  descent,	  Blackshaw	  insists	  	  
It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  Gustav	  Mahler	  described	  his	  Jewish	  heritage	  as	  a	  condition	  akin	  
to	  being	  born	  with	  an	  arm	  that	  was	  too	  short,	  and	  Arthur	  Schnitzler	  likened	  the	  
experience	  of	  living	  as	  a	  Jew	  in	  Vienna	  to	  being	  given	  a	  local	  anaesthetic	  and	  asked	  to	  
remain	  ‘indifferent’	  as	  dirty	  knives	  scraped	  and	  cut	  your	  skin	  until	  the	  blood	  flowed.	  	  Their	  
recourse	  to	  physical	  metaphors	  poignantly	  illustrates	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  city’s	  virulent	  anti-­‐
Semitic	  discourse,	  which	  equated	  ‘Jewishness’	  with	  the	  dirty,	  infectious	  and	  imperfect	  
human	  body.309	  
Coffer	  disputes	  Blackshaw’s	  argument	  that	  Gerstl	  “constructed	  himself	  exactly	  as	  this	  new,	  
peculiarly	  contemporary	  Christ	  as	  heralded	  by	  Weininger,	  purified	  of	  his	  (Jewish)	  body,	  a	  Christ	  
who	  has	  truly	  transcended	  the	  flesh.”310	  	  Not	  the	  least	  of	  Coffer’s	  objections	  is	  his	  new	  dating	  of	  
Gerstl’s	  painting	  to	  before	  the	  publication	  of	  Weininger’s	  book.	  	  But	  perhaps	  an	  even	  more	  
important	  objection	  for	  Coffer	  is	  a	  visual	  one	  –	  according	  to	  him	  in	  Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  
Blue	  Background	  “the	  androgynous,	  even	  asexual,	  exaggerated	  slimness	  of	  his	  waist,	  hips	  and	  
wrists,	  purvey	  an	  almost	  effeminate	  sense	  …	  bears	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  model	  blond,	  blue-­‐eyed	  
masculinity	  of	  ‘a	  distinctly	  Aryan	  ideal’	  that	  Weininger	  demands	  and	  to	  which	  Blackshaw	  
alludes.”311	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   Coffer’s	  line	  of	  inquiry	  into	  the	  probable	  meanings	  of	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐representational	  
strategies	  is	  more	  private	  and	  biographical	  than	  cultural,	  racial,	  or	  religious.	  	  He	  focuses	  on	  the	  
artist’s	  personal	  experiences	  of	  rejection	  and	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  such	  experiences	  on	  
Richard	  Gerstl’s	  early	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  Indeed,	  Coffer	  largely	  dismisses	  the	  significance	  of	  
Jewishness	  to	  Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background,	  and	  instead	  emphasizes	  that	  this	  
self-­‐portrait	  was	  created	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  several	  personally	  significant	  rejections.	  	  These	  
rejections	  include	  his	  expulsion	  from	  the	  Academy,	  his	  expulsion	  from	  Simon	  Hollósyʼs	  summer	  
painting	  school	  in	  Nagybánya,	  Hungary	  after	  apparently	  (at	  the	  age	  of	  seventeen!)	  entering	  into	  
a	  sexual	  relationship	  with	  his	  teacher’s	  wife,	  and	  finally	  his	  rejection	  from	  the	  military.	  	  Based	  
on	  these	  biographical	  findings	  Coffer	  suggests	  the	  following	  interpretation	  of	  Self-­‐Portrait	  
before	  a	  Blue	  Background:	  “about	  to	  enter	  manhood,	  Gerstl	  was	  exposing	  and	  exorcising	  his	  
adolescent	  demons	  …	  There	  is	  a	  sense,	  therefore,	  that	  even	  had	  he	  deliberately	  portrayed	  
himself	  in	  an	  Ecce	  Homo	  pose,	  he	  did	  so,	  not	  for	  obvious	  iconographical	  purposes,	  but	  to	  
sardonically	  symbolise	  his	  own	  mounting	  experiences	  of	  suffering.”	  	  In	  conclusion	  Coffer	  opines	  
that	  given	  Gerstl’s	  insecurities	  and	  introversion	  we	  can	  understand	  how	  the	  artist’s	  “restoration	  
from	  such	  a	  potent	  combination	  of	  academic,	  sexual	  and	  physical	  despair	  would	  manifest	  itself	  
in	  the	  defiant,	  proud	  and	  narcissistic	  restatement	  of	  self-­‐worth	  that	  most	  characterises	  his	  first	  
self-­‐portrait.”312	  	  
	   I	  think	  Coffer	  makes	  a	  convincing	  case	  in	  his	  argument	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  early	  
experiences	  of	  rejection	  to	  Gerstl’s	  strategies	  of	  self-­‐representation.	  	  But	  could	  we	  not	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understand	  Blackshaw	  as	  likewise	  focusing	  on	  rejection	  when	  she	  argues	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  
virulent	  antisemitism	  on	  this	  developing	  young	  man’s	  self-­‐perceptions	  and	  representations?	  	  
Even	  Coffer	  acknowledges	  that	  Gerstl’s	  adolescent	  demons	  “may,	  indeed,	  have	  included	  a	  
religious	  dichotomy	  in	  his	  upbringing	  and	  an	  incertitude	  of	  identity	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
antisemitic	  Vienna,	  both	  of	  which,	  of	  course,	  might	  later	  have	  found	  a	  ready	  affinity	  with	  
Schönberg.”313	  	  Moreover	  Blackshaw	  and	  Coffer	  both	  discuss	  Gerstl’s	  distorted,	  negative	  
representations	  of	  his	  own	  body.	  	  So	  without	  denying	  the	  important	  differences	  between	  
Coffer’s	  and	  Blackshaw’s	  perspectives,	  I	  nevertheless	  find	  constructive	  lines	  of	  continuity,	  too.	  	  
Both	  lines	  of	  interpretation	  align	  with	  my	  own	  theories	  on	  ambivalent	  Jewishness	  in	  antisemitic	  
Vienna	  and	  the	  links	  between	  rejection,	  corporeal	  insecurity,	  and	  distorted	  self-­‐perception	  and	  
representation.	  	  And	  both	  Blackshaw’s	  and	  Coffer’s	  arguments	  sustain	  my	  sense	  of	  connection	  
between	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  and	  contemporaneous	  ideas	  of	  ugliness	  in	  Vienna.	  
	  
§	  
A	  contrasting	  yet	  oddly	  symmetrical	  interpretation,	  proffered	  by	  Schröder,	  is	  that	  Gerstl’s	  first	  
and	  last	  self-­‐portraits	  both	  show	  the	  painter	  laughing	  –	  rather	  than	  being	  nudes	  as	  Coffer	  
insists.314	  	  In	  its	  original	  incarnation,	  prior	  to	  its	  subsequent	  cropping	  by	  the	  artist,	  this	  full-­‐
figure	  laughing	  self-­‐portrait	  showed	  Gerstl	  standing	  in	  a	  relaxed	  yet	  alert	  pose	  –	  his	  legs	  apart,	  
one	  hand	  in	  the	  pocket	  of	  his	  suit,	  one	  hand	  hanging	  comfortably	  by	  his	  side	  –	  in	  a	  fairly	  
spacious	  empty	  room	  (Fig.	  25).	  The	  palette	  is	  dusky	  –	  grey-­‐black,	  grey-­‐gold,	  and	  grey-­‐green	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predominate	  –	  but	  the	  artist’s	  own	  face	  is	  a	  merry	  golden	  tone	  livened	  further	  by	  generous	  
highlights,	  ruddy	  cheeks	  and	  lips,	  and	  twinkling	  green	  eyes.	  	  Indeed	  Gerstl’s	  eyes	  are	  
exceptionally	  beautiful,	  and	  more	  realistically	  rendered	  than	  in	  any	  other	  self-­‐portrait	  I	  discuss	  
here.	  	  These	  eyes	  appear	  capable	  of	  sight,	  even	  replete	  with	  wisdom;	  in	  a	  photograph	  taken	  
within	  about	  a	  year	  of	  this	  work’s	  execution	  I	  see	  the	  same	  sense	  of	  sagacious	  circumspection	  in	  
his	  eyes	  (Fig.	  26).	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  sadness	  to	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure	  
(Fig.	  13),	  though,	  that	  I	  think	  can	  be	  best	  approached	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  Blackshaw’s	  and	  
Coffer’s	  notions	  about	  the	  artist.	  
Lovely,	  realistic	  eyes	  notwithstanding,	  compared	  to	  contemporaneous	  photographs	  
Gerstl’s	  physiognomy	  in	  this	  laughing	  self-­‐portrait	  seems	  slightly	  exaggerated	  –	  for	  example	  his	  
ears	  appear	  than	  in	  photographs,	  his	  nose	  longer	  and	  more	  curved.	  	  The	  artist’s	  hair	  in	  
Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure	  is	  perhaps	  dark	  blonde,	  strawberry	  blonde,	  or	  
light	  brown,	  and	  sheared	  very	  short.	  	  One	  curiosity	  of	  the	  work	  is	  that	  Gerstl	  does	  not	  actually	  
seem	  to	  be	  laughing	  –	  at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  readily	  identifiable	  manner.	  	  He	  smiles	  broadly,	  a	  toothy	  
grin	  animating	  his	  entire	  face,	  but	  his	  jaw	  seems	  closed	  rather	  than	  mirthfully	  open.	  
	   Another	  slightly	  confounding	  element	  of	  this	  self-­‐portrait	  is	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  
the	  cheerful	  figure	  and	  the	  dark,	  oppressive	  room	  –	  which	  Schröder	  refers	  to	  as	  “gloomy.”	  	  
Indeed	  he	  comments	  the	  room	  is	  “more	  a	  cell	  than	  a	  studio.”315	  	  If	  Gerstl	  is	  a	  prisoner,	  there’s	  a	  
darkness	  to	  his	  “laughter”	  –	  and	  a	  sadness	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  only	  people	  to	  whom	  he	  offers	  
this	  laughter	  are	  destined	  to	  stay	  forever	  outside	  the	  frame.	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  rough	  lines	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animating	  the	  dark	  space	  around	  the	  artist	  seem	  like	  they	  might	  reach	  out	  and	  consume	  Gerstl	  
at	  any	  moment.	  	  	  
It	  is	  these	  conflicting	  visual	  elements	  –	  which	  Schröder	  calls	  “ambiguous”	  –	  that	  lead	  
Schröder	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  is	  somewhat	  “grotesque”	  overall.316	  	  I	  would	  concur	  
with	  his	  conclusions	  but	  suggest	  that	  affectively	  what	  is	  being	  represented	  is	  ambivalence.	  	  Less	  
ambivalent	  was	  Gerstl’s	  subsequent	  act	  of	  somewhat	  shocking	  violence:	  he	  chose	  to	  deface	  his	  
own	  visage	  with	  dark	  blue	  paint	  and	  subsequently	  cut	  the	  work	  into	  pieces.	  	  Although	  it	  might	  
not	  yet	  be	  possible	  to	  confirm	  the	  exact	  facts	  around	  the	  production	  of	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  
Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure,	  nevertheless	  the	  work	  offers	  significant	  material	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  
ugliness.	  	  Such	  material	  could	  include	  both	  the	  antisemitic	  understandings	  of	  ugliness	  
Blackshaw	  suggests	  and,	  as	  Coffer	  insists,	  ugliness	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  rejection	  and	  alienation.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Certainly	  Gerstl	  seems	  to	  have	  not	  merely	  styled	  himself	  as,	  but	  actually	  been,	  a	  hostile	  recluse	  
who	  rejected	  the	  counsel	  and	  community	  of	  others.	  	  Gerstl	  initially	  attended	  Vienna’s	  Fine	  Arts	  
Academy,	  but	  he	  and	  his	  teachers	  seemed	  unable	  to	  tolerate	  one	  another.	  	  The	  notoriously	  
conservative	  professor	  Christian	  Griepenkerl,	  who	  taught	  Gerstl	  and	  later	  Schiele,	  apparently	  
once	  told	  Gerstl	  angrily:	  “‘the	  way	  you	  paint,	  I	  can	  piss	  in	  the	  snow.’”317	  	  After	  attending	  
Academy	  classes	  between	  1898	  and	  the	  summer	  of	  1901,	  for	  the	  next	  seven	  years	  of	  Gerstl’s	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brief	  life	  his	  artistic	  studies	  were	  “primarily	  self-­‐directed.”318	  	  He	  did	  return	  to	  Griepenkerl’s	  
class	  briefly	  in	  1904,	  but	  it	  seems	  he	  was	  expelled	  after	  two	  semesters.319	  	  Griepenkerl	  also	  
apparently	  said	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Devil	  himself	  who	  brought	  Gerstl	  to	  his	  class.320	  	  
Gerstl	  eventually	  found	  a	  more	  progressive	  teacher,	  Heinrich	  Lefler,	  who	  supported	  the	  
young	  artist’s	  work.	  	  Nevertheless	  Gerstl	  alienated	  even	  Lefler	  –	  specifically,	  with	  his	  hostility	  
toward	  Lefler’s	  participation	  in	  the	  Festival	  Parade	  [Festzug]	  to	  celebrate	  Emperor	  Franz	  
Joseph’s	  Jubilee.	  	  Student	  and	  teacher	  fought,	  and	  Gerstl	  was	  asked	  to	  leave	  Lefler’s	  studio	  
permanently.321	  	  And	  whereas	  Kokoschka	  deferentially	  dedicated	  The	  Dreaming	  Youths	  to	  Klimt	  
before	  even	  meeting	  him,322	  Gerstl	  backed	  out	  of	  an	  exhibition	  at	  Galerie	  Miethke	  because	  
Klimt,	  whose	  art	  he	  despised,	  would	  also	  be	  showing	  works	  in	  the	  same	  room.323	  	  	  
Another	  infamous	  example	  of	  Gerstl’s	  hostility	  occurred	  when	  the	  director	  of	  Vienna’s	  
Museum	  of	  Fine	  Arts	  [Kunsthistorisches	  Museum]	  saw	  Gerstl	  painting	  at	  the	  museum	  and	  
offered	  commentary	  on	  Gerstl’s	  work.	  	  The	  artist’s	  response	  was,	  apparently,	  to	  snarl	  “‘Don’t	  
disturb	  me.	  	  What	  do	  you	  know	  anyway?’”324	  	  Even	  today	  such	  behaviour	  would	  surely	  be	  
provocative	  –	  but	  in	  Gerstl’s	  time,	  when	  academic	  art	  still	  prevailed	  and	  the	  antagonistic	  
attitude	  of	  the	  rock-­‐star	  artist	  was	  not	  yet	  well	  developed,	  Gerstl’s	  behaviour	  must	  have	  been	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truly	  shocking.	  	  He	  was	  even	  known	  to	  destroy	  paintings	  if	  the	  wrong	  person	  complimented	  
them.325	  	  Kallir	  suggests	  that	  such	  antics	  indicate	  that	  the	  artist	  suffered	  from	  “deep-­‐seated	  
emotional	  problems.”326	  	  While	  Gerstl’s	  extremism	  could	  certainly	  have	  been	  an	  indication	  of	  
mental	  illness,	  I	  would	  propose	  that	  his	  hostile	  behaviour	  also	  represents	  quite	  typical	  
strategies,	  in	  adolescence	  and	  early	  adulthood,	  to	  individuate	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  defining	  
oneself	  against	  others.	  	  Like	  Weininger,	  Gerstl	  barely	  made	  it	  out	  of	  adolescence	  before	  killing	  
himself.	  
Kallir	  insists,	  when	  discussing	  Gerstl’s	  extreme	  isolation,	  that	  the	  young	  artist’s	  “sense	  of	  
disorientation	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  Adolf	  Loos’s	  diatribes	  against	  the	  prevailing	  tendency	  to	  
merge	  the	  fine	  and	  applied	  arts.”327	  	  She	  contends	  that	  Loos’s	  hostility	  promoted	  Gerstl’s	  own,	  
that	  the	  young	  painter	  became	  antagonistic	  toward	  Klimt	  and	  the	  artists	  of	  the	  Wiener	  
Werkstätte	  without	  having	  positive	  models	  to	  emulate,	  and	  that	  all	  of	  this	  contributed	  to	  
Gerstl’s	  alienation	  and	  exacerbated	  his	  self-­‐destructive	  instincts.328	  	  Werkner	  opines	  that	  it	  is	  
“impossible	  to	  say	  with	  certainty”	  whether	  Gerstl’s	  suicide	  was	  provoked	  more	  by	  disastrous	  
events	  in	  his	  romantic	  life,	  “or	  whether	  it	  was	  primarily	  his	  isolation	  as	  an	  artist.”329	  	  There	  is	  no	  
doubt,	  however,	  that	  Gerstl	  was	  a	  difficult,	  solitary	  young	  man	  –	  apparently	  he	  had	  only	  one	  
visual	  artist	  friend,	  Viktor	  Hammer,	  and	  they	  were	  cordial	  but	  very	  formal.	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Coffer	  rejects	  Schröder’s	  suggestion	  that	  Gerstl’s	  defacing	  of	  the	  Fragment	  of	  a	  
Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure	  foreshadows	  the	  artist’s	  eventual	  suicide.	  	  Instead	  Coffer	  
argues,	  now,	  for	  the	  artist’s	  affinity	  with	  Weininger,	  suggesting	  that	  in	  this	  self-­‐portrait	  Gerstl	  
may	  have	  been	  deliberately	  referencing	  Weininger’s	  suicide	  a	  few	  months	  earlier.330	  	  And	  yet	  
such	  possibilities	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive:	  Gerstl	  may	  have	  been	  alienated	  not	  only	  as	  an	  
artist	  but	  also	  as	  someone	  of	  Jewish	  descent,	  and	  struggling	  with	  an	  ambivalent	  sense	  of	  his	  
own	  Jewishness.	  	  It’s	  impossible	  to	  know	  Gerstl’s	  feelings;	  but	  if	  Weininger	  was	  a	  strong	  
influence	  on	  Gerstl	  –	  as	  Werkner,	  Blackshaw,	  and	  Coffer	  all	  concur	  he	  was	  –	  then	  Weininger’s	  
theory	  and	  practice	  of	  Jewish	  self-­‐sacrifice	  may	  have	  encouraged	  Gerstl’s	  own.	  	  	  Weininger’s	  
arguments	  may	  have	  also	  affected	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐perception,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  his	  self-­‐
representational	  choices.	  	  	  
In	  conclusion	  Coffer	  opines:	  “this	  uneasy	  self-­‐image,	  and	  its	  subsequent	  disfigurement	  
and	  disownment,	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  bear	  some	  relationship	  to	  Gerstl's	  discomfort	  with	  his	  
appearance.”	  	  Thus	  although	  at	  first	  glance	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure	  
may	  seem	  cheerful,	  gazing	  at	  this	  mutilated	  fragment	  of	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  we	  can	  almost	  see	  
Gerstl’s	  laughter	  morph	  morbidly	  from	  the	  sanguine	  expression	  of	  mirth	  into	  a	  laughter	  of	  
despair.	  	  We	  may	  not	  have	  proof	  but	  we	  do	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  perceived	  ugliness	  was	  
a	  cause	  of	  Gerstl’s	  joyless	  laughter.	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In	  1906	  Gerstl	  painted	  a	  skilled,	  realistic	  portrait	  of	  the	  assimilated	  Jewish	  composer	  Arnold	  
Schönberg	  in	  a	  pointillist	  style.	  	  Schönberg	  had	  converted	  to	  Protestantism	  much	  earlier,	  on	  25	  
March	  1898.	  	  Despite	  Gerstl’s	  conversion	  and	  possible	  identification	  with	  Roman	  Catholicism	  
and	  Catholic	  imagery	  around	  1904–05,	  by	  1907	  at	  the	  latest	  Gerstl	  was	  associating	  almost	  
exclusively	  with	  the	  circle	  of	  musicians	  around	  Schönberg,	  who	  were	  mostly	  likewise	  
assimilated	  Jews.	  	  Coffer	  acknowledges	  that	  “Schönberg,	  like	  Gerstl,	  may	  have	  faced	  religious	  
stresses	  in	  his	  household,”	  and	  that	  such	  ambivalent	  identification	  “may	  have	  contributed	  to	  
the	  affinity	  that	  developed	  between	  them.”331	  	  Anxiety	  and	  ambivalence	  about	  Jewish	  identities	  
in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  such	  that	  even	  Jews	  who	  converted	  kept	  
company	  mostly	  with	  one	  another	  rather	  than	  with	  other	  Gentiles.	  
Gerstl	  began	  giving	  Schönberg	  and	  his	  wife	  Mathilde	  painting	  lessons,	  and	  he	  spent	  the	  
summers	  of	  both	  1907	  and	  1908	  with	  the	  Schönberg	  family	  in	  Gmunden	  on	  Lake	  Traunsee,	  a	  
very	  popular	  spa	  destination	  in	  upper	  Austria.	  	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1907,	  when	  Gerstl	  was	  
enjoying	  the	  company	  of	  perhaps	  the	  only	  community	  he	  would	  ever	  belong	  to,	  the	  artist	  
painted	  his	  most	  upbeat	  self-­‐portrait	  by	  far.	  	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  front	  of	  a	  Blue-­‐Green	  Background	  
(Fig.	  27)	  shows	  Gerstl	  from	  just	  below	  the	  groin	  up	  in	  a	  wide-­‐legged	  stance.	  	  The	  artist’s	  hands	  
are	  on	  his	  hips	  in	  a	  somewhat	  cocky	  gesture	  of	  self-­‐assurance;	  his	  smirking	  smile	  and	  clear,	  
direct	  gaze	  reinforce	  this	  sense	  of	  self-­‐confidence.	  	  Gerstl	  looks	  very	  sure	  of	  his	  place	  in	  the	  
world	  here.	  	  	  
Liberated,	  perhaps,	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  existential	  security	  during	  this	  period,	  Gerstl’s	  painting	  
style	  changed	  rapidly	  as	  he	  explored	  increasingly	  dissonant	  and	  diffuse	  impasto	  techniques.	  	  For	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example,	  in	  Die	  Familie	  Schönberg	  (late	  July	  1908)	  the	  Schönberg	  family	  is	  barely	  identifiable	  
(Fig.	  28).	  	  Gerstl’s	  technique	  at	  this	  time	  has	  garnered	  praise	  from	  art	  historians	  as	  an	  early	  and	  
largely	  overlooked	  example	  of	  abstraction	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  European	  art.332	  	  But	  I	  am	  
more	  interested	  in	  how	  his	  increasingly	  abstract	  style	  served	  to	  communicate	  ideas	  about	  
subjectivity	  –	  specifically,	  the	  dissolution	  of	  idiosyncratic	  identity	  and	  resultant	  erasure	  of	  both	  
self	  and	  society.	  	  
	   Eventually	  there	  was	  a	  radical	  split	  with	  the	  Schönberg	  family,	  provoked	  by	  the	  affair	  
Gerstl	  had	  with	  Mathilde.	  	  Initially,	  however,	  Gerstl	  and	  Schönberg	  shared	  significant	  interests	  
and	  supported	  one	  another	  staunchly.	  	  Gerstl	  was	  easily	  as	  knowledgeable	  about	  music	  as	  he	  
was	  about	  visual	  art	  –	  he	  was	  even	  offered	  a	  job	  as	  a	  music	  critic333	  –	  while	  Schönberg	  was	  for	  a	  
time	  very	  invested	  in	  his	  practice	  of	  self-­‐portraiture.	  	  Moreover	  Schönberg	  initially	  did	  not	  
object	  to	  the	  friendship	  between	  his	  friend	  and	  his	  wife.	  
	   Mathilde,	  sister	  of	  composer	  Alexander	  von	  Zemlinsky,	  had	  married	  Schönberg	  in	  1901,	  
when	  she	  was	  twenty-­‐four	  and	  he	  was	  twenty-­‐seven.	  	  Four	  months	  later	  their	  first	  child,	  
Gertrud,	  was	  born.	  	  In	  1906	  Gerstl	  painted	  the	  Schönbergs	  as	  a	  couple,	  but	  the	  following	  year	  
he	  painted	  Mathilde	  alone	  more	  frequently	  than	  any	  subject	  other	  than	  himself.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  
any	  documentation	  of	  Gerstl’s	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  (the	  young	  artist	  destroyed	  the	  papers	  in	  
his	  studio	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  affair)	  means	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  any	  certain	  insight	  into	  his	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  Jane	  Kallir,	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  (New	  York:	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  St	  Etienne,	  1992),	  11.	  	  Kallir	  also	  notes	  
Kokoschka’s	  hostility	  toward	  abstraction	  –	  “a	  style	  he	  could	  neither	  understand	  nor	  condone.”	  	  Noting	  that	  
Kokoschka	  felt	  excluded	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  abstraction,	  she	  describes	  him	  as	  “an	  inveterate	  outsider”	  to	  the	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  of	  his	  
life,	  and	  concludes:	  “he	  had	  worn	  the	  outcast’s	  mask	  for	  too	  long,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  could	  not	  remove	  it,”	  19.	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state	  of	  mind	  during	  this	  final	  period	  of	  intimacy	  with	  another	  human	  being.	  	  Lacking	  written	  
documentation,	  we	  have	  his	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  	  
	   Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  was	  –	  according	  to	  Coffer’s	  new	  date	  –	  produced	  either	  
during	  the	  young	  artist’s	  first	  vacation	  with	  the	  Schönberg	  family	  in	  Gmunden	  (in	  summer	  1907)	  
or	  possibly	  shortly	  thereafter	  in	  autumn,	  after	  Gerstl’s	  return	  to	  Vienna.334	  	  Addressing	  the	  
effect	  of	  this	  summer	  on	  Gerstl’s	  artistic	  development,	  Coffer	  opines:	  “the	  vacation	  appears	  to	  
have	  been	  a	  revelatory	  experience,	  transforming	  his	  art	  in	  just	  a	  few	  weeks,	  from	  academic	  
studies,	  through	  verdant	  landscapes	  to	  his	  manic	  Selbstbildnis/lachend	  [Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing],	  
and	  the	  evolving	  styles	  of	  late	  summer	  and	  early	  autumn.”335	  	  And	  yet	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  
how	  an	  idyllic	  context	  would	  have	  led	  to	  the	  profoundly	  disturbing	  expressionistic	  work	  of	  Self-­‐
Portrait,	  Laughing.	  	  So	  Coffer’s	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary	  notwithstanding,	  most	  critics	  have	  
insisted	  that	  this	  manifestly	  miserable	  self-­‐portrait	  was	  actually	  Gerstl’s	  last	  work	  of	  art	  before	  
his	  violent	  and	  untimely	  suicide.	  	  For	  example	  Schröder	  says	  that	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  is	  
Gerstl’s	  last	  painted	  self-­‐portrait,	  and	  records	  a	  disintegrating	  personality.336	  	  Werkner,	  after	  
insisting	  that	  Gerstl’s	  is	  “a	  classic	  case	  of	  ‘neglected	  genius’	  with	  tragic	  consequences”337	  goes	  
on	  to	  refer	  to	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  as	  Gerstl’s	  “last	  testament.”338	  	  Peter	  Vergo,	  who	  gives	  no	  
date	  for	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing,	  assesses	  astutely	  that	  the	  work	  is	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  striking,	  
even	  haunting	  images	  of	  early	  Expressionist	  art”	  and	  simply	  refers	  to	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐portrait	  as	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  “Richard	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“one	  of	  his	  last	  paintings.”339	  	  Incredible	  as	  it	  may	  seem	  these	  listed	  comments	  represent	  the	  
main	  English-­‐language	  commentary	  on	  Gerstl’s	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  –	  and	  indeed	  until	  
Coffer’s	  dissertation	  there	  was	  not	  much	  more	  forthcoming	  on	  Gerstl’s	  oeuvre	  as	  a	  whole,	  
either.	  	  	  	  
	   Given	  this	  scarcity	  of	  commentary	  it	  is	  marvellous	  to	  see	  how	  rigorously	  Coffer	  
reconstructs	  the	  historical	  and	  material	  context	  for	  Gerstl’s	  disputed	  work340	  –	  but	  also	  a	  bit	  
disappointing	  that	  he	  barely	  discusses	  the	  visual	  content	  of	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing.	  	  So	  brief	  is	  
Coffer’s	  visual	  exegesis	  and	  analysis	  that	  it	  can	  be	  reproduced	  in	  nearly	  its	  entirety	  here:	  
The	  work	  shows	  Gerstl	  using	  his	  flecking	  technique	  to	  new	  and	  dramatic	  effect,	  creating	  a	  
fluid,	  agitated	  background	  that	  somehow	  amplifies	  the	  artist’s	  nightmarish	  laugh	  and	  
dishevelled	  look.	  	  He	  also	  deserts	  his	  typical	  piercing	  and	  disconcerting	  glare,	  leaving	  his	  
eyes	  animated	  and	  uneven	  in	  a	  vulnerable,	  almost	  pleading	  gaze.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  Gerstl	  
portrays	  himself	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  taciturn,	  tight-­‐lipped	  image	  conveyed	  by	  many	  
of	  his	  previous	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  Indeed,	  here,	  this	  is	  displaced	  by	  a	  manic	  spontaneity	  that	  
appears	  to	  anticipate	  the	  artist’s	  mental	  frailties	  outlined	  by	  [attending	  physician]	  Gerber	  
and	  confirm	  Hammerʼs	  recollection	  that	  Gerstl's	  mockery	  of	  his	  own	  appearance	  was	  “das	  
Lachen	  der	  Verzweiflung”	  [the	  laughter	  of	  despair].341	  	  
Brevity	  notwithstanding,	  Coffer’s	  description	  certainly	  complements	  the	  one	  I	  offered	  in	  the	  
opening	  pages	  of	  this	  chapter:	  the	  work’s	  oppressively	  frantic	  ground,	  the	  physiognomic	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asymmetries	  and	  irregularities,	  and	  Gerstl’s	  dark,	  gaping,	  abyssal	  mouth.	  	  It	  is	  so	  unfortunate	  
that	  we	  don’t	  have	  more	  incontrovertible	  information	  about	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  and	  the	  
context	  of	  its	  production.	  	  Despite	  such	  lack,	  Gerstl’s	  laughter	  of	  despair	  in	  this	  ugly	  self-­‐portrait	  
is	  compelling.	  	  It	  echoes	  through	  the	  night	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  exert	  a	  pull	  on	  
viewers	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come.	  	  
	  
§	  
Gerstl’s	  oil-­‐on-­‐canvas	  self-­‐portrait	  painting	  of	  12	  September	  1908,	  executed	  less	  than	  two	  
months	  before	  his	  suicide,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  precious	  few	  works	  from	  this	  ill-­‐fated	  artist	  with	  a	  sure	  
date.	  	  Like	  so	  much	  of	  Gerstl’s	  art,	  though,	  it	  remains	  enigmatic	  in	  other	  respects.	  	  This	  Self-­‐
Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  shows	  the	  painter	  life-­‐sized	  and	  projecting	  an	  assertive	  but	  ambivalent	  
affect.	  	  Gerstl	  looks	  directly	  at	  the	  viewer,	  his	  white	  body	  surrounded	  by	  a	  protective,	  radiant	  
nimbus	  of	  phosphorescent	  blue.	  	  One	  hand	  is	  on	  his	  cocked	  hip	  and	  the	  other	  is	  gripping	  a	  
paintbrush;	  these	  two	  points,	  along	  with	  Gerstl’s	  genitals,	  create	  a	  strong	  triangular	  
compositional	  focus.	  	  The	  self-­‐portrait	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  confident,	  as	  fragile,	  or	  as	  
evincing	  a	  sort	  of	  manic	  bravado	  –	  a	  merely	  compensatory	  confidence.	  
	   As	  in	  the	  earlier	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  Background	  Gerstl	  here	  depicts	  his	  face	  
somewhat	  realistically	  and	  substantially,	  but	  his	  body	  is	  more	  abstract	  –	  almost	  dematerialized.	  	  
The	  area	  above	  the	  artist’s	  left	  knee	  –	  around	  his	  outer	  lower	  thigh	  –	  and	  along	  his	  upper	  right	  
arms	  are	  translucent,	  as	  if	  the	  blue	  nimbus	  is	  literally	  eating	  through	  Gerstl’s	  flesh,	  leaving	  
behind	  only	  a	  ghost.	  	  Indeed	  although	  his	  right	  arm	  is	  crooked	  jauntily	  on	  his	  hip,	  recalling	  the	  
self-­‐satisfaction	  evinced	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  front	  of	  a	  Blue-­‐Green	  Background,	  the	  confidence	  of	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the	  pose	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  artist’s	  arm	  look	  like	  it’s	  been	  stripped	  of	  its	  flesh.	  	  
All	  that	  remains	  is	  a	  yellowish-­‐beige	  bone,	  with	  a	  scumbled	  wash	  of	  pinkish-­‐white	  that	  suggests	  
skin	  hanging	  from	  the	  forearm.	  	  The	  area	  around	  the	  head	  is	  covered	  and	  engraved	  with	  
scribbled	  shapes	  and	  lines	  that	  seem	  frenzied	  and	  chaotic.	  	  But	  Gerstl	  stares	  out	  at	  us	  with	  a	  
steady,	  unflinching	  gaze.	  	  	  
	   Coffer	  refers	  to	  Gerstl’s	  “jagged,	  intense,	  elongated	  brushwork”	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  
Nude)	  and	  also	  notes	  how	  “the	  sharper	  definition	  of	  his	  [facial]	  features	  suggests	  a	  momentary	  
retreat	  from	  the	  developing	  abstraction	  that	  characterised	  his	  ‘Gmunden	  portraits.’”342	  	  And	  yet	  
other	  than	  the	  face	  the	  only	  part	  of	  Gerstl’s	  body	  with	  any	  real	  sense	  of	  substance,	  gravity,	  or	  
weight	  is	  the	  pelvic	  and	  groin	  area.	  	  Moreover	  the	  cropping	  of	  the	  picture,	  as	  Werkner	  has	  
noted,	  “creates	  an	  effect	  of	  inescapable	  immediacy.”343	  	  Whereas	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  before	  a	  Blue	  
Background	  Gerstl	  was	  already	  thin,	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  Gerstl	  is	  positively	  “emaciated,	  
his	  ribcage	  visible,	  his	  waist	  pinched	  and	  his	  arms	  spindly.”344	  	  In	  sum:	  we	  have	  here	  a	  ghostly	  
portrait	  of	  a	  skeletal	  man	  who	  details	  only	  his	  face	  –	  with	  its	  steely	  stare	  –	  and	  the	  area	  around	  
his	  penis.	  	  	  
	   The	  sexual	  emphasis	  is	  not	  accomplished	  merely	  by	  making	  the	  work	  a	  nude,	  nor	  even	  
with	  the	  triangular	  compositional	  focus	  on	  the	  genitals	  created	  by	  the	  framing	  device	  of	  the	  
artist’s	  bent	  arms.	  	  Instead	  Gerstl	  visually	  foregrounds	  his	  sex	  in	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  nearly	  every	  
possible	  way:	  elongating	  his	  legs,	  but	  then	  amputating	  them	  below	  the	  knee	  in	  order	  to	  force	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  293.	  
343	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  42.	  
344	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  293.	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the	  phallus	  into	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  work;	  giving	  himself	  plentiful,	  dark	  brown	  pubic	  hair	  that	  
frames	  his	  likewise	  dark	  penis;	  and	  making	  both	  the	  ambiguous	  object	  he	  holds	  in	  his	  left	  hand	  
(presumably	  a	  brush	  and/or	  palette)	  and	  his	  prominent	  nose	  a	  reddish	  brown	  colour	  like	  his	  
penis.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  factors	  ensure	  that	  the	  viewer	  will	  really	  notice	  Gerstl’s	  nakedness	  
–	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  for	  certain	  what	  Gerstl	  hoped	  to	  achieve	  with	  this	  revelation.	  
	   Certainly	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  lacks	  the	  slightly	  precious	  spiritualism	  of	  Self-­‐Portrait	  
before	  a	  Blue	  Background,	  and	  yet	  I	  think	  it	  is	  probably	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  artist	  
intended	  this	  final	  nude	  as	  a	  carnally	  attractive	  self-­‐representation.	  	  By	  contrast	  Coffer	  does	  
seem	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  work	  constitutes	  a	  kind	  of	  profane	  postscript	  to	  the	  earlier	  sacred	  
self-­‐portrait.	  	  Indeed	  Coffer	  theorizes	  that	  while	  Gerstl’s	  phallic	  focus	  might	  be	  a	  crude	  homage	  
to	  Weininger’s	  aphoristic	  saying	  that	  ‘The	  man	  has	  the	  penis,	  but	  the	  vagina	  has	  the	  woman,’345	  
more	  likely	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  sexual	  hubris.	  	  More	  specifically	  Coffer	  opines	  that	  “whilst	  some	  
…	  find	  pre-­‐suicidal	  tendencies”	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude),	  “the	  work	  may	  be	  better	  seen	  to	  
represent	  the	  feelings	  of	  an	  artist	  crowing	  at	  his	  potency,	  having	  slept	  with	  the	  wife	  of	  a	  man	  
who	  was	  not	  only	  his	  friend,	  but	  a	  father-­‐figure,	  too.”346	  
	   But	  just	  because	  a	  work	  of	  art	  shows	  sexuality	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  sexy,	  and	  just	  
because	  someone	  is	  naked	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  offer	  a	  real	  revelation.	  	  This	  trembling	  self-­‐
image,	  with	  so	  much	  bravado	  in	  its	  phallic	  focus	  and	  wide-­‐legged	  stance	  and	  yet	  so	  little	  
substance	  to	  this	  sanguinity,	  almost	  waxes	  and	  wanes	  before	  our	  very	  eyes.	  	  So	  I	  propose	  an	  
alternate	  interpretation	  of	  this	  work,	  which	  Gerstl	  executed	  less	  than	  two	  weeks	  after	  Mathilde	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345	  “Der	  Mann	  hat	  den	  Penis,	  aber	  die	  Vagina	  hat	  die	  Frau”;	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  293.	  
346	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  293.	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had	  returned	  to	  her	  composer	  husband	  and	  very	  shortly	  before	  his	  own	  self-­‐destruction.	  Gerstl	  
is	  at	  once	  confident	  and	  fragile,	  desperately	  social	  yet	  misanthropic	  and	  alone.	  	  Robbed	  of	  a	  
substantial	  body	  and	  a	  fully	  realized	  environment,	  arms	  and	  hands	  posed	  confidently	  but	  
disintegrating	  into	  nothingness,	  with	  a	  realistic	  face	  and	  zones	  of	  reproduction	  and	  elimination,	  
Gerstl’s	  nude	  represents	  a	  profoundly	  ambivalent	  statement	  about	  selfhood	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  
create	  one’s	  self	  out	  of	  desire	  and	  lack,	  out	  of	  the	  pain	  of	  rejection,	  out	  of	  emotional	  and	  
physical	  ugliness.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Mere	  days	  after	  Gerstl	  signed	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  he	  made	  a	  series	  of	  more	  disturbing	  –	  
indeed,	  almost	  demonic	  –	  self-­‐portrait	  drawings,347	  one	  dated	  15	  September	  (Fig.	  29)	  and	  two	  
dated	  29	  September	  (Figs.	  30–31).	  	  On	  the	  back	  (verso)	  of	  the	  15	  September	  drawing	  is	  
another,	  undated,	  sepia-­‐on-­‐paper	  self-­‐portrait	  (Fig.	  32)	  in	  which	  Gerstl	  appears	  to	  still	  sport	  the	  
longer	  hair	  of	  the	  painted	  nude	  self-­‐portrait;	  the	  three	  dated	  drawings	  all	  show	  Gerstl	  with	  the	  
close-­‐cropped	  hairstyle	  of	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing.348	  	  Together	  the	  drawings	  have	  been	  
interpreted	  as	  documenting	  a	  man’s	  dizzying	  descent	  into	  despair,	  if	  not	  downright	  dementia.	  	  	  
	   The	  undated	  sepia-­‐on	  paper	  self-­‐portrait	  on	  the	  verso	  of	  the	  15	  September	  drawing	  is	  
rendered	  entirely	  with	  frantic,	  rough	  black	  lines,	  and	  the	  artist	  has	  scratched	  over	  one	  side	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347	  Coffer,	  “Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  293–4,	  suggests	  that	  these	  drawings	  were	  in	  fact	  executed	  in	  
summer/autumn	  1907,	  rather	  than	  1908.	  
348	  Hence	  Coffer’s	  suggestion	  that	  both	  this	  undated	  self-­‐portrait	  drawing	  and	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  were	  actually	  
produced	  in	  1907,	  not	  1908.	  	  Coffer’s	  arguments	  are	  reasonably	  sound,	  but	  the	  conventional	  view,	  that	  Gerstl	  had	  
his	  hair	  cut	  shortly	  after	  completing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  and	  we	  see	  this	  shorn	  style	  in	  three	  self-­‐portrait	  
drawings	  plus	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing,	  still	  has	  explanatory	  force.	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his	  face	  again	  and	  again.	  	  This	  dissonant	  self-­‐representational	  strategy	  evokes	  the	  auto-­‐
aggression	  Gerstl	  committed	  against	  his	  own	  face	  in	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  
Figure.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  asymmetrical	  nature	  of	  the	  darkening	  creates	  a	  strange	  splitting	  effect	  in	  
the	  sense	  of	  communicated	  identity.	  	  Indeed	  in	  this	  late,	  undated	  self-­‐portrait	  drawing	  we	  
glimpse	  a	  potentially	  monstrous	  sense	  of	  duality,	  as	  though	  the	  artist	  was	  divided	  into	  self	  and	  
shadow-­‐self,	  like	  the	  late-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  literary	  characters	  Dr	  Jekyll	  and	  Mr	  Hyde.	  	  
Schröder,	  discussing	  this	  drawing,	  describes	  Gerstl’s	  chaotic	  visual	  forms	  and	  hypnotically	  
intense	  gaze,	  and	  suggests	  –	  as	  with	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Laughing	  –	  that	  psychologically	  the	  work	  
foreshadows	  the	  artist’s	  suicide.349	  
	   The	  recto	  pencil-­‐on-­‐paper	  self-­‐portrait	  drawing	  of	  15	  September	  functions	  in	  a	  way	  as	  
the	  formal	  opposite	  of	  the	  verso	  image	  just	  discussed.	  	  Here	  the	  artist	  draws	  more	  careful,	  
considered	  lines,	  his	  hair	  is	  smoothed	  down,	  and	  features	  are	  rendered	  individually.	  	  There	  is	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  outlining	  and	  even	  some	  modelling.	  	  Half	  of	  Gerstl’s	  face	  is	  once	  again	  shrouded	  in	  
darkness;	  this	  time,	  however,	  the	  shadows	  are	  rendered	  more	  naturalistically,	  less	  punitively.	  	  
But	  surrounding	  half	  his	  head,	  opposite	  the	  shadowed	  side	  of	  his	  face,	  Gerstl	  has	  pencilled	  in	  a	  
semi-­‐circular	  nimbus	  of	  darkness.	  	  The	  disturbing	  effect	  of	  this	  darkness,	  enveloping	  his	  head	  on	  
one	  side	  and	  staining	  his	  face	  on	  the	  other,	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  artist	  emerges	  from	  the	  
shadows	  –	  and	  could	  pull	  back	  into	  the	  gloom	  at	  any	  moment.	  	  The	  self-­‐image	  is	  disconcerting	  
in	  several	  other	  ways	  as	  well.	  	  Gerstl’s	  slightly	  mismatched	  eyes,	  for	  example,	  have	  been	  lined	  
more	  and	  more	  widely	  open,	  with	  heavy	  circles	  inscribed	  beneath;	  the	  irises	  and	  pupils	  merge	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together	  in	  leaden	  blackness,	  and	  are	  topped	  by	  very	  heavy,	  furrowed	  black	  brows.	  	  Gerstl’s	  
mouth	  is	  also	  downturned	  so	  gravely	  that	  it’s	  instinctively	  somewhat	  unsettling.	  	  	  
Referring	  to	  not	  only	  this	  series	  of	  self-­‐portrait	  drawings	  but	  also	  the	  painted	  Self-­‐
Portrait	  (Full	  Nude)	  of	  12	  September,	  Schröder	  insists	  on	  the	  extreme	  negative	  influence	  of	  
Schönberg’s	  13	  September	  birthday	  on	  the	  estranged	  young	  Gerstl’s	  morbid	  state	  of	  mind.350	  	  
Certainly	  Gerstl	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  close-­‐knit	  Schönberg	  circle	  by	  this	  point.	  	  And	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  alienated	  artist	  committed	  suicide	  after	  a	  musical	  performance	  from	  which	  he	  had	  
been	  deliberately	  excluded	  (through	  the	  circulation	  of	  secret	  invitations)	  may	  corroborate	  
Schröder’s	  interpretation,	  too.	  	  Although	  the	  affair	  is	  widely	  thought	  to	  have	  been	  over	  by	  this	  
point,	  Coffer	  observes	  that	  the	  clandestine	  concert	  performance	  by	  Schönberg’s	  students	  “was	  
scheduled	  for	  3pm	  on	  4	  November	  [Gerstl’s	  suicide	  was	  that	  night],	  and	  it	  can	  be	  imagined	  that	  
Schönberg	  would	  have	  been	  embarrassed	  to	  attend	  without	  her,	  or,	  at	  least,	  knowing	  that	  his	  
wife	  was	  with	  another	  man.”351	  	  Supporting	  this	  observation,	  Coffer	  notes	  evidence	  indicating	  
that	  Richard	  and	  Mathilde	  actually	  renewed	  their	  affair	  briefly	  but	  Mathilde	  again	  left	  the	  artist	  
to	  return	  to	  her	  husband,	  which	  suggests	  that	  Gerstl’s	  suicide	  could	  perhaps	  have	  been	  the	  
direct	  result	  of	  such	  double	  estrangement.352	  	  Gerstl,	  barred	  from	  Mathilde,	  from	  Arnold,	  from	  
the	  circle	  of	  musicians	  surrounding	  Schönberg,	  already	  alienated	  from	  other	  artists,	  and	  with	  no	  
work,	  school,	  or	  community	  to	  speak	  of,	  chose	  death.	  	  Despite	  all	  the	  turbulence	  in	  Gerstl’s	  life	  
between	  August	  and	  November	  1908,	  and	  despite	  the	  disastrous	  conclusion,	  nevertheless	  in	  his	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  162.	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self-­‐portrait	  drawings	  the	  artist	  did	  not	  flinch.	  	  One	  can	  see	  the	  steeliness	  of	  his	  gaze	  as	  he	  
documented	  what	  he	  saw	  in	  the	  mirror	  –	  however	  distorted	  into	  ugliness	  that	  image	  might	  
have	  become	  by	  grief,	  hatred,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  his	  own	  identity	  as	  traumatic.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
In	  The	  Broken	  Mirror:	  Understanding	  and	  Treating	  Body	  Dysmorphic	  Disorder,	  professor	  of	  
psychiatry	  and	  human	  behaviour	  (and	  director	  of	  The	  Body	  Dysmorphic	  Disorder	  Program	  at	  
Rhode	  Island	  Hospital)	  Katharine	  A.	  Phillips	  highlights	  how	  the	  psychiatric	  disturbance	  now	  
known	  as	  body	  dysmorphia	  disorder	  (BDD)	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  emotional	  and	  
intersubjective	  nature	  of	  perceived	  ugliness.	  	  One	  patient	  told	  her	  ‘”I	  look	  depressed	  …	  I	  feel	  my	  
mouth	  is	  unattractive	  and	  that	  I’m	  not	  likable	  because	  I	  look	  depressed.	  	  Looking	  depressed	  
equals	  looking	  like	  something	  people	  don’t	  want	  to	  see,	  which	  is	  distasteful.’”353	  	  Another	  
patient	  also	  connected	  ugliness	  with	  being	  bad	  and	  unlovable,	  saying	  “‘I	  feel	  like	  a	  freak,	  a	  bad	  
person	  because	  I	  have	  a	  defect	  in	  my	  appearance.	  	  I	  fear	  that	  no	  one	  will	  ever	  love	  me	  –	  that	  I’ll	  
be	  an	  outcast.’”354	  	  Phillips	  stresses	  that	  a	  tortured	  but	  ambivalent	  relationship	  with	  mirrors	  
often	  underpins	  the	  entire	  disorder	  and	  not	  only	  do	  most	  people	  with	  BDD	  check	  their	  
reflection	  far	  too	  often,	  “occasionally,	  mirror	  checking	  triggers	  a	  suicide	  attempt.”355	  	  Kallir	  
notes	  that	  “Schiele	  and	  Gerstl	  both	  had	  ongoing	  relationships	  with	  the	  large	  mirrors	  that	  were	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  A.	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  The	  Broken	  Mirror:	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  Dysmorphic	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  (Oxford:	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  Press,	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dominant	  fixtures	  in	  their	  studios,”356	  and	  whereas,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  
Schiele’s	  relationship	  with	  mirrors	  –	  while	  certainly	  obsessive	  –	  as	  positive,	  Gerstl’s	  might	  have	  
been	  traumatic.	  
While	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Gerstl	  had	  BDD,	  nor	  do	  I	  make	  any	  claims	  to	  diagnostic	  
expertise	  in	  general,	  I	  do	  find	  Phillips’s	  observations	  relevant	  to	  my	  own	  consideration	  of	  
ugliness.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  so	  in	  light	  of	  her	  comment,	  with	  which	  I	  concur,	  that	  “body	  image	  is	  
our	  internal	  self-­‐portrait.”357	  	  Phillips	  also	  touches	  on	  connections	  between	  self-­‐image,	  ugliness,	  
and	  caricature	  when	  she	  observes	  that	  patients	  “use	  words	  like	  ‘deformed,’	  ‘monstrous,’	  or	  
‘hideous.’	  	  They	  describe	  themselves	  as	  the	  Elephant	  Man	  or	  the	  wife	  of	  Frankenstein.	  	  One	  
man	  said	  he	  looked	  like	  a	  cartoon	  character,	  and	  a	  woman	  said	  that	  she	  resembled	  a	  distorted	  
figure	  from	  a	  Salvador	  Dalí	  painting.”358	  	  Phillips	  also	  stresses	  that	  people	  with	  BDD	  tend	  to	  be	  
especially	  sensitive	  to	  criticism	  and	  rejection.359	  	  That	  being	  said,	  presumably	  it	  is	  not	  only	  
people	  with	  BDD	  but	  all	  people	  whose	  self-­‐images	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  representations	  
surrounding	  them	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  others.	  	  Thus	  Phillips’s	  investigations	  may	  have	  
broader	  relevance	  than	  to	  just	  the	  tiny	  percentage	  of	  people	  with	  diagnosable	  BDD	  –	  estimated	  
at	  about	  1	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  general	  population,	  but	  as	  high	  as	  13	  per	  cent	  in	  students.360	  
Although	  his	  style	  changed	  significantly	  from	  self-­‐portrait	  to	  self-­‐portrait,	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐
representations	  were	  consistently	  ugly.	  	  That	  practice	  of	  ugliness	  becomes	  distressing	  if	  we	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consider	  that	  the	  artist	  may	  really	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  create	  himself,	  not	  just	  represent	  
himself.	  	  At	  least	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  Gerstl’s	  artistic	  output	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  self-­‐portraits,361	  a	  
number	  that	  –	  although	  not	  as	  overwhelmingly	  high	  as	  Schiele’s	  –	  is	  quite	  exceptional.	  	  
Compulsive	  self-­‐documentation,	  rather	  than	  constituting	  the	  mere	  re-­‐presentation	  of	  identity,	  
is	  an	  attempt	  to	  establish	  and	  secure	  identity.	  	  Indeed	  even	  documenting	  the	  self	  as	  ugly,	  or	  as	  
chaotic	  and	  protean,	  is	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐narrativization	  that	  itself	  bestows	  order	  –	  and	  order	  is,	  
conventionally,	  associated	  with	  beauty.	  	  Paradoxically,	  by	  identifying	  ourselves	  as	  formless	  we	  
form	  our	  selves;	  in	  presenting	  our	  ugliness	  we	  reveal	  our	  capacity	  for	  beauty;	  and	  in	  the	  very	  
act	  of	  admitting	  our	  lack,	  and	  our	  loneliness,	  we	  offer	  ourselves	  as	  a	  gift,	  as	  a	  communication	  
that	  could	  eventually	  become	  a	  basis	  for	  community.	  	  Given	  that	  Hermann	  Bahr	  went	  so	  far	  as	  
to	  describe	  Vienna,	  in	  his	  1906	  text	  Wien,	  as	  a	  place	  where	  people	  “are	  always	  kept	  in	  the	  cage	  
of	  an	  immense	  loneliness,”362	  these	  ugly	  moments	  of	  self-­‐creation	  and	  self-­‐offering	  were	  
perhaps	  as	  needful	  as	  they	  were	  nerve-­‐wracking.	  
	  
§	  
The	  two	  graphic	  self-­‐portrait	  drawings	  dated	  29	  September	  have,	  I	  would	  argue,	  a	  similar	  
relationship	  to	  one	  another	  as	  do	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  drawings	  discussed	  above.	  	  Whereas	  one	  
self-­‐portrait	  shows	  Gerstl	  in	  a	  demonic-­‐looking	  process	  of	  dematerialization,	  the	  other	  	  
displays	  the	  artist’s	  face	  with	  unsettling	  detail	  and	  black	  outlining.	  	  The	  latter	  drawing,	  held	  in	  
the	  print	  collection	  at	  the	  Albertina	  museum	  shows	  –	  overlaid	  on	  the	  washes	  that	  establish	  the	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  “Richard	  Gerstl	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  others	  have	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basic	  contours	  and	  features	  of	  Gerstl’s	  face	  and	  head	  –	  dark	  scores	  that	  echo	  the	  more	  frantic	  
scratches	  in	  the	  undated	  self-­‐portrait	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  I	  am	  tempted	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  marks	  in	  
this	  self-­‐portrait	  as	  “scars.”	  	  Gerstl’s	  chin	  shows	  two	  sets	  of	  pencil	  marks,	  one	  below	  the	  lips	  and	  
the	  other	  at	  the	  base,	  that	  look	  like	  the	  rough	  stitches	  associated	  with	  Frankenstein	  and	  other	  
manufactured	  monsters.	  	  Over	  a	  faint	  but	  somewhat	  naturalistic-­‐looking	  right	  ear	  the	  artist	  has	  
imposed	  three	  different	  outlines,	  not	  at	  all	  contoured,	  only	  silhouetted,	  which	  renders	  the	  ear	  
somewhat	  tumorous	  in	  appearance,	  and	  also	  pushes	  the	  drawing	  toward	  caricature.	  	  Moreover	  
three	  spots	  on	  the	  inner	  eyes	  and	  on	  the	  artist’s	  lower	  right	  cheek	  appear	  rubbed	  or	  materially	  
damaged	  in	  some	  way.	  	  	  
	   This	  agitation	  of	  the	  various	  lines	  of	  pen,	  pencil,	  and	  ink	  wash	  contrasts	  very	  strongly	  
with	  the	  static,	  even	  stoic	  mien	  to	  Gerstl’s	  face	  and	  particularly	  his	  eyes,	  which	  stare	  out	  at	  the	  
viewer	  with	  a	  chilling	  sobriety	  and	  directness.	  	  In	  this	  case	  that	  viewer	  is	  quite	  palpably	  himself.	  	  
Gerstl’s	  mouth	  is	  again	  set	  in	  an	  almost	  downturned	  expression	  of	  grim	  determination.	  	  Despite	  
this	  determined	  expression,	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  still	  bespeaks	  inner	  conflict	  through	  the	  obsessive	  
reworking	  of	  not	  only	  the	  ears	  but	  also	  the	  eyes,	  nose,	  and	  mouth	  in	  black	  ink.	  	  This	  is	  an	  
ambivalent	  self-­‐representation	  of	  the	  first	  rank.	  
	   In	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  drawing	  that	  Gerstl	  may	  have	  composed	  originally	  around	  1906	  or	  1907	  	  
(Fig.	  33)	  there	  is	  visible	  damage	  to	  the	  image	  –	  gouges	  in	  the	  crown	  of	  the	  head	  and	  violently	  
destructive	  rubbing	  on	  the	  temple	  –	  that	  I	  suspect	  may	  have	  been	  an	  auto-­‐aggression,	  perhaps	  
made	  shortly	  before	  the	  artist’s	  suicide	  while	  he	  was	  destroying	  personal	  effects	  and	  drawings	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in	  his	  studio.	  	  In	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  on	  ugliness363	  Mark	  Cousins	  stresses	  how	  normally	  the	  ugly	  
object	  threatens	  by	  “eating	  up	  the	  space	  between	  it	  and	  the	  subject.”364	  	  In	  Gerstl’s	  case,	  
though,	  the	  object-­‐self	  of	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  and	  the	  viewer-­‐self	  of	  the	  subject	  were	  both	  part	  of	  
the	  same	  phenomenon	  of	  ugliness	  –	  an	  ambivalent	  experience	  of	  ugliness	  that	  was	  certainly	  
corporeal,	  and	  may	  have	  been	  related	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  Jewishness.	  	  Originally	  in	  Judaism	  the	  
concept	  of	  sin	  was	  related	  to	  a	  literal	  stain	  rather	  than	  an	  abstract	  notion	  of	  ethics,365	  and	  there	  
are	  also	  sins	  that	  are	  not	  severe	  enough	  to	  be	  punishable	  but	  are	  still	  considered	  to	  stain	  the	  
one’s	  character.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  –	  and	  plausible	  –	  enough	  to	  imagine	  Gerstl	  feeling	  stained	  in	  this	  
way.	  	  He	  courted	  controversy	  consistently,	  he	  had	  enemies	  and	  few	  friends,	  his	  sexual	  object-­‐
choices	  were	  inappropriate	  and	  ultimately	  unavailable,	  he	  believed	  he	  was	  ugly	  and	  was	  
evidently	  too	  weak	  for	  the	  army.	  	  Gerstl	  produced	  a	  small	  but	  powerful	  series	  of	  
representations	  of	  the	  self	  as	  stained,	  ugly,	  but	  honest	  –	  and	  did	  so	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
modernity	  that	  Weininger,	  one	  of	  Gerstl’s	  idols,	  had	  characterized	  as	  weak,	  Jewish,	  ugly,	  and	  
false.	  	  Perhaps	  Gerstl	  felt	  himself	  “cleansed	  and	  armed”	  for	  death,	  like	  Weininger,	  through	  the	  
life	  of	  the	  self-­‐portrait.	  
	   The	  sense	  of	  dematerialization	  in	  the	  other	  29	  September	  self-­‐portrait	  literalizes	  and	  
concretizes,	  paradoxically,	  the	  actual	  social-­‐existential	  dematerialization	  of	  Gerstl’s	  own	  life.	  	  
Pale	  ink	  washes	  and	  slight	  definitions	  in	  charcoal	  show	  this	  Gerstl	  as	  not	  much	  more	  than	  an	  
accusatory	  apparition.	  	  While	  the	  body	  is	  torqued	  to	  the	  left,	  Gerstl	  twists	  his	  head	  to	  stare	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unrelentingly	  out	  at	  himself,	  the	  viewer.	  	  Despite	  this	  dramatic	  gesture	  the	  artist	  appears	  
enervated.	  	  The	  dark	  features	  in	  Gerstl’s	  art	  and	  life,	  the	  intense	  impastos	  and	  antagonistic	  
attitudes,	  have	  now	  vanished.	  	  Indeed	  the	  forebodingly	  dark	  eyes	  of	  the	  15	  September	  self-­‐
portrait	  have	  been	  replaced	  here	  by	  eyes	  so	  pale	  they	  seem	  not	  of	  this	  world,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  they	  
probably	  are	  not:	  Gerstl	  here	  captures	  that	  “ethereally	  stark	  affect”	  which,	  as	  one	  palliative	  
care	  provider	  reminded	  me,	  people	  often	  have	  shortly	  before	  they	  die.366	  	  On	  the	  night	  of	  4–5	  
November,	  Gerstl	  executed	  a	  final	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  sorts:	  in	  front	  of	  his	  studio	  mirror	  he	  stabbed	  
and	  hung	  himself	  –	  probably	  naked,	  and	  possibly	  castrated.367	  	  
	  
§	  
The	  ugly	  selves	  Gerstl	  left	  behind	  in	  his	  self-­‐portraits	  could	  be	  considered	  at	  worst	  to	  represent	  
traumatic	  identities,	  and	  at	  best	  an	  experience	  of	  ambivalent	  selfhood.	  	  Gerstl’s	  ugly	  self-­‐
representational	  practices	  may	  have	  helped	  him	  to	  cathartically	  articulate	  traumatic	  identities	  –	  
and	  he	  even	  tried,	  it	  seems,	  to	  laugh	  them	  off.	  	  But	  as	  both	  subject	  and	  object	  in	  this	  solitary	  
comi-­‐drama,	  Gerstl	  was	  caught	  –	  trapped	  in	  a	  deadly,	  closed	  system	  of	  self-­‐creation	  and	  
destruction.	  	  In	  the	  end	  it	  appears	  that	  his	  wish	  to	  permanently	  destroy	  the	  ugly	  object	  –	  this	  
ugly	  self	  that	  produced	  only	  the	  laughter	  of	  despair,	  and	  which	  he	  captured	  again	  and	  again	  in	  
the	  zone	  of	  self-­‐representation	  –	  overcame	  Gerstl’s	  will	  to	  live.	  	  In	  destroying	  that	  ugly	  object	  –	  
himself	  –	  Gerstl	  made	  of	  death	  a	  theatre	  performed	  for	  an	  audience	  of	  one.	  	  His	  suicide	  was	  his	  
ultimate	  self-­‐portrait,	  and	  besides	  a	  modest	  extant	  oeuvre	  Gerstl	  has	  left	  us	  with	  not	  much	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more	  than	  fragments	  and	  impressions.	  	  We	  might	  almost	  laugh	  at	  the	  ridiculous	  waste	  here	  –	  at	  
how	  miserable	  and	  scanty	  are	  the	  remains	  of	  this	  first-­‐born	  Austrian	  expressionist,	  at	  how	  
promising	  his	  artistic	  development	  seems	  to	  have	  been,	  at	  how	  grotesque	  and	  premature	  was	  
his	  death	  –	  but	  our	  laugh	  would	  also	  be	  a	  laughter	  of	  despair.	  
	   I	  believe	  that	  Gerstl’s	  complicated,	  ambivalent	  religious	  background,	  his	  interest	  in	  
selfhood	  and	  ugliness,	  and	  his	  existential	  alienation	  and	  violent	  suicide	  can	  and	  probably	  should	  
all	  be	  understood	  as	  phenomena	  with	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  causes	  and	  meanings.	  	  
Gerstl’s	  tale	  is	  both	  painfully	  individual	  and	  uncannily	  representative	  of	  a	  dark	  facet	  of	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  modernity.	  	  As	  scholars	  have	  noted,368	  late-­‐nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna	  was	  the	  site	  of	  many	  identity	  crises.	  	  In	  his	  study	  of	  Weininger	  
Chandak	  Sengoopta	  in	  particular	  explains	  that	  
many	  retreated	  into	  the	  self,	  even	  if	  Ernst	  Mach	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  self	  was	  a	  fiction,	  
and	  even	  if	  life	  had	  shown	  there	  was	  no	  free	  will.	  	  The	  Kantian	  autonomous	  self	  …	  was	  a	  
myth	  one	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  live.	  	  For	  Arthur	  Schnitzler,	  it	  was	  artistic	  creativity	  that	  led	  
inward;	  for	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  it	  was	  the	  elaboration	  of	  psychological	  theory;	  and	  for	  Otto	  
Weininger,	  it	  was	  the	  philosophical	  validation	  (and	  cultural	  utilization)	  of	  Kant’s	  concept	  
of	  the	  intelligible	  self.369	  	  
I	  have	  disagreed	  with	  Schorske	  that	  the	  Viennese	  retreated	  from	  politics	  –	  Jewishness	  alone	  
was	  obviously	  a	  hugely	  important	  political	  issue.	  	  I	  do	  concur	  with	  Sengoopta	  and	  others,	  
though,	  that	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  selfhood	  was	  often	  both	  a	  result	  of	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  See	  especially	  Le	  Rider,	  Modernity	  and	  Crises	  of	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grapple	  with	  the	  aesthetic,	  ethical,	  and	  epistemological	  aporias	  of	  modern	  life	  in	  Vienna.	  	  
Although	  admittedly	  still	  mysterious	  to	  us,	  Gerstl’s	  practice	  of	  ugly	  self-­‐portraiture	  seems	  























Arnold	  Schönberg’s	  Practice	  of	  Ugly	  Self-­‐Portraiture	  
I	  know	  that,	  being	  younger,	  I	  have	  a	  right	  to	  be	  different	  …	  still,	  there	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  which	  I	  
should	  have	  yielded	  absolutely	  …	  that	  indefinable	  thing	  which	  I	  have	  so	  strongly	  sensed	  in	  your	  
presence	  and	  which	  is	  for	  me	  the	  power	  of	  genius	  …	  if	  I	  have	  nevertheless	  been	  at	  variance	  with	  
you	  -­‐	  I	  do	  not	  know	  why.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  shortsightedness,	  perhaps	  contrariness?	  	  Perhaps	  too	  it	  
was	  love,	  for	  with	  all	  this	  I	  have	  always	  venerated	  you	  awfully.	  	  It	  was	  flapperish:	  love	  that	  pursues	  
with	  hatred.	  
–	  letter	  from	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  to	  Gustav	  Mahler,	  5	  July	  1910	  
	  
I	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  understood.	  I	  want	  to	  express	  myself,	  but	  I	  hope	  to	  be	  misunderstood.	  	  It	  would	  
be	  terrible	  if	  someone	  could	  see	  through	  me.	  
–	  letter	  from	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  to	  Alma	  Mahler,	  7	  October	  1910	  
Viennese	  composer	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  (1874–1951)	  began	  painting	  in	  1906	  and	  had	  one	  of	  his	  
periods	  of	  greatest	  artistic	  productivity	  during	  and	  after	  the	  Gerstl	  affair370	  in	  1908.	  	  There	  is	  an	  
early	  Schönberg	  self-­‐portrait	  (c.	  1908,	  cat	  no.	  2371)	  –	  a	  smallish	  work	  executed	  with	  pen	  and	  
Chinese	  ink	  on	  paper	  –	  that	  shows	  Schönberg’s	  upper	  torso	  and	  face,	  in	  which	  he	  looks	  
somewhat	  slimmer	  than	  in	  other	  contemporaneous	  self-­‐representations	  (Fig.	  34).	  	  Moreover	  
his	  suit,	  although	  hastily	  scrawled	  in,	  is	  crisply	  tailored.	  	  Schönberg’s	  jaw	  is	  set	  and	  narrow,	  and	  
his	  eyes	  glower	  slightly	  from	  under	  arched	  brows.	  	  They	  are	  animated	  by	  a	  youthful	  cunning	  
absent	  from	  other,	  more	  somber	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  The	  artist’s	  signature	  is	  comparatively	  large	  and	  
ornate,	  parallel	  to	  the	  left	  border.	  	  Shortly	  after	  he	  produced	  this	  slightly	  stylized	  and	  somewhat	  
flattering	  self-­‐portrait	  Schönberg	  turned	  to	  a	  practice	  of	  self-­‐portraiture	  that	  was	  distinctly	  
uglier.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  By	  “Gerstl	  affair”	  I	  mean	  to	  refer	  here	  to	  Richard	  Gerstl’s	  affair	  with	  Arnold’s	  wife	  Mathilde,	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
Richard	  and	  Arnold’s	  friendship,	  and	  Richard’s	  subsequent	  suicide.	  
371	  I	  refer	  here	  and	  throughout	  the	  chapter	  to	  the	  catalogue	  raisonné	  at	  the	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center	  in	  Vienna,	  
the	  archive	  that	  houses	  the	  Schönberg	  Nachlass.	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   Known	  more	  for	  dissonant	  musical	  innovations,	  especially	  atonal	  and	  twelve-­‐tone	  
music,	  than	  for	  despondent	  visual	  art,	  Schönberg	  nevertheless	  produced	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  
visual	  work:	  around	  two	  hundred	  drawings	  and	  watercolours	  and	  more	  than	  sixty	  oil	  
paintings.372	  	  The	  most	  striking	  thematic	  leitmotifs	  in	  Schönberg’s	  oeuvre	  are	  hostile	  portraits	  of	  
critics	  and	  abrasive	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  Schönberg	  experimented	  with	  different	  visual	  genres,	  but	  on	  
the	  whole	  his	  approach	  was	  dominated	  by	  self-­‐portraiture	  in	  various	  forms:	  semi-­‐realistic	  brush	  
and	  ink	  on	  paper,	  naïve	  oil	  and	  watercolour	  on	  cardboard,	  sketches	  and	  caricatures,	  and	  the	  
fantastical	  array	  of	  Blicks	  –	  Schönberg’s	  spiritual	  but	  crude	  and	  unattractive	  self-­‐portraits	  
referred	  to	  in	  English	  both	  as	  Visions	  and	  as	  Gazes.	  	  And	  yet	  to	  date	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  
monograph	  –	  or	  even	  a	  lengthy	  article	  –	  in	  German	  or	  English	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐
portraits.	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  just	  barely	  begin	  to	  redress	  such	  neglect,	  discussing	  different	  ways	  in	  
which	  Schönberg’s	  life	  and	  work	  produced	  and	  reproduced	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  
hatred,	  ugly	  representational	  practices,	  and	  solipsism.	  	  I	  refer	  to	  both	  public	  and	  private	  
cultures	  –	  as	  well	  as	  their	  inevitable	  intertwining.	  	  I	  posit	  that	  Schönberg	  experienced	  crises	  of	  
subjectivity	  that	  in	  turn	  led	  him	  to	  paint	  certain	  aspects	  of	  his	  identity	  –	  man,	  despised	  
vanguard	  musician,	  altruistic	  and	  betrayed	  husband,	  truthful	  artist	  –	  as	  primary	  and	  maligned.	  	  
Scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  take	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐descriptions	  at	  face	  value	  and	  paint	  his	  suffering	  
as	  heroic	  –	  a	  perspective	  that	  I	  will	  not	  so	  much	  negate	  as	  denaturalize.	  	  	  
I	  believe	  that	  Schönberg’s	  ugly	  art,	  the	  culture	  in	  which	  it	  developed,	  and	  the	  
commentary	  to	  which	  it	  gave	  rise	  can	  all	  be	  better	  understood	  if	  we	  approach	  the	  biographical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372	  According	  to	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  157.	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and	  broader	  cultural	  context	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  the	  affective	  bases	  of	  representational	  strategies	  of	  
ugliness.	  	  Hating,	  being	  hated,	  representing	  oneself	  as	  ugly,	  representing	  others	  as	  ugly	  –	  these	  
are	  both	  private	  and	  public,	  internal	  and	  external	  phenomena,	  and	  core	  components	  of	  
Viennese	  modernity.	  	  And	  in	  all	  these	  respects	  –	  as	  well	  as,	  of	  course,	  in	  his	  creative	  
accomplishment	  –	  Schönberg	  is	  an	  exemplary	  subject.	  	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐portraits	  are	  often	  
rough,	  pessimistic,	  and	  downright	  unattractive,	  but	  he	  consistently	  emphasized	  their	  
importance,	  insisting	  that	  they	  arose	  from	  an	  inner	  need	  and	  were	  significant	  expressions	  of	  his	  
core	  creativity.	  	  As	  Patrick	  Werkner	  notes,	  Schönberg	  was	  “an	  outsider	  and	  an	  amateur	  as	  far	  as	  
painterly	  skills	  are	  concerned.	  	  But	  he	  is	  a	  key	  figure	  if	  his	  visionary	  paintings	  are	  seen	  together	  
with	  his	  writings,	  his	  theory,	  and	  his	  contribution	  to	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  Gesamtkunstwerk.	  	  
His	  role	  is	  central	  to	  Viennese	  Modernism.”373	  	  	  
	  
§	  
The	  first	  public	  display	  of	  Schönberg’s	  visual	  art	  was	  a	  solo	  exhibition	  at	  the	  gallery	  in	  the	  Hugo	  
Heller	  bookshop	  in	  Vienna,	  in	  1910.	  	  Schönberg	  scholar	  Eberhard	  Freitag374	  opens	  his	  brief	  1978	  
article	  “German	  Expressionism	  and	  Schoenberg’s	  Self-­‐Portraits”	  with	  the	  following	  assessment:	  
On	  October	  19,	  1910,	  an	  exhibit	  of	  forty-­‐seven	  oil	  paintings,	  drawings,	  and	  water	  colors	  
by	  Arnold	  Schoenberg	  was	  opened	  in	  a	  small	  room	  of	  the	  Viennese	  book	  and	  art	  dealer	  
Hugo	  Heller	  …	  The	  first	  invitations	  had	  hardly	  been	  sent	  out	  when	  members	  of	  the	  Court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  Ibid.,	  168.	  
374	  Freitag	  wrote	  a	  doctoral	  dissertation,	  “Schönberg	  als	  Maler,”	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Münster	  (1973),	  which	  was	  
followed	  immediately	  by	  the	  publication	  of	  Freitag’s	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  in	  Selbetzeugnissen	  und	  Bilddokumenten	  
(Reinbek/Hamburg:	  Rowolt	  Taschenbuch,	  1973). 
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Opera	  began	  to	  circulate	  the	  cynical	  line:	  ‘Schoenberg’s	  music	  and	  Schoenberg’s	  pictures	  
–	  that	  will	  knock	  your	  ears	  and	  eyes	  out	  at	  the	  same	  time!’	  	  As	  to	  be	  expected,	  the	  
criticisms	  in	  the	  press	  were	  devastating.375	  
And	  yet	  curiously,	  if	  we	  consult	  page	  thirteen	  of	  Vienna’s	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse	  on	  14	  October,	  
1910	  –	  five	  days	  before	  Schönberg’s	  show	  had	  even	  started,	  according	  to	  Freitag’s	  erroneous	  
description376	  –	  we	  find	  a	  brief	  review	  informing	  the	  reader	  of	  a	  general	  exhibition	  of	  
Schönberg’s	  works	  being	  held	  now	  at	  the	  art	  salon	  in	  Heller’s	  bookstore.	  	  We	  are	  further	  told	  
that	  the	  exhibition	  has	  so	  far	  enjoyed	  strong	  attendance	  and	  three	  oil	  paintings	  have	  already	  
been	  purchased:	  a	  portrait	  of	  a	  doctor,	  one	  of	  the	  artist’s	  wife,	  and	  a	  self-­‐portrait.377	  On	  14	  
October,	  1910	  –	  the	  same	  day	  as	  the	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse	  review	  –	  Arthur	  Schnitzler	  wrote	  in	  his	  
journal:	  “‘in	  Heller’s	  Art	  Salon	  saw	  the	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  pictures.	  	  Talent	  unmistakable.’”378	  	  
The	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse	  also	  ran	  a	  longer	  review	  of	  Schönberg’s	  exhibition	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
month.	  	  Albeit	  slightly	  sarcastic,	  this	  review	  was	  by	  no	  means	  scathing,	  either.379	  	  	  
According	  to	  Werkner	  the	  art	  show	  contained	  fourteen	  so-­‐called	  Impressions	  and	  
Fantasies,	  eleven	  Portraits	  and	  Studies	  –	  five	  of	  these	  devoted	  to	  Mahler	  –	  plus	  three	  
Nocturnes,	  two	  self-­‐portrait	  drawings,	  two	  caricatures,	  and	  five	  studies	  and	  figurines	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375	  Eberhard	  Freitag,	  “German	  Expressionism	  and	  Schoenberg’s	  Self-­‐Portraits,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Arnold	  Schoenberg	  
Institute	  II,	  no.	  3:	  “Schoenberg	  as	  Artist”	  (June	  1978):	  164–72.	   
376	  The	  exhibition	  actually	  opened	  on	  12	  October.	  
377	  Anon.,	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse,	  14	  October	  1910,	  13.	  
378	  In	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  170.	  	  
379	  r.	  [Josef	  Reitler],	  “Schönberg-­‐Abend	  im	  Kunstsalon	  Heller,”	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse,	  30	  October	  1910,	  16.	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Schönberg’s	  musical	  drama	  The	  Lucky	  Hand.380	  	  So	  Werkner’s	  account	  further	  contradicts	  
Freitag’s	  description.	  	  Schönberg’s	  first	  exhibition	  is	  contested,	  an	  amply	  but	  inaccurately	  
discussed	  cultural	  affair.	  	  Freitag	  contends	  that	  the	  show	  was	  surrounded	  contemporaneously	  
with	  hostility,	  and	  I	  myself	  have	  read	  variations	  on	  Freitag’s	  description	  of	  that	  reception	  many	  
times.381	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  situation	  from	  a	  different	  angle,	  however,	  the	  exhibition	  at	  the	  Heller	  
gallery	  suddenly	  appears	  as	  one	  rather	  unremarkable	  art	  show	  amongst	  many	  –	  received,	  like	  
so	  many	  other	  works	  of	  art	  in	  Viennese	  modernity,	  with	  theatrical	  reactions	  characterized	  by	  a	  
high	  degree	  of	  ambivalence.	  	  
	  
§	  
Implicitly	  and	  explicitly	  the	  figureheads	  of	  Viennese	  modernity	  –	  literary,	  political,	  artistic,	  even	  
medical	  –	  seem	  to	  circle	  around	  the	  question,	  admittedly	  narcissistic	  but	  nonetheless	  dialogical:	  
“how	  does	  how	  you	  see	  me	  affect	  how	  I	  see	  myself?”	  	  Schönberg’s	  and	  Gerstl’s	  respective	  
ruminations	  on	  selfhood	  play	  out	  somewhat	  differently,	  however,	  from	  the	  more	  public	  
performances	  of	  some	  of	  their	  peers:	  Gerstl’s	  self-­‐portraits	  feel	  more	  private,	  if	  likewise	  
confrontational,	  compared	  to	  Kokoschka’s,	  and	  Schönberg’s	  art	  is	  aggressively	  isolationist	  
compared	  to	  the	  sexual	  contact	  seen	  for	  example	  in	  Schiele’s	  oeuvre.	  	  Thus	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  
whereas	  Kokoschka	  and	  Schiele’s	  ugly	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  were	  often	  oriented	  
around	  chiasmic	  lines	  of	  intersubjective	  attraction	  and	  repulsion	  –	  I	  draw	  you	  toward	  me	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  169.	  
381	  For	  example	  Jelena	  Hahl-­‐Koch,	  “Kandinsky,	  Schönberg	  and	  Their	  Parallel	  Experiments,”	  in	  Schönberg	  &	  
Kandinsky:	  An	  Historic	  Encounter,	  ed.	  Konrad	  Boehmer	  (Amsterdam:	  Harwood	  Academic,	  1997),	  80,	  references	  this	  
lore	  without	  providing	  any	  further	  information	  or	  citations.	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theatrical	  self-­‐display	  then	  repel	  you	  with	  obscene	  ugliness	  –	  Gerstl	  and	  Schönberg	  both	  seem	  
to	  represent	  solipsism	  in	  their	  art.	  	  	  
Such	  solipsism	  is	  clearly	  compensatory,	  however	  –	  Schönberg	  the	  angry,	  isolated	  artist	  
still	  depends	  for	  this	  sense	  of	  anti-­‐social	  selfhood	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  others.	  	  In	  Schönberg’s	  
most	  unappealing	  self-­‐representations,	  a	  palpable	  sense	  of	  loneliness	  often	  radiates.	  	  In	  his	  
polemical	  1949	  publication	  Philosophy	  of	  New	  Music	  Theodor	  Adorno,	  discussing	  Expressionism	  
generally	  and	  Schönberg	  in	  particular,	  refers	  to	  a	  pervasive	  “illusion	  of	  individuality.”	  	  Adorno	  
concludes	  that	  what	  is	  being	  unintentionally	  represented	  is	  actually	  “loneliness	  as	  a	  style.”382	  	  
Later	  in	  the	  same	  text	  Adorno	  reiterates	  that	  with	  Schönberg,	  “everything	  is	  based	  upon	  that	  
lonely	  subjectivity	  which	  withdraws	  into	  itself.”383	  	  This	  quality	  of	  loneliness	  in	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐
portraiture	  reveals	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  others	  that	  the	  rigidly	  individualistic	  self-­‐portraits	  might	  
otherwise	  conceal.	  	  One	  of	  Anton	  von	  Webern’s384	  three	  daughters	  said,	  when	  describing	  her	  
childhood:	  “Schönberg’s	  pictures	  ‘made	  an	  unpleasant	  impression	  on	  me.	  	  As	  a	  child	  I	  was	  
literally	  afraid	  [of	  them].	  	  It	  was	  positively	  spooky	  to	  go	  into	  the	  dining	  room	  of	  the	  Schönberg	  
home,’	  where	  his	  pictures	  hung.”	  	  And	  yet	  to	  the	  child	  apparently	  “Schönberg	  himself,	  in	  
contradistinction	  to	  the	  impression	  created	  by	  his	  pictures,	  seemed	  ‘friendly	  and	  quite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382	  Theodor	  Adorno,	  Philosophy	  of	  Modern	  Music,	  trans	  Anne	  G.	  Mitchell	  and	  Wesley	  V.	  Blomster	  (New	  York:	  
Seabury	  Press,	  1973),	  46.	  	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  work	  as	  Philosopher	  of	  New	  Music	  for	  the	  reader’s	  sake,	  because	  that	  is	  by	  
far	  the	  more	  common	  title.	  	  Philosophy	  of	  New	  Music	  is	  also	  better	  translation	  of	  the	  German	  original,	  Philosophie	  
der	  neuen	  Musik.	  
383	  Ibid.,	  142.	  
384	  Von	  Webern	  was	  a	  student	  and	  friend	  of	  Schönberg’s,	  and	  is	  a	  noted	  composer	  in	  his	  own	  right.	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natural.’”	  	  Werkner	  concludes	  that	  such	  a	  discrepancy	  ultimately	  “speaks	  for	  the	  
‘psychotherapeutic’	  nature	  of	  those	  works.”385	  
An	  oil-­‐on-­‐board	  self-­‐portrait	  dated	  c.	  1910	  (Fig.	  35,	  cat.	  no.	  10),	  which	  shows	  Schönberg	  
from	  the	  neck	  up	  in	  a	  domestic	  environment	  (a	  blurry	  bookshelf	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  background),	  is	  
comparatively	  recognizable	  but	  ugly	  if	  only	  because	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  skin.	  	  Schönberg	  chose	  
a	  cheerful	  red	  spectrum	  to	  create	  a	  decidedly	  disconsolate	  image:	  peach,	  salmon,	  and	  cherry	  
skin	  tones	  here	  make	  Schönberg	  appear	  as	  though	  he	  has	  been	  burned.	  	  Besides	  rage,	  other	  
associations	  with	  very	  flushed	  skin	  include	  sickness	  and	  shame.	  	  But	  the	  most	  interesting	  
interpretive	  connection	  is	  to	  look	  at	  it	  as	  boiled	  skin,	  and	  compare	  it	  to	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  
Schönberg	  himself	  about	  being	  boiled	  alive.	  	  In	  a	  now-­‐famous	  analogy,	  the	  composer	  used	  the	  
image	  of	  boiling	  water	  to	  explain	  the	  sense	  of	  persecution	  he	  felt	  while	  developing	  his	  artistic	  
style	  and	  identity	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Schönberg	  also	  analyzes	  how	  this	  
hostility	  ultimately	  affected	  him:	  
I	  had	  the	  feeling	  as	  if	  I	  had	  fallen	  into	  an	  ocean	  of	  boiling	  water	  …	  and,	  not	  knowing	  how	  
to	  swim	  or	  get	  out	  in	  another	  manner,	  I	  tried	  with	  my	  legs	  and	  arms	  as	  best	  I	  could.	  	  I	  did	  
not	  know	  what	  saved	  me;	  why	  I	  was	  not	  drowned	  or	  cooked	  alive	  …	  I	  have	  perhaps	  only	  
one	  merit:	  I	  never	  gave	  up.	  	  But	  how	  could	  I	  give	  up	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  an	  ocean?	  …	  There	  
was	  nobody	  to	  help	  me	  …	  I	  was	  always	  in	  the	  red	  …	  it	  burned	  not	  only	  my	  skin,	  it	  also	  
burned	  internally	  …	  I	  see	  that	  I	  was	  always	  in	  the	  red	  …	  Maybe	  something	  has	  been	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achieved	  but	  it	  was	  not	  I	  who	  deserves	  the	  credit	  for	  that.	  	  The	  credit	  must	  be	  given	  to	  my	  
opponents.	  	  They	  were	  the	  ones	  who	  really	  helped	  me.386	  	  
In	  this	  self-­‐portrait	  Schönberg	  stares	  intently	  outward,	  and	  both	  the	  angry	  flesh	  tones	  and	  his	  
stare	  strike	  the	  viewer	  forcibly.	  	  But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  sense	  of	  calmness	  in	  Schönberg’s	  visage	  
here,	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  him	  glaring	  at	  real-­‐life	  opponents	  with	  equal	  equanimity.	  	  
Schönberg’s	  trenchant	  stare,	  seen	  throughout	  his	  self-­‐portraits,	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  an	  
indefatigable	  –	  if	  irascible	  –	  temperament.	  	  	  
For	  Werkner,	  it	  is	  truly	  vision	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Schönberg’s	  visual	  art	  practice;	  he	  claims	  
that	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  “the	  hallucinatory	  pictures	  that	  Schönberg	  described	  as	  Gazes	  ...	  
which	  Kandinsky	  called	  Visions,”	  what	  is	  being	  shown	  is	  “not	  faces,	  but	  the	  act	  of	  seeing.”387	  	  
Werkner	  elaborates:	  “Schönberg’s	  visionary	  painting	  is	  consequently	  more	  accessible	  to	  us	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  circumstances	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  it	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  purely	  art-­‐historical	  
considerations.”388	  	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  such	  “circumstances”	  is	  the	  affect	  of	  hostility.	  	  Tales	  of	  hate	  
surround	  Schönberg’s	  pictures:	  the	  hostility	  he	  claimed	  was	  directed	  at	  him,	  the	  hostility	  he	  is	  
purported	  to	  have	  provoked	  in	  others.	  	  As	  the	  Viennese	  artist	  Albert	  Paris	  von	  Gütersloh	  
concluded	  in	  his	  1912	  essay	  on	  Schönberg	  as	  a	  painter,	  “Very	  few	  trust	  these	  pictures.	  	  Most	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  Letter	  of	  22	  May	  1947,	  in	  Stein,	  ed.,	  Arnold	  Schoenberg	  Letters,	  trans	  Eithne	  Wilkins	  and	  Ernst	  Kaiser	  (New	  York:	  
St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1965,	  c1964),	  245–6,	  emphasis	  added.	  
387	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  161.	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people	  hate	  them	  instinctively	  on	  first	  seeing	  them.	  	  So	  do	  the	  artists,	  who	  are	  frightened	  to	  
death	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  having	  to	  paint	  like	  this	  themselves	  some	  day.”389	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Before	  further	  examining	  Schönberg’s	  hostile	  pictorialism	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  review	  certain	  
biographical	  details	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  contemporaneous	  with	  his	  ugliest	  art	  practice,	  circa	  
1908–10.	  	  Gerstl’s	  biography	  is	  likewise	  relevant,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  purported	  influence,	  
on	  Schönberg,	  of	  Gerstl’s	  affair	  with	  his	  wife	  but	  also	  because	  Gerstl	  gave	  both	  Schönbergs	  
painting	  lessons.	  	  He	  may	  therefore	  have	  influenced	  Schönberg’s	  art	  directly	  via	  instruction	  in	  
theory	  and	  technique	  and	  indirectly	  by	  further	  destabilizing	  the	  already	  tenuous	  marital	  
relations	  between	  Arnold	  and	  Mathilde.	  	  	  
Kallir	  emphasizes	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Schönberg	  had	  already	  been	  taking	  painting	  
lessons	  from	  Gerstl	  since	  the	  year	  before,	  he	  actually	  dated	  his	  first	  painting	  six	  weeks	  after	  
Gerstl’s	  suicide.	  	  Kallir	  concludes	  that	  Schönberg	  “was	  unable	  to	  forget	  the	  young	  painter.”	  	  
“Within	  the	  next	  two	  years,”	  she	  notes,	  “he	  would	  execute	  approximately	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  a	  total	  
oeuvre	  comprising	  about	  sixty-­‐five	  oils.”390	  	  	  
Regarding	  the	  predominance	  of	  self-­‐portraits	  in	  this	  oeuvre	  Werkner	  suggests	  that	  
Schönberg	  produced	  self-­‐portraits	  “as	  a	  kind	  of	  confirmation	  of	  his	  identity”	  during	  difficult	  
times.	  	  As	  examples	  of	  such	  difficult	  times	  Werkner	  references	  Gerstl’s	  suicide,	  Schönberg’s	  
marital	  problems,	  the	  hostility	  of	  Vienna	  toward	  Schönberg’s	  musical	  innovations,	  and	  chronic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389	  Albert	  Paris	  von	  Gütersloh,	  “Schoenberg	  the	  Painter,”	  in	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  Das	  Bildnerische	  Werk/Arnold	  
Schoenberg:	  Paintings	  and	  Drawings,	  ed.	  Thomas	  Zaunschirm	  (Klagenfurt:	  Ritter,	  1991),	  427.	  
390	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  40.	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financial	  difficulties.	  	  Purportedly	  these	  events	  contributed	  clearly	  to	  the	  artist’s	  distress	  and	  
subsequent	  self-­‐representational	  strategies.391	  	  It’s	  natural	  enough,	  of	  course,	  to	  assume	  that	  
negative	  events	  have	  negative	  effects	  –	  and	  I	  would	  not	  presume	  to	  suggest	  otherwise.	  	  
Nevertheless	  what	  I	  do	  suggest	  is	  that	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  the	  Schönberg	  story	  worth	  
questioning.	  	  Several	  spurious	  details	  get	  circulated	  about	  the	  composer	  continuously,	  and	  
taken	  together	  they	  threaten	  to	  obscure	  how	  dramatically	  constructed	  his	  negative	  narrative	  
really	  was.	  	  By	  correcting	  a	  few	  common	  historical	  errors	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  looking	  carefully	  
at	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐representational	  strategies,	  I	  hope	  we	  can	  rethink	  his	  narrative	  of	  
martyrdom	  a	  little.	  	  
Critics	  on	  all	  sides	  –	  art	  historians,	  music	  historians	  and	  musicologists,	  the	  many	  
Schönberg	  scholars,	  the	  few	  Gerstl	  scholars	  –	  tend	  to	  especially	  stress	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  
Mathilde	  and	  Richard’s	  affair	  on	  Arnold’s	  mindset.	  	  While	  I	  would	  never	  claim	  to	  know	  
otherwise,	  I	  do	  suggest	  we	  more	  thoroughly	  circulate	  another,	  documented	  but	  under-­‐
discussed	  aspect	  of	  this	  psychosexual	  history.	  	  It	  is	  not	  often	  mentioned	  and	  sometimes	  
outright	  denied,392	  but	  Schönberg	  initially	  reacted	  casually	  to	  news	  of	  a	  romantic	  link	  between	  
his	  friend	  and	  his	  wife.	  	  When	  Schönberg’s	  daughter	  told	  her	  father	  around	  May	  of	  1908393	  that	  
she	  had	  seen	  Gerstl	  and	  her	  mother	  kiss,	  Schönberg	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Gerstl	  assuring	  him	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  161.	  
392	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  26:	  “How	  long	  the	  affair	  went	  undetected	  is	  unknown.	  	  Certainly	  Schoenberg	  had	  
no	  suspicions	  when,	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1908,	  he	  again	  invited	  Gerstl	  to	  join	  the	  family	  on	  holiday	  in	  Gmunden.”	  	  	  
393	  Bryan	  R.	  Simms,	  “‘My	  Dear	  Hagerl’:	  Self-­‐Representation	  in	  Schoenberg’s	  String	  Quartet	  No.	  2,”	  19th-­‐Century	  
Music	  26,	  no.	  3	  (2003):	  267.	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two	  men	  should	  never	  let	  a	  woman	  come	  between	  them.394	  	  Although	  decades	  later	  Schönberg	  
was	  quite	  hostile	  in	  his	  passing	  comments	  about	  Gerstl,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  indiscretions	  he	  
“seems	  to	  have	  laid	  blame	  for	  them	  solely	  on	  Mathilde,	  not	  Gerstl.”395	  	  Meanwhile	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  
15	  June	  Mathilde	  wrote	  to	  Arnold:	  “‘What	  more	  do	  you	  want	  to	  know	  about	  Gerstl?	  	  I	  have	  
already	  written	  to	  you	  very	  plainly	  that	  I	  long	  only	  for	  you.	  	  What	  still	  upsets	  you?	  	  Are	  you	  
content	  with	  me	  now?’”396	  	  And	  more	  desperately,	  on	  21	  June,	  1908:	  “‘Am	  I	  really	  so	  disgusting	  
to	  you?	  	  And	  you	  are	  always,	  always	  good	  to	  me.	  	  Sometimes	  you	  would	  like	  to	  beat	  me	  up	  (but	  
I	  would	  fight	  back).	  	  You	  are	  always	  good	  and	  I	  am	  insufferable.	  	  That’s	  the	  way	  it	  is	  and	  always	  
has	  been.	  	  It	  upsets	  me	  so	  because	  I	  care	  for	  you	  so	  much.	  	  But	  you	  know	  I	  cannot	  tell	  you	  that	  
and	  you	  should	  really	  know	  that	  I	  can’t.’”397	  	  Mathilde’s	  ambivalence	  comes	  through	  here	  in	  the	  
way	  that	  as	  she	  tries	  to	  split	  herself	  from	  her	  husband	  and	  good	  from	  bad	  absolutely	  –	  and	  take	  
all	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  bad	  onto	  herself	  –	  her	  description	  comes	  off	  as	  almost	  sarcastic,	  
presumably	  inadvertently.	  
Schönberg	  seemed	  to	  be	  ambivalent	  about	  the	  matter	  as	  well.	  	  He	  attempted,	  in	  a	  deeply	  
confused	  and	  rather	  alarming	  statement	  notably	  reminiscent	  of	  Weininger’s	  binary	  logic	  in	  Sex	  
and	  Character,	  to	  explain	  his	  feelings	  about	  his	  wife	  at	  the	  time	  of	  her	  affair: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394	  “Er	  wollte	  sich	  erschießen,	  und	  Gerstl	  habe	  ihn	  (so	  hat	  er	  es	  dann	  den	  Bruder	  erzahlt)	  getröstet:	  Er	  (Schönberg)	  
sei	  der	  größte	  lebende	  Kunstler,	  den	  er	  (Gerstl)	  kenne.	  	  Schönberg	  habe	  das	  damals	  zu	  schätzen	  gewußt.	  	  So	  habe	  
es	  einen	  Brief	  von	  ihm	  an	  Richard	  Gerstl	  gegeben	  (offenbar	  geschrieben	  zu	  einer	  Zeit,	  als	  dessen	  Beziehung	  zur	  
Frau	  Mathilde	  schon	  etliche	  Spannungen	  verursacht	  hatte),	  in	  welchem	  Schönberg	  in	  etwa	  gemeint	  haben	  soll,	  
zwei	  sie	  wie	  beide	  sollten	  sich	  einer	  Frau	  wegen	  nicht	  entzweien.”	  	  Verbal	  communication	  from	  Alois	  Gerstl,	  cited	  
in	  Otto	  Breicha,	  Gerstl	  und	  Schönberg:	  Eine	  Beziehung	  (Salzburg:	  Galerie	  Welz,	  1993),	  14.	  
395	  Simms,	  “‘My	  Dear	  Hagerl,’”	  269.	  
396	  In	  ibid.	  
397	  In	  ibid.,	  270.	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I	  denied	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  wife	  betrayed	  me	  …	  She	  lied	  –	  I	  believed	  her.	  	  If	  I	  had	  not	  
believed	  her,	  would	  she	  have	  remained	  with	  me	  so	  long?	  	  Wrong!	  	  She	  did	  not	  lie	  to	  me.	  	  
For	  my	  wife	  does	  not	  lie.	  	  The	  soul	  of	  my	  wife	  is	  so	  united	  with	  my	  own	  that	  I	  know	  
everything	  about	  her.	  	  Consequently,	  she	  did	  not	  lie;	  or	  else	  she	  was	  not	  my	  wife.	  	  And	  so	  
it	  is.	  	  The	  soul	  of	  my	  wife	  was	  so	  alien	  from	  mine	  that	  I	  could	  not	  arrive	  at	  either	  a	  truthful	  
or	  a	  dishonest	  relationship	  with	  her.	  	  We	  never	  really	  spoke	  with	  one	  another	  –	  i.e.,	  
communicated	  –	  we	  just	  talked	  …	  We	  never	  knew	  each	  other.	  	  I	  also	  do	  not	  even	  know	  
what	  she	  looks	  like.	  	  I	  cannot	  conjure	  up	  her	  likeness.	  	  Perhaps	  she	  does	  not	  exist	  at	  all.	  	  
She	  lives	  only	  in	  my	  imagination.398	  	  
In	  pitting	  subjectivities	  against	  one	  another	  Schönberg’s	  description	  evinces	  the	  Viennese	  
preoccupation	  with	  hostile	  self/other	  relations.	  	  But	  the	  way	  he	  transitions	  from	  being	  intensely	  
invested	  in	  his	  marital	  relationship	  to	  being	  unsure	  in	  the	  end	  whether	  or	  not	  his	  wife	  exists	  is	  
more	  aggressive,	  even,	  than	  the	  objectification	  of	  the	  subject	  Freud	  instantiated	  in	  founding	  a	  
system	  oriented	  around	  the	  individual	  “subject”	  with	  everyone	  else	  an	  “object.”	  	  Schönberg	  
demonstrates	  an	  obvious	  identity	  dysphoria	  here,	  and	  some	  sadistic	  desire	  to	  erase	  his	  wife’s	  
very	  being	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  his	  sense	  of	  his	  own.	  	  
In	  his	  article	  “‘My	  Dear	  Hagerl’:	  Self-­‐Representation	  in	  Schoenberg’s	  String	  Quartet	  No.	  
2,”	  Bryan	  R.	  Simms	  attempts	  to	  right	  several	  scholarly	  wrongs	  in	  the	  extant	  histories	  of	  the	  
doomed	  love	  triangle.	  	  Contemplating	  the	  common	  tale	  that	  Mathilde	  and	  Richard	  were	  caught	  
in	  flagrante	  delicto,	  he	  suggests	  instead	  that	  the	  disastrous	  moment	  was	  perhaps	  being	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  In	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  28.	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discovered	  with	  Richard	  painting	  Mathilde	  in	  the	  nude.399	  	  Simms	  also	  negates	  “the	  often-­‐
stated	  assumption”	  that	  after	  Mathilde	  and	  Richard	  fled	  the	  scene	  she	  moved	  in	  with	  Gerstl	  in	  
Vienna	  –	  noting	  that	  such	  conclusions	  are	  simply	  “not	  supported	  by	  the	  content	  of	  her	  
letters,”400	  which	  he	  reproduces	  in	  detail.	  	  According	  to	  Alexander	  Zemlinsky’s	  second	  wife,401	  
who	  heard	  recollections	  of	  the	  whole	  torrid	  and	  tragic	  affair	  from	  her	  husband,	  when	  Mathilde	  
heard	  of	  Gerstl’s	  suicide	  she	  “‘stopped	  speaking,’”	  and	  from	  that	  moment	  onward	  in	  life	  “‘only	  
spoke	  what	  was	  necessary.’”402	  	  In	  a	  letter	  written	  to	  Gerstl’s	  brother	  Alois	  after	  Gerstl’s	  suicide	  
Mathilde	  said	  that	  of	  her	  and	  Richard,	  Richard	  had	  taken	  the	  easier	  way	  out.403	  	  	  
In	  Arnold	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna	  Kallir	  begins	  discussing	  the	  love	  affair	  with	  the	  comment:	  
“of	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Schoenberg	  circle,	  Gerstl	  found	  himself	  inexplicably	  attracted	  to	  the	  
composer’s	  wife.”	  	  Mathilde	  is	  then	  described	  as	  “a	  cipher	  of	  a	  woman	  who	  seemed,	  more	  
often	  than	  not,	  simply	  to	  fade	  into	  the	  background.”404	  	  Two	  pages	  later	  Kallir	  concludes,	  
regarding	  the	  Schönbergs’	  eventual	  reconciliation:	  “fortunately,	  Webern	  came	  to	  the	  rescue,	  
appealing	  to	  Mathilde’s	  sense	  of	  motherhood.”405	  	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Zemlinsky’s	  wife’s	  dire	  
description	  of	  Mathilde	  as	  traumatized	  and	  henceforth	  nearly	  mute,	  according	  to	  Kallir	  after	  the	  
reconciliation	  Schönberg’s	  “wife	  resumed	  her	  role	  as	  companion	  and	  friend,	  someone	  whom	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399	  Simms,	  “‘My	  Dear	  Hagerl,’”	  275.	  
400	  Ibid.	  
401	  Née	  Luise	  Sachsel.	  
402	  In	  Lorraine	  Gorrell,	  Discordant	  Melody:	  Alexander	  Zemlinsky,	  His	  Songs,	  and	  the	  Second	  Viennese	  School	  
(Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2002),	  79.	  
403	  Breicha,	  Gerstl	  und	  Schönberg,	  24.	  
404	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  26.	  
405	  Ibid.,	  28.	  
	  	  
171	  
could	  count	  on	  to	  sympathize	  with	  his	  problems	  and	  to	  supervise	  his	  correspondence.”406	  	  A	  
reader	  could	  be	  excused	  for	  finding	  these	  different	  descriptions	  of	  the	  Schönberg	  reconciliation	  
themselves	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  –	  and	  I	  hope	  my	  readers	  will	  excuse	  me	  if	  I	  reject	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  
happy	  marriage	  is	  likely	  to	  include	  a	  mute	  wife-­‐as-­‐secretary.	  
In	  the	  article	  “Schoenberg	  on	  Holiday:	  His	  Six	  Summers	  on	  Lake	  Traun,”	  Ena	  Steiner	  
explains	  that	  	  
As	  late	  as	  1948,	  in	  his	  essay	  “The	  Blessing	  of	  the	  Dressing,”	  Schoenberg	  still	  distinguishes	  
between	  “the	  masculine	  and	  the	  feminine	  way	  of	  thinking.”	  	  Men,	  he	  says,	  at	  once	  
conceive	  the	  future,	  the	  destiny	  of	  an	  idea;	  women	  see	  only	  the	  nearest	  result	  of	  a	  
problem	  and	  fail	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  more	  distant	  events.	  	  His	  reading	  of	  Otto	  Weininger's	  
book	  Geschlecht	  und	  Charakter,	  where,	  among	  other	  extreme	  ideas,	  the	  author	  
passionately	  proclaims	  the	  inferiority	  of	  women,	  helped	  confirm	  Schoenberg	  in	  an	  
antifeminism	  that	  probably	  lay	  dormant	  since	  his	  experience	  of	  first	  love	  for	  his	  cousin	  
Malva	  Goldchmidt	  …	  By	  the	  time	  of	  his	  marriage	  in	  1901	  he	  seemed	  unable	  to	  make	  the	  
transition	  from	  self-­‐centered	  bachelorhood	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  married	  life.407	  
I	  find	  Steiner’s	  observation	  apt,	  albeit	  somewhat	  ambiguously	  phrased.	  	  Unfortunately	  Steiner	  
does	  not	  clarify	  or	  further	  detail	  this	  notion	  that	  Schönberg	  was	  somehow	  too	  self-­‐centred	  to	  
be	  a	  married	  man.	  	  But	  his	  claim	  recalls	  a	  passage	  in	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna	  that	  rankles.	  	  
Describing	  how	  “in	  a	  fit	  of	  madness”	  one	  of	  Schönberg’s	  neighbours	  threatened	  to	  kill	  the	  
composer	  in	  August	  1911,	  Kallir	  notes	  in	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna	  that	  without	  “any	  warning	  or	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preliminary	  preparations,	  Schoenberg	  suddenly	  turned	  up	  alone,	  on	  the	  Starnbegersee	  in	  
southern	  Germany.	  	  Berg,	  Webern,	  and	  some	  other	  friends	  quickly	  took	  up	  a	  collection	  so	  that	  
he	  could	  send	  for	  Mathilde	  and	  the	  children.”408	  	  Personally	  I	  am	  about	  as	  appalled	  that	  
Schönberg	  left	  his	  family	  to	  this	  murderous	  neighbour	  as	  other	  scholars	  seem	  to	  be	  that	  
Mathilde	  shared	  a	  kiss	  and	  perhaps	  more	  with	  her	  husband’s	  friend.	  	  And	  yet	  the	  former	  
anecdote	  is	  barely	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature,	  much	  less	  with	  censure.	  	  	  
What	  kinds	  of	  personal	  and	  political,	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  differences	  undergird	  such	  
discrepant	  scholarly	  accounts?	  	  My	  feeling	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  differences	  could	  be	  traced	  back	  
to	  preconceived	  notions	  –	  often	  unconscious,	  but	  prejudiced	  and	  tenacious	  –	  about	  gender	  and	  
genius.	  	  Misogyny	  was	  endemic	  to	  and	  therefore	  largely	  unsurprising	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  
Vienna;	  more	  surprising,	  though,	  is	  the	  apparent	  repetition	  of	  such	  prejudicial	  notions	  in	  more	  
or	  less	  contemporary	  scholarship.	  	  Whereas	  a	  wife	  and	  mother	  provides	  comfort	  to	  her	  
husband	  and	  should	  not	  want	  to	  live	  without	  her	  children,	  a	  genius	  cannot	  live	  without	  his	  art	  –	  
and	  will	  fight	  for	  his	  right	  to	  create	  more	  than	  he	  will	  for	  anything,	  or	  anyone,	  else.	  	  A	  man	  
needs	  art	  like	  a	  woman	  needs	  love.	  	  I	  seek	  to	  denaturalize	  such	  discourses	  wherever	  I	  
encounter	  them	  –	  to	  acknowledge	  these	  notions	  explicitly	  in	  order	  to	  return	  them	  to	  the	  level	  
of	  interpretation	  rather	  than	  an	  implied	  fact	  of	  nature.	  
	  
§	  
Besides	  relationship	  problems,	  hostility	  toward	  the	  composer’s	  music	  is	  a	  major	  theme	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  Schönberg,	  while	  Schönberg’s	  own	  hatred	  of	  critics	  is	  a	  major	  theme	  in	  his	  visual	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art.	  	  Mahler	  had	  left	  Vienna	  the	  year	  before,	  on	  9	  December	  1907,	  a	  consequence	  of	  which	  was	  
that	  the	  Society	  of	  Creative	  Musicians	  [Vereinigung	  schaffender	  Tonkünstler]	  disbanded.	  	  And	  as	  
the	  more	  or	  less	  direct	  result	  of	  that	  rupture,	  Schönberg’s	  local	  musical	  career	  was	  threatened.	  	  
Mahler,	  the	  honorary	  head	  of	  that	  organization,	  had	  promoted	  performances	  of	  Schönberg’s	  
music.	  	  Without	  him	  there	  was	  but	  one	  Schönberg	  concert	  in	  Vienna	  the	  following	  year.409	  	  Thus	  
Schönberg	  scholars	  conclude	  that	  the	  negative	  experiences	  of	  1908	  “completely	  changed	  his	  
relation	  to	  reality	  –	  and	  to	  himself.”	  	  Schönberg’s	  persona	  was	  now	  understood	  as	  that	  of	  
someone	  “fighting	  almost	  alone	  against	  a	  world	  of	  enemies.”410	  	  Adorno	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  praise	  
Schönberg	  for	  his	  spirit	  of	  renunciation,	  his	  antipathy	  toward	  reconciliation,	  and	  his	  “inhuman	  
coldness.”411	  	  
In	  reality,	  however,	  Schönberg	  was	  conflicted.	  	  Dümling	  notes	  that	  as	  Schönberg	  
“confessed	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Karl	  Kraus,	  his	  attitude	  to	  the	  public	  was	  ambivalent.”	  	  While	  
Schönberg	  rightly	  refused	  to	  write	  for	  the	  audience,	  he	  nevertheless	  “envied	  other	  artists	  their	  
positive	  reviews.”	  	  Dümling	  explains	  further	  that	  Schönberg	  “did	  not	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  
listeners,	  who	  he	  believed	  were	  mostly	  incompetent,	  and	  yet	  he	  needed	  their	  response.”	  	  
Ultimately	  Schönberg	  “explained	  away	  his	  lack	  of	  success	  in	  concert	  life	  and	  the	  accompanying	  
scandals	  as	  confirmation	  of	  his	  lonely	  way.”412	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Freitag’s	  reference	  to	  Schönberg’s	  music	  and	  art	  assaulting	  both	  ear	  and	  eye,	  which	  we	  
encountered	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  as	  a	  line	  ostensibly	  circulating	  in	  the	  Court	  Opera,	  
reflects	  a	  none-­‐too-­‐kind	  review	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  Illustrirte	  Wiener	  Extrablatt	  on	  13	  October	  
1910.413	  	  Schönberg’s	  Rosé	  Quartet	  was	  played	  at	  his	  own	  vernissage,	  and	  the	  review	  states	  
that	  the	  music	  was	  the	  perfect	  accompaniment	  for	  the	  composer’s	  art:	  both	  eyes	  and	  ears	  were	  
ravished.	  	  In	  both	  creative	  spheres,	  the	  reviewer	  concludes	  sarcastically,	  it’s	  now	  apparent	  that	  
truly	  anything	  is	  possible.	  	  Even	  in	  translation	  we	  can	  clearly	  tell	  that	  this	  is	  meant	  as	  a	  bad	  
thing.	  
In	  Schönberg’s	  visual	  art,	  the	  critic	  is	  “presented	  as	  a	  personification	  of	  ignorance.”414	  	  
Schönberg	  even	  intimated	  in	  an	  aphorism	  published	  in	  1912	  in	  Der	  Ruf	  that	  journalists	  were	  not	  
human	  beings.415	  	  Really	  the	  critics	  included	  the	  public	  at	  large	  –	  those	  who	  apparently	  
coughed,	  laughed,	  whistled,	  and	  stamped	  at	  Schönberg’s	  shows,	  those	  who	  understood	  neither	  
the	  man	  nor	  his	  art.	  	  That	  whole	  narrative	  is	  buttressed	  by	  the	  hostility	  and	  ugliness	  in	  
Schönberg’s	  art.	  	  In	  Satire,	  an	  oil-­‐on-­‐board	  painting	  dated	  1910	  (Fig.	  36,	  cat.	  no.	  111),	  
Schönberg	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  greenish-­‐beige	  imbecilic	  face,	  very	  crudely	  executed.	  	  Small	  dark	  
brown	  eyes	  with	  yellow	  pupils	  stare	  out	  at	  us	  blankly,	  like	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  puppet	  or	  rag	  doll.	  	  
There	  are	  greenish-­‐black	  lines	  accenting	  the	  oversize	  nose	  and	  scoring	  the	  cheeks.	  	  A	  strange	  
red	  band,	  wider	  at	  the	  base	  than	  the	  tip,	  runs	  across	  the	  satirical	  puppet-­‐figure’s	  forehead.	  	  The	  
wide,	  gash-­‐y	  grin	  seems	  to	  be	  smeared	  with	  –	  possibly	  leaking	  –	  red.	  	  Is	  this	  meant	  to	  represent	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blood,	  a	  counter-­‐attack	  on	  the	  vampiric,	  creatively	  enervating	  Viennese	  public,	  whose	  hostile	  
reactions	  to	  Schönberg’s	  work	  made	  him	  flee	  to	  Berlin	  in	  1901	  and	  again	  ten	  years	  later	  in	  1911	  
–	  only	  to	  return	  to	  Vienna	  both	  times?	  	  	  
Referring	  to	  Schönberg’s	  “almost	  pathological	  hatred	  of	  critics,”	  Kallir	  notes	  that	  they	  
were	  “the	  subject	  of	  some	  of	  his	  most	  biting	  caricatures.”416	  	  Schönberg	  also	  “banished	  all	  
newspaper	  criticism	  from	  his	  house,	  even	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  cancel	  two	  magazine	  subscriptions	  
because	  their	  reviewers	  were	  hostile	  to	  his	  music.”417	  	  The	  artist’s	  oil-­‐on-­‐wood	  Critic	  I	  (Fig.	  37,	  
cat.	  no.	  112),	  painted	  with	  hues	  of	  brown,	  purple,	  pink,	  and	  red,	  pictures	  a	  masculine	  figure	  
with	  a	  mask-­‐like	  face.	  	  This	  critic’s	  head	  is	  shaped	  like	  an	  inverted	  triangle;	  he	  has	  extremely	  
large,	  pointed,	  red-­‐tipped	  ears	  filled	  only	  with	  pools	  of	  dark	  purple,	  and	  a	  prominent	  beard.	  	  His	  
stupid	  grin	  is	  filled	  in	  with	  dark	  purple,	  just	  like	  the	  ears	  –	  and	  as	  in	  Satire	  the	  eyes,	  now	  pupil-­‐
less	  and	  blind,	  stare	  out	  blankly.	  	  As	  many	  of	  us	  might	  like	  to,	  Schönberg	  here	  represents	  the	  
critic	  as	  a	  moron.	  	  Finally,	  in	  the	  oil-­‐on-­‐board	  Critic	  II	  (Fig.	  38,	  cat.	  no.	  113)	  of	  1909–10	  a	  broad-­‐
featured	  and	  brightly	  coloured	  face	  reminiscent	  of	  those	  seen	  in	  Emil	  Nolde’s	  Christ	  scenes	  (Fig.	  
39),	  hovers	  in	  profile.	  	  A	  huge	  splotch	  of	  dirty-­‐centred	  rouge	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  second	  critic’s	  
face	  dominates	  the	  composition.	  	  Parted	  fleshy	  lips	  sit	  dumbly	  atop	  a	  recessive	  chin	  and	  
beneath	  a	  monstrously	  misshapen	  and	  oversized	  nose.	  	  Anti-­‐naturalistic	  colour	  accents	  serve	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  countenance	  as	  unappealing.	  	  It	  is	  a	  strong	  statement	  of	  hostility	  to	  local	  critics,	  
and	  its	  legibility	  results	  in	  large	  part	  from	  the	  artist’s	  strategies	  of	  ugliness.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Despite	  the	  entrenched	  narrative	  of	  Schönberg’s	  life	  as	  a	  tale	  of	  woe,	  he	  had	  very	  
staunch	  supporters	  and	  experienced	  extraordinary	  windfalls,	  too	  –	  even	  during	  the	  worst	  of	  
times.	  	  For	  example	  when	  Schönberg	  reluctantly	  asked	  Mahler	  for	  a	  loan	  during	  a	  period	  of	  
financial	  struggle	  in	  1910,418	  Mahler’s	  response	  was	  to	  give	  Schönberg	  a	  far	  larger	  loan	  –	  
enough	  for	  a	  whole	  year’s	  worth	  of	  rent.	  	  From	  his	  art	  we	  get	  pictures	  of	  foes,	  but	  Schönberg	  
did	  have	  loyal	  friends.	  	  From	  an	  art	  historical	  point	  of	  view	  at	  least,	  Schönberg	  and	  Kandinsky’s	  
friendship	  is	  particularly	  significant.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Apparently	  Schönberg	  and	  Kandinsky	  met	  in	  person	  for	  the	  first	  time	  on	  14	  September	  1911,	  
but	  had	  been	  corresponding	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.419	  	  Initially	  Schönberg	  and	  
Kandinsky	  were	  inspired	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  their	  agreement	  that	  painting	  should	  not	  aim	  to	  
depict	  material	  reality.	  	  They	  shared	  other	  areas	  of	  common	  interest	  and	  agreement,	  too	  –	  for	  
example	  they	  considered	  themselves	  “spiritually	  sympathetic.”	  	  In	  a	  letter	  of	  18	  December	  1911	  
Schönberg	  even	  wrote	  to	  Kandinsky:	  “I	  have	  just	  read	  your	  book	  from	  cover	  to	  cover,	  and	  I	  will	  
read	  it	  once	  more.	  	  I	  find	  it	  pleasing	  to	  an	  extraordinary	  degree,	  because	  we	  agree	  on	  nearly	  all	  
of	  the	  main	  issues.”420	  	  Kandinsky’s	  book	  was	  Concerning	  the	  Spiritual	  in	  Art	  (1911)	  and	  the	  
feeling	  was	  mutual	  –	  Kandinsky	  was	  very	  taken	  with	  his	  new	  Viennese	  composer	  friend	  around	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  Letter	  of	  2	  August	  1910,	  in	  Stein,	  ed.,	  Arnold	  Schoenberg	  Letters,	  trans.	  Eithne	  Wilkins	  and	  Ernst	  Kaiser	  (New	  
York:	  St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1965,	  c1964),	  297.	  
419	  Klaus	  Kropfinger,	  “Latent	  Structural	  Power	  versus	  the	  Dissolution	  of	  Artistic	  Material	  in	  the	  Works	  of	  Kandinsky	  
and	  Schönberg,”	  in	  Schönberg	  &	  Kandinsky:	  An	  Historic	  Encounter,	  9.	  
420	  Ibid.,	  16.	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the	  time	  Concerning	  the	  Spiritual	  in	  Art	  was	  published.	  	  Indeed	  Kandinsky	  praises	  Schönberg	  in	  
that	  text,	  emphasizing	  how	  “alone”	  he	  was	  “in	  severing	  himself	  from	  conventional	  beauty.”421	  	  	  
In	  an	  often-­‐overlooked	  footnote	  in	  Concerning	  the	  Spiritual	  in	  Art	  Kandinsky	  explains	  his	  
position	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  inner	  need,	  ugliness,	  and	  the	  “spiritually	  unsympathetic”:	  
The	  term	  “outer,”	  here	  used,	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  term	  “material”	  used	  
previously.	  	  I	  am	  using	  the	  former	  to	  mean	  “outer	  need,”	  which	  never	  goes	  beyond	  
conventional	  limits,	  nor	  produces	  other	  than	  conventional	  beauty.	  	  The	  “inner	  need”	  
knows	  no	  such	  limits,	  and	  often	  produces	  results	  considered	  “ugly.”	  	  But	  “ugly”	  itself	  is	  a	  
conventional	  term,	  and	  only	  means	  “spiritually	  unsympathetic,”	  being	  applied	  to	  some	  
expression	  of	  an	  inner	  need,	  either	  outgrown	  or	  not	  yet	  attained.	  	  But	  everything	  which	  
adequately	  expresses	  the	  inner	  need	  is	  beautiful.422	  
What	  exactly	  Kandinsky	  means	  by	  “spiritually	  unsympathetic”	  here	  is	  not	  totally	  clear	  –	  
unsympathetic	  to	  whom,	  for	  example?	  	  It	  seems	  that	  Kandinsky	  is	  saying	  that	  representations	  
of	  spiritual	  states	  that	  we	  find	  sympathetic	  will	  appear	  beautiful,	  while	  representations	  of	  
spiritual	  states	  that	  we	  find	  unsympathetic	  will	  strike	  us	  as	  ugly.	  	  He	  does	  explain	  that	  for	  “those	  
who	  are	  not	  accustomed	  to	  it	  the	  inner	  beauty	  appears	  as	  ugliness	  because	  humanity	  in	  general	  
inclines	  to	  the	  outer	  and	  knows	  nothing	  of	  the	  inner.”423	  	  For	  the	  Blaue	  Reiter	  artist	  ugliness	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421	  Wassily	  Kandinsky,	  Concerning	  the	  Spiritual	  in	  Art,	  trans.	  Michael	  T.H.	  Sadler	  (Boston:	  MFA	  Publications,	  2006),	  
35.	  	  I	  would	  disagree	  with	  Kandinsky	  here,	  and	  would	  date	  a	  Viennese	  engagement	  with	  ugliness	  at	  least	  as	  far	  
back	  as	  the	  debacle	  around	  Klimt’s	  Faculty	  paintings	  –	  if	  back	  further	  to	  the	  expressive,	  often	  bizarre	  
characterological	  busts	  of	  court-­‐artist-­‐turned-­‐paranoid-­‐recluse	  Franz	  Xaver	  Messerschmidt	  (1736–1783).	  	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  know	  that	  Kandinsky	  viewed	  Schönberg	  as	  more	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  the	  rejection	  
of	  beauty	  than	  other	  artists	  of	  the	  time.	  
422	  Kandinsky,	  Concerning	  the	  Spiritual,	  fn.	  2,	  70–1.	  
423	  Ibid.,	  34–5.	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a	  superficial	  aesthetic	  misapprehension	  of	  a	  more	  fundamentally	  misunderstood	  spirituality.	  	  
Thus	  ugliness	  was	  apparently	  permissible	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  it	  was	  not	  actually	  regarded	  –	  by	  
Kandinsky	  at	  least	  –	  as	  ugliness.	  	  	  
	   In	  Schönberg’s	  Theory	  of	  Harmony,	  which	  like	  Kandinsky’s	  book	  was	  published	  in	  1911,	  
Schönberg	  comments	  similarly	  on	  misunderstandings	  of	  ugliness.	  	  He	  insists	  that	  although	  
Mozart	  was	  chastised	  for	  being	  “a	  dissonance	  chaser,”424	  the	  composer	  obeyed	  a	  sense	  of	  inner	  
necessity.	  	  According	  to	  Schönberg,	  too	  often	  people	  thought	  that	  Mozart	  “gave	  in	  to	  the	  
passion	  to	  write	  something	  ugly,”	  and	  would	  admonish	  him,	  saying	  that	  with	  talent	  like	  
Mozart’s	  ugliness	  was	  unnecessary.	  	  Schönberg	  avers:	  “it	  seems,	  though,	  that	  [composers]	  do	  
find	  it	  necessary	  …	  to	  write	  just	  what	  the	  aestheticians	  do	  not	  like,	  just	  what	  these	  people	  
declare	  to	  be	  ugly.	  	  Otherwise	  we	  should	  not	  see	  that	  happening	  over	  and	  over	  throughout	  
history.	  	  But	  if	  it	  is	  really	  ugly,	  then	  who	  is	  right?”425	  	  For	  Schönberg	  the	  answer	  is	  clear:	  “history	  
leaves	  no	  doubt	  whatsoever	  about	  it,”	  he	  declares,	  “he	  is	  right	  who	  will	  always	  be	  right:	  he	  who	  
creates	  even	  when	  it	  is	  ugly.”426	  	  Schönberg	  restates	  these	  views	  of	  ugliness	  several	  times	  
throughout	  the	  text.	  	  Later	  he	  comments:	  
The	  artist's	  creative	  activity	  is	  instinctive	  …	  He	  is	  merely	  the	  instrument	  of	  a	  will	  hidden	  
from	  him,	  of	  instinct,	  of	  his	  unconscious.	  	  Whether	  it	  is	  new	  or	  old,	  good	  or	  bad,	  beautiful	  
or	  ugly,	  he	  does	  not	  know	  …	  Right	  or	  wrong,	  new	  or	  old,	  beautiful	  or	  ugly	  –	  how	  does	  one	  
know	  who	  only	  senses	  the	  instinctual	  urge.	  	  Who	  would	  dare	  to	  differentiate	  right	  from	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  Arnold	  Schoenberg,	  Theory	  of	  Harmony,	  trans.	  Roy	  E.	  Carter	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1983),	  324.	  




wrong	  in	  the	  instinct,	  in	  the	  unconscious,	  to	  keep	  separate	  the	  knowledge	  inherited	  from	  
predecessors	  and	  the	  intuitive	  power	  granted	  by	  the	  spirit.427	  
Schönberg	  and	  Kandinsky’s	  artistic	  accord	  stemmed	  in	  part	  from	  their	  shared	  interest	  in	  spirit	  
[Geist]	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  spirit’s	  “needs”	  and	  its	  heuristic	  qualities.	  	  	  
Schönberg	  “developed	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  truth”	  as	  a	  reaction	  “against	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  
the	  beautiful	  and	  of	  the	  ornament.”	  	  In	  his	  1911	  essay	  “Problems	  of	  Art	  Instruction”	  Schönberg	  
“mentioned	  truthfulness	  as	  the	  highest	  criterion	  of	  art.”	  	  Schönberg	  claimed	  that	  this	  principle	  
“was	  personified	  in	  his	  drama	  “Die	  glückliche	  Hand,”	  where	  the	  beautiful	  woman	  “cannot	  have	  
the	  least	  understanding	  for	  the	  lonely	  man,	  the	  truthful	  artist.”428	  	  As	  Dümling	  notes:	  “strangely	  
enough	  Schönberg	  related	  truthfulness	  no	  longer	  to	  artistic	  subjectivity	  but	  to	  the	  
subconscious.”429	  	  For	  Schönberg	  the	  unconscious	  was	  indeed	  the	  repository	  of	  instinct	  and	  
“inner	  necessity,”	  and	  was	  in	  that	  respect	  at	  least	  our	  best	  path	  to	  truth.	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Kallir	  argues	  that	  insofar	  as	  Schönberg	  actually	  focused	  most	  ardently	  on	  his	  painting	  practice	  
immediately	  after	  his	  wife’s	  affair	  with	  Gerstl	  and	  the	  artist’s	  suicide,	  “the	  composer	  may	  
subconsciously	  have	  turned	  to	  painting	  as	  a	  way	  to	  confront	  and	  overcome	  his	  anguish.”430	  	  She	  
expands	  her	  argument	  about	  the	  therapeutic	  nature	  of	  Schönberg’s	  painting	  practice	  by	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  Ibid.,	  416.	  
428	  Dümling,	  “Public	  Loneliness	  and	  Atonality,”	  132.	  
429	  Ibid.	  
430	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  40.	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explaining	  that	  artists	  “frequently	  turn	  to	  an	  unfamiliar	  medium	  when	  their	  own	  work	  has	  
reached	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis	  or	  transition.”	  	  Moreover,	  as	  Viennese	  modernism	  developed	  it	  
increasingly	  became	  “standard	  practice	  for	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  to	  dismiss	  the	  validity	  of	  formal	  
education.	  	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  assume	  that	  a	  painter	  was	  no	  more	  or	  less	  
qualified	  to	  write	  plays	  than	  a	  playwright,	  or	  that	  a	  composer,	  given	  the	  inclination,	  could	  paint	  
just	  as	  well	  as	  a	  school-­‐trained	  artist.431	  	  It	  even	  seems	  that	  in	  certain	  avant-­‐garde	  circles	  in	  
Vienna	  works	  by	  those	  considered	  “outsiders”	  were	  understood	  as	  more	  authentic	  than	  works	  
by	  trained	  artists	  –	  because	  a	  lack	  of	  training	  and	  technique	  was	  equated	  with	  greater	  
immediacy	  of	  expression.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  conventions	  of	  visual	  ugliness	  were	  used	  strategically	  to	  
communicate	  a	  purportedly	  more	  honest	  –	  i.e.	  less	  prettified	  –	  vision	  of	  self	  and	  society,	  so	  
experimentation	  with	  different	  media	  and	  genres	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  radical	  act	  containing	  a	  
kernel	  of	  raw	  truth.	  	  Kandinsky	  shared	  these	  interests,	  but	  favoured	  artists	  who	  rejected	  the	  
base	  body	  in	  favour	  of	  exalted	  spirit.	  	  Whereas	  Kandinsky	  saw	  beauty	  in	  truth,	  Schönberg	  used	  
ugliness	  to	  connote	  truth.	  
These	  kinds	  of	  artistic	  strategies	  and	  perspectives	  tend	  to	  be	  framed	  (both	  at	  the	  time	  
and	  in	  much	  of	  the	  literature)	  as	  manifestations	  of	  strength,	  but	  I	  suggest	  we	  also	  assess	  them	  
as	  artefacts	  of	  anxiety.	  	  As	  Kropfinger	  notes	  bluntly,	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  “the	  new	  
possibilities	  of	  material,	  structure,	  and	  artistic	  configuration	  constituted	  an	  artistic	  and	  
historical	  challenge	  that	  could	  drive	  artists	  crazy.”432	  	  In	  one	  of	  Schönberg’s	  better-­‐known	  
images,	  an	  oil-­‐on-­‐cardboard	  painting	  dated	  May	  1910	  and	  entitled	  Red	  Gaze	  (Fig.	  40,	  cat.	  no.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  40–1.	  
432	  Kropfinger,	  “Latent	  Structural	  Power,”	  26.	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61,	  as	  Gaze),	  a	  distorted	  and	  misshapen	  head	  is	  painted	  in	  the	  left	  middle	  ground,	  and	  emerges	  
from	  an	  ambiguous	  crevasse	  in	  an	  unmodelled	  and	  largely	  unmodulated	  field	  of	  beige	  paint.	  	  
The	  flat	  head	  stares	  out	  at	  us	  with	  gaping	  mouth	  and	  yellow-­‐pupiled,	  black-­‐irised	  eyes	  that	  are	  
ringed	  with	  bright	  red.	  	  Schönberg	  has	  applied	  the	  paint	  messily	  to	  the	  cardboard	  surface.	  	  
Although	  the	  figure	  does	  not	  really	  appear	  human,	  the	  gaping	  mouth	  and	  red-­‐rimmed	  eyes	  
communicate	  some	  kind	  of	  distress.	  	  The	  affect	  of	  Schönberg’s	  Red	  Gaze	  is	  one	  of	  privation	  and	  
desperation.	  
In	  the	  catalogue	  raisonné	  published	  by	  the	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center	  we	  find	  imagery	  as	  
bizarre	  in	  the	  category	  of	  “self-­‐portraits”	  as	  in	  that	  filed	  under	  “impressions	  and	  fantasies.”433	  	  
And	  no	  matter	  how	  inhuman	  some	  of	  the	  imagery	  may	  be,	  the	  heads	  and	  silhouettes	  in	  
Schönberg’s	  self-­‐portraits	  and	  other	  works	  are	  nearly	  always	  the	  same	  shape	  –	  and	  palpably	  his	  
own.	  	  In	  the	  catalogue	  commentary	  on	  Schönberg’s	  Paintings	  and	  Drawings	  Thomas	  
Zaunschirm	  says,	  regarding	  the	  artist’s	  Visions	  and	  Gazes,	  that	  it	  is	  “a	  smooth	  transition	  from	  
the	  Self-­‐Portraits	  to	  the	  Visions,”	  and	  cites	  letters	  in	  which	  Schönberg	  refers	  to	  works	  as	  “self-­‐
portraits”	  that	  show	  “no	  physical	  resemblance”	  to	  Schönberg.434	  	  	  
One	  self-­‐portrait	  work	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  related	  to	  another	  of	  Schönberg’s	  visions	  or	  
gazes	  is	  the	  oil-­‐on-­‐canvas	  Brown	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (Fig.	  41,	  cat.	  no.	  12),	  dated	  1910,	  which	  resembles	  
the	  artist’s	  Red	  Gaze.	  	  Brown	  Self-­‐Portrait	  also	  features	  an	  unfinished	  and	  largely	  unmodelled	  
face	  –	  only	  slightly	  more	  human-­‐looking	  –	  floating	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  flat	  beige	  tones.	  	  Now	  instead	  of	  
being	  open	  wide	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  cry	  or	  protest	  the	  mouth	  is	  downturned	  in	  an	  obviously	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433	  See	  http://www.schoenberg.at/index.php?option=com_joomgallery&Itemid=339&lang=en	  for	  a	  complete	  
online	  catalogue.	  
434	  Zaunschirm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  Das	  Bildnerische	  Werk/Arnold	  Schoenberg:	  Paintings	  and	  Drawings,	  369.	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melancholic	  manner,	  as	  are	  the	  eyebrows.	  	  Yellow	  eyes	  rimmed	  with	  red	  and	  black	  look	  
clownishly	  sad,	  while	  clumsily	  applied	  whitish	  paint	  at	  the	  outer	  corners	  might	  be	  a	  botched	  
attempt	  at	  tears.	  	  A	  bulbous	  chin,	  large	  green	  nose,	  and	  long,	  droopy	  eyebrows	  all	  look	  weak,	  
dumb,	  and	  a	  little	  foul.	  	  
Somewhere	  between	  fantasy	  and	  realism	  is	  Schönberg’s	  oil-­‐on-­‐board	  Green	  Self-­‐Portrait	  
(Fig.	  42,	  cat.	  no.	  15)	  dated	  23	  October	  1910.	  	  His	  ghostly	  head	  hovers	  insubstantially	  in	  a	  
greenish-­‐beige	  field	  and	  he	  winces	  out	  at	  the	  viewer	  with	  a	  downturned,	  slightly	  pouting	  mouth	  
and	  asymmetrical	  brown	  eyes	  accented	  by	  red,	  green,	  and	  yellow	  colour	  blocking.	  	  In	  Tears,	  an	  
oil-­‐on-­‐canvas	  work	  completed	  before	  October	  1910	  (Fig.	  43,	  cat.	  no.	  77),	  Schönberg	  presents	  an	  
ethereal,	  inhuman	  face	  that	  consists	  largely	  of	  eyes	  –	  articulated	  only	  by	  red	  pupils	  with	  green	  
outlines	  –	  and	  a	  shadowy	  suggestion	  of	  a	  nose	  and	  mouth	  behind	  lines	  that	  seem	  vaguely	  to	  
indicate	  streaming	  light	  or	  gushing	  water.	  	  The	  ugliness	  of	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐portraiture	  is	  thus	  
attributable	  to	  a	  number	  of	  discrete	  factors:	  his	  awkward	  handling	  of	  the	  materials	  and	  lack	  of	  
technical	  skill,	  his	  tendency	  even	  in	  more	  realistic	  self-­‐representations	  to	  eschew	  self-­‐flattery	  in	  
favour	  of	  austerity,	  and	  his	  nightmarish,	  angry,	  and	  lonely	  expressionist	  style.	  
	  
§	  
Perhaps	  it	  was	  in	  part	  because	  his	  art	  was	  so	  very	  personal	  that	  Schönberg	  significantly	  
overestimated	  its	  commercial	  value.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  early	  1910	  when	  Schönberg	  was	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  his	  most	  prolific	  period	  of	  creative	  productivity	  –	  but	  also	  in	  dire	  financial	  straits	  –	  he	  
doggedly	  pursued	  an	  income	  from	  his	  portrait	  painting	  practice.435	  	  Schönberg	  first	  wrote	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435	  Cf.	  Letter	  to	  Emil	  Hertzka,	  7	  March	  1910,	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  ed.,	  Schoenberg	  Letters,	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Emil	  Hertzka,	  the	  president	  of	  Universal	  Edition	  (a	  classical	  music	  publishing	  firm	  in	  Vienna)	  to	  
advertise	  his	  skills	  as	  a	  visual	  artist:	  	  
You	  know	  that	  I	  paint.	  	  What	  you	  do	  not	  know	  is	  that	  my	  work	  is	  highly	  praised	  by	  experts.	  
And	  I	  am	  to	  have	  an	  exhibition	  next	  year.	  	  What	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  you	  might	  be	  able	  
to	  get	  one	  or	  another	  well-­‐known	  patron	  to	  buy	  some	  of	  my	  pictures	  or	  have	  his	  portrait	  
done	  by	  me.	  	  	  
He	  insisted:	  
You	  must	  not	  tell	  people	  that	  they	  will	  like	  my	  pictures.	  	  You	  must	  make	  them	  realise	  that	  
they	  cannot	  but	  like	  my	  pictures,	  because	  they	  have	  been	  praised	  by	  authorities	  on	  
painting;	  and	  above	  all	  that	  it	  is	  much	  more	  interesting	  to	  have	  one’s	  portrait	  done	  by	  or	  
to	  own	  a	  painting	  by	  a	  musician	  of	  my	  reputation	  than	  to	  be	  painted	  by	  some	  mere	  
practitioner	  of	  painting	  whose	  name	  will	  be	  forgotten	  in	  20	  years	  …	  For	  a	  lifesize	  portrait	  I	  
want	  from	  2	  to	  6	  sittings	  and	  200	  to	  400	  kronen.	  	  That	  is	  really	  very	  cheap,	  considering	  
that	  in	  20	  years	  people	  will	  pay	  ten	  times	  as	  much	  and	  in	  40	  years	  a	  hundred	  times	  as	  
much	  for	  these	  paintings.	  	  I	  am	  sure	  you	  quite	  realize	  this,	  and	  I	  hope	  you	  won’t	  make	  any	  
feeble	  jokes	  about	  a	  matter	  as	  serious	  as	  this,	  but	  will	  take	  it	  as	  seriously	  as	  it	  deserves.436	  
By	  way	  of	  comparison,	  around	  this	  time	  Schiele	  was	  asking	  for	  anywhere	  between	  60	  and	  150	  
kronen	  for	  an	  oil	  painting,	  and	  although	  Kokoschka	  tried	  to	  insist	  that	  he	  should	  be	  given	  200	  
kronen	  for	  a	  portrait,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  his	  sitters	  balked	  at	  those	  prices	  and	  often	  outright	  
refused	  to	  buy	  their	  own	  portraits.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  the	  increasingly	  renowned	  Schiele	  did	  
raise	  his	  prices,	  in	  1912,	  to	  300–400	  kronen	  “he	  was	  reproached	  for	  exceeding	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  




market.”437	  	  The	  avant-­‐garde	  vogue	  for	  intermedial	  experimentation	  notwithstanding,	  for	  a	  
composer	  to	  be	  demanding,	  in	  1910,	  prices	  comparable	  to	  Schiele’s	  1912	  ones	  is	  very	  striking	  
indeed.	  
Carl	  Moll	  was	  Schönberg’s	  next	  target.	  	  Moll	  was	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  Secession,	  
the	  composer’s	  friend,	  Alma	  Mahler’s	  stepfather,	  and	  an	  artistic	  advisor	  for	  the	  Galerie	  Miethke	  
(where	  Gerstl	  had	  backed	  out	  of	  an	  exhibition	  when	  he	  discovered	  that	  Klimt’s	  work	  would	  also	  
be	  on	  display).	  	  Schönberg	  asked	  Moll	  to	  arrange	  a	  solo	  show	  for	  him	  at	  the	  Galerie	  Miethke,	  a	  
proposition	  that	  Moll	  rejected	  tactfully	  but	  decisively.	  	  While	  acknowledging	  Schönberg’s	  strong	  
expressive	  drive,	  Moll	  opined	  that	  the	  public	  was	  not	  prepared	  for	  Schönberg’s	  
representational	  strategies,	  and	  even	  observed	  that	  the	  composer’s	  “‘manner	  of	  artistic	  
expression	  …	  appears	  …	  to	  be	  very	  much	  in	  the	  beginning	  stages.’”438	  	  	  
	   Later	  in	  life,	  living	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Schönberg	  valued	  his	  paintings	  more	  highly	  than	  
his	  musical	  compositions	  –	  at	  least	  in	  financial	  terms.	  	  While	  he	  offered	  to	  sell	  the	  score	  of	  his	  
melodrama	  Pierrot	  Lunaire,	  one	  of	  his	  most	  famous	  musical	  works,	  for	  $1,500	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  
for	  the	  painting	  Tears	  Schönberg	  wanted	  $3,500.	  	  At	  this	  time	  in	  the	  US	  Schiele’s	  work	  could	  be	  
purchased	  for	  around	  $1,500,	  Kokoschka’s	  for	  slightly	  more,	  and	  a	  painting	  by	  Renoir	  generally	  
commanded	  between	  $2,000	  and	  $4,000.439	  	  Just	  as	  they	  had	  in	  Vienna	  decades	  earlier,	  
Schönberg’s	  prices	  for	  his	  paintings	  seem	  implausibly	  inflated	  here.	  	  So	  it’s	  odd	  to	  read	  Adorno’s	  
claim	  that	  “even	  in	  his	  Expressionistic	  phase	  Schoenberg,	  who	  composed	  frantically,	  was	  a	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  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  43.	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  In	  ibid.,	  42.	  
439	  Ibid.,	  43.	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radical	  opponent	  of	  the	  market.”440	  	  In	  a	  perhaps	  somewhat	  similar	  vein,	  conductor	  and	  
Schönberg	  scholar	  Leon	  Botstein	  argues	  that	  “despite	  Schönberg’s	  dismissal	  of	  his	  own	  work	  as	  
a	  painter	  as	  that	  of	  an	  ‘amateur,’	  he	  produced	  an	  impressive	  output	  between	  the	  years	  1908	  
and	  1912.”441	  	  This	  statement	  is	  arguably	  somewhat	  misleading:	  Schönberg’s	  self-­‐effacing	  (and	  
much-­‐touted)	  description	  of	  himself	  as	  an	  amateur	  came	  out	  first	  in	  a	  famous	  letter	  to	  
Kandinsky	  written	  on	  8	  March	  1912,	  and	  then	  again	  many	  years	  later	  in	  a	  1950	  interview	  with	  
Halsey	  Stevens.	  	  The	  1912	  letter	  was	  written	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Schönberg	  was	  finally	  despairing	  of	  
finding	  paying	  customers	  for	  his	  visual	  art,	  and	  the	  other	  recorded	  instance	  of	  Schönberg	  
describing	  himself	  as	  an	  amateur	  was	  about	  four	  decades	  after	  the	  composer’s	  most	  active	  
period	  as	  a	  painter.	  	  But	  we	  have	  seen	  definitively	  that	  around	  1910	  Schönberg	  not	  only	  took	  
his	  painting	  very	  seriously,	  he	  also	  repeatedly	  sought	  exhibitions	  for,	  and	  income	  from,	  his	  
visual	  artwork.	  	  
	  
§	  
The	  self-­‐images	  Schönberg	  produced	  in	  and	  around	  Vienna	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  were	  
very	  important	  to	  the	  composer	  and	  remained	  so	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  life.	  	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  
how	  this	  attachment	  may	  have	  had	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  valuable	  function	  of	  self-­‐imaging	  
during	  times	  of	  crisis.	  	  I	  have	  also	  considered	  how	  Schönberg’s	  artistic	  practice	  pictured	  angst	  
and	  hostility	  in	  pictorial	  form,	  and	  used	  strategies	  of	  ugliness.	  	  Schönberg	  felt	  persecuted	  in	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  Adorno,	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  of	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  Leon	  Botstein,	  “Egon	  Schiele	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	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Vienna	  and	  yet	  the	  city	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  as	  much	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  as	  frustration.	  	  
Freud	  likewise	  referred	  to	  Vienna	  as	  the	  object	  of	  his	  unmitigated	  hatred	  at	  times	  but	  at	  other	  
times	  acknowledged	  his	  more	  complex	  relations	  with	  the	  city,	  including	  feelings	  of	  love.	  	  In	  “a	  
perverse	  way,”	  Kallir	  suggests,	  “Schoenberg	  was	  grateful	  to	  Vienna	  for	  the	  ordeal	  of	  his	  earlier	  
years.”	  	  She	  notes	  in	  particular	  how	  the	  struggles	  he	  endured	  in	  Vienna	  were	  “certainly	  
preferable	  to	  the	  sybaritic	  ease	  of	  American	  life.”	  	  Whereas	  the	  Viennese	  “had	  opposed	  his	  
compositions	  because	  music	  mattered	  to	  them,”	  in	  the	  US	  “nothing	  mattered	  –	  the	  sense	  of	  
urgency	  was	  lacking.	  	  Schoenberg	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  conflict	  had	  actually	  been	  a	  necessary	  
stimulus	  to	  his	  work.”442	  	  	  
Nevertheless	  Schönberg’s	  comments	  about	  the	  early	  years	  in	  Vienna	  remained	  acerbic.	  	  
According	  to	  Kallir	  the	  “love	  he	  felt	  for	  the	  Austrian	  capital	  made	  that	  city’s	  rejection	  almost	  
impossible	  to	  forgive	  or	  forget.”443	  	  In	  1934	  Schönberg	  wrote	  a	  very	  short	  piece,	  “About	  
Kandinsky,”	  whose	  sole	  purpose	  seems	  to	  be	  demonstrating	  that	  Kandinsky	  had	  not	  influenced	  
him.	  	  After	  sketching	  out	  a	  creative	  timeline	  to	  that	  effect,	  Schönberg	  concludes:	  “This	  is	  as	  
much	  nonsense	  as	  my	  being	  supposedly	  influenced	  by	  Kokoschka.	  	  Everything	  important	  had	  
been	  done	  before	  Kokoschka	  emerged(!)	  I	  am	  also	  not	  influenced	  by	  another	  painter	  who,	  on	  
the	  contrary,	  claimed	  to	  have	  learned	  painting	  through	  me	  (which	  I	  never	  really	  understood)	  as	  
my	  Gazes	  prove	  which	  are	  unique	  in	  their	  way.	  	  True,	  I	  am	  presumably	  in	  some	  way	  connected	  
with	  contemporaries	  but	  hardly	  with	  these.”	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That	  “other”	  painter	  is	  of	  course	  Gerstl.	  	  Werkner	  notes:	  “Schönberg	  referred	  to	  the	  
influence	  of	  Gerstl	  on	  his	  painting	  very	  occasionally	  in	  retrospect,	  and	  then	  only	  in	  a	  
contemptuous	  manner.”444	  	  Four	  years	  after	  the	  biting	  commentary	  of	  “About	  Kandinsky,”	  in	  
Schönberg’s	  1938	  essay	  “Painting	  Influences,”	  he	  spitefully	  summarizes	  his	  entire	  relationship	  
with	  Gerstl	  using	  fewer	  than	  ten	  sentences:	  
if	  one	  thinks	  of	  this	  certain	  Mr.	  Gerstl	  then	  the	  matter	  stands	  thus.	  	  When	  this	  person	  
invaded	  my	  house	  he	  was	  a	  student	  of	  Keffler445	  [sic]	  for	  whom	  he	  supposedly	  painted	  
too	  radically.	  	  But	  it	  was	  not	  quite	  so	  radical,	  for	  at	  that	  time	  his	  ideal,	  his	  model,	  was	  
[Max]	  Liebermann.	  	  In	  many	  conversations	  about	  art,	  music	  and	  sundry	  things	  I	  wasted	  
many	  thoughts	  on	  him	  as	  on	  everybody	  else	  who	  wanted	  to	  listen.	  	  Probably	  this	  had	  
confirmed	  him	  in	  his,	  at	  that	  time,	  rather	  tame	  radicalism	  to	  such	  a	  degree,	  that	  when	  he	  
saw	  some	  quite	  miscarried	  attempts	  of	  mine,	  he	  took	  their	  miserable	  appearance	  to	  be	  
intentional	  and	  exclaimed:	  “Now	  I	  have	  learned	  from	  you	  how	  one	  has	  to	  paint.”	  	  I	  believe	  
that	  Webern	  will	  be	  able	  to	  confirm	  this.	  	  Immediately	  afterwards	  he	  started	  to	  paint	  
“Modern.”	  	  I	  have	  today	  no	  judgment	  if	  these	  pictures	  are	  of	  any	  value.	  	  I	  never	  was	  very	  
enthusiastic	  about	  them.446	  
Schönberg	  was	  a	  complex,	  controversial	  figure,	  and	  it	  is	  probably	  not	  a	  surprise	  that	  a	  
man	  of	  such	  stature	  should	  so	  remain.	  	  It	  appears	  as	  well	  that	  he	  may	  have	  courted	  controversy	  
at	  times	  –	  I	  have	  deliberately	  presented	  contradictory	  accounts	  here	  in	  part	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  157.	  
445	  Schönberg	  means	  to	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  to	  the	  Viennese	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  Arnold	  Schönberg,	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  Journal	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such	  possibilities.	  	  Despite	  ambiguities	  surrounding	  issues	  in	  his	  personal	  life	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
reception	  of	  his	  artistic	  work,	  links	  between	  visual	  ugliness	  and	  interpersonal	  and	  cultural	  
hostility	  are	  clear.	  	  Likewise	  evident	  are	  extreme	  and	  often	  competing	  ideas	  about	  identity,	  art,	  
and	  truth.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  we	  will	  examine	  local	  enmities	  and	  representational	  practices	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  Viennese	  conflation	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  	  Indeed	  Vienna	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  



















Chapter	  6	  	  
Enemies!	  	  
Representations	  of	  Honesty	  and	  Hostility	  in	  Viennese	  Aesthetics	  and	  Ethics	  	  
	  
	  
Music	  should	  not	  be	  decorative	  but	  true.	  
–	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Lack	  of	  ornamentation	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  intellectual	  strength.	  
–	  Adolf	  Loos	  
	  
Ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  one.	  
–	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  
	  
	  
Leon	  Botstein,	  in	  his	  essay	  “Egon	  Schiele	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  
Aesthetic	  Innovation	  in	  Vienna,	  1890–1918,”	  discusses	  the	  tremendous	  influence	  of	  Karl	  Kraus,	  
Adolf	  Loos,	  and	  Otto	  Weininger	  on	  Schönberg.	  	  Botstein	  proposes	  that	  these	  figures	  along	  with	  
Wittgenstein	  together	  form	  an	  “axis”	  of	  Viennese	  modernism.	  	  Explicitly	  following	  Schönberg’s	  
own	  discourse,	  Botstein	  concludes:	  “in	  Arnold	  Schönberg’s	  later	  terminology,	  the	  battle	  within	  
the	  new	  movements	  of	  art	  was	  between	  ‘style’	  and	  ‘idea.’”447	  	  According	  to	  Botstein,	  two	  
oppositional	  artistic	  axes	  advocated	  two	  likewise	  opposing	  sets	  of	  values,	  both	  of	  which	  
flourished	  in	  Vienna	  and	  represent	  “two	  competing	  trends	  …	  within	  modernism	  itself.”448	  	  
Botstein	  presents	  the	  latter	  –	  “idea-­‐driven”	  –	  set	  of	  values,	  associated	  with	  the	  putative	  “Kraus-­‐
Loos	  axis,”	  as	  more	  iconoclastic,	  more	  critical,	  and	  also	  more	  honest	  than	  the	  former	  –	  “style”	  –	  
set,	  which	  Botstein	  associates	  with	  Gustav	  Mahler,	  Gustav	  Klimt,	  Arthur	  Schnitzler,	  and	  Egon	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  Botstein,	  “Egon	  Schiele	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  107.	  
448	  Ibid.,	  106.	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Schiele.449	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  polemical	  nature	  of	  his	  approach,	  Botstein	  states	  that	  his	  
discussion	  is	  intended	  as	  “a	  modest	  provocation.”	  	  But	  he	  also	  insists	  that	  his	  more	  scholarly	  
aim	  is	  “to	  refine	  the	  methodology	  by	  which	  one	  seeks	  to	  explain	  shifts	  in	  aesthetic	  practice	  and	  
values	  within	  biographical	  frameworks	  and	  within	  …	  a	  particular	  historical	  environment.”450	  
	  	  I	  share	  Botstein’s	  intellectual	  goal	  to	  refine	  the	  tools	  we	  use	  to	  illuminate	  and	  
understand	  aesthetic,	  historical,	  and	  biographical	  phenomena.	  	  However	  for	  me	  an	  essential	  
component	  of	  such	  a	  process	  of	  methodological	  refinement	  would	  be	  the	  denaturalization	  of	  
contemporaneous	  discourses.	  	  By	  contrast,	  Botstein’s	  essay	  is	  characterized	  not	  so	  much	  by	  
refinement	  of	  methodology	  as	  by	  the	  pervasive	  recapitulation	  of	  certain	  specific	  Viennese	  
discursive	  tropes.	  	  Generally	  such	  tropes	  –	  which	  characterize	  the	  writings	  of	  Weininger,	  
Schönberg,	  Kraus,	  and	  Loos	  –	  include	  the	  elevation	  of	  austerity,	  formalism,	  and	  so-­‐called	  purity	  
and	  the	  denigration	  of	  the	  decorative,	  the	  psychological,	  and	  the	  feminine	  or	  sexual	  in	  art.	  	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  highlight	  the	  hostility	  of	  Viennese	  interlocutors,	  examining	  enmities	  and	  
in	  the	  process	  questioning	  certain	  tenacious	  discourses	  around	  Viennese	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  	  
Indeed	  scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  representational	  style	  promulgated	  by	  the	  Viennese	  
“axis	  of	  ideas.”	  	  Both	  then	  and	  now	  hostility	  is	  persistently	  linked	  to	  honesty	  and	  aesthetics	  and	  
ethics	  are	  conflated.	  	  For	  example	  according	  to	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  whereas	  Viennese	  aesthetes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449	  Botstein	  insists	  that	  Schönberg	  “never	  attended	  secondary	  school	  and	  was	  self-­‐taught	  as	  composer,	  painter,	  
and	  writer,”	  and	  refers	  to	  him	  as	  “an	  outsider	  triumphing	  over	  the	  reigning	  networks	  of	  professional	  training	  and	  
advancement.”	  	  Botstein	  then	  contrasts	  this	  outsider’s	  triumph	  favourably	  to	  Schiele’s	  apparently	  unfairly	  
advantageous	  situation:	  first	  Botstein	  refers	  to	  Schiele’s	  formal	  education	  at	  the	  Fine	  Arts	  Academy	  from	  1906–09	  
(in	  fact	  the	  adolescent	  artist’s	  attendance	  was	  spotty	  at	  best),	  then	  he	  notes	  that	  three	  Schiele	  paintings	  were	  
included	  in	  the	  1908	  Kunstschau	  (without	  making	  mention	  of	  the	  reviews),	  and	  finally	  Botstein	  concludes	  that	  
Schiele’s	  fame	  is	  aesthetically	  impure,	  102–3.	  
450	  Ibid.,	  101.	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sought	  to	  cover	  over	  ugliness	  with	  a	  false	  beauty	  that	  reflected	  merely	  their	  own	  narcissism,	  
more	  critical	  thinkers	  found	  radically	  honest	  solutions	  to	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  problems.451	  	  	  
More	  recently	  however	  Claude	  Cernuschi	  has	  disagreed,	  arguing	  –	  throughout	  his	  
Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  Epistemology	  and	  Politics	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Vienna	  –	  
that	  these	  kinds	  of	  divisions	  between	  style	  and	  idea,	  narcissism	  and	  critical	  thought,	  cannot	  
themselves	  be	  separated	  from	  “the	  Jewish	  question.”	  	  For	  Cernuschi	  the	  very	  aesthetic	  
discourses	  and	  strategies	  that	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  Botstein,	  and	  others	  have	  praised	  as	  critical,	  
ethical,	  and	  honest	  are	  in	  fact	  predicated	  on	  antisemitism	  and	  associated	  misogyny.	  	  Cernuschi	  
demurs,	  for	  example,	  that	  Kraus	  “assumed	  that	  supporting	  Expressionism	  would	  convince	  both	  
anti-­‐Semites	  (and	  himself)	  that	  he	  was	  patronizing	  an	  antidecorative	  art	  form	  that	  conveyed	  
psychological	  truth	  –	  i.e.	  an	  art	  form	  that	  embodied	  the	  very	  characteristics	  that	  had	  often	  been	  
denied	  to	  Jews.”452	  	  Concurring	  with	  Cernuschi,	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  more	  specifically	  in	  this	  chapter	  
on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  discourses	  were	  conflated	  and	  tied	  up	  with	  
representational	  strategies	  –	  including	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  –	  focused	  on	  honesty	  
and	  hostility.	  	  Ugliness,	  radically	  reconfigured	  as	  it	  opposite,	  would	  play	  a	  critical	  part	  in	  these	  
new	  discourses.	  
Viennese	  modernists	  pursued	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  enmities	  with	  single-­‐minded	  hatred.	  	  
One’s	  choice	  of	  friends,	  of	  aesthetic	  theories,	  one’s	  manner	  of	  dress	  and	  decoration	  or	  lack	  
thereof	  –	  all	  of	  these	  things	  apparently	  had	  not	  only	  crucial	  aesthetic	  but	  also	  ethical	  
implications.	  	  Self-­‐representational	  strategies	  were	  essential	  for	  men	  trying	  to	  live	  out	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna,	  66.	  
452	  Cernuschi,	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka,	  147.	  
	  	  
192	  
own	  theories	  in	  practice	  –	  to	  make	  their	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  existences	  exemplary.	  	  For	  these	  
Viennese	  cliques,	  ethics	  were	  inextricable	  from	  aesthetics	  because	  lies	  in	  art	  reflected	  lies	  in	  
life.	  	  Certainly	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  group	  identity	  and	  image	  for	  men	  including	  Schönberg,	  
Kraus,	  Loos,	  and	  Wittgenstein	  was	  the	  notion	  that	  authenticity	  and	  truthfulness	  were	  
themselves	  established	  through	  unflinching	  critique	  of	  more	  spurious	  forms	  of	  expression.	  	  But	  
in	  fact	  these	  critiques	  were	  often	  characterized	  less	  by	  honesty	  than	  by	  hostility.	  
Effeminate	  and	  decorative	  forms	  were	  censured	  with	  peculiar	  prejudice.	  	  The	  war	  
against	  decoration	  was	  not	  only	  tied	  up	  with	  issues	  of	  antisemitism:	  it	  also	  paralleled	  a	  war	  
against	  women	  insofar	  as	  Woman	  –	  as	  per	  Weininger’s	  ever-­‐popular	  philosophy	  –	  was	  deemed	  
incapable	  of	  honesty	  or	  truthfulness.	  	  The	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  putative	  axis	  of	  ideas	  
was	  that	  decorative	  forms	  aimed	  at	  an	  ersatz	  beauty,	  which	  these	  men	  considered	  the	  real	  
ugliness.	  	  Deliberately	  choosing	  formal	  and	  expressive	  tools	  that	  the	  deluded	  aesthetes	  would	  
consider	  ugly	  thus	  became	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  enacting	  an	  ethical	  identity.	  	  Feuds	  were,	  
moreover,	  a	  prideful	  extension	  of	  ethics	  –	  indeed,	  as	  one	  scholar	  says	  succinctly	  of	  Kraus,	  
mouthpiece	  for	  the	  so-­‐called	  axis	  of	  ideas:	  “it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  an	  author	  more	  feud-­‐
prone	  than	  Kraus.	  	  It	  would	  be	  even	  harder	  to	  think	  of	  one	  who	  did	  as	  much	  boasting	  about	  the	  
size	  of	  his	  various	  ‘hatreds.’”	  	  By	  reversing	  the	  terms	  by	  which	  ugliness	  should	  be	  understood	  
and	  defending	  their	  hostile	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  theories	  with	  discursive	  violence,	  figures	  like	  





Kraus,	  a	  famously	  irascible	  writer	  and	  journalist	  who	  single-­‐mindedly	  headed	  the	  publication	  of	  
his	  own	  newspaper,	  Die	  Fackel	  [The	  Torch],	  from	  1899–1936,	  is	  also	  known	  more	  broadly	  for	  his	  
language	  critique.	  	  According	  to	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  “when	  Kraus	  called	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  
language,	  as	  the	  crucial	  instrument	  of	  thought,	  he	  did	  so	  with	  a	  moral	  hatred	  for	  that	  
slovenliness	  in	  thought	  and	  expression	  which	  is	  the	  enemy	  of	  individual	  integrity.”453	  	  At	  stake	  
in	  such	  critiques	  was	  more	  than	  merely	  proper	  language	  use:	  	  also	  at	  stake	  were	  aesthetics,	  
ethics,	  representation,	  and	  the	  relations	  therein.	  	  Consult	  almost	  any	  source	  on	  Kraus	  and	  you	  
will	  read	  that	  the	  man	  regularly	  spent	  agonized	  hours	  debating	  the	  proper	  placement	  of	  a	  
comma.	  	  In	  his	  recent	  book	  The	  Anti-­‐Journalist:	  Karl	  Kraus	  and	  Jewish	  Self-­‐Fashioning	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐
Siècle	  Europe	  Paul	  Reitter	  insists	  that	  Kraus	  “was	  never	  the	  narrow,	  conventionally	  elitist	  
advocate	  of	  ‘good	  German’	  that	  he	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  made	  out	  to	  be”;	  on	  the	  contrary	  Kraus	  
saw	  a	  “‘connection	  between	  mistreated	  words	  and	  mistreated	  bodies.’”454	  	  Kraus	  “believed	  that	  
deliberating	  carefully	  over	  words	  is	  the	  best	  practice	  for	  ethical	  deliberating”	  –	  “his	  Sprachkritik	  
serve[d]	  as	  a	  moral	  mirror.”455	  	  Yet	  despite	  his	  concern	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  mistreated	  
words	  and	  bodies,	  Kraus	  chose	  carnally	  violent	  metaphors	  to	  describe	  the	  ethical	  nature	  of	  
truth	  and	  language	  use.	  	  “The	  closer	  I	  come	  to	  a	  word,”	  Kraus	  noted,	  “the	  more	  it	  bleeds,	  like	  a	  
corpse	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  murderer.”456	  	  Kraus	  also	  sarcastically	  opined:	  “‘that	  one	  is	  a	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  Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna,	  30.	  
454	  Ibid.	  
455	  Paul	  Reitter,	  The	  Anti-­‐Journalist:	  Karl	  Kraus	  and	  Jewish	  Self-­‐Fashioning	  in	  Fin-­‐de-­‐Siècle	  Europe	  (Chicago:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2008),	  20.	  




murderer	  does	  not	  necessarily	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  his	  style.	  	  But	  his	  style	  can	  tell	  us	  that	  he	  
is	  a	  murderer.’”457	  	  With	  such	  high	  stakes	  –	  life	  itself	  –	  self-­‐definition	  was	  of	  paramount	  
importance,	  perhaps	  especially	  for	  assimilated	  Jewish	  figures	  like	  Kraus.	  	  	  
Reitter	  refers	  to	  Kraus’s	  style	  of	  “self-­‐portraiture,”458	  explaining:	  “we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  
writer	  who	  was	  …	  intensely	  and	  literally	  concerned	  with	  his	  image.	  	  Kraus	  printed	  in	  Die	  Fackel	  a	  
professional	  photographic	  portrait	  of	  himself	  –	  using	  it,	  after	  he	  had	  been	  caricatured,	  as	  a	  kind	  
of	  visual	  refutation.”459	  	  It’s	  not	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  Kraus	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  was	  not	  ugly;	  
rather,	  it	  was	  crucial	  for	  him	  to	  show	  what	  was	  correct	  –	  to	  be	  honest	  about	  what	  he	  looked	  
like,	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  others	  should	  be	  likewise	  honest.	  	  And	  yet	  Kraus’s	  attitudes	  about	  
honesty	  were	  anything	  but	  straightforward,	  for	  they	  were	  also	  closely	  tied	  to	  his	  own	  
ambivalent	  Jewishness.	  
Reitter	  observes,	  in	  his	  nuanced,	  thoughtful	  analysis,	  that	  while	  Kraus	  “seems	  to	  have	  
employed	  certain	  grotesque	  stereotypes”	  about	  Jewishness	  “because	  he	  subscribed	  to	  them,”	  
he	  “also	  appropriated	  antisemitic	  rhetoric	  in	  a	  wilfully	  contradictory	  process	  of	  self-­‐
fashioning.”460	  	  In	  such	  a	  scenario	  honesty	  itself	  is	  contested,	  and	  hostility	  becomes	  a	  core	  
component	  of	  self-­‐creation.	  	  When	  Kraus’s	  colleague	  Franz	  Werfel	  wrote	  a	  play	  entitled	  Mirror	  
Man	  [Spiegelmensch,	  1920],	  for	  example,	  that	  lampooned	  Kraus	  using	  Jewish	  stereotypes,	  
Kraus’s	  response	  was	  to	  strategically	  embrace	  precisely	  these	  stereotypes	  in	  his	  counter-­‐attacks	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against	  Werfel.	  	  Werfel	  accused	  Kraus	  of	  Jewish	  self-­‐hatred	  and	  caricatured	  Kraus’s	  capacity	  for	  
mimicry	  –	  as	  mobilized,	  for	  example,	  in	  Kraus’s	  “Demolished	  Literature”	  essay	  where	  he	  had	  
imitated	  the	  style	  of	  the	  despised	  Jung	  Wien	  group.	  	  In	  response	  Kraus	  noted	  that	  the	  very	  
accusation	  of	  Jewish	  self-­‐hatred	  can	  itself	  be	  anti-­‐Jewish,	  and	  that	  likewise	  the	  denigration	  of	  
mimesis	  is	  a	  questionable	  –	  and	  potentially	  antisemitic	  –	  manoeuvre.461	  	  	  
Kraus’s	  attitude	  toward	  Jewishness	  –	  both	  his	  own	  and	  others’	  –	  was	  so	  “wilfully	  
contradictory”	  in	  part	  because	  for	  Kraus	  in	  antisemitic	  Vienna	  “establishing	  a	  truly	  radical	  
position”	  required	  a	  likewise	  “radical	  performance	  of	  German-­‐Jewish	  identity.”462	  	  The	  
importance	  Kraus	  placed	  on	  radical	  originality,	  on	  crafting	  an	  aesthetic	  identity	  that	  was	  also	  
ethical,	  and	  on	  honesty	  –	  all	  were	  tied	  to	  his	  hate	  for	  the	  Jung	  Wien	  writers.	  	  The	  “thrust	  of	  his	  
criticism	  is	  that	  these	  would-­‐be	  iconoclasts	  form	  a	  coterie	  whose	  members	  have	  the	  same	  
affected	  feelings	  and	  opinions,	  which	  they	  write	  about	  in	  the	  same	  affected	  way	  …	  He	  skewered	  
modernist	  critics	  like	  Salten	  and	  Bahr	  because,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  they	  lacked	  the	  very	  radical	  
energy	  that	  they	  themselves	  celebrated.”463	  	  For	  Kraus	  this	  herd	  mentality	  constituted	  a	  
weakness	  of	  character,	  a	  flaw	  with	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  implications.	  	  Being	  derivative	  
was	  incompatible	  with	  being	  authentically	  oneself,	  and	  precluded	  proper	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  
engagement.	  
Evincing,	  perhaps,	  anxiety	  about	  the	  contemporaneous	  association	  between	  hysteria,	  
Jewishness,	  and	  ersatz	  identity	  Kraus	  declared:	  “nothing	  is	  more	  horrible	  than	  my	  self	  in	  the	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mirror	  of	  hysteria.	  	  Nothing	  is	  more	  vulgar	  than	  my	  style	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  another.	  	  To	  imitate	  me	  
is	  to	  punish	  me.”464	  	  Ultimately	  Reitter	  concludes	  in	  The	  Anti-­‐Journalist	  that	  Kraus	  was	  “not	  
alone	  with	  his	  complex	  Jewish	  antisemitism.	  	  Many	  Germanic	  Jews	  –	  for	  example,	  Weininger	  –	  
availed	  themselves	  of	  antisemitic	  language	  with	  evident	  and	  grim	  sincerity.	  	  However,	  others	  …	  
used	  provocatively	  anti-­‐Jewish	  tropes	  as	  Kraus	  did,	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  time:	  in	  an	  ugly	  yet	  
often	  trenchant	  mode	  of	  self-­‐representation	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  our	  map	  of	  
German	  culture.”465	  	  I	  would	  add	  that	  we	  can	  enrich	  our	  picture	  of	  Germanic	  culture	  generally	  
and	  Viennese	  modernity	  especially	  if	  we	  integrate	  Reitter’s	  specific	  insight	  about	  antisemitism	  
and	  ugly	  self-­‐representation	  into	  our	  larger	  discussions	  of	  the	  contemporaneous	  cultural	  
dynamics	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐representation.	  
	  
§	  
Janik	  and	  Toulmin,	  who	  characterize	  the	  Krausian	  approach	  as	  “critical	  modernism,”	  represent	  
it	  as	  an	  appropriately	  aggressive	  response	  to	  cultural	  decadence	  and	  insincerity.	  	  According	  to	  
them	  “the	  Viennese	  form	  of	  alienation	  was	  intimately	  tied	  to	  what	  was	  basically	  an	  uncritical	  
fixation	  on	  culture	  with	  its	  extreme	  fondness	  for	  theatricality	  as	  well	  as	  an	  obsession	  with	  one’s	  
identity	  in	  a	  social	  situation	  where	  one’s	  public	  persona	  often	  had	  precious	  little	  in	  common	  
with	  one’s	  private	  thoughts.”	  	  They	  go	  on	  somewhat	  dramatically	  themselves:	  “what	  we	  have	  
termed	  critical	  modernism	  was	  one	  peculiar	  Viennese	  response	  to	  this	  situation	  of	  being	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alienated	  with	  society,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  destiny	  of	  Western	  society.”466	  
	   Certainly	  such	  alienation	  was	  the	  destiny	  of	  the	  rapidly	  burgeoning	  and	  diversifying	  
Vienna.	  	  From	  1857	  to	  1910	  the	  population	  of	  Vienna	  more	  than	  quadrupled	  with	  a	  massive	  
influx	  of	  heterogeneous	  immigrants.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  explosive	  growth	  contributed	  to	  
cultural	  and	  creative	  alienation	  and	  attack.	  	  Although	  Janik	  claims,	  in	  his	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  
Revisited,	  that	  it	  is	  a	  notorious	  eccentricity	  of	  Viennese	  modernity	  that	  “gifted	  individuals	  often	  
chose	  not	  to	  know	  each	  other	  when	  it	  was	  easily	  possible	  to	  do	  so,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  danger	  that	  
originality	  might	  be	  compromised,”467	  people	  did	  not	  so	  much	  avoid	  contact	  altogether	  as	  
pursue	  it	  in	  the	  form	  of	  public	  sparring.	  	  Aesthetics,	  ethics,	  and	  representational	  strategies	  both	  
produced	  and	  reproduced	  the	  hostility	  of	  local	  culture.	  	  Janik	  glosses	  the	  Xenophobic	  
underpinnings	  of	  this	  situation	  thus:	  “however	  much	  the	  native	  Viennese	  might	  resent	  the	  
Czech,	  the	  Dalmatian,	  the	  Magyar,	  or	  the	  Galician	  Jew,	  he	  was	  familiar	  with	  all	  of	  them.	  	  That	  
familiarity	  bred	  a	  cosmopolitan	  wit	  –	  even	  if	  it	  were	  to	  have	  scurrilous,	  racist,	  and	  sardonic	  
overtones.”468	  
Reiterating	  the	  familiar	  trope	  of	  the	  persecuted	  artist,	  Janik	  also	  insists	  that	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  Viennese	  creativity	  “it	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  that	  we	  recognize	  the	  role	  that	  
Vienna’s	  almost	  incredible	  hostility	  to	  her	  most	  illustrious	  sons	  played	  in	  forming	  that	  milieu.”469	  
He	  concludes:	  “It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  cynicism	  about	  public	  life	  and	  a	  certain	  fatalistic	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alienation	  with	  respect	  to	  ethical	  matters	  could	  come	  to	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  in	  Vienna.”470	  	  Janik	  
refers	  to	  three	  possible	  reactions	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  alienation:	  to	  join	  in	  the	  corruption,	  to	  
disconnect	  from	  society,	  or	  to	  attack.	  	  This	  last	  option	  Janik	  characterizes	  as	  a	  “mode	  of	  social	  
criticism,	  which	  is	  distinguished	  by	  its	  efforts	  to	  turn	  Viennese	  obsession	  with	  style	  against	  
itself.”471	  	  Janik	  and	  Toulmin	  note,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  “conception	  of	  the	  
artist	  as	  the	  consummate	  stylist	  was	  the	  exact	  opposite	  of	  Kraus’s	  own.”472	  	  But	  perhaps	  the	  
most	  pugnacious	  representative	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  attack	  on	  Viennese	  style	  was	  architect	  and	  




Before	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  Loos	  had	  triumphantly	  announced:	  “the	  old	  styles	  are	  dead,	  long	  
live	  the	  new	  style!”473	  	  Ushering	  in	  modernity	  with	  the	  bold	  claim	  that	  	  “those	  who	  have	  
trodden	  the	  thorny	  path	  of	  the	  artistic	  trailblazer	  will	  not	  be	  denied	  the	  wider	  recognition	  that	  
is	  their	  due,	  ”	  Loos	  opined	  triumphantly:	  “the	  courage	  to	  assert	  the	  truth	  has	  emerged	  
victorious.”474	  	  This	  “truth”	  was	  that	  beauty	  was	  no	  longer	  necessary.	  	  Loos	  complained,	  
however,	  that	  Austria	  lagged	  behind	  other	  countries,	  and	  more	  generally	  he	  bemoaned	  the	  
value	  still	  placed	  on	  beauty	  in	  classically	  oriented	  Germanic	  culture	  and	  aesthetics.	  	  An	  extreme	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Anglophile,	  Loos	  insisted	  that	  the	  “English	  laugh	  at	  the	  Germans’	  obsession	  with	  beauty,”	  
claiming	  approvingly	  that	  the	  “best	  people	  in	  Germany	  go	  along	  with	  the	  English.	  	  They	  can	  
manage	  without	  beauty.”475	  	  Although	  Loos	  retained	  his	  preoccupations	  with	  progress	  and	  
aesthetic	  honesty,	  he	  turned	  to	  a	  more	  actively	  hostile,	  negative	  form	  of	  critique	  in	  the	  coming	  
years.	  	  The	  most	  egregious	  example,	  and	  also	  his	  most	  well-­‐known	  text,	  is	  no	  doubt	  the	  lecture	  
“Ornament	  and	  Crime,”	  which	  Loos	  wrote	  in	  1908	  and	  delivered	  in	  Berlin	  on	  21	  January	  1910.	  
As	  Loos	  made	  infamously	  clear	  in	  this	  lecture,	  he	  hated	  ornament.476	  	  Loos	  argued	  that	  
ornament	  represented	  not	  merely	  an	  aesthetic	  but	  also	  an	  ethical	  ill,	  and	  likewise	  that	  
ornament	  was	  fundamentally	  contrary	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  modern	  times.	  	  He	  compares	  children,	  
tribal	  Papuans,	  and	  criminals	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  decorative	  and	  using	  the	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  
evolutionary	  notion	  of	  ontogeny	  recapitulating	  phylogeny.	  	  The	  urge	  to	  decorate	  everything	  –	  
including	  oneself	  –	  is	  for	  Loos	  deeply	  sexual,	  and	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  children	  and	  savages,	  
whom	  Loos	  construes	  as	  non-­‐ethical	  entities.	  	  Ultimately	  the	  will	  to	  decorate	  is	  an	  impulse	  that	  
should	  be	  overcome.	  	  For	  a	  modern	  adult	  to	  embrace	  ornament	  is	  criminal,	  degenerate,	  and	  
unethical.	  	  Therefore	  “people	  with	  tattoos	  not	  in	  prison	  are	  either	  latent	  criminals	  or	  
degenerate	  aristocrats.”477	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  anachronistic	  as	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  His	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  austere	  enough	  at	  the	  time	  to	  garner	  
the	  well-­‐known	  epithet	  “Café	  Nihilism,”	  would	  quite	  likely	  strike	  most	  of	  us	  now	  as	  “decorative”	  simply	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  it	  was	  filled	  with	  the	  elegant	  touches	  of	  fine	  handicraft.	  	  But	  when	  Loos	  refers	  to	  ornament	  and	  crime	  
he	  means	  ornament	  as	  something	  imitative	  and	  non-­‐utilitarian;	  ornament	  was,	  ostensibly,	  dishonest	  about	  both	  
the	  object	  and	  the	  times.	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Loos	  censured	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  “in	  the	  past	  the	  artist	  was	  a	  healthy,	  vigorous	  figure,”	  
the	  degenerate	  ornamental	  artist	  of	  contemporary	  times	  “lags	  behind	  or	  is	  a	  pathological	  
case.”478	  	  He	  also	  diagnosed	  Viennese	  applied	  artists	  as	  particularly	  pathological,	  arguing	  angrily	  
that	  applied	  artists	  in	  contemporary	  Vienna	  mistakenly	  aimed	  to	  clothe	  craft	  in	  the	  lies	  of	  fine	  
art,	  and	  were	  “stuffed	  full	  of	  wrong	  ideas.”	  	  He	  mocked	  the	  effeminate,	  affected	  archaisms	  of	  
craft	  students	  who	  valorized	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  Renaissance	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
contemporaneity.	  	  Satirizing,	  for	  example,	  the	  desire	  for	  “jewels	  and	  colors	  and	  fluttering	  
plumes,”	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  present	  times	  were	  “simply	  horrible,”	  Loos	  lampooned	  those	  
who	  clung	  to	  ornament	  and	  rejected	  what	  they	  falsely	  considered	  “the	  ugly	  hustle	  and	  bustle	  of	  
modern	  life.”479	  	  Loos	  imagines	  such	  aesthetic	  imitation	  and	  ornament	  as	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  
“monster	  threatening	  to	  sap	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  our	  handicrafts.”480	  	  
As	  with	  Kraus,	  Loos’s	  –	  often	  virulently	  sexist	  and	  racist	  –	  discourse	  suggests	  that	  the	  
health	  and	  future	  of	  self	  and	  society	  alike	  is	  at	  stake.	  	  He	  says:	  “To	  prefer	  ornamentation	  is	  to	  
put	  oneself	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Red	  Indian.	  	  But	  we	  must	  seek	  to	  overcome	  the	  Red	  Indian	  within	  
us	  …	  The	  goal	  toward	  which	  the	  whole	  of	  mankind	  is	  striving	  is	  to	  see	  beauty	  in	  form	  alone,	  and	  
not	  to	  make	  it	  dependent	  on	  ornament	  and	  decoration.”481	  	  And	  while	  Loos	  insisted:	  “the	  
evolution	  of	  culture	  is	  synonymous	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  ornamentation	  from	  objects	  of	  everyday	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use,”482	  Kraus	  declared	  of	  literature:	  “‘the	  face	  of	  the	  feuilleton	  has	  smeared	  itself	  with	  blood.	  	  
Ornaments	  on	  worthless	  prose	  now	  mock	  endless	  human	  hardship.’”483	  	  Where	  earlier	  
commentators	  referred	  to	  Klimt’s	  ornamental	  painting	  style	  as	  Jewish	  and	  ugly,	  Loos	  and	  Kraus	  
used	  similar	  rhetoric	  to	  claim	  that	  ornament	  conventionally	  understood	  as	  beautiful	  was	  
actually	  ugly	  because	  it	  was	  primitive,	  dishonest,	  and	  therefore	  not	  befitting	  modern	  Germanic	  
culture.	  	  This	  strategic	  discursive	  use	  of	  different	  concepts	  of	  ugliness	  then	  allowed	  Viennese	  
modernists	  to	  further	  emphasize	  their	  aesthetic	  iconoclasm:	  beauty	  became	  ugliness,	  and	  
insofar	  as	  it	  was	  honest	  ugliness	  became	  beautiful.	  	  A	  modernist	  concern	  with	  innovation	  and	  
honesty,	  combined	  with	  a	  Viennese	  obsession	  with	  selfhood	  and	  hostility,	  created	  an	  
aspirational	  oppositional	  persona.	  	  Although	  such	  a	  pugnacious	  performance	  of	  self	  was	  
actually	  fairly	  common,	  it	  tended	  to	  be	  represented	  in	  almost	  messianic	  ethico-­‐aesthetic	  terms	  
in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Kraus	  and	  Loos	  continue	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  many	  as	  
warriors	  for	  truth	  –	  warriors	  living	  and	  dying	  for	  their	  vanguard	  ideas.	  	  Of	  the	  interdependence	  
of	  Kraus’s	  life	  and	  work	  Walter	  Benjamin	  insists	  that	  Kraus	  “never	  offered	  an	  argument	  that	  has	  
not	  engaged	  his	  whole	  person.”484	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Significantly	  less	  hostile	  but	  every	  bit	  as	  concerned	  with	  honesty,	  representation	  through	  
language	  use,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  was	  Kraus’s	  contemporary	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and	  fellow	  ambivalent,	  assimilated	  Jew	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein.	  	  Indeed	  Wittgenstein	  is	  also	  linked	  
to	  Kraus	  (as	  well	  as	  Weininger)	  by	  shared	  concerns	  regarding	  Jewishness	  and	  self-­‐
representation.	  	  Ray	  Monk’s	  definitive	  biography,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein:	  The	  Duty	  of	  Genius,	  
begins	  with	  an	  epigraph	  from	  Weininger	  (the	  titular	  “duty	  of	  genius”	  is	  also	  a	  reference	  to	  
Weininger).	  	  Monk’s	  first	  chapter,	  moreover,	  is	  named	  “The	  Laboratory	  for	  Self-­‐Destruction”	  in	  
direct	  homage	  to	  Kraus’s	  famous	  dictum	  that	  Vienna	  was	  the	  laboratory	  for	  world	  destruction.	  	  
As	  Monk	  summarizes:	  “it	  was	  no	  doubt	  through	  Gretl	  [Margarete,	  Wittgenstein’s	  elder	  sister]	  
that	  Wittgenstein	  first	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Karl	  Kraus.	  	  Kraus’s	  satirical	  journal	  Die	  
Fackel	  (‘The	  Torch’)	  first	  appeared	  in	  1899,	  and	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  was	  a	  huge	  success	  
among	  the	  intellectually	  disaffected	  in	  Vienna.	  	  It	  was	  read	  by	  everyone	  with	  any	  pretence	  to	  
understanding	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  trends	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  exerted	  an	  enormous	  influence	  
on	  practically	  all	  the	  major	  figures	  …	  from	  Adolf	  Loos	  to	  Oskar	  Kokoschka.”485	  	  But	  in	  Vienna	  
influence	  could	  easily	  become	  ambivalent,	  or	  worse:	  so	  close	  were	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Loos’s	  
concerns	  regarding	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  that	  “Loos	  himself	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  exclaimed	  on	  
meeting	  Wittgenstein:	  ‘You	  are	  me!’”486	  	  Yet	  apparently	  after	  the	  war	  Wittgenstein	  “denounced	  
Loos	  as	  a	  charlatan.”487	  	  	  
Honesty	  was	  supremely	  important	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  and	  he	  was	  constantly	  revisiting	  and	  
revising	  his	  own	  assumptions	  and	  ideas.	  	  Monk	  emphasizes	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  autobiography,	  
planned	  but	  never	  published,	  was	  intended	  to	  “reveal	  his	  essential	  nature	  without	  any	  kind	  of	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  (London:	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explanation,	  justification	  or	  defence.”	  	  Bizarrely	  –	  for	  a	  person	  who	  lived	  such	  a	  virtuous	  and	  
ascetic	  existence	  –	  Wittgenstein	  apparently	  “took	  for	  granted	  that	  what	  would	  be	  revealed	  [in	  
such	  an	  autobiography]	  would	  be	  an	  ‘unheroic,’	  perhaps	  even	  ‘ugly’	  nature.”488	  	  Wittgenstein	  
was	  very	  hard	  on	  himself	  (though	  he	  would	  disagree	  with	  that	  assessment),	  so	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  
surprising	  that	  he	  believed	  that	  confessing	  to	  his	  true	  nature	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  revealing	  
an	  inner	  ugliness.	  	  And	  indeed	  confession	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here,	  particularly	  because	  
“for	  Wittgenstein,	  all	  philosophy,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  pursued	  honestly	  and	  decently,	  begins	  with	  a	  
confession.”489	  	  
	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  such	  obsession	  with	  the	  duty	  of	  genius	  and	  the	  honest	  expression	  of	  
internal	  states	  can	  exacerbate	  alienation	  and	  solipsism.	  	  After	  he	  left	  Vienna	  Wittgenstein	  
became	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  exactly	  this	  problem	  –	  in	  both	  his	  life	  and	  his	  work.	  	  Monk	  
concurs:	  “taken	  to	  its	  extreme,”	  he	  says	  “the	  view	  that	  the	  ‘internal’	  has	  priority	  over	  the	  
‘external’	  becomes	  solipsism	  …	  much	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophical	  thinking	  about	  the	  
self	  is	  an	  attempt	  once	  and	  for	  all	  to	  put	  to	  rest	  the	  ghost	  of	  this	  view”	  inherited	  from	  his	  early	  
years	  in	  Vienna.	  	  Monk	  himself	  opines	  that	  of	  all	  the	  books	  that	  Wittgenstein	  “read	  as	  a	  
schoolboy	  which	  influenced	  his	  later	  development,”	  the	  doctrine	  of	  destructive	  solipsism	  “finds	  
its	  most	  startling	  expression	  in	  Sex	  and	  Character.”490	  	  At	  least	  as	  late	  as	  1931	  Wittgenstein	  still	  
made	  Weiningerian	  comments	  about	  how	  the	  Jewish	  mind	  can	  only	  be	  “reproductive,”	  never	  
original.	  	  It	  behoves	  us	  to	  acknowledge	  how	  issues	  of	  antisemitism	  and	  ambivalent	  Jewishness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  Ibid.,	  311.	  
489	  Ibid.,	  366.	  
490	  Ibid.,	  19.	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were	  at	  play	  in	  even	  the	  most	  exalted	  products	  of	  Viennese	  modernism.	  	  For	  example,	  
according	  to	  Wittgenstein	  even	  “the	  greatest	  of	  Jewish	  thinkers	  is	  no	  more	  than	  talented.”491	  	  In	  
his	  category	  of	  reproductive	  Jewish	  thinking	  –	  which	  according	  to	  the	  philosopher	  precluded	  
“genius”	  –	  Wittgenstein	  included	  not	  only	  himself	  but	  also	  Freud	  and	  Breuer,	  amongst	  others.	  	  	  
Like	  Kraus,	  and	  like	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  Circle	  contemporary	  Karl	  Popper,492	  
Wittgenstein	  delivered	  quite	  damning	  –	  if	  compelling	  and	  considered	  –	  critiques	  of	  
psychoanalysis.	  	  Vocal	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  did	  actually	  respect	  Freud,	  Wittgenstein	  was	  
nonetheless	  sharply	  critical	  of	  the	  epistemological	  assumptions	  of	  psychoanalysis	  –	  and	  found	  
psychoanalysis’s	  claims	  to	  scientific	  status	  dishonest.	  	  For	  example,	  Wittgenstein	  lambasted	  
Freud’s	  conflation	  of	  psyche	  and	  soma	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  trope	  rather	  than	  a	  scientifically	  or	  
epistemologically	  valid	  tenet.493	  	  Wittgenstein	  argued,	  instead,	  that	  psychoanalysis	  was	  closer	  
to	  philosophy	  than	  to	  science;	  according	  to	  him	  the	  honest	  truth	  was	  that	  psychoanalysis	  
offered	  merely	  one	  interpretation	  amongst	  many.	  	  And	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  Freud	  and	  the	  
psychoanalysts	  argued	  for	  absolute	  veracity.	  	  Wittgenstein	  was	  more	  a	  critic	  of	  psychoanalysis	  
than	  an	  enemy	  of	  it	  like	  Kraus,	  who	  infamously	  claimed	  that	  psychoanalysis	  “‘is	  that	  disease	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Culture	  and	  Value,	  trans.	  Peter	  Winch	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1980),	  18.	  
492	  The	  so-­‐called	  “Vienna	  Circle”	  was	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  inspired	  by	  Ernst	  Mach’s	  philosophy	  and	  
Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  propounded	  forms	  of	  logical	  
positivism,	  which	  they	  claimed	  was	  taken	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  
insisted	  that	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  philosophers	  had	  radically	  misinterpreted	  his	  work,	  which	  was	  not	  so	  much	  for	  
logical	  positivism	  as	  against	  it.	  	  Wittgenstein	  did	  associate	  with	  the	  philosophers	  but	  insisted	  on	  reading	  poetry	  at	  
their	  meetings.	  	  This	  strategy	  underscored	  the	  philosopher’s	  point,	  made	  in	  the	  last	  few	  and	  routinely	  ignored	  
pages	  of	  his	  Tractatus,	  that	  philosophy	  can	  only	  speak	  about	  the	  least	  important	  aspects	  of	  existence.	  	  The	  most	  
important	  things	  must	  be	  passed	  over	  in	  silence.	  	  	  
493	  Cernuschi	  also	  notes	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  “objections	  to	  connecting	  soma	  and	  psyche	  recall	  Breuer’s	  objection	  
that	  Freud	  was	  being	  ‘tricked’	  by	  his	  ‘own	  figures	  of	  speech’	  when	  he	  described	  the	  mind	  in	  spatial	  terms,”	  
Re/Casting	  Kokoschka,	  170.	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the	  mind	  for	  which	  it	  believes	  itself	  to	  be	  the	  cure.’”494	  	  But	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Kraus	  shared	  a	  
deep	  and	  impassioned	  concern	  for	  truth	  and	  language	  use	  that	  prompted	  both	  men	  to	  look	  at	  
psychoanalysis	  askance.	  	  
Wittgenstein’s	  admittedly	  worthwhile	  critiques	  of	  psychoanalysis	  have	  not	  usually	  been	  
considered	  alongside	  the	  more	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  his	  assessments	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Jewish	  
mind.”	  	  When	  Wittgenstein	  commented	  that	  Freud	  was	  only	  clever,	  never	  wise,495	  he	  could	  
have	  been	  talking	  about	  any	  Jewish	  man	  –	  including	  himself.	  	  That’s	  how	  neatly	  he	  was	  
reproducing	  his	  culture’s	  antisemitic	  prejudice.	  	  Moreover	  in	  Vienna	  at	  the	  time	  psychoanalysis	  
was	  referred	  to	  spitefully	  as	  “the	  Jewish	  science.”	  	  Freud	  expressly	  sought	  an	  Aryan	  crown	  
prince	  of	  psychoanalysis	  who	  could	  erase	  such	  Jewish	  taint	  –	  and	  found	  it,	  for	  a	  time,	  in	  the	  
young	  Swiss	  doctor	  Carl	  Jung.	  	  Locally,	  however,	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  insecurity	  and	  ethnic	  
antagonism	  contributed	  to	  Freud’s	  domineering	  attitudes	  about	  sexuality,	  Kraus’s	  various	  
enmities,	  and	  Wittgenstein’s	  skepticism	  and	  solitude.	  	  	  
Over	  the	  years	  many	  members	  of	  the	  Wittgenstein	  clan	  committed	  suicide;	  but	  it	  is	  
worth	  noting	  in	  particular	  that	  Ludwig’s	  homosexual	  brother	  Rudi,	  who	  sought	  treatment	  for	  
his	  “perversion”	  in	  Berlin,	  killed	  himself	  (in	  a	  manner	  as	  theatrical	  as	  Weininger	  and	  Gerstl)	  in	  
May	  1904,	  one	  year	  after	  Sex	  and	  Character	  was	  published	  and	  six	  months	  after	  Weininger	  had	  
killed	  himself.	  	  Both	  self	  and	  society	  imposed	  punitive	  restrictions	  on	  acceptable	  masculinities.	  	  
Enemies	  were	  everywhere	  –	  including	  within.	  	  Comparing	  Weininger,	  Kafka,	  and	  Freud,	  
Wittgenstein	  defended	  his	  utmost	  respect	  for	  Weininger	  by	  representing	  the	  three	  men	  thus:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494	  In	  Reitter,	  The	  Anti-­‐Journalist,	  126–7.	  
495	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Lectures	  and	  Conversations	  on	  Aesthetics,	  Psychology	  and	  Religious	  Belief,	  ed.	  Cyril	  Barrett	  
(Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1967),	  41.	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Freud	  worked	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  others,	  Kafka	  gave	  himself	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  trouble	  not	  writing	  
about	  his	  troubles,	  and	  Weininger	  took	  the	  high	  road	  of	  honesty	  by	  actually	  trying	  to	  work	  on	  
his	  own	  problems.496	  
	  
§	  
Thus	  the	  rejection	  of	  ornament,	  of	  the	  ornate	  craftwork	  of	  the	  Wiener	  Werkstätte	  for	  example	  
–	  indeed,	  of	  the	  basic	  decorative	  impulse	  itself	  –	  was	  merely	  an	  aesthetic	  aspect	  of	  what	  was	  
understood	  as	  a	  larger,	  ethical	  commitment	  to	  representational	  honesty,	  to	  clarity	  of	  thought	  
through	  clarity	  of	  expression.	  	  And	  although	  Wittgenstein	  certainly	  changed	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  
he	  inherited	  from	  his	  early	  years	  in	  Vienna,	  he	  never	  abandoned	  his	  position	  against	  decoration	  
–	  much	  to	  the	  consternation	  of	  baffled	  fellows	  at	  Cambridge	  later.	  	  Apparently	  Wittgenstein	  
“chose	  the	  furniture	  for	  his	  rooms	  with	  great	  care.”	  	  Wittgenstein’s	  close	  companion	  David	  
Pinsent	  recalls:	  “‘I	  went	  out	  and	  helped	  him	  interview	  a	  lot	  of	  furniture	  at	  various	  shops	  …	  It	  
was	  rather	  amusing:	  he	  is	  terribly	  fastidious	  and	  we	  led	  the	  shopman	  a	  frightful	  dance,	  
Vittgenstein	  [sic]	  ejaculating	  ‘No	  –	  beastly!’	  to	  90%	  of	  what	  he	  shewed	  us!’”497	  	  Monk	  
continues:	  “[Bertrand]	  Russell,	  too,	  was	  drawn	  into	  Wittgenstein’s	  deliberations	  on	  the	  matter,	  
and	  found	  it	  rather	  exasperating.	  	  ‘He	  is	  very	  fussy	  …	  He	  gave	  me	  a	  lecture	  on	  how	  furniture	  
should	  be	  made	  –	  he	  dislikes	  all	  ornamentation	  that	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  construction,	  and	  can	  
never	  find	  anything	  simple	  enough.’”	  	  In	  the	  end,	  apparently,	  Wittgenstein	  gave	  up	  and	  had	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496	  Monk,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  498.	  
497	  In	  Monk,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  55.	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his	  furniture	  custom	  made.498	  	  Monk	  concludes	  that	  neither	  Pinsent	  nor	  Russell	  could	  
understand	  Wittgenstein’s	  ethical	  concern	  for	  aesthetics	  because	  to	  truly	  understand	  the	  
urgency	  of	  these	  issues	  for	  the	  philosopher,	  “one	  would	  have	  to	  have	  been	  Viennese;	  one	  
would	  have	  to	  have	  felt,	  like	  Karl	  Kraus	  and	  Adolf	  Loos,	  that	  the	  once	  noble	  culture	  of	  Vienna,	  
which	  from	  Haydn	  to	  Schubert	  had	  surpassed	  anything	  else	  in	  the	  world,	  had,	  since	  the	  latter	  
half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  atrophied	  into	  …	  its	  opposite,	  misused	  as	  ornament	  and	  
mask.’”499	  
This	  notion	  of	  the	  mask	  also	  has	  broader	  resonances	  with	  Viennese	  culture;	  the	  image	  
of	  the	  mask	  evokes	  the	  struggles	  we’ve	  seen	  with	  failed	  narcissism	  and	  traumatic	  identity,	  both	  
within	  and	  beyond	  categories	  of	  antisemitism	  and	  ambivalent	  Jewishness.	  	  In	  his	  1909	  essay	  
“Self-­‐Mirroring”	  [Selbstbespiegelung]	  Kraus	  insisted	  that	  the	  self	  should	  “transform	  itself	  
completely	  after	  the	  object	  it	  represents.”500	  	  Meanwhile	  Reitter	  asks	  poignantly:	  would	  Jewish	  
“minds	  be	  so	  much	  oriented	  toward	  incessant	  ‘summarizing’	  and	  ‘breaking	  down’	  if	  they	  could	  
create	  positive	  representations	  of	  their	  own	  peculiarities?	  	  Would	  the	  parallel	  between	  
journalists	  and	  Jews	  work	  if	  Jews	  could	  achieve	  the	  kind	  of	  self-­‐representation	  without	  which,	  
by	  Weininger’s	  standards,	  there	  is	  no	  self	  –	  only	  the	  ‘nichts’	  of	  Judaism	  and	  femininity?”501	  	  For	  
me	  at	  least,	  it	  is	  heartening	  to	  know	  that	  eventually	  Kraus	  stopped	  censuring	  Jewish	  people	  
who	  did	  not	  “redeem	  themselves	  through	  ‘total	  assimilation,’”	  and	  beginning	  “around	  1910,	  in	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fact,	  he	  became	  an	  enthusiastic	  advocate	  of	  Yiddish	  culture.”502	  	  Kraus	  became	  a	  regular	  at	  the	  
comic	  Yiddish	  theatre,	  the	  Budapester	  Orpheumgesellschaft,	  and	  often	  brought	  Loos	  and	  
Kokoschka.	  	  Reitter	  notes	  that	  this	  newfound	  practice	  “corresponds	  to	  a	  larger	  pattern	  of	  
behavior	  …	  Kraus	  championed	  ‘minor’	  forms.”503	  
	  
§	  
Nevertheless	  the	  drive	  to	  distinguish	  such	  “good”	  minor	  forms	  from	  the	  “bad”	  ones	  of	  the	  
decorative	  artists	  gave	  rise	  to	  some	  truly	  extreme	  discourses.	  	  Loos	  may	  have	  drily	  observed	  
that	  “‘style,’	  style	  in	  quotation	  marks,	  is	  no	  longer	  necessary”504	  as	  early	  as	  1898,	  but	  the	  hostile	  
discourses	  he	  and	  his	  cohorts	  developed	  around	  honesty,	  aesthetics,	  and	  ethics	  actually	  
constituted	  a	  style	  of	  rhetoric.	  	  Moreover	  despite	  Loos’s	  contempt	  for	  the	  painter	  who	  
expressed	  his	  individuality	  through	  fancy	  clothing	  and	  an	  affected	  demeanour,	  Loos’s	  own	  
antagonistic	  anti-­‐style	  was	  also	  a	  style	  of	  self-­‐representation.	  	  Loos’s	  discursive	  strategies	  have	  
been	  very	  effective	  –	  he	  was	  intelligent,	  a	  keen	  observer,	  and	  there’s	  an	  almost	  undeniable	  
seduction	  to	  his	  sophistry.	  	  A	  pithy	  line	  like	  “woe	  to	  the	  painter	  who	  can	  express	  his	  
individuality	  through	  a	  velvet	  jacket”505	  is	  clever	  enough	  to	  seem	  convincing	  –	  until	  we	  
remember	  the	  sheer	  inaccuracy	  of	  such	  hyperbole.	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Indeed	  despite	  the	  passionate	  paeans	  to	  progress,	  these	  men	  were	  far	  more	  
constrained	  by	  the	  prejudices	  of	  the	  age	  than	  they	  admitted.	  	  Still,	  a	  surprising	  number	  of	  
scholars	  have	  succumbed	  to	  Loos’s	  self-­‐representational	  style;	  less	  surprising	  is	  Loos’s	  
contemporaneous	  influence	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  Certainly	  Loos	  had	  a	  
tremendous	  influence	  on	  Kokoschka,	  although	  it	  was	  only	  after	  seeing	  Kokoschka’s	  ugly	  Self-­‐
Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  (Fig.	  2)	  that	  Loos	  sought	  an	  association	  with	  the	  artist.506	  	  	  
When	  Loos	  decided	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  support	  Kokoschka’s	  less	  than	  realistic	  style	  of	  
portraiture,	  his	  –	  and	  Kraus’s	  –	  discursive	  cunning	  was	  more	  than	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  how	  to	  cast	  
Kokoschka’s	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  honesty	  and	  accuracy.	  	  Using	  their	  “characteristic	  wit,	  Loos	  and	  
Kraus	  suggest	  that,	  insofar	  as	  Kokoschka’s	  portraits	  were	  concerned,	  absence	  of	  likeness	  was	  
more	  than	  compensated	  by	  psychological	  truth.”507	  	  Kokoschka	  painted	  portraits	  of	  both	  Kraus	  
and	  Loos	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Of	  his	  own	  portrait	  Kraus	  famously	  commented	  that	  while	  those	  
who	  knew	  him	  might	  not	  recognize	  him	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  representation,	  those	  who	  didn’t	  were	  
sure	  to.	  	  Loos	  declared	  pithily	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  portrait	  of	  him	  that	  it	  was	  a	  better	  likeness	  than	  
Loos	  himself	  was.	  
	  
§	  
Loos	  comments,	  in	  his	  essay	  “Oskar	  Kokoschka,”	  that	  when	  he	  saw	  Kokoschka’s	  art	  and	  learned	  
that	  the	  young	  artist	  was	  toiling	  over	  at	  the	  Wiener	  Werkstätte	  making	  decorative	  objects,	  it	  
was	  “immediately	  clear”	  to	  him	  that	  “one	  of	  the	  greatest	  crimes	  against	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  was	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being	  committed.”508	  	  With	  characteristic	  aggressiveness	  Loos	  got	  Kokoschka	  to	  agree	  to	  leave	  
the	  Wiener	  Werkstätte	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  he,	  Loos,	  find	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  portrait	  
commissions	  for	  the	  young	  artist.	  	  Carl	  Schorske	  describes	  Loos	  and	  Kokoschka’s	  aesthetic	  
affiliation	  in	  psychological	  terms,	  claiming	  that	  
in	  a	  partnership	  of	  opposites,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Loos	  in	  effect	  assaulted	  the	  Kunstschau’s	  
aesthetic	  synthesis	  of	  painting	  and	  architecture	  on	  both	  flanks.	  	  Loos	  banished	  the	  
decorative	  elements	  from	  architecture	  in	  favor	  of	  severely	  neutral	  rationality.	  	  Kokoschka,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  proceeded	  from	  the	  abstract	  explorations	  of	  the	  erotic	  life	  of	  his	  
Kunstchau	  works	  to	  concretely	  characterological	  painting	  …	  Kokoschka	  hurled	  himself	  
with	  the	  caricaturist’s	  passion	  into	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  psychological	  portraiture.	  	  He	  would	  
capture	  the	  spirit	  of	  his	  subjects	  through	  dialogue.	  	  By	  thus	  penetrating	  deeply	  into	  
another’s	  soul,	  he	  aimed	  to	  ‘find	  through	  painting	  a	  basis	  of	  self-­‐knowledge.’509	  
Cernuschi,	  however,	  concludes	  censoriously:	  	  
political	  and	  cultural	  allegiances	  were	  so	  intertwined	  in	  Vienna	  that	  intellectuals	  readily	  
used	  terms	  of	  political	  invective	  (‘feminized’	  or	  ‘Judaicized’)	  to	  denigrate	  works	  of	  art.	  	  
Kokoschka’s	  work	  may	  have	  seemed	  shocking	  and	  radical	  at	  first,	  but	  Kokoschka	  and	  his	  
patrons	  were	  no	  different	  than	  those	  same	  Viennese	  intellectuals.	  	  They	  held	  similar	  
beliefs,	  and,	  against	  similar	  interpretive	  assumptions,	  they	  also	  construed	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Kokoschka’s	  Expressionist	  idiom	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  what	  the	  culture	  saw	  as	  ‘feminine’	  
or	  ‘Jewish.’	  	  Their	  strategies	  were	  intentionally	  conceived	  to	  endow	  style	  with	  political	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connotations	  and	  to	  permit	  politics	  to	  determine	  the	  ultimate	  morality	  of	  style.	  	  The	  
declaration	  that	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thus	  had	  both	  remarkable	  
rhetorical	  power	  and	  nefarious	  consequences	  in	  a	  cultural	  landscape	  as	  politically	  divisive	  
as	  that	  of	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  Vienna.	  	  It	  inspired	  artists	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  morality	  of	  art	  
while	  allowing	  them	  to	  ignore	  the	  art	  of	  morality.510	  	  	  
Loos’s	  discourse	  has	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  consolidating	  and	  securing	  Kokoschka’s	  
reputation	  as	  an	  artist	  with	  preternatural	  insight	  –	  not	  only	  psychological,	  but	  also	  somatic.	  	  It	  
was	  Loos	  who	  first	  famously	  commented	  that	  Kokoschka	  had	  X-­‐ray	  eyes,	  a	  comparison	  that	  –	  as	  
Cernuschi	  discusses	  extensively	  –	  has	  persisted	  incredibly	  literally	  in	  the	  literature.511	  	  And	  
when,	  in	  1910,	  Loos	  secured	  a	  portrait	  commission	  for	  Kokoschka	  from	  renowned	  psychiatrist	  
Auguste	  Forel,	  Forel	  and	  family	  felt	  that	  the	  resultant	  portrait	  depicted	  the	  doctor	  as	  though	  he	  
had	  suffered	  a	  stroke,	  and	  declined	  to	  purchase	  the	  work.	  	  But	  because	  the	  doctor	  
subsequently	  had	  a	  stroke	  –	  two	  years	  later	  –	  that	  affected	  him	  physically	  the	  way	  that	  
Kokoschka	  had	  represented	  him	  earlier,	  Kokoschka’s	  diagnostic	  abilities	  are	  forever	  trumpeted	  
by	  subsequent	  commentators.512	  	  And	  Kokoschka	  himself	  tells	  this	  story	  in	  his	  autobiography:	  	  
“For	  one	  early	  number	  of	  the	  magazine	  [Der	  Sturm]	  I	  designed	  a	  poster,	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  with	  a	  
red	  background	  ...	  The	  poster	  shows	  me	  with	  head	  shaven,	  like	  a	  convict,	  and	  pointing	  at	  a	  
wound	  in	  my	  chest;	  it	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  reproach	  to	  the	  Viennese,	  but	  a	  few	  years	  later,	  in	  the	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war,	  a	  Russian	  bayonet	  went	  through	  my	  lung	  at	  exactly	  that	  place.”513	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  we	  
will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Kokoschka’s	  reputation,	  in	  particular	  by	  examining	  his	  self-­‐



















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




I’m	  Ugly	  Because	  You	  Hate	  Me:	  	  
Ugliness	  and	  Negative	  Empathy	  in	  Oskar	  Kokoschka’s	  Early	  Self-­‐Portraiture	  
I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  nerve-­‐mad	  portrait.	  
–	  letter	  from	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  to	  Emma	  Bacher,	  27	  April	  1909	  
	  
My	  whole	  life	  is	  a	  hell.	  
–	  letter	  from	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  to	  Lotte	  Franzos,	  24	  December	  1910	  
	  
My	  electricity	  …	  needs	  to	  be	  discharged	  if	  I	  am	  to	  keep	  lucid	  control	  of	  my	  nerves.	  
–	  letter	  from	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  to	  Alma	  Mahler,	  29	  April	  1912	  
	  
There	  is	  an	  anecdote	  about	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  young	  Oskar	  Kokoschka’s	  work	  that	  is	  often	  
repeated	  and	  will	  be	  familiar	  to	  anyone	  who	  has	  studied	  the	  Viennese	  artist.	  	  Apparently,	  upon	  
seeing	  Kokoschka’s	  art	  for	  the	  first	  time	  Archduke	  Franz	  Ferdinand,	  heir	  to	  Emperor	  Franz	  
Joseph’s	  throne,	  proclaimed	  that	  “this	  fellow’s	  bones	  ought	  to	  be	  broken	  in	  his	  body.”514	  	  The	  
legendary	  moment	  is	  purported	  to	  have	  occurred	  in	  1911,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  group	  exhibition	  
at	  Vienna’s	  Hagenbund	  where	  Kokoschka	  showed	  twenty-­‐five	  paintings	  and	  drawings.	  	  His	  
works	  were	  also	  lambasted	  belligerently	  in	  the	  press.	  	  Critics	  singled	  out	  Kokoschka’s	  pieces,	  
which	  were	  mostly	  portraits,	  for	  their	  displeasing,	  even	  threatening	  aspects.	  	  But	  in	  Die	  Fackel,	  
Kraus’s	  notoriously	  iconoclastic	  and	  abrasive	  journal,	  a	  review	  was	  published	  that	  noted	  that	  
“‘the	  way	  in	  which	  Kokoschka	  attains	  the	  effect	  of	  his	  pictures	  is	  not	  one	  that	  also	  leads	  to	  the	  
beautification	  of	  his	  subjects:	  another	  goal	  is	  aimed	  at	  by	  another	  means.’”515	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514	  “Dem	  Kerl	  sollte	  man	  die	  Knoche	  im	  Leibe	  zerbrechen,”	  in	  Edith	  Hoffmann,	  Kokoschka:	  Life	  and	  Work	  (London:	  
Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1947),	  86.	  	  
515	  In	  Hoffmann,	  Kokoschka,	  87.	  	  The	  original	  review	  by	  Franz	  Grüner	  ran	  in	  Die	  Fackel	  on	  28	  February	  1911	  under	  
the	  title	  “Oskar	  Kokoschka.” 
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   In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  Kokoschka,	  himself	  in	  his	  early	  twenties,	  
alighted	  on	  a	  self-­‐representational	  strategy	  that	  would	  serve	  him	  well	  for	  decades	  to	  come	  –	  
indeed,	  that	  would	  buttress	  the	  artist’s	  subversive	  reputation	  even	  after	  his	  death.	  	  Kokoschka	  
seems	  to	  have	  decided	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  successful	  artist	  in	  competitive	  Vienna	  he	  had	  to	  
cultivate	  a	  highly	  negative	  persona	  and	  represent	  himself	  as	  a	  pariah,	  hated	  and	  attacked.	  	  In	  a	  
letter	  written	  in	  late	  1907	  Kokoschka	  complained	  to	  a	  friend:	  “If	  I	  could	  only	  get	  away	  
somewhere	  …	  to	  Africa,	  or	  England	  or	  anywhere,	  it	  might	  save	  my	  life.	  	  Here	  you	  use	  all	  your	  
energy	  creating	  resistance	  and	  friction	  for	  yourself.”516	  	  A	  few	  months	  later	  in	  another	  letter	  to	  
the	  same	  friend	  –	  fellow	  artist	  Erwin	  Lang	  –	  Kokoschka	  insisted:	  “I	  can’t	  stand	  it	  here	  any	  longer,	  
it’s	  all	  ossified	  as	  if	  the	  screaming	  had	  never	  been	  heard.”517	  	  This	  image	  of	  himself	  screaming	  
apparently	  appealed	  to	  Kokoschka;	  he	  later	  produced	  a	  self-­‐portrait	  bust	  that	  he	  described	  as	  a	  
warrior	  with	  its	  mouth	  opened	  in	  an	  “impassioned	  cry.”518	  	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  (Fig.	  2)	  was	  
one	  of	  a	  series	  of	  self-­‐portraits	  Kokoschka	  made	  that	  relied	  on	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  to	  produce	  
and	  reproduce	  a	  theatrically	  negative	  persona:	  the	  artist	  as	  avant-­‐garde	  antagonist.	  
	  
§	  
The	  link	  between	  hatred	  and	  ugliness	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
negative	  Einfühlung,	  or	  negative	  empathy,	  in	  the	  aesthetic	  theory	  of	  German	  professor	  	  of	  
philosophy	  and	  psychology	  Theodor	  Lipps.	  	  Lipps	  (1851–1914)	  was	  the	  leading	  aesthetic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  “Letter	  to	  Erwin	  Lang	  [late	  1907],”	  in	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  Letters	  1905-­‐1976,	  trans.	  Mary	  Whittall	  
(London:	  Thames	  and	  Hudson,	  1992),	  15.	  	  
517	  Ibid.,	  16.	  
518	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  21. 
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theorist	  of	  his	  time:	  his	  Einfühlung	  theory	  dominated	  the	  Germanic	  understanding	  of	  aesthetic	  
experience	  until	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  I	  will	  first	  offer	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  Lipps’s	  theories	  
of	  positive	  and	  negative	  empathy,	  and	  then	  touch	  on	  the	  broader	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
Einfühlung.	  	  I	  propose	  that	  Kokoschka,	  with	  his	  apparent	  desire	  to	  provoke	  hatred	  and	  his	  
strategic	  use	  of	  ugliness	  to	  both	  provoke	  and	  connote	  that	  hatred,	  developed	  his	  own	  practice	  
of	  negative	  empathy.	  	  
	   Lipps	  developed	  a	  new	  scientific	  field	  of	  “psychological	  aesthetics,”	  which	  sought	  to	  
bridge	  psychology	  and	  philosophy;	  the	  linchpin	  of	  this	  emergent	  discipline	  was	  Lipps’s	  theory	  of	  
empathy.	  	  Lipps	  described	  Einfühlung	  as	  “not	  a	  sensation	  in	  one’s	  [own]	  body,	  but	  feeling	  
something,	  namely,	  oneself,	  into	  the	  [a]esthetic	  object.”519	  	  Speaking	  first	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  
appreciation	  of	  beauty,	  he	  emphasized	  that	  this	  psychological	  process	  of	  projection	  was	  
involved	  in	  all	  intersubjective	  encounters,	  not	  merely	  in	  the	  apprehension	  of	  aesthetic	  
objects.520	  
	   Within	  Lipps’s	  theory	  negative	  empathy	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  empathy’s	  ugly	  counterpart.	  	  In	  
his	  1903	  Leitfaden	  der	  Psychologie	  [Guide	  to	  Psychology]	  Lipps	  stated	  explicitly	  that	  the	  object	  
of	  negative	  empathy	  is	  ugly,	  and	  he	  returned	  to	  his	  theory	  of	  negative	  Einfühlung	  in	  at	  least	  
four	  texts	  published	  between	  1903	  and	  1906.521	  	  But	  these	  discussions	  notwithstanding,	  Lipps’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519	  Theodor	  Lipps,	  “Empathy,	  Inner	  Imitation,	  and	  Sense-­‐feelings,”	  in	  A	  Modern	  Book	  of	  Aesthetics:	  An	  Anthology,	  
ed.	  Melvin	  Rader,	  5th	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1979),	  377.	  
520	  Ibid.,	  371.	  
521	  Theodor	  Lipps,	  Leitfaden	  der	  Psychologie	  (Leipzig:	  Wilhelm	  Engelmann,	  1903),	  200:	  “Den	  Gegenstand	  der	  
negativen	  Einfühlung	  bezeichnen	  wir	  als	  häßlich.”	  	  See	  also	  Lipps,	  “Einfühlung,	  innere	  Nachahmung,	  und	  
Organempfindungen,”	  Archiv	  für	  die	  gesamte	  Psychologie,	  vol.	  1	  (1903):	  185–204,	  Ästhetik:	  Psychologie	  des	  
Schönen	  und	  der	  Kunst,	  vol.	  1:	  Grundlegung	  der	  Ästhetik	  (Hamburg:	  Leopold	  Voss,	  1903)	  and	  vol.	  2,	  Die	  ästhetische	  
Betrachtung	  und	  die	  bildende	  Kunst	  (Hamburg:	  Leopold	  Voss,	  1906).	  	  
	  	  
216	  
idea	  of	  negative	  empathy	  seems	  to	  have	  remained	  largely	  undeveloped	  –	  the	  dark,	  bleary	  
reflection	  of	  his	  more	  substantive	  theory	  of	  positive	  Einfühlung.	  	  In	  his	  article	  “Theodor	  Lipps	  
and	  the	  Shift	  from	  ‘Sympathy’	  to	  ‘Empathy’”	  Gustav	  Jahoda	  –	  psychologist	  born	  and	  educated	  
in	  Vienna	  –	  acknowledges	  that	  Lipps’s	  notion	  of	  negative	  empathy	  is	  “rather	  an	  elusive	  
concept.”	  	  Jahoda	  explains	  that	  Lipps’s	  concept	  can	  be	  “tentatively	  summarised	  as	  …	  the	  effect	  
of	  someone	  behaving	  in	  an	  offensive	  and	  hurtful	  way.”	  	  And	  although	  “the	  unpleasant	  
behaviour	  is	  said	  to	  ‘penetrate’	  the	  observer	  or	  victim,	  it	  produces	  inner	  rejection.”522	  	  The	  idea	  
here	  is	  that	  aesthetic	  encounters	  are	  predicated	  on	  the	  introjection	  of	  an	  object	  of	  
contemplation	  that	  can	  potentially	  threaten	  or	  even	  hurt	  us.	  	  According	  to	  Lipps,	  when	  this	  
happens	  we	  hate	  the	  object	  we	  have	  temporarily	  identified	  with,	  rejecting	  it	  and	  considering	  it	  
ugly.	  
	   Even	  Lipps’s	  theory	  of	  positive	  Einfühlung	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  define	  clearly,	  as	  he	  
modified	  it	  several	  times.	  	  In	  his	  1903	  article	  “Empathy,	  Inner	  Imitation,	  and	  Sense-­‐feelings”	  
Lipps	  first	  proposed	  a	  theory	  of	  Einfühlung	  as	  “inner	  imitation,”	  and	  in	  his	  Guide	  to	  Psychology	  
he	  indicated	  that	  the	  manifestations	  of	  life	  were	  based	  in	  a	  drive	  toward	  imitation.523	  	  But	  he	  
rejected	  his	  own	  terminology	  and	  understanding	  later	  that	  year	  in	  Aesthetics:	  The	  Psychology	  of	  
Beauty	  and	  Art	  [Ästhetik:	  Psychologie	  des	  Schönen	  und	  der	  Kunst]:	  “‘I	  described	  Einfühlung	  also	  
with	  the	  name	  ‘inner	  imitation.’	  	  This	  naming	  we	  must	  …	  completely	  abandon.’”524	  	  Some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522	  Gustav	  Jahoda,	  “Theodor	  Lipps	  and	  the	  Shift	  from	  ‘Sympathy’	  to	  ‘Empathy,’”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  
Behavioral	  Sciences	  41,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2005):	  158. 
523	  Lipps,	  “Einfühlung,	  innere	  Nachahmung,	  und	  Organempfindungen”	  and	  Leitfaden	  der	  Psychologie:	  “Mein	  
Verständnis	  der	  Lebensäußerungen	  hat	  seinen	  Grund	  im	  instinktiven	  Triebe	  der	  Nachahmung,”	  193.	  
524	  In	  Jahoda,	  “Theodor	  Lipps	  ,”155.	  	  Originally	  in	  Lipps,	  Ästhetik,	  vol.1,	  127.	  	  See	  also	  Ästhetik,	  vol.	  2,	  414,	  where	  
Lipps	  affirms	  that	  while	  the	  idea	  of	  inner	  imitation	  is	  “ultimately	  justified,”	  the	  term	  is	  misleading.	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elements	  of	  Lipps’s	  theory	  of	  Einfühlung	  remained	  constant,	  however,	  and	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  
these	  below.	  	  Even	  if	  he	  abandoned	  the	  rubric	  of	  imitation	  Lipps	  certainly	  retained	  the	  general	  
notion	  of	  identification;	  moreover	  he	  also	  consistently	  associated	  the	  positive	  experience	  of	  
Einfühlung	  with	  beauty,	  harmony,	  freedom,	  and	  pleasure,	  and	  negative	  Einfühlung	  with	  
dissonance,	  hatred,	  conflict,	  and	  ugliness.	  	  
	   Concepts	  of	  Einfühlung	  had	  a	  rich	  history	  in	  German	  thought	  even	  before	  Lipps	  adapted	  
the	  idea	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  aesthetic	  response.525	  	  The	  noun	  Einfühlung,	  which	  literally	  means	  “in-­‐
feeling”	  and	  refers	  to	  an	  instinctive	  form	  of	  psychological	  projection,	  a	  “feeling	  oneself	  into,”	  
was	  coined	  by	  Robert	  Vischer526	  in	  his	  1873	  dissertation	  On	  the	  Optical	  Sense	  of	  Form:	  A	  
Contribution	  to	  Aesthetics.527	  	  Vischer’s	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  empathy	  had	  been	  
influenced	  in	  part	  by	  Karl	  Albert	  Scherner’s	  1861	  text	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Dream,528	  and	  in	  turn	  
Vischer’s	  own	  discussion	  subsequently	  influenced	  Johannes	  Volkelt’s	  notion	  of	  empathy	  in	  
Volkelt’s	  1876	  text	  The	  Symbol	  Concept	  in	  the	  Newest	  Aesthetics.529	  	  Freud’s	  Interpretation	  of	  
Dreams	  reflects	  the	  very	  deep	  impression	  that	  Volkelt’s	  1875	  text	  Dream-­‐Phantasy,530	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525	  Johann	  Gottfried	  von	  Herder,	  for	  example,	  used	  the	  neologism	  “sich	  einfühlen”	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century. 
526	  Vischer	  (1847–1933)	  was	  a	  German	  philosophy	  student	  whose	  work	  in	  aesthetics	  influenced	  the	  development	  
of	  the	  discipline	  of	  art	  history,	  and	  specifically	  the	  approach	  of	  Vienna	  School	  art	  historians	  such	  as	  Riegl.	  	  Vischer	  
died	  in	  Vienna.	  
527	  Über	  das	  optische	  Formgefühl.	  Ein	  Beitrag	  zur	  Ästhetik.	  	  	  
528	  Das	  Leben	  des	  Traums.	  	  Like	  Lipps,	  Scherner	  (1825–1889)	  was	  a	  German	  philosopher	  and	  psychologist.	  	  
529	  Der	  Symbol-­‐Begriff	  in	  der	  neuesten	  Ästhetik.	  	  Johannes	  Volkelt	  (1848–1930),	  educated	  in	  Jena,	  Leipzig,	  and	  
Vienna,	  became	  professor	  of	  philosophy	  and	  pedagogy	  at	  Leipzig	  University	  in	  1894.	  
530	  Die	  Traumphantasie.	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through	  it	  Scherner’s	  Life	  of	  Dreams,	  made	  on	  the	  Viennese	  psychoanalyst;	  Freud	  cites	  both	  
thinkers	  throughout	  his	  text.531	  	  
	   Lipps	  himself	  was	  also	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  Freud	  –	  as	  anyone	  familiar	  with	  Freud’s	  early	  
writings	  knows,	  he	  cited	  Lipps	  repeatedly	  and	  even	  bemoaned	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  his	  own	  
work	  in	  psychoanalysis	  simply	  re-­‐stated	  Lipps’s	  earlier	  insights.532	  	  Freud	  first	  cites	  Lipps’s	  1897	  
conference	  paper	  about	  the	  unconscious	  in	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams;	  he	  then	  
acknowledges	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  Jokes	  and	  Their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious	  that	  Lipps’s	  1898	  
book	  Komik	  und	  Humor	  inspired	  Freud	  to	  write	  his	  own	  study	  of	  humour.	  	  Moreover,	  Freud	  
takes	  the	  important	  economical	  notion	  of	  “psychical	  damming-­‐up”	  (cathexis)	  directly	  from	  
Komik	  und	  Humor.533	  
	  
§	  
Perhaps	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  following	  Lipps’s	  psychological	  theory,	  Kokoschka	  seemed	  
to	  believe	  that	  we	  find	  ugly	  what	  we	  hate.	  	  His	  innovation	  was	  to	  use	  this	  insight	  to	  deliberately	  
portray	  himself	  as	  hated	  and	  ugly.	  	  Indeed,	  hostile	  intersubjective	  processes	  that	  provoke	  a	  
reaction	  of	  negative	  empathy	  are	  central	  to	  Kokoschka’s	  early	  work.	  	  Passed	  over	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  modern	  Viennese	  art,	  Lipps’s	  concept	  of	  negative	  empathy	  provides	  a	  compelling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531	  Freud	  writes	  that	  Scherner’s	  attempt	  to	  explain	  dreams	  is	  “the	  most	  original	  and	  most	  comprehensive,”	  but	  also	  
that	  the	  reader	  will	  “gladly	  resort	  to	  the	  clearer	  and	  conciser	  presentation	  of	  Scherner’s	  theories	  made	  by	  the	  
philosopher	  Volkelt.”	  “The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams,”	  in	  The	  Major	  Works	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  ed.	  Robert	  Maynard	  
Hutchins	  (Chicago:	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica,	  1952),	  172.	  
532	  For	  example	  in	  a	  letter	  written	  to	  Fliess	  on	  31	  August	  1898,	  The	  Complete	  Letters	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud	  to	  Wilhelm	  
Fliess	  1887–1904,	  ed.	  and	  trans.	  J.M.	  Masson	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  325.	  
533	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  XIII,	  118. 
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basis	  from	  which	  to	  examine	  and	  interpret	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  –	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  early	  self-­‐
portraiture	  specifically,	  and	  in	  Viennese	  modernity	  more	  generally	  as	  well.	  	  
	   I	  argue	  that	  Kokoschka	  deliberately	  baited	  the	  public	  with	  arrogant,	  off-­‐putting	  
behaviour,	  represented	  himself	  with	  abrasive,	  alienating	  techniques,	  and	  produced	  and	  
reproduced	  a	  discourse	  that	  represented	  him	  as	  repeatedly	  arousing	  hostility	  through	  radical	  
artistic	  originality.	  	  “I’m	  ugly	  because	  you	  hate	  me”	  Kokoschka’s	  early	  self-­‐portraits	  proclaim,	  
linking	  what	  might	  otherwise	  be	  two	  discrete	  phenomena.	  	  The	  ugly	  self-­‐portraits	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  
give	  an	  accurate	  sense	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  physical	  appearance	  as	  a	  young	  man;	  instead	  they	  offer	  
opportunities	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  how	  and	  why	  Kokoschka	  used	  corporeal	  ugliness	  very	  
effectively	  to	  represent	  hostile	  feelings	  the	  public	  purportedly	  had	  toward	  him,	  and	  he	  toward	  
them.	  	  This	  success	  of	  this	  approach,	  I	  argue,	  helped	  Kokoschka	  to	  create	  a	  memorable	  artistic	  
identity	  and	  reputation.	  	  
A	  clue	  to	  how	  this	  unfolded	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Lipps’s	  own	  description	  of	  negative	  
empathy	  in	  action:	  	  
I	  see	  …	  a	  person	  looking,	  not	  proudly	  but	  arrogantly.	  	  I	  experience	  within	  myself	  the	  
arrogance	  contained	  in	  that	  look.	  	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that	  I	  imagine	  this	  inner	  conduct	  or	  inner	  
condition;	  it	  is	  not	  just	  that	  I	  know	  about	  it;	  rather,	  it	  obtrudes,	  forces	  itself	  into	  my	  
experience.	  	  But	  within	  myself	  I	  work	  against	  it.	  	  My	  inner	  being	  objects;	  I	  feel	  in	  the	  
arrogant	  look	  a	  life-­‐denial	  or	  life-­‐inhibition	  affecting	  me,	  a	  denial	  of	  my	  personality.	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Because	  of	  that,	  and	  only	  because	  of	  that,	  the	  arrogance	  can	  hurt	  me.	  	  My	  feeling	  of	  
discomfort	  rests	  on	  that	  negative	  [empathy].534	  
Not	  only	  in	  self-­‐portraits	  produced	  around	  1909–10,	  but	  also	  in	  his	  autobiography	  –	  another	  
kind	  of	  self-­‐portrait	  –	  Kokoschka	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  narrative	  of	  alienation	  in	  which	  he	  and	  
his	  art	  occupy	  precisely	  the	  position	  of	  the	  negative,	  arrogant,	  ugly	  person	  whom	  Lipps	  had	  so	  
memorably	  described.	  	  More	  than	  merely	  a	  stance	  of	  youthful	  rebellion,	  Kokoschka’s	  
embodiment	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  negative	  empathy	  clearly	  inspired	  him	  to	  be	  productive;	  he	  used	  
hatred	  and	  ugliness	  to	  create	  new,	  confrontational	  art.	  	  Before	  finally	  turning	  to	  Kokoschka’s	  
works,	  however,	  we	  must	  briefly	  situate	  Lipps’s	  Einfühlung	  theory	  in	  relation	  to	  broader	  
philosophical	  and	  psychological	  questions.	  
	  
§	  
Contemporary	  psychologists	  and	  neuroscientists	  are	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  significant	  cross-­‐
fertilization	  between	  early	  psychoanalytic	  ideas	  and	  Einfühlung	  theory.535	  	  But	  this	  awareness	  
does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  extended	  substantially	  to	  art	  theory	  yet.536	  	  Given	  that	  psychoanalytic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534	  Lipps	  in	  Jahoda,	  “Theodor	  Lipps,”	  158.	  	  The	  original	  reads:	  “Ich	  sehe	  …	  einen	  Menschen	  nicht	  stolz,	  sondern	  
hochmütig	  blicken.	  	  Auch	  den	  in	  diesem	  Blick	  liegenden	  Hochmut	  erlebe	  ich	  in	  mir,	  Ich	  stelle	  mir	  dies	  innere	  
Verhalten	  oder	  diese	  innere	  Zuständlichkeit	  nicht	  nur	  vor;	  ich	  weiss	  nicht	  nur	  davon;	  sondern	  sir	  drängt	  sich	  mir	  
auf,	  drängt	  sich	  in	  mein	  Erleben	  ein.	  	  Aber	  ich	  arbeite	  innerlich	  dagegen.	  	  Mein	  inneres	  Wesen	  widersetzt	  sich;	  ich	  
fühle	  in	  dem	  hochmütigen	  Blick	  eine	  eigene	  innere	  Lebensnegation	  oder	  Lebenshemmung,	  eine	  Verneinung	  
meiner	  Persönlichkeit.	  	  Darum	  und	  nur	  darum	  kann	  mich	  der	  Hochmut	  verletzen.	  	  Mein	  Gefühl	  der	  Unlust	  is	  
begründet	  in	  dieser	  negativen	  Einfühlung.”	  	  Lipps,	  Ästhetik,	  vol.	  1,	  139–40.	  
535	  For	  more	  on	  this	  see	  233.	  
536	  Einfühlung	  theory	  does	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  architectural	  studies,	  however.	  	  Juliet	  Koss,	  whose	  work	  
straddles	  art	  and	  architectural	  theory,	  has	  written	  extensively	  about	  empathy.	  	  See	  for	  example	  Koss,	  “Empathy	  
and	  Abstraction	  at	  the	  Munich	  Artists’	  Theatre,”	  in	  The	  Built	  Surface,	  Volume	  Two:	  Architecture	  and	  the	  Pictorial	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approaches	  to	  art	  are	  quite	  common,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  ugliness,	  negativity,	  
and	  intersubjective	  dynamics	  in	  art,	  the	  art	  historical	  neglect	  of	  Einfühlung	  theory	  –	  and	  
specifically,	  of	  negative	  empathy	  –	  is	  unfortunate.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note,	  though,	  that	  this	  
disregard	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  comparatively	  marginal	  status	  of	  negative	  Einfühlung	  in	  Lipps’s	  
own	  aesthetic	  theory,	  where	  empathy	  rather	  than	  negative	  empathy	  is	  the	  focal	  concept.	  
	   Just	  as	  love	  rather	  than	  hatred	  has	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  poetry	  and	  poetics,	  beauty	  rather	  
than	  ugliness	  has	  dominated	  aesthetic	  discussion.	  	  In	  Lipps’s	  1903	  Ästhetik,	  aesthetics	  is	  defined	  
classically	  as	  “the	  science	  of	  the	  beautiful.”537	  	  Insofar	  as	  aesthetics	  was	  the	  science	  of	  the	  
beautiful,	  and	  Einfühlung	  referred	  to	  a	  compulsion	  to	  imagine	  ourselves	  in	  the	  place	  of	  what	  we	  
see,	  Lipps’s	  focus	  on	  positive	  Einfühlung	  –	  purportedly	  a	  harmonious	  feeling	  of	  love,	  freedom,	  
and	  confidence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  beautiful	  person,	  object,	  or	  work	  of	  art	  –	  made	  sense.	  	  In	  such	  a	  
context,	  ugliness	  and	  negative	  empathy	  threaten	  not	  only	  the	  aesthetic	  participant,	  but	  the	  
optimism	  of	  Einfühlung	  theory	  itself.	  
	   According	  to	  Lipps,	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  an	  “activity	  of	  the	  self”	  meant	  to	  be	  
pleasurable	  or	  at	  least	  to	  produce	  a	  feeling	  of	  self-­‐worth	  [Selbstwertgefühl].538	  	  He	  elaborates	  
that	  although	  we	  value	  our	  own	  life	  force,	  this	  is	  not	  considered	  an	  aesthetic	  value.	  	  But	  when	  
we	  encounter	  another’s	  life	  force,	  or	  even	  their	  potential	  for	  it,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  value	  it	  –	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Arts	  from	  Romanticism	  to	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century,	  eds	  Christy	  Anderson	  and	  Karen	  Koehler	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  
2002),	  98–119;	  Koss,	  “On	  the	  Limits	  of	  Empathy,”	  Art	  Bulletin	  88,	  no.	  1	  (March	  2006):	  139–57.	  
537	  Lipps	  in	  James	  H.	  Tufts,	  “Review	  of:	  Aesthetik:	  Psychologie	  des	  Schönen	  und	  der	  Kunst,	  by	  Theodor	  Lipps,”	  The	  
Philosophical	  Review	  13,	  no.	  6	  (November	  1904):	  677.	  	  Lipps,	  Ästhetik,	  vol.	  1:	  “Die	  Ästhetik	  ist	  die	  Wissenschaft	  
vom	  Schönen;	  implicite	  auch	  vom	  Hässlichen,”	  1.	  	  The	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  work	  treats	  ugliness,	  at	  less	  than	  ten	  
pages	  of	  the	  total	  600.	  	  
538	  In	  Tufts,	  “Review,”	  679.	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valorization	  is	  also	  “the	  essence	  of	  aesthetic	  feeling”	  and	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  
empathy.539	  	  Yet	  Lipps’s	  description	  applies	  only	  to	  positive	  Einfühlung.	  	  He	  clarifies	  by	  
differentiating	  between	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  arguing	  that	  “all	  enjoyment	  of	  beauty	  is	  an	  
impression	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  life,	  actual	  or	  potential,	  which	  lies	  in	  an	  object;	  and	  all	  ugliness	  is	  in	  
its	  ultimate	  nature,	  negation,	  defect	  of	  life,	  obstruction,	  pining	  away,	  destruction,	  death.”540	  
Lipps	  argues	  that	  beauty	  represents	  the	  power	  of	  life,	  whereas	  ugliness	  represents	  the	  forces	  of	  
death.	  	  Indeed	  as	  early	  as	  1883	  Lipps	  was	  describing	  death	  itself	  as	  the	  ultimate	  form	  of	  
ugliness.541	  	  He	  claims	  that	  when	  we	  encounter	  ugliness,	  it	  “‘obtrudes,	  forces	  itself’”	  into	  our	  
experience	  and	  we	  instinctively	  “‘work	  against	  it’”	  because	  our	  “‘inner	  being	  objects.’”542	  	  The	  
young	  Kokoschka	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  this	  threatening,	  objectionable	  phenomenon,	  and	  in	  his	  
self-­‐portraits	  he	  also	  represented	  himself	  as	  defective	  or	  even	  dead.	  	  The	  uncanny	  effects	  of	  
such	  “self-­‐portraits	  as	  a	  dead	  man”	  are	  consistent	  with	  Lipps’	  account	  of	  the	  initial	  
identification	  and	  subsequent	  repulsion	  of	  negative	  Einfühlung.	  	  Creating	  works	  of	  art	  that	  both	  
attracted	  and	  repelled	  the	  viewer	  was	  an	  essential	  facet	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  self-­‐constructed	  
persona	  as	  a	  hated,	  infamous,	  and	  ugly	  outsider.	  
	   Kokoschka	  probably	  did	  not	  encounter	  Lipps’s	  ideas	  directly	  until	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  
Worringer’s	  Abstraction	  and	  Empathy	  in	  1908,	  but	  he	  was	  familiar	  with	  other	  thinkers	  who	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539	  Ibid. 
540	  Ibid.	  
541	  Theodor	  Lipps,	  Grundtatsachen	  des	  Seelenlebens	  [The	  Basic	  Facts	  of	  Mental	  Life]	  (Bonn:	  Max	  Cohen,	  1883):	  
“Nennen	  wir	  die	  absolute	  Gehemmtheit	  und	  Negation	  des	  Lebens	  Tod,	  so	  können	  wir	  kurz	  den	  Tod	  als	  höchsten	  
Inhalt	  des	  Hässlichen	  bezeichnen,“	  691.	  
542	  Lipps	  in	  Jahoda,	  “Theodor	  Lipps,”	  158. 
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developed	  or	  were	  developing	  similar	  notions,	  including	  Schopenhauer	  and	  Freud.	  	  Although	  he	  
did	  not	  discuss	  Lipps’s	  theory	  of	  negative	  empathy	  explicitly,	  Freud	  did	  address	  issues	  of	  
Einfühlung	  and	  ugliness	  in	  Jokes	  and	  Their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious.	  	  And	  like	  Lipps,	  Freud	  
emphasizes	  the	  ways	  that	  we	  resist	  empathetic	  identification	  with	  the	  ugly	  and	  use	  humour	  as	  
a	  form	  of	  defence.	  	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  always	  use	  the	  specific	  terms	  “ugliness”	  or	  “the	  ugly,”	  
nevertheless	  physical	  deformity,	  obesity,	  age,	  disability,	  and	  the	  exaggeration	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  
ostensibly	  undesirable	  physical	  characteristics	  underpin	  Freud’s	  joke	  theory.	  	  In	  fact,	  ugliness	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  Freud	  discusses	  in	  the	  production	  of	  laughter.	  	  Caricature,	  
intimately	  related	  to	  the	  ugly,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  in	  Freud’s	  analysis	  of	  humour.	  	  For	  
Freud	  the	  entire	  structure	  of	  humour	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  ugliness	  but	  also	  on	  Einfühlung:	  “we	  
take	  the	  producing	  person’s	  psychical	  state	  into	  consideration,	  put	  ourselves	  into	  it	  and	  try	  to	  
understand	  it	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  our	  own.	  	  It	  is	  these	  processes	  of	  empathy	  and	  comparison	  
that	  result	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  expenditure	  which	  we	  discharge	  by	  laughing.”543	  	  Thus	  in	  addition	  
to	  hatred,	  laughter	  is	  another	  way	  that	  we	  disavow	  empathetic	  identification	  with	  the	  ugly.	  
	  
§	  
Kokoschka	  himself	  alludes	  to	  a	  possible	  connection	  between	  physical	  deformity	  and	  Einfühlung	  
in	  his	  autobiography,	  noting	  that	  one	  of	  his	  sitters	  was	  a	  hunchback	  with	  “an	  extraordinary	  
capacity	  for	  empathy.”544	  	  But	  whereas	  Lipps	  believed	  that	  ugly	  art	  and	  hostile	  affects	  should	  be	  
generally	  avoided,	  by	  contrast	  Kokoschka	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  attracted	  to	  precisely	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543	  Freud,	  Standard	  Edition	  XIII,	  186.	  
544	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  42.	  	  For	  the	  German	  original,	  “Einfühlungsgabe,”	  see	  Kokoschka,	  Mein	  Leben,	  Vorwort	  und	  
dokumentarische	  Mitarbeit	  von	  Remigius	  Netzer	  (Munich:	  Bruckmann,	  1969),	  83. 
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phenomena.	  	  In	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  consistently	  frames	  his	  artistic	  training	  and	  
development	  in	  terms	  of	  dramatic	  feelings	  of	  alienation,	  hostility,	  and	  even	  horror.	  He	  notes	  
that	  he	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  Vienna	  Fine	  Arts	  Academy	  but	  rather	  the	  School	  of	  Arts	  and	  Crafts	  
[Kunstgewerbeschule]	  because	  –	  he	  claims	  –	  “[i]t	  never	  entered	  my	  head	  to	  go”	  to	  the	  Academy	  
“and	  pass	  myself	  off	  as	  an	  artist	  in	  a	  velvet	  jacket	  and	  beret.”545	  	  Even	  at	  the	  
Kunstgewerbeschule	  Kokoschka	  soon	  distinguished	  himself	  by	  his	  negativity.	  	  He	  apparently	  
hated	  the	  “tedious	  instruction,”	  and	  pointedly	  drew	  life	  models	  tiny	  in	  protest	  against	  the	  
distance	  –	  in	  a	  large	  studio	  full	  of	  other	  students–	  between	  the	  artist	  and	  his	  model.	  	  As	  a	  result	  
he	  was	  given	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  “solitary	  cell,”	  his	  own	  small	  studio	  at	  the	  school.546	  
	   Not	  only	  did	  Kokoschka	  disapprove	  of	  the	  local	  art	  schools,	  he	  apparently	  also	  eschewed	  
local	  art	  and	  museums	  –	  claiming,	  for	  example,	  that	  he	  almost	  never	  visited	  the	  famed	  
Kunsthistorisches	  Museum	  in	  Vienna.	  	  Fascinated	  instead	  by	  the	  ethnographic	  collection	  at	  the	  
Natural	  History	  Museum,	  the	  young	  artist	  was	  drawn	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  pain	  he	  supposedly	  
saw	  on	  the	  face	  of	  a	  tattooed	  Polynesian	  mask	  –	  a	  theme	  to	  which	  I	  shall	  return.	  	  In	  his	  
autobiography	  the	  elderly	  Kokoschka	  immediately	  subverts	  this	  elective	  affinity,	  however,	  by	  
insisting	  that	  actually	  he	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  imitating	  primitive	  art	  because,	  he	  declares:	  “I	  was	  
not	  a	  savage.”547	  	  And	  not	  only	  did	  the	  young	  artist	  not	  imitate	  primitive	  art	  or	  appreciate	  the	  
old	  masters	  in	  the	  Kunsthistorisches	  collection,	  he	  also	  claims	  not	  to	  have	  attended	  any	  of	  the	  
exhibitions	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Secession.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  17.	  
546	  Ibid.,	  19.	  
547	  Ibid.,	  19–20. 
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   Yet	  immediately	  after	  these	  attempts	  to	  convince	  the	  reader	  of	  his	  absolute	  originality	  
and	  total	  lack	  of	  artistic	  influences	  or	  community,	  Kokoschka	  has	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  he	  
came	  to	  be	  included	  in	  Vienna’s	  1908	  Kunstschau,	  an	  exhibition	  of	  national	  and	  international	  
art	  timed	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  Sixtieth	  Crown	  Jubilee	  celebrations	  for	  the	  ruler	  of	  the	  Austro-­‐
Hungarian	  Empire,	  Emperor	  Franz	  Joseph.	  	  Kokoschka	  states	  that	  the	  artists	  “invited	  were	  
chosen	  from	  among	  those	  who	  were	  still	  not	  fully	  understood	  or	  appreciated	  in	  their	  own	  
countries,”	  and	  notes	  appreciatively	  that	  he	  was	  not	  only	  invited	  to	  participate	  but	  even	  given	  a	  
small	  room	  to	  himself.548	  	  Warming	  up	  to	  his	  topic,	  a	  reminiscence	  of	  youthful	  precocity	  over	  
sixty	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  autobiography’s	  publication	  in	  1971,	  Kokoschka	  describes	  his	  
deliberately	  defiant	  performance	  as	  an	  avant-­‐garde	  antagonist	  at	  the	  Kunstschau,	  insisting	  that:	  
When	  you	  strive	  to	  create	  what	  people	  are	  not	  yet	  prepared	  to	  understand,	  you	  are	  
bound	  to	  suffer	  the	  consequences.	  	  Their	  incomprehension	  turns	  to	  laughter,	  and	  they	  
feel	  superior	  because	  your	  effort	  to	  solicit	  their	  attention	  has	  failed.	  	  I	  feared	  this	  would	  
be	  my	  fate.	  	  So,	  when	  Klimt	  came	  to	  my	  room,	  flanked	  by	  [Ferdinand]	  Hodler	  in	  top	  hat,	  
frock-­‐coat	  and	  sash,	  with	  the	  other	  gentlemen	  of	  the	  jury	  following	  behind,	  I	  refused	  to	  
let	  them	  in.	  	  ‘I	  won’t	  open	  the	  door,’	  I	  said,	  ‘until	  you	  promise	  to	  show	  my	  work	  to	  the	  
public,	  whatever	  the	  jury	  thinks.’	  	  They	  were	  furious;	  but	  Klimt,	  though	  a	  little	  taken	  
aback,	  did	  not	  stay	  to	  bandy	  words	  with	  me.	  	  Goodnaturedly,	  he	  motioned	  the	  group	  on,	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  Ibid.,	  20.	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and	  said	  only:	  ‘Let	  the	  fellow	  get	  himself	  torn	  apart	  by	  the	  press,	  if	  that’s	  what	  he	  
wants.’549	  
Kokoschka	  was	  not,	  in	  fact,	  torn	  apart	  by	  the	  press	  that	  year.	  	  	  
This	  image	  of	  the	  young	  artist	  as	  a	  provocateur	  who	  inspired	  the	  fury	  of	  the	  Viennese	  
has	  been	  circulated	  tirelessly,	  however.	  	  It	  behoves	  us	  to	  remember,	  though,	  that	  the	  evidence	  
that	  gave	  rise	  to	  this	  artistic	  reputation	  was	  related	  largely	  by	  the	  artist	  himself.	  	  That	  
Kokoschka’s	  artistic	  identity	  developed	  from	  negative	  perceptions	  and	  affects	  is	  more	  than	  
likely,	  but	  what	  might	  we	  learn	  by	  calling	  into	  question	  his	  oft-­‐repeated	  narrative	  of	  exclusion?	  	  
That	  is:	  what	  if	  that	  negativity	  originated	  largely	  in	  the	  artist	  himself	  and	  he	  projected	  it	  onto	  
others,	  creating	  ugly	  images	  of	  himself	  –	  the	  hated	  artist	  –	  to	  correspond	  to	  that	  projection?	  	  
What	  might	  we	  learn	  about	  the	  construction	  and	  performance	  of	  artistic	  identity	  in	  Vienna	  circa	  
1908–10,	  after	  which	  Kokoschka	  left	  Vienna	  for	  Berlin?	  	  Gemma	  Blackshaw	  has	  noted	  that	  
attacking	  one’s	  competitors	  was	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  culture,	  
“with	  character	  defamation	  practically	  constituting	  its	  own	  literary	  genre.”550	  	  She	  argues	  that	  
in	  such	  a	  hostile	  atmosphere,	  “[f]riendships	  had	  to	  be	  strategised	  and	  alliances	  carefully	  forged	  
in	  order	  to	  grasp	  and	  maintain	  a	  position	  within	  the	  city.”551	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Kokoschka	  
managed	  to	  forge	  very	  strategic	  friendships	  and	  alliances	  while	  simultaneously	  portraying	  
himself	  as	  loathed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549	  Ibid.,	  21.	  	  For	  more	  information	  on	  Kokoschka	  at	  the	  Kunstschau	  see	  Vergo’s	  Art	  in	  Vienna,	  and	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  
analysis	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  play	  see	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Yvonne	  Modlin,	  “Murderer	  Hope	  of	  Women:	  Expressionist	  Drama	  
and	  Myth,”	  in	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  1886–1890,	  ed.	  Richard	  Calvocoressi	  (London:	  Tate	  Gallery,	  1986),	  20–31.	  
550	  Blackshaw,	  “The	  Jewish	  Christ,”	  35–6.	  
551	  Ibid.,	  36.	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   At	  the	  1908	  Kunstschau	  the	  young	  artist	  displayed	  a	  tapestry	  cartoon	  entitled	  The	  
Bearers	  of	  Dreams	  [Die	  Traumtragenden]	  (Fig.	  44).	  	  This	  work	  related	  to	  lithographs	  Kokoschka	  
had	  created	  at	  the	  Wiener	  Werkstätte	  for	  his	  art	  book	  The	  Dreaming	  Youths	  [Die	  träumenden	  
Knaben],	  which	  explores	  adolescent	  anxiety,	  lust,	  and	  violence	  –	  all	  written	  in	  the	  first	  person	  
and	  based	  loosely	  on	  Kokoschka’s	  actual	  relationship	  with	  a	  young	  woman	  named	  Lilith	  Lang.552	  
Although	  in	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  insists	  that	  he	  was	  impervious	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  
other	  artists	  at	  this	  time,	  his	  art	  teacher	  Otto	  Czeschka	  recalls	  that	  when	  Kokoschka	  entered	  
Czeschka’s	  class	  he	  immediately	  started	  to	  emulate	  another	  student,	  Rudolf	  Kalvach553	  –	  and	  
Kokoschka’s	  The	  Dreaming	  Youths	  does	  bear	  an	  obvious	  resemblance	  to	  Kalvach’s	  Indian	  Fairy	  
Tale	  [Indisches	  Märchen],	  for	  example	  (Fig.	  45).	  Another	  influence	  on	  the	  skeletal	  Dreaming	  
Youths	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  the	  attenuated	  figures	  of	  Belgian	  sculptor	  George	  Minne	  (Figs.	  46–




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552	  Lang	  was	  a	  fellow	  student	  at	  the	  Kunstgewerbeschule,	  and	  Erwin	  Lang’s	  younger	  sister.	  
553	  Werkner,	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  66.	  
554	  Ibid.	  	  Cf.	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  21.	  	  Note	  that	  Minne’s	  Fountain,	  a	  circle	  of	  five	  identical	  figures	  of	  the	  Kneeling	  
Youth,	  was	  first	  exhibited	  in	  Vienna	  at	  the	  eighth	  Secession	  Exhibition,	  3	  November	  –	  27	  December,	  1900.	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An	  additional	  example	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  unreliability	  is	  his	  claim	  that	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  
was	  shown	  at	  the	  1908	  Kunstschau,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  exhibited	  at	  the	  Kunstschau	  of	  1909.555	  	  
Kokoschka	  explains	  that	  both	  the	  work	  and	  the	  artist	  were	  despised:	  
As	  far	  as	  the	  Viennese	  public	  was	  concerned,	  my	  room	  became	  ‘the	  Chamber	  of	  Horrors’,	  
and	  my	  work	  a	  laughing-­‐stock.	  	  Every	  day	  I	  found	  bits	  of	  chocolate	  and	  other	  debris	  in	  the	  
mouth	  of	  my	  bust,	  probably	  put	  there	  by	  girls	  as	  a	  further	  expression	  of	  the	  scorn	  they	  
felt	  for	  the	  Oberwildling,	  the	  ‘Chief	  Savage,’	  as	  I	  had	  been	  dubbed	  by	  the	  critic	  Ludwig	  
Hevesi.556	  	  
The	  portrait	  is	  certainly	  ugly	  according	  to	  Lipps’s	  comment	  that	  the	  ugly	  is	  that	  which	  is	  
defective,	  destructive,	  or	  evokes	  death.	  	  Facial	  features	  are	  mangled	  as	  if	  by	  major	  trauma,	  and	  
the	  whole	  visage	  looks	  as	  if	  it	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  collapsing	  after	  putrefaction.	  	  The	  nose	  is	  
crushed	  and	  irregular,	  the	  bright	  blue	  eyes	  are	  asymmetrical,	  look	  blind,	  and	  a	  flattened,	  floppy	  
eyelid	  covers	  the	  left	  eye.	  	  The	  entire	  surface	  of	  the	  face	  is	  ridged	  with	  concave	  and	  convex	  lines	  
resembling	  scars.	  	  Kokoschka’s	  left	  ear	  seems	  cauliflowered,	  and	  examined	  closely	  from	  certain	  
angles	  his	  lumpy	  neck	  can	  provoke	  visceral	  horror.	  	  	  
The	  Polynesian	  mask	  at	  Vienna’s	  Museum	  of	  Natural	  History	  may	  have	  inspired	  
Kokoschka,	  but	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  he	  produced	  under	  that	  influence	  looks	  like	  the	  decomposing	  
corpse	  of	  a	  bruised	  and	  battered	  boxer.	  	  This	  is	  appropriate	  perhaps	  for	  a	  work	  entitled	  Self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555	  This	  discrepancy	  has	  been	  discussed	  repeatedly,	  although	  some	  ambiguity	  remains.	  	  For	  discussions	  that	  cite	  
the	  work’s	  correct	  date	  as	  1909	  see	  for	  example	  Frank	  Whitford,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  
Michigan,	  1986),	  30–4;	  Cernuschi,	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  28,	  and	  n.	  28,	  198;	  Museum	  of	  Fine	  
Arts	  Boston,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior,	  http://www.mfa.org/collections/object/self-­‐portrait-­‐as-­‐a-­‐
warrior-­‐64963.	  	  	  
556	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  21. 
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Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  –	  but	  who	  was	  Kokoschka	  fighting,	  and	  why?	  	  Kokoschka’s	  description	  of	  
his	  encounter	  with	  the	  Polynesian	  mask	  evokes	  Lipps’s	  account	  of	  the	  basic	  structures	  of	  
empathy:	  “Seeing	  a	  Polynesian	  mask	  with	  its	  incised	  tattooing,	  I	  understood	  at	  once,	  because	  I	  
could	  feel	  my	  own	  facial	  nerves	  reacting	  to	  cold	  and	  hunger	  in	  the	  same	  way.”557	  	  Kokoschka	  
notes	  that	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  mask	  was	  empathetic,	  stemming	  from	  his	  own	  similar	  
physiological	  reactions	  to	  cold	  and	  hunger.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Kokoschka’s	  sentiment	  is	  ambiguous.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  he	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  primitive	  art	  but	  did	  not	  imitate	  it.	  	  
But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  whether	  Kokoschka	  means	  to	  indicate	  that	  he	  was	  actually	  cold	  and	  
hungry	  while	  he	  was	  looking	  at	  the	  mask	  itself,	  or	  that	  the	  mask	  triggered	  an	  embodied	  
memory	  of	  his	  previous	  experiences	  of	  cold	  and	  hunger	  –	  or	  indeed	  if	  the	  mask	  was	  in	  fact	  
intended	  to	  represent	  cold	  and	  hunger	  at	  all.	  	  There	  is,	  moreover,	  an	  oscillation	  between	  
imitation	  and	  rejection	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  account,	  a	  fundamental	  ambivalence	  around	  
identification	  and	  disavowal.	  	  This	  ambivalence	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  seriously	  he	  took	  not	  
only	  his	  own	  artistic	  persona,	  but	  also	  the	  public’s	  perception	  of	  it.	  	  Kokoschka’s	  account	  of	  his	  
encounter	  with	  the	  Polynesian	  mask,	  and	  the	  affinity	  he	  felt	  with	  it,	  also	  clearly	  highlights	  the	  
physical	  and	  emotional	  intersubjectivity	  upon	  which	  –	  both	  he	  and	  Lipps	  argue	  –	  all	  aesthetic	  
experience	  is	  based.	  
	   I	  have	  suggested	  that	  in	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  instigates	  a	  number	  of	  falsehoods,	  
related	  insofar	  as	  they	  all	  pertain	  to	  the	  artist’s	  radical	  originality	  –	  his	  ostensible	  lack	  of	  artistic	  
influences	  –	  and	  his	  tendency	  to	  provoke	  hatred.	  	  But	  I	  have	  pointed	  mostly	  to	  chronological	  
errors	  that	  might	  be	  simple	  mistakes.	  	  There	  is	  a	  more	  significant	  fiction,	  however,	  that	  is	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  Ibid.,	  20.	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repeated	  frequently	  and	  has	  often	  remained	  unquestioned	  in	  discussions	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  life	  
and	  work.	  	  At	  the	  1909	  Kunstschau,	  as	  well	  as	  displaying	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior	  and	  several	  
other	  painted	  and	  graphic	  works,	  Kokoschka	  also	  staged	  his	  play	  Murderer	  the	  Women’s	  Hope	  
[Mörder,	  Hoffnung	  der	  Frauen],	  frequently	  referred	  to	  now	  as	  the	  first	  expressionist	  drama.	  	  
Below	  I	  will	  first	  recount	  certain	  salient	  details	  of	  the	  artist’s	  view	  of	  his	  play,	  and	  then	  turn	  to	  
what	  I	  believe	  is	  Kokoschka’s	  significant	  distortion	  regarding	  the	  actual	  reception	  of	  Murderer.	  
Not	  surprisingly	  Kokoschka	  makes	  himself	  and	  his	  play	  out	  to	  be	  far	  more	  controversial	  –	  and	  
hated	  –	  than	  was	  actually	  the	  case.	  
	  
§	  
In	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  offers	  the	  reader	  a	  description	  of	  not	  only	  Murderer	  itself	  but	  
also	  the	  public	  reaction	  to	  its	  premiere.	  	  His	  description	  is	  quite	  titillating,	  involving	  multiple	  
violent	  disputes	  between	  actors,	  audience	  members,	  and	  nearby	  soldiers	  –	  and	  culminating	  in	  a	  
fracas	  serious	  enough	  to	  draw	  the	  Viennese	  police	  to	  the	  scene.	  	  Kokoschka	  describes	  the	  
content	  of	  his	  play,	  its	  mise-­‐en-­‐scène,	  reception,	  and	  subsequent	  place	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
expressionist	  theatre	  for	  several	  pages,	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  he	  believes	  the	  dramatic	  work	  has	  an	  
important	  place	  in	  his	  oeuvre.	  	  Equally	  clear,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  how	  important	  it	  is	  to	  Kokoschka	  
to	  frame	  the	  entire	  episode	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  fraught	  relationship	  between	  artist	  and	  public.	  	  We	  
have	  seen	  that	  Lipps	  described	  as	  ugly	  that	  arrogant	  person	  whose	  look	  we	  cannot	  successfully	  
empathize	  ourselves	  into,	  instead	  feeling	  “inwardly	  unfree,	  inhibited,	  subjected	  to	  a	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constraint,”	  which	  produces	  a	  reaction	  of	  hatred.558	  	  Kokoschka’s	  alienating	  arrogance	  
produced	  an	  emotional	  ugliness	  akin	  to	  the	  ugliness	  Lipps	  describes,	  in	  which	  pleasurable	  
feelings	  are	  indicators	  of	  aesthetic	  quality	  or	  at	  least	  beauty	  and	  people	  reject	  artworks	  and	  
artists	  that	  make	  no	  attempt	  to	  please	  them.	  
	   Both	  highly	  personal	  and	  highly	  allegorical,	  Murderer	  the	  Women’s	  Hope	  reflects	  
Kokoschka’s	  view	  that	  the	  sexes	  are	  fundamentally	  antagonistic.	  	  Like	  Weininger,	  Kokoschka	  
refers	  in	  his	  play	  not	  to	  specific	  men	  and	  women	  but	  rather	  to	  archetypes	  of	  “Man”	  and	  
“Woman.”	  	  Textually	  Murderer	  is	  very	  short,	  with	  a	  script	  of	  only	  a	  few	  pages.	  	  Set	  at	  night	  in	  a	  
landscape	  dominated	  by	  a	  foreboding	  tower,	  the	  protagonists	  are	  surrounded	  by	  a	  chorus	  of	  
likewise	  unnamed	  “Men”	  and	  “Women.”	  	  Like	  The	  Dreaming	  Youths	  the	  play	  is	  obviously	  
somewhat	  biographical,	  however	  symbolically	  represented,	  and	  it	  repeats	  specific	  motifs	  taken	  
from	  Kokoschka’s	  earlier	  text	  –	  for	  example	  references	  to	  the	  “red	  fish”	  that	  in	  The	  Dreaming	  
Youths	  the	  artist’s	  first-­‐person	  narrator	  stabs	  to	  death	  with	  a	  triple-­‐bladed	  knife,	  then	  rends	  in	  
two	  with	  his	  hands.	  	  The	  action	  of	  the	  play	  revolves	  around	  the	  interplay	  of	  sexualized	  violence	  
between	  Man	  and	  Woman:	  Man	  orders	  other	  men	  to	  brand	  Woman	  with	  a	  hot	  iron,	  Woman	  
stabs	  Man	  with	  a	  knife,	  and	  Man	  is	  then	  imprisoned	  in	  a	  cage	  within	  a	  tower	  by	  three	  masked	  
men.	  	  Finally	  Man	  breaks	  out	  of	  his	  literal	  and	  metaphorical	  cage	  and	  kills	  everyone	  “like	  
mosquitoes,	  leaving	  red	  behind.”559	  	  In	  the	  distance,	  cocks	  crow.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558	  Lipps	  in	  Wilhelm	  Worringer,	  Abstraction	  and	  Empathy:	  A	  Contribution	  to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Style,	  trans.	  Michael	  
Bullock	  (New	  York:	  International	  Universities	  Press,	  Inc.,	  1963),	  7.	  
559	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Murderer	  the	  Women’s	  Hope,	  in	  Henry	  I.	  Schvey,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka:	  The	  Painter	  as	  Playwright	  
(Detroit:	  Wayne	  State	  University	  Press,	  1982),	  140. 
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   Referring	  to	  a	  “savage	  review	  in	  the	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse”	  printed	  on	  5	  July	  1909,	  the	  day	  
after	  the	  first	  performance,	  Kokoschka	  describes	  the	  context	  of	  this	  performance	  and	  the	  
reaction	  it	  supposedly	  elicited	  from	  the	  audience:	  
A	  flimsy	  barrier	  separated	  the	  stage	  from	  the	  rows	  of	  seats,	  which	  were	  full	  to	  bursting-­‐
point.	  	  The	  garden	  was	  too	  small	  to	  hold	  the	  throng	  of	  society,	  intellectuals,	  and	  the	  
merely	  curious,	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  come	  to	  see	  what	  outrage	  this	  bull	  in	  a	  china	  shop	  was	  
about	  to	  commit.	  	  The	  audience	  maintained	  a	  chorus	  of	  catcalls	  throughout	  the	  play,	  but	  
my	  actors	  were	  not	  deterred.	  	  Eventually,	  as	  all	  foot-­‐stamping,	  scuffling	  and	  chair-­‐
brandishing	  increased	  in	  pitch,	  the	  soldiers	  stormed	  in	  and	  a	  free-­‐for-­‐all	  followed	  
between	  them	  and	  the	  audience.	  	  In	  the	  tumult	  the	  police	  had	  to	  be	  sent	  for.	  	  Fortunately	  
for	  me,	  Adolf	  Loos	  and	  his	  friend,	  the	  satirical	  writer	  Karl	  Kraus,	  knew	  the	  chief	  of	  police,	  
Dr	  Schober,	  and	  arranged	  for	  him	  to	  come	  with	  a	  squad	  of	  men	  and	  restore	  order.	  	  Only	  
the	  personal	  intervention	  of	  this	  senior	  official	  saved	  me	  from	  being	  arrested	  for	  a	  breach	  
of	  peace.560	  
But	  the	  review	  Kokoschka	  refers	  to	  not	  only	  is	  not	  savagely	  critical	  –	  as	  the	  artist	  claims–	  it	  also	  
mentions	  nothing	  about	  a	  significant	  squabble,	  much	  less	  the	  full-­‐scale	  riot	  that	  Kokoschka	  
implies	  took	  place.	  	  In	  fact,	  although	  the	  review	  does	  acknowledge	  that	  Kokoschka	  had	  incited	  
some	  public	  debate,	  it	  also	  claims	  that	  the	  audience	  “accepted	  this	  certainly	  jovially-­‐intentioned	  
drama”	  [gewiß	  heiter	  gemeinte	  Drama]	  with	  “understanding	  cheerfulness”	  [verständnisvoller	  
Fröhlichkeit].561	  	  	  No	  violence	  is	  mentioned	  –	  certainly	  nothing	  to	  corroborate	  Kokoschka’s	  claim	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  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  29.	  
561	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse,	  5	  July	  1909,	  8.	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Scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  repeat	  Kokoschka’s	  story	  concerning	  Murderer	  as	  if	  it	  were	  the	  
proverbial	  naked	  truth,	  although	  certainly	  some	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  “blatant	  degree	  of	  
revisionism”	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  autobiography.563	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  Kokoschka’s	  
negative	  self-­‐representation	  –	  as	  a	  hated	  outsider,	  a	  loner	  whose	  artistic	  provocations	  were	  
brilliant	  but	  misunderstood	  and	  under-­‐appreciated	  –	  is	  reproduced	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  
Viennese	  modernism.	  	  In	  Avant	  Garde	  Theatre,	  1892–1992,	  Christopher	  Innes	  claims	  regarding	  
Murderer	  that:	  as	  “a	  gesture	  of	  defiance	  the	  performance	  was	  undoubtedly	  successful.	  	  It	  
caused	  a	  riot,	  order	  had	  to	  be	  restored	  by	  force	  and	  the	  reviews	  were	  vicious,	  calling	  Kokoschka	  
a	  ‘criminal,’	  a	  ‘degenerate,’	  a	  ‘corrupter	  of	  youth.’”564	  	  Interestingly,	  however,	  although	  the	  
citation	  Innes	  offers	  for	  this	  claim	  refers	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  rather	  positive	  Neue	  Freie	  Presse	  
review	  described	  above,	  the	  words	  are	  actually	  taken	  verbatim	  from	  Kokoschka’s	  own	  
autobiography.565	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562	  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  29. 
563	  Cernuschi,	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka,	  118.	  	  Werkner	  also	  refers	  to	  “the	  distortions	  so	  seductively	  offered	  by	  
hindsight	  (one	  thinks	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  Autobiography),”	  Austrian	  Expressionism,	  3.	  	  Schvey,	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  31,	  
among	  others,	  takes	  Kokoschka	  at	  his	  word.	  
564	  Christopher	  Innes,	  Avant	  Garde	  Theatre	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  55.	  
565	  Innes,	  Avant	  Garde	  Theatre,	  n.	  36,	  237.	  	  In	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  notes	  that	  after	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  
play	  he	  was	  “was	  called	  a	  ‘degenerate	  artist,’	  ‘bourgeois-­‐baiter’	  (Bürgerschreck),	  ‘corrupter	  of	  youth,’	  and	  
‘common	  criminal’	  by	  the	  press,”	  My	  Life,	  31.	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   I	  would	  argue,	  moreover,	  that	  Kokoschka’s	  self-­‐creation	  as	  an	  ugly,	  hated	  outsider	  has	  
also	  helped	  to	  determine	  his	  legacy	  as	  an	  artistic	  “genius”	  –	  and	  was	  meant	  to.	  	  If	  according	  to	  
empathy	  theory	  people	  love	  what	  pleases	  them,	  and	  what	  pleases	  them	  is	  beauty,	  then	  the	  
strategic	  use	  of	  pictorial	  ugliness	  –	  as	  that	  which	  is	  unpleasing	  –	  signalled	  vanguard	  values	  in	  
the	  arts.	  	  While	  Kokoschka’s	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  might	  indeed	  have	  struck	  some	  conservative	  
viewers	  as	  degenerate,	  others	  championed	  his	  work	  as	  visually	  displeasing	  but	  also	  uniquely	  
truthful	  –	  as	  though	  the	  two	  phenomena	  were	  connected.	  	  In	  Wittgenstein’s	  Vienna	  Janik	  and	  
Toulmin	  invoke	  this	  rhetoric,	  referring	  to	  Kokoschka	  as	  a	  “controversial	  and	  self-­‐taught	  painter”	  
and	  emphasizing	  his	  “independence	  and	  genius.”566	  	  This	  is	  inaccurate	  insofar	  as	  Kokoschka	  was	  
neither	  self-­‐taught	  nor	  even	  particularly	  independent:	  he	  attended	  the	  School	  of	  Arts	  and	  
Crafts,	  made	  decorative	  art	  for	  the	  famous	  Wiener	  Werkstätte,	  and	  curried	  favour	  with	  a	  
variety	  of	  artists,	  historians,	  and	  critics	  including	  Klimt	  and,	  later,	  Loos	  and	  Kraus.	  
	   In	  fact	  Gerstl	  is	  probably	  a	  better	  example	  of	  an	  independent	  and	  largely	  self-­‐taught	  
artist.	  	  More	  than	  a	  true	  outsider,	  Kokoschka	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	  canny	  self-­‐promoter	  who	  
simultaneously	  fostered	  notoriety	  and	  nepotism	  with	  those	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  him.	  That	  
Kokoschka’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  “controversial,	  independent,	  and	  self-­‐taught	  genius”	  is	  more	  
tenacious	  than	  Gerstl’s	  no	  doubt	  mostly	  results	  from	  the	  embarrassment	  of	  biographical	  riches	  
concerning	  the	  former	  artist	  and	  the	  paucity	  of	  documents	  pertaining	  to	  the	  latter.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  that	  Kokoschka’s	  art	  is	  also	  more	  public,	  more	  confrontational,	  and	  more	  
explicitly	  and	  thematically	  “ugly”	  than	  Gerstl’s	  may	  have	  also	  contributed	  to	  Kokoschka’s	  
greater	  reputation	  for	  provocation.	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  Janik	  and	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   Kokoschka	  certainly	  caused	  some	  real	  contemporaneous	  hostility	  with	  his	  strategic	  use	  
of	  ugliness	  and	  negative	  empathy,	  but	  he	  especially	  pointed	  the	  historical	  discourse	  in	  this	  
direction.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  exhibition	  catalogue	  revealingly	  titled	  The	  Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  
Schiele,	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Other	  Scandals,	  the	  authors	  –	  describing	  Kokoschka’s	  play	  Murderer	  –	  
assert	  that	  “from	  the	  start,	  both	  the	  text	  of	  the	  play	  and	  Kokoschka’s	  own	  illustrations	  to	  it	  
proved	  extremely	  controversial.”567	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Yvonne	  Modlin	  have	  questioned	  this,	  
however,	  noting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  record	  in	  the	  newspapers	  of	  any	  riot	  after	  the	  performance	  of	  
Murderer.	  	  Citing	  their	  article,	  Jane	  Kallir	  claims	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  paint	  everything	  as	  a	  scandal	  
was	  actually	  a	  post-­‐War	  impulse	  on	  Kokoschka’s	  part.	  	  Kallir	  argues	  that	  “had	  such	  a	  riot	  
actually	  taken	  place	  in	  1909,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  emotionally	  devastating;	  after	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  
story	  was	  proof	  positive	  of	  the	  play’s	  artistic	  merit.”568	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Kallir	  I	  suggest	  that	  
constructing	  a	  negative	  reputation	  became	  absolutely	  crucial	  to	  Kokoschka’s	  artistic	  practice	  
even	  before	  1909,	  and	  intentional	  visual	  ugliness	  was	  a	  major	  facet	  of	  this	  practice	  of	  
negativity.	  	  Indeed	  nearly	  all	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  representational	  strategies	  at	  this	  time	  seem	  to	  be	  
inextricably	  intertwined	  with	  fear	  or	  hatred.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Describing	  the	  costume	  design	  for	  Murderer	  in	  his	  autobiography	  Kokoschka	  writes:	  
I	  dressed	  them	  in	  makeshift	  costumes	  of	  rags	  and	  scraps	  of	  cloth	  and	  painted	  their	  faces	  
and	  bodies,	  where	  exposed.	  	  In	  this,	  I	  had	  been	  helped	  by	  my	  visits	  to	  the	  ethnographical	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  Tobias	  G.	  Natter	  and	  Max	  Hollein,	  eds,	  The	  Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Other	  Scandals	  (New	  
York:	  Prestel,	  2005),	  150	  (catalogue	  entry	  by	  Berud	  Apke). 
568	  Kallir,	  Schoenberg’s	  Vienna,	  78.	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museum.	  	  There	  I	  had	  learned	  how	  primitive	  peoples,	  presumably	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  their	  
fear	  of	  death,	  had	  decorated	  the	  skulls	  of	  the	  dead	  with	  facial	  features,	  with	  the	  play	  of	  
expressions,	  the	  lines	  of	  laughter	  and	  anger,	  restoring	  to	  them	  the	  appearance	  of	  life.	  	  In	  a	  
similar	  way	  I	  decorated	  the	  actors’	  arms	  and	  legs	  with	  nerve	  lines,	  muscles	  and	  tendons,	  
just	  as	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  my	  old	  drawings.569	  
The	  artist’s	  illustrations	  to	  accompany	  the	  play,	  in	  which	  he	  pictures	  himself	  as	  the	  male	  
protagonist,	  do	  not	  seem	  constructed	  to	  show	  the	  appearance	  of	  life	  but	  rather	  sickness	  and	  
death	  (Figs.	  49–52).570	  	  Their	  animated	  linearity	  and	  the	  exposed	  nerve	  lines,	  muscles,	  and	  
tendons	  that	  Kokoschka	  mentions	  evoke	  the	  medical	  imagery	  that	  interested	  him	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Moreover	  his	  first	  poster	  advertising	  the	  play	  was	  a	  large	  lithograph,	  in	  which	  he	  pictures	  
himself	  as	  a	  flayed	  Jesus	  in	  a	  Pietà	  image	  (Fig.	  53).	  	  One	  of	  the	  few	  artistic	  influences	  Kokoschka	  
does	  acknowledge	  in	  his	  autobiography	  is	  Johann	  Amos	  Comenius,	  and	  Comenius’s	  1658	  text	  
Orbis	  Sensualium	  Pictus	  contains	  medical	  imagery	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  écorché	  
images	  that	  represent	  the	  human	  body	  flayed	  and	  in	  agony,	  such	  as	  Nicolas	  Beatrizet’s	  
Anatomia	  engraving	  from	  1556	  (Figs.	  54–55).	  	  In	  turn	  these	  images	  resemble	  the	  wax	  
anatomical	  models	  at	  the	  medical	  history	  museum	  in	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna,	  which	  Kokoschka	  
probably	  visited	  (Fig.	  56).	  
	   Kokoschka	  insists	  that	  the	  tickets	  for	  Murderer	  “were	  sold	  out	  a	  week	  before	  the	  
performance,”	  but	  only,	  he	  says,	  “thanks	  to	  the	  notoriety	  of	  my	  pictures.”	  	  “As	  I	  had	  intended,”	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  Kokoschka,	  My	  Life,	  28–9. 
570	  Kokoschka	  published	  several	  of	  these	  accompanying	  illustrations,	  in	  which	  he	  pictures	  himself	  as	  the	  male	  




the	  artist	  gloats,	  “it	  sent	  the	  Viennese	  into	  paroxysms	  of	  rage.”	  	  Having	  just	  acknowledged	  that	  
he	  had	  deliberately	  provoked	  a	  strong	  negative	  reaction	  in	  the	  public,	  Kokoschka	  nevertheless	  
goes	  on:	  “I	  was	  angry	  at	  the	  insults	  I	  read	  every	  day	  in	  the	  Press	  where	  I	  saw	  myself	  treated	  as	  a	  
criminal.	  	  So	  I	  had	  my	  head	  shaved	  in	  order	  to	  look	  the	  part,	  and	  in	  my	  drawings	  for	  the	  play,	  
and	  in	  a	  second	  poster,	  I	  showed	  myself	  in	  this	  guise	  to	  the	  public.”571	  	  This	  image	  of	  himself,	  
with	  a	  brutish,	  enlarged	  jaw,	  massive	  under-­‐bite,	  leering	  grin,	  mismatched	  eyes,	  and	  a	  nipple	  
placed	  like	  a	  giant	  hairy	  mole	  near	  the	  armpit,	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ugly	  and	  
recognizable	  of	  Kokoschka’s	  early	  self-­‐portraits	  (Fig.	  19).	  	  He	  returned	  to	  it	  not	  only	  in	  1912,	  to	  
advertise	  a	  lecture	  (Fig.	  57),	  but	  again	  in	  a	  1923	  double	  self-­‐portrait	  (Fig.	  58)	  –	  claiming	  with	  
now-­‐familiar	  rhetoric	  that	  when	  the	  work,	  The	  Painter	  and	  His	  Model	  II,	  was	  exhibited	  in	  1924	  
at	  the	  Vienna	  Secession	  it	  provoked	  “caricatures	  and	  malicious	  comments	  in	  the	  Viennese	  
newspapers.”572	  
	   I	  have	  thus	  far	  considered	  several	  different	  falsehoods	  that	  Kokoschka	  perpetuated	  
about	  himself,	  his	  art,	  and	  the	  Viennese	  art-­‐going	  public.	  	  In	  his	  letter	  to	  Erwin	  Lang	  Kokoschka	  
claimed	  that	  in	  Vienna,	  one	  wasted	  energy	  trying	  to	  “create	  friction”	  –	  but	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  
such	  friction	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  waste	  of	  energy	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  Kokoschka.	  	  He	  was	  
celebrated	  as	  well	  as	  denigrated	  by	  the	  Viennese,	  and	  even	  though	  his	  works	  were	  often	  
perceived	  as	  ugly,	  they	  were	  also	  at	  times	  commended	  for	  that	  very	  quality	  of	  ugliness.	  	  The	  
strategic	  positioning	  of	  himself	  as	  an	  avant-­‐garde	  antagonist,	  arousing	  the	  wrath	  of	  an	  ignorant	  
public,	  was	  and	  is	  central	  to	  Kokoschka’s	  legacy.	  	  And	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  negative	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  Ibid.,	  28.	  
572	  Kokoschka	  in	  Natter	  and	  Hollein,	  The	  Naked	  Truth,	  125. 
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empathy	  was	  at	  play	  in	  Kokoschka’s	  art,	  his	  social	  provocations	  actually	  constituted	  an	  essential	  
component	  of	  his	  art	  production.	  
	   I	  have	  examined	  the	  ways	  that	  Kokoschka’s	  self-­‐representational	  strategies	  in	  life	  and	  in	  
art	  were	  related,	  focusing	  especially	  on	  those	  practices	  that	  depended	  on	  affects	  of	  hate	  or	  
produced	  an	  effect	  of	  ugliness.	  	  By	  putting	  Kokoschka’s	  early	  works,	  particularly	  his	  ugly	  self-­‐
portraits,	  in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  contemporaneous	  theory	  of	  negative	  Einfühlung,	  or	  negative	  
empathy,	  we	  can	  not	  only	  broaden	  our	  perspectives	  on	  the	  artist	  himself	  but	  also	  deepen	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  important	  imbrications	  between	  negativity	  and	  ugliness	  in	  Viennese	  
aesthetic	  theory	  and	  practice	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  In	  her	  
2008	  dissertation,	  “The	  Aesthetics	  of	  Ugliness,”	  Anna	  Elizabeth	  Baker	  notes	  that	  the	  Deutsches	  
Wörterbuch	  defines	  hässlich,	  the	  German	  word	  for	  ugly,	  “in	  terms	  of	  inducing	  hostility	  
(feindselig)	  and	  being	  unlovable.	  	  The	  etymology	  of	  hässlich	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  hate,’	  
hassen,	  implying	  that	  something	  (or	  someone)	  ugly	  also	  contains	  something	  inherently	  
dislikeable.”573	  	  In	  such	  a	  context	  the	  connection	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  negative	  empathy	  between	  
ugliness	  and	  hatred	  seems	  almost	  unavoidable.	  	  
	   Causality	  admittedly	  remains	  somewhat	  ambiguous	  in	  this	  analysis	  of	  ugliness	  and	  
negative	  empathy:	  does	  ugliness	  cause	  hatred,	  or	  does	  hating	  someone	  make	  us	  see	  them	  as	  
ugly?	  	  The	  answer	  may	  well	  be	  both;	  although	  contemporaneous	  commentators	  like	  Lipps	  were	  
unclear	  about	  the	  exact	  nature	  or	  trajectory	  of	  our	  intertwined	  experiences	  of	  hatred	  and	  
ugliness,	  nevertheless	  it	  seems	  plausible	  to	  suggest	  that	  causality	  here	  might	  be	  more	  circular	  
than	  linear.	  	  We	  not	  only	  hate	  something	  because	  we	  find	  it	  ugly,	  but	  also	  then	  hate	  it	  all	  the	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  Anna	  Elizabeth	  Baker,	  “The	  Aesthetics	  of	  Ugliness,”	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  California,	  2008),	  5.	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more	  because	  of	  this	  aesthetic	  repugnance,	  which	  then	  makes	  the	  despised	  object	  even	  uglier,	  
and	  so	  on.	  	  
	   The	  ideas	  that	  ugliness	  causes	  displeasure	  and	  that	  experiencing	  the	  emotion	  of	  hatred	  
might	  heighten	  our	  perception	  of	  ugliness	  both	  seem	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  contemporary	  
neuroscience.	  	  In	  The	  Age	  of	  Insight:	  The	  Quest	  to	  Understand	  the	  Unconscious	  in	  Art,	  Mind	  and	  
Brain	  From	  Vienna	  1900	  to	  the	  Present,	  neuroscientist	  Eric	  Kandel	  explains	  that	  although	  beauty	  
and	  ugliness	  are	  both	  represented	  in	  the	  same	  part	  of	  the	  brain,	  we	  interpret	  pleasurable	  
images	  as	  beautiful	  and	  displeasing	  images	  as	  ugly.574	  	  Kandel	  was	  born	  in	  Vienna	  in	  1929	  and	  
left	  with	  his	  family	  after	  the	  Anschluss	  in	  1938.	  	  Discussions	  of	  beauty	  versus	  ugliness	  run	  
throughout	  The	  Age	  of	  Insight,	  in	  chapters	  on	  unconscious	  emotions,	  conscious	  feelings,	  and	  
their	  bodily	  expression,	  as	  well	  as	  biological	  responses	  to	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  in	  Viennese	  art.	  	  
Kandel	  also	  explains	  that	  emotion	  is	  actually	  a	  form	  of	  cognition,	  that	  we	  respond	  to	  
threatening	  facial	  expressions	  with	  increased	  activity	  in	  the	  amygdala	  –	  a	  region	  of	  the	  brain	  
that	  plays	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  experience	  and	  memory	  of	  negative	  emotions	  like	  hatred	  
and	  fear	  –	  and	  that	  cues	  from	  the	  amygdala	  “boost	  the	  visual	  processing	  of	  emotionally	  charged	  
stimuli,	  which	  presumably	  explains	  why	  such	  stimuli,	  as	  used	  by	  Klimt,	  Kokoschka,	  and	  Schiele	  
sharpen	  our	  attention.”575	  	  Some	  might	  say	  that	  Kokoschka’s	  facial	  expression	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  
a	  Warrior	  represents	  fear,	  while	  others	  might	  demur	  that	  it	  provokes	  it;	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  such	  interpretations	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  We	  are	  operating	  to	  some	  extent	  
from	  a	  shared	  pool	  of	  emotions,	  and	  the	  boundaries	  between	  individuals	  are	  leaky.	  	  As	  we	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574	  Eric	  Kandel,	  The	  Age	  of	  Insight:	  The	  Quest	  to	  Understand	  the	  Unconscious	  in	  Art,	  Mind	  and	  Brain	  From	  Vienna	  
1900	  to	  the	  Present	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2012),	  373–4.	  
575	  Ibid.,	  343,	  346,	  347. 
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dependent	  on	  other’s	  perceptions	  of	  us	  for	  our	  own	  self-­‐understanding,	  so	  too	  do	  feelings	  of	  
anxiety,	  hatred,	  and	  ugliness	  all	  seem	  to	  be	  deeply	  intermeshed.	  	  Most	  interesting	  is	  the	  
ambiguous	  nature	  of	  these	  interrelations	  between	  negativity	  and	  ugliness,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  
what	  one	  person	  finds	  displeasing,	  threatening,	  and	  ugly,	  another	  person	  may	  find	  pleasing,	  
liberating,	  and	  beautiful.	  	  Indeed	  where	  Kokoschka	  used	  ugliness	  and	  negativity	  in	  order	  to	  
bolster	  an	  aggressively	  antagonistic	  persona,	  Schiele	  had	  a	  different	  artistic	  agenda.	  	  Two	  of	  
Schiele’s	  more	  famous	  observations	  are	  first,	  that	  everything	  is	  living	  dead,	  and	  second,	  that	  
everything	  is	  sacred	  –	  including	  so-­‐called	  sexual	  profanity.	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  observations	  




From	  Dionysian	  Ugliness	  to	  Radical	  Beauty:	  	  
The	  Kindred	  Visions	  of	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  and	  Egon	  Schiele	  	  
People	  will	  be	  seized	  with	  terror	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  each	  of	  my	  works	  of	  “living”	  art.	  	  
–	  	  Egon	  Schiele	  
We	  negate	  and	  must	  negate	  because	  something	  in	  us	  wants	  to	  live	  and	  affirm.	  
–	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science	  
I	  want	  to	  tear	  into	  myself	  so	  that	  I	  may	  create	  again	  …	  I	  am	  so	  rich	  that	  I	  must	  give	  myself	  away.	  
–	  Egon	  Schiele	  
Schiele’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  sex-­‐obsessed	  artist	  precedes	  him.	  	  Indeed	  those	  less	  familiar	  with	  him	  
–	  who	  know	  Schiele’s	  life	  and	  work	  indirectly,	  through	  other	  artists	  or	  scholars	  –	  may	  think	  of	  
Schiele	  as	  a	  primarily	  erotic	  or	  even	  pornographic	  artist.	  	  People	  who	  don’t	  even	  know	  where	  
Schiele	  was	  from	  know	  or	  when	  he	  was	  alive	  know	  that	  he	  was	  imprisoned	  for	  something	  
dirty.576	  	  Kokoschka	  infamously	  referred	  to	  Schiele	  as	  a	  “crook”	  and	  “pornographer,”	  and	  his	  
descriptions	  seem	  to	  have	  become	  almost	  as	  influential	  as	  they	  are	  inaccurate.	  	  Pornography	  is	  
by	  its	  very	  nature	  compensatory	  and	  superficial;	  by	  contrast,	  those	  who	  look	  can	  find	  in	  
Schiele’s	  oeuvre	  a	  critical,	  even	  alienating,	  but	  ultimately	  very	  profound	  picture	  of	  human	  
sexuality.	   	  
We	  have	  seen	  how	  dramatic,	  controversial	  –	  flamboyantly	  theatrical,	  even	  –	  early-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  discourse	  could	  be.	  	  And	  whether	  the	  topic	  of	  discussion	  was	  art,	  
sexuality,	  Jewishness,	  or	  even	  modernity	  itself,	  questions	  of	  identity,	  truth,	  and	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576	  For	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  artist’s	  twenty-­‐four	  days	  of	  imprisonment	  see	  Alessandra	  Comini’s	  excellent	  Schiele	  in	  
Prison	  (Greenwich:	  New	  York	  Graphic	  Society,	  1973).	  Comini	  also	  authored	  the	  definitive	  text	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  
Portraits	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1974),	  which	  was	  reissued	  in	  2014	  by	  Sunstone	  Press,	  and	  edited	  
the	  catalogue	  accompanying	  the	  exhibition	  Egon	  Schiele:	  Portraits,	  which	  ran	  at	  the	  Neue	  Galerie	  in	  New	  York	  from	  
9	  October,	  2014–20	  April,	  2015.	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representation	  have	  consistently	  been	  at	  stake.	  	  Although	  we’ve	  seen	  real	  tragedy,	  we’ve	  also	  
seen	  how	  “outsider”	  status	  could	  be	  as	  contrived	  as	  it	  was	  coveted	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  
Vienna.	  	  Yet	  much	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  angst	  and	  alienation	  employed	  to	  champion	  aesthetic	  –	  
and	  ostensibly	  ethical	  –	  causes	  in	  early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Vienna	  still	  enjoys	  great	  currency	  in	  
current	  commentary.	  	  Thus	  the	  divisive	  vicissitudes	  of	  modernist	  Viennese	  theory	  and	  practice	  
persist,	  with	  specialist	  scholars	  and	  other	  interlocutors	  often	  positioning	  themselves	  
antagonistically	  along	  the	  same	  basic	  fault	  lines	  now	  that	  were	  originally	  created	  quite	  self-­‐
consciously	  by	  the	  historical	  figures	  themselves.	  	  	  
In	  his	  efforts	  to	  divide	  and	  conquer	  Viennese	  modernism,	  Leon	  Botstein	  claims	  
dismissively	  that	  Schiele	  “benefited	  from	  a	  reasonably	  stable	  pattern	  of	  external	  support	  and	  
patronage	  throughout	  his	  short	  career,	  despite	  public	  scandals	  and	  imprisonment.	  	  Schiele’s	  
notoriety	  stemmed	  less	  from	  the	  formal	  innovations	  of	  his	  art	  and	  more	  from	  its	  explicit	  imagery	  
–	  its	  suspect	  moral	  character	  and	  susceptibility	  to	  being	  labeled	  as	  pornography.”577	  
	  It	  seems	  doubtful,	  however,	  that	  Botstein	  is	  genuinely	  interested	  in	  Schiele’s	  art,	  especially	  
since	  there	  are	  biographical	  blunders	  and	  art	  historical	  aporias	  in	  his	  essay578	  that	  suggest	  
Botstein	  was	  not	  too	  familiar	  with	  Schiele’s	  oeuvre	  when	  he	  wrote	  the	  essay.	  	  What	  Botstein	  
does	  do	  is	  use	  Schiele	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  straw	  man	  for	  arguments	  about	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Kraus-­‐
Loos	  axis	  over	  the	  Mahler-­‐Klimt	  axis.	  	  “Kraus,	  Otto	  Weininger,	  and	  Loos	  were	  certainly	  the	  key	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  Botstein,	  “Egon	  Schiele	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg,”	  103,	  emphasis	  added.	  
578	  For	  example	  Botstein	  claims	  that	  Schiele	  never	  felt	  compelled	  to	  leave	  Vienna,	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  young	  artist’s	  
antipathy	  toward	  the	  city	  –	  not	  to	  mention	  his	  travels	  out	  of	  it	  –	  are	  well	  documented;	  Botstein	  also	  refers	  to	  a	  
“second	  phase”	  of	  Schiele’s	  work	  from	  1907–17,	  which	  suggests	  a	  fundamental	  misunderstanding	  because	  there	  is	  
no	  significant	  oeuvre	  before	  then	  (the	  artist	  was	  born	  in	  1890),	  103–4.	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figures,”	  Botstein	  decrees	  in	  his	  description	  of	  the	  “divergent	  direction	  in	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  Viennese	  
modernism.”	  	  
	  Botstein	  claims	  approvingly	  that	  for	  these	  heroic	  men	  the	  “essential	  objective	  was	  to	  
strip	  art	  of	  a	  philosophical	  narcissism	  and	  to	  reaffirm	  art	  as	  a	  redemptive	  project.	  	  That	  project	  
was	  ultimately	  ethical.	  	  Art	  needed	  to	  exert	  a	  purifying	  influence	  on	  a	  corrupt	  culture.”579	  	  And	  
yet	  we’ve	  clearly	  seen	  how	  concerned	  these	  men	  were	  with	  themselves,	  and	  with	  self-­‐
fashioning	  and	  representation.	  	  Moreover	  I	  would	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  Weininger,	  
Schönberg,	  Kraus,	  and	  Loos	  actually	  purified	  Viennese	  culture	  –	  more	  importantly,	  though,	  I	  
would	  question	  what	  sort	  of	  purification	  of	  self	  and	  society	  is	  truly	  worth	  striving	  for.	   	  
Having	  relegated	  Schiele	  to	  the	  inferior	  style	  camp	  of	  Viennese	  modernism,	  Botstein	  
goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  even	  Schiele’s	  relentless	  focus	  on	  sexuality	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	  merely	  a	  
matter	  of	  style.	  In	  Botstein’s	  view,	  Schiele	  merely	  	  
toyed	  with,	  and	  manipulated,	  the	  well-­‐known	  Viennese	  taste	  for	  pornography	  and	  
eroticism.	  	  Depictions	  of	  genitalia,	  sexual	  poses,	  and	  masturbation	  are	  devoid	  of	  a	  critical	  
dimension	  associated	  with	  …	  Kraus	  and	  Loos.	  	  Schiele’s	  pictures	  exploit	  the	  fact	  of	  mere	  
shock.	  	  They	  play	  with	  and	  ultimately	  profit	  from	  the	  most	  superficial	  level	  of	  ambivalence	  
and	  hypocrisy	  regarding	  sexuality	  and	  intimacy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  audience.	  	  Narcissism	  
and	  a	  coy	  attitude	  toward	  candor,	  rather	  than	  interior	  distress	  and	  angst	  (as	  in	  Kokoschka	  
and	  Gerstl),	  emerge.580	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579	  Ibid.,	  107.	  
580	  Ibid.,	  110–11.	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I	  will	  argue	  instead	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  Schiele’s	  examination	  of	  human	  sexuality	  as	  a	  
legitimate	  psycho-­‐philosophical	  concern.	  	  	  
Botstein	  concludes	  his	  essay,	  written	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  with	  this	  hope	  
and	  plea	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  this	  Kraus-­‐Loos	  axis	  –	  the	  dissemination	  of	  which	  is	  clearly	  
one	  of	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  his	  article.	  	  He	  suggests:	  “perhaps	  before	  the	  century	  draws	  to	  a	  close	  
the	  critical	  possibilities	  inherent	  in	  the	  aesthetic	  modernism	  explored	  in	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  Vienna	  will	  
find	  an	  echo	  once	  again.”581	  	  For	  my	  part	  I	  hope	  Botstein’s	  wish	  remains	  unfulfilled.	  	  Though	  I	  
would	  never	  deny	  the	  interest	  of	  Krausian,	  Loosian,	  Schönbergian,	  Wittgensteinian,	  or	  even	  
Weiningerian	  discourse,	  nor	  would	  I	  ever	  want	  to	  see	  the	  world	  structured	  according	  to	  their	  
strictures.	  
	   Instead	  I	  would	  argue	  for	  precisely	  the	  critical,	  redemptive	  element	  Botstein	  repeatedly	  
insists	  is	  lacking	  in	  this	  other,	  purportedly	  lesser	  strain	  of	  late-­‐nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐twentieth	  
century	  Viennese	  culture:	  the	  ostensibly	  coy,	  narcissistic,	  style-­‐obsessed	  group	  of	  Mahler,	  
Schnitzler,	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  and	  others.	  	  Indeed	  by	  putting	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  early	  self-­‐portraits	  in	  
dialogue	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy,	  particularly	  his	  dynamic,	  ever-­‐evolving	  philosophy	  of	  the	  
Dionysian,	  I	  hope	  to	  review	  and	  recoup	  precisely	  those	  elements	  in	  Schiele’s	  oeuvre	  that	  
Botstein	  so	  trenchantly	  decries	  as	  lacking.	  	  Botstein	  states	  that	  for	  the	  Kraus-­‐Loos	  axis	  –	  and	  
thus	  for	  him	  as	  well	  –	  artists	  like	  Schiele	  “merely	  celebrated	  decoration	  and	  ornament	  and	  
threw	  themselves	  into	  a	  race	  for	  fame	  and	  material	  success	  that	  deprived	  art	  of	  its	  necessary	  
function	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  philosophical	  and	  cultural	  critique.”582	  	  By	  contrast	  I	  argue	  that	  we	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  Ibid.,	  117.	  
582	  Ibid.,	  106–7.	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can	  discern	  in	  Schiele’s	  early,	  ugly	  self-­‐portraits	  precisely	  the	  tools	  for,	  and	  indeed	  evidence	  of,	  
the	  kind	  of	  philosophical	  and	  cultural	  critique	  that	  Botstein	  apparently	  finds	  lacking.	  	  Even	  the	  
basic	  skeleton	  of	  Schiele’s	  life	  story	  nudges	  us	  toward	  cultural	  critique,	  while	  his	  artistic	  self-­‐
representational	  style	  suggests	  surprisingly	  sophisticated	  philosophical	  visions.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Like	  other	  precocious	  artists,	  philosophers,	  and	  prolific	  self-­‐portraitists,	  Egon	  Schiele	  favoured	  
the	  metaphor	  of	  “giving	  birth	  to	  oneself.”583	  	  His	  true	  origins	  were	  almost	  as	  striking:	  Schiele’s	  
mother	  Marie	  met	  her	  future	  husband	  when	  she	  was	  a	  mere	  twelve-­‐year-­‐old,	  convent-­‐
educated	  little	  girl.	  	  Adolf	  Schiele	  was	  twenty-­‐three	  and	  apparently	  vowed	  on	  the	  spot	  to	  make	  
this	  child	  his	  wife.	  	  Five	  years	  later,	  in	  1879,	  Marie	  married	  Adolf	  –	  only	  to	  be	  infected	  by	  the	  
deadly	  syphilis	  her	  husband	  carried	  silently	  within	  him.	  	  	  
	   Less	  than	  three	  years	  after	  Adolf	  and	  Marie	  were	  married,	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  penned	  
these	  words	  in	  the	  aphorism	  “On	  female	  chastity”:	  	  	  
There	  is	  something	  quite	  amazing	  and	  monstrous	  about	  the	  education	  of	  upper-­‐class	  
women.	  	  What	  could	  be	  more	  paradoxical?	  	  All	  the	  world	  is	  agreed	  that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  
brought	  up	  as	  ignorant	  as	  possible	  of	  erotic	  matters,	  and	  that	  one	  has	  to	  imbue	  their	  
souls	  with	  a	  profound	  sense	  of	  shame	  in	  such	  matters	  …	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  remain	  
ignorant	  even	  in	  their	  hearts;	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  neither	  eyes	  nor	  ears	  …	  for	  this	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583	  For	  a	  sustained	  investigation	  of	  Schiele’s	  self-­‐portraiture	  as	  an	  integral	  aspect	  of	  his	  overall	  project	  of	  self-­‐
creation,	  see	  Danielle	  Knafo’s	  wonderful	  work	  Egon	  Schiele:	  A	  Self	  in	  Creation:	  A	  Psychoanalytic	  Study	  of	  the	  
Artist’s	  Self-­‐Portraits	  (Madison:	  Fairleigh	  Dickinson	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  Although	  in	  her	  book	  Knafo	  does	  not	  




their	  “evil”;	  and	  mere	  knowledge	  is	  considered	  evil.	  	  And	  then	  to	  be	  hurled,	  as	  by	  a	  
gruesome	  lightning	  bolt,	  into	  reality	  and	  knowledge,	  by	  marriage	  …	  In	  sum,	  one	  cannot	  be	  
too	  kind	  about	  women.584	  	  	  
The	  reality	  of	  the	  Schiele	  wedding	  night	  –	  gruesome	  or	  otherwise	  –	  may	  never	  be	  known,	  but	  
Egon’s	  brother-­‐in-­‐law	  later	  claimed	  that	  the	  adolescent	  Marie	  ran	  away	  from	  Adolf	  in	  terror.585	  	  
Her	  retrospective	  diary	  entry,586	  however,	  reads	  like	  the	  polite	  reminiscence	  of	  a	  proper	  young	  
lady.	  	  After	  the	  wedding	  began	  a	  series	  of	  pregnancies	  and	  miscarriages	  that	  while	  common	  
enough	  at	  the	  time,	  could	  nevertheless	  have	  been	  very	  traumatic	  –	  Marie’s	  body	  was	  dedicated	  
to	  a	  dance	  of	  death	  masquerading	  as	  the	  cycle	  of	  life.	  	  By	  the	  time	  she	  bore	  Egon	  Marie	  had	  
already	  given	  birth	  to	  no	  fewer	  than	  four	  babies,	  only	  one	  of	  whom	  would	  survive	  beyond	  
childhood.	  	  Egon,	  the	  male	  heir,	  was	  brought	  into	  a	  world	  in	  which	  sexuality,	  disease,	  and	  death	  
were	  not	  only	  inextricably	  intertwined	  but	  also	  oppressively	  omnipresent.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Initially	  allied	  with	  Klimt	  and	  the	  Secessionists,	  by	  1910	  Schiele	  was	  creating	  original	  works	  that	  
focused	  on	  themes	  of	  sexuality	  and	  death,	  ugliness,	  masking,	  and	  sickness	  and	  transformation.	  	  
Although	  he	  had	  earlier	  favoured	  melancholic	  allegorical	  landscapes,	  in	  1910	  Schiele	  turned	  
primarily	  to	  the	  human	  body	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  examine	  these	  themes,	  which	  share	  a	  kinship	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  §71.	  	  
585	  Anton	  Peschka,	  Jr.,	  Die	  Wahrheit	  über	  Egon	  Schiele	  (unpublished	  manuscript),	  15;	  cited	  in	  Jane	  Kallir,	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  Life	  and	  Work,	  27.	  	  Lewis	  Crofts’s	  novel	  The	  Pornographer	  of	  Vienna	  also	  begins	  with	  a	  lurid	  fictionalization	  
of	  this	  purported	  event.	  
586	  Christian	  M.	  Nebehay,	  ed.,	  Egon	  Schiele:	  1890–1918:	  Leben,	  Briefe,	  Gedichte,	  12;	  cited	  and	  translated	  in	  Kallir,	  
Egon	  Schiele:	  Life	  and	  Work,	  38n7.	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Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  –	  particularly	  his	  later	  concept	  of	  the	  Dionysian.	  	  While	  we	  have	  no	  
reason	  to	  imagine	  Schiele	  as	  a	  reader	  of	  Nietzsche,	  Vienna	  was	  saturated	  both	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  
actual	  writings	  and	  with	  multiple	  and	  various	  Nietzscheanisms.	  	  Already	  by	  1876,	  at	  a	  time	  
when	  Nietzsche	  had	  few	  readers	  in	  Germany,	  university	  students	  in	  Vienna	  had	  formed	  a	  
Nietzsche	  society	  known	  as	  the	  Pernerstorfer	  circle	  and	  written	  to	  the	  philosopher	  to	  express	  
their	  admiration	  for	  his	  work.587	  Gustav	  Mahler	  originally	  intended	  to	  name	  his	  Third	  Symphony	  
(completed	  in	  1896)	  “Meine	  fröhliche	  Wissenschaft”	  in	  homage	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  book	  Die	  
fröhliche	  Wissenschaft	  [The	  Gay	  Science	  (1882/87)],	  and	  incorporated	  Nietzsche’s	  “Night	  Song”	  
from	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra	  (1883–85)	  into	  the	  fourth	  movement	  of	  that	  symphony.588	  	  Max	  
Burckhard,	  who	  directed	  the	  Burgtheater	  –	  the	  national	  imperial	  theatre	  in	  Vienna	  –	  from	  
1890–98,	  apparently	  worshipped	  Nietzsche.589	  	  The	  Vienna	  Psychoanalytic	  Society	  discussed	  the	  
philosopher	  frequently.590	  	  Adolf	  Loos	  named	  Trotzdem	  (1931),	  a	  collection	  of	  his	  writings	  from	  
1900–30,	  after	  Nietzsche;	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  autobiography	  Ecce	  Homo	  (completed	  1888)	  he	  uses	  
the	  term	  “trotzdem”	  in	  a	  claim	  that	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  “everything	  decisive	  comes	  into	  being	  
‘nevertheless’	  [trotzdem].”591	  	  Loos	  paraphrases	  this	  passage	  as	  the	  epigraph	  for	  his	  Trotzdem.	  	  
Klimt’s	  Secession-­‐era	  work,	  for	  example	  his	  Beethoven	  frieze	  for	  the	  Vienna	  Secession’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587	  William	  J.	  McGrath,	  Dionysian	  Art	  and	  Populist	  Politics	  in	  Austria	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1974),	  218.	  
588	  Ibid.,	  226–7.	  
589	  Clare	  A.P.	  Willsdon,	  “Klimt’s	  Beethoven	  Frieze:	  Goethe,	  Tempelkunst	  and	  the	  Fulfilment	  of	  Wishes,”	  Art	  History	  
19,	  no.	  1	  (March	  1996):	  45.	  
590	  See,	  for	  one	  example:	  Friedman,	  ed.,	  On	  Suicide:	  Discussions	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Psychoanalytic	  Society,	  1910.	  
591	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Anti-­‐Christ,	  Ecce	  Homo,	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols,	  and	  Other	  Writings,	  eds	  Aaron	  Ridley	  and	  
Judith	  Norman,	  trans.	  Judith	  Norman	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),124.	  
	  	  
248	  
Beethoven	  exhibition	  of	  1902,	  shows	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  contemporaneously	  popular,	  romantic	  
synthesis	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  German	  Goethe,	  Wagner,	  Schopenhauer,	  and	  Nietzsche.592	  	  	  
Thus	  there	  were	  certainly	  myriad	  different	  manifestations	  of	  the	  Viennese	  Nietzsche	  
cult.	  	  Nevertheless	  Nietzsche’s	  first	  book	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tragedy	  out	  of	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Music	  
(1872/86)	  was	  particularly	  influential	  in	  artistic	  and	  literary	  circles,	  and	  his	  iconoclastic	  ideas	  
regarding	  Classical	  culture,	  the	  Dionysian,	  music,	  poetry,	  the	  visual	  arts,	  the	  higher	  man,	  
embodiment,	  and	  the	  unconscious	  were	  widely	  discussed.	  	  In	  an	  oft-­‐quoted	  passage	  from	  
Gustav	  Klimt,	  The	  Beethoven	  Frieze:	  History,	  Function,	  and	  Meaning	  (1980)	  author	  Marian	  
Bisanz-­‐Prakken	  states	  succinctly:	  “every	  educated	  person	  was	  familiar	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  
philosophy.”593	  	  Indeed,	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  Nietzschean	  influences	  in	  Schiele’s	  Vienna	  can	  barely	  be	  
overstated.	  
	  	   In	  such	  a	  cultural	  context	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Schiele	  developed	  a	  visual	  vocabulary	  
well	  suited	  to	  Nietzschean	  interpretation.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophical	  and	  psychological	  themes	  
are	  admittedly	  prolific	  and	  protean:	  those	  most	  fruitful	  when	  put	  into	  dialogue	  with	  Schiele’s	  
oeuvre	  include	  his	  notions	  of	  embodiment	  and	  his	  Dionysian	  perspectives	  on	  beauty	  and	  
ugliness,	  transformation	  and	  masking,	  health	  and	  sickness	  (including	  his	  “great	  health,”	  which	  
incorporates	  sickness)	  and	  self-­‐creation.	  	  Schiele’s	  art	  highlights	  the	  emergence,	  from	  pathology	  
and	  paroxysm,	  of	  a	  philosophy	  of	  embodiment	  as	  the	  source	  of	  a	  Dionysian	  power,	  and	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592	  Willsdon,	  “Klimt’s	  Beethoven	  Frieze,”	  passim.	  
593	  52;	  cited	  in	  Willsdon,	  “Klimt’s	  Beethoven	  Frieze,”	  50.	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profoundly	  anti-­‐classical	  presentation	  of	  the	  body,	  especially	  the	  naked	  body,	  continues	  to	  have	  
radical594	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  existence	  today.	  
	  
§	  
In	  The	  Birth	  of	  Genius	  (Dead	  Mother	  II)	  (Fig.	  59),	  which	  Egon	  painted	  at	  the	  age	  of	  twenty-­‐one,	  
we	  are	  confronted	  by	  an	  emphatic	  declaration	  of	  self-­‐creation.	  	  Here,	  Schiele	  pictures	  a	  living	  
baby,	  an	  expression	  of	  shock	  consuming	  his	  round	  face,	  who	  struggles	  against	  his	  containment	  
within	  his	  dead	  mother’s	  torso.	  	  The	  dead	  mother’s	  head	  slants	  horizontally	  in	  one	  direction	  at	  
the	  top	  of	  the	  image	  while	  her	  long,	  bony	  fingers	  splay	  outward,	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  at	  
the	  bottom;	  this	  visually	  frames	  the	  baby,	  who	  pushes	  against	  his	  enclosure	  with	  eerily	  adult	  
hands.	  	  One	  digit	  extends	  beyond	  the	  border.	  	  This	  image	  of	  a	  baby	  struggling	  for	  life,	  trapped	  
within	  the	  womb	  of	  a	  dead	  mother,	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  Egon’s	  frequent	  complaints	  about	  Marie’s	  
cold,	  unloving	  nature	  –	  her	  deadness,	  essentially	  –	  and	  his	  descriptions	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  self-­‐
generated	  genius.	  	  	  	  
However,	  one	  can	  plainly	  see	  that,	  regardless	  of	  what	  Egon’s	  conscious	  intentions	  were,	  
the	  artist	  has	  given	  the	  dead	  mother	  the	  features	  he	  normally	  gives	  himself:	  his	  own	  face	  and	  
hands	  as	  pictured	  in	  many	  contemporaneous	  self-­‐portraits.	  	  This,	  arguably,	  bespeaks	  
apprehension	  about	  the	  Schiele	  family	  stain	  and	  the	  terrifying	  possibility	  that	  he	  himself	  might	  
also	  be	  a	  “dead	  mother.”	  	  Paralyzed	  into	  deadly	  inertia	  by	  congenital	  sickness,	  then	  resentment,	  
a	  “dead-­‐mother	  Schiele”	  might	  never	  be	  able	  to	  breathe	  life	  into	  the	  potential	  creations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594	  Meaning	  both	  “fundamental”	  and	  “extreme.”	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gestating	  within.595	  	  Artistic	  anxieties	  regarding	  fecundity	  are	  common:	  Cecile	  Nebel	  asserts	  that	  
“self-­‐doubt,	  a	  sense	  of	  impotence,	  anguish,	  inadequacy,	  uncertainty	  have	  more	  often	  than	  not	  
accompanied	  artistic	  creativity.”596	  	  The	  ambivalent	  visual	  treatment	  of	  sexuality,	  creation	  and	  
death	  in	  The	  Birth	  of	  Genius	  exemplifies	  not	  only	  Schiele’s	  own	  idiosyncratic	  turmoil	  but	  also	  his	  
ability	  to	  refract	  the	  larger	  dramas	  of	  human	  existence	  through	  extreme	  representations	  of	  the	  
human	  body.	  
	   As	  Sigmund	  Freud	  examined	  his	  own	  psyche	  during	  self-­‐analysis,	  so	  Schiele	  looked	  at	  his	  
own	  body	  as	  an	  object	  of	  and	  tool	  for	  experimentation.	  	  Nietzsche	  did	  both;	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  
history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  that	  of	  a	  grand	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  body,	  and	  philosophers	  as	  
thwarted	  men	  who	  mistook	  their	  symptom	  for	  a	  system.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  radical	  originality	  –	  his	  
self-­‐designations	  included	  philologist,	  philosopher,	  psychologist	  and	  anti-­‐Christ	  –	  was	  due	  in	  no	  
small	  part	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  turned	  this	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  body	  on	  its	  head	  by	  
striving	  to	  articulate	  and	  legitimate	  precisely	  a	  philosophy	  of	  the	  body.	  	  In	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  a	  
book	  written	  after	  convalescence	  from	  a	  lengthy	  and	  harrowing	  illness,	  Nietzsche	  declares	  his	  
aim	  explicitly:	  “To	  what	  extent	  can	  truth	  endure	  incorporation?	  That	  is	  the	  question;	  that	  is	  the	  
experiment.”597	  	  This	  evokes	  both	  gleaning	  the	  truths	  of	  the	  flesh	  and	  making	  truth	  something	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595	  In	  Egon	  Schiele:	  A	  Self	  in	  Creation,	  psychoanalyst	  Knafo	  persuasively	  opines	  that	  “Schiele’s	  fascination	  with	  
sickness	  and	  death,	  especially	  as	  concerned	  babies,	  was	  most	  certainly	  related	  to	  the	  deaths	  of	  his	  [siblings].	  
During	  the	  years	  1910	  and	  1911,	  Schiele	  became	  fixated	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  mother’s	  pregnant	  state	  had	  
repeatedly	  led	  to	  dead	  babies	  …	  Schiele’s	  sense	  of	  himself	  included	  the	  notion	  that	  he	  too	  should	  be	  dead	  …	  
Repeatedly	  returning	  to	  the	  birth	  experience,	  Schiele	  confronted	  the	  survivor’s	  dilemma.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  is	  
the	  special	  child,	  the	  ‘genius’	  who	  makes	  it	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  is	  ridden	  with	  guilt	  and	  feels	  that	  he	  too	  
must	  die,”	  95.	  
596	  Cecile	  Nebel,	  The	  Dark	  Side	  of	  Creativity:	  Blocks,	  Unfinished	  Works	  and	  the	  Urge	  to	  Destroy	  (Troy:	  The	  Whitston	  
Publishing	  Company,	  1988),	  1.	  
597	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  §110,	  “Origin	  of	  knowledge.”	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lived	  corporeally	  –	  truth	  is	  now	  of,	  and	  in,	  the	  body.	  	  In	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra,	  conceived	  
while	  Nietzsche	  was	  writing	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  he	  discusses	  the	  embodied	  self,	  which	  controls	  
the	  ego	  self,	  as	  the	  “it”	  –	  the	  same	  “das	  Es,”	  in	  German,	  that	  later,	  English	  readers	  would	  
encounter	  in	  Freud’s	  work	  as	  “the	  Id.”	  	  That	  this	  “it”	  rules	  over	  our	  egos	  and	  minds	  should	  in	  
fact	  inspire	  joy,	  because	  the	  body	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  soul	  and	  of	  our	  most	  valuable	  forms	  of	  
knowing:	  	  
‘I,’	  you	  say,	  and	  are	  proud	  of	  the	  word.	  	  But	  greater	  is	  that	  in	  which	  you	  do	  not	  have	  faith	  
–	  your	  body	  and	  its	  great	  reason:	  that	  which	  does	  not	  say	  ‘I,’	  but	  does	  ‘I’	  …	  Behind	  your	  
thoughts	  and	  feelings,	  my	  brother,	  there	  stands	  a	  mighty	  ruler,	  an	  unknown	  sage	  –	  whose	  
name	  is	  self.	  	  In	  your	  body	  he	  dwells;	  he	  is	  your	  body.	  	  There	  is	  more	  reason	  in	  your	  body	  
than	  in	  your	  best	  wisdom	  …	  I	  want	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  despisers	  of	  the	  body.	  	  It	  is	  their	  
respect	  that	  begets	  their	  contempt.	  	  What	  is	  it	  that	  created	  respect	  and	  contempt	  and	  
worth	  and	  will?	  	  The	  creative	  self	  created	  respect	  and	  contempt;	  it	  created	  pleasure	  and	  
pain.	  	  The	  creative	  body	  created	  the	  spirit	  as	  a	  hand	  for	  its	  will.598	  	  	  
Unsympathetic	  critics	  have	  lambasted	  Schiele	  for	  his	  adolescent	  portrayals	  of	  the	  self	  controlled	  
and	  tortured	  by	  the	  pains	  and	  pleasures	  of	  the	  flesh;	  from	  a	  Nietzschean	  perspective,	  however,	  
Schiele	  shows	  great	  wisdom.	  	  He,	  too,	  experimented	  to	  see	  how	  he	  could	  represent	  the	  
experiences	  and	  knowledges	  of	  the	  body	  –	  truth	  incorporated,	  pain	  and	  pleasure,	  indivisible,	  
creative	  and	  willed	  to	  power.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598	  Nietzsche,	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra,	  First	  Part,	  “On	  the	  Despisers	  of	  the	  Body.”	  	  Cf.	  The	  Portable	  Nietzsche,	  ed.	  




In	  Schiele’s	  works	  around	  1910–11,	  especially,	  the	  creative	  and	  destructive	  forces	  of	  this	  
corporeal	  self	  –	  the	  “it”	  –	  are	  pictured	  provocatively	  in	  various	  stages	  of	  sexuality,	  sickness,	  and	  
death.	  	  Schiele	  objectified	  and	  amputated	  sexualized	  bodies,	  both	  as	  life-­‐giving	  vessels	  and	  as	  
corpses,	  in	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining	  (1910)	  (Fig.	  60),	  Female	  Nude	  (1910),	  and	  Male	  
Lower	  Torso	  (1910).	  	  In	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining	  we	  already	  see	  him	  ruminating	  
visually	  on	  the	  same	  thematic	  question	  that	  still	  clearly	  occupied	  him	  a	  year	  later	  in	  The	  Birth	  of	  
Genius	  (Dead	  Mother	  II):	  what	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  sexuality,	  reproduction,	  and	  death	  –	  
between	  creation	  and	  destruction?	  	  But	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining	  is	  less	  allegorical,	  
more	  gynecological.	  	  On	  18	  May	  1910,	  the	  gynecologist	  Dr.	  Erwin	  von	  Graff	  wrote	  to	  the	  artist	  
regarding	  a	  woman	  whom	  Schiele	  had	  apparently	  impregnated	  and	  subsequently	  deserted,	  
leaving	  her	  with	  the	  doctor.599	  	  The	  doctor	  allowed	  Schiele	  to	  paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  him	  and	  
granted	  the	  artist	  access	  to	  pregnant	  patients	  and	  babies	  for	  the	  same	  creative	  purpose.	  	  Even	  
within	  an	  artistic	  corpus	  known	  for	  its	  tendency	  toward	  the	  macabre,	  the	  portraits	  Schiele	  
created	  in	  this	  context	  are	  notably	  morbid.	  	  Schiele	  insisted	  that	  “everything	  is	  living	  dead,”600	  
and	  almost	  none	  of	  his	  other	  works	  capture	  this	  philosophy	  as	  vividly	  and	  aggressively	  as	  his	  
pictures	  of	  rigid,	  discoloured	  babies	  and	  limp,	  forlorn	  pregnant	  women	  –	  who	  look	  more	  like	  
cattle	  doomed	  for	  slaughter	  than	  powerful,	  creative	  vessels.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599	  	  Christian	  M.	  Nebehay,	  ed.,	  Egon	  Schiele:	  1890–1918:	  Leben,	  Briefe,	  Gedichte,	  102;	  cited	  in	  Stephanie	  Auer,	  
“Egon	  Schiele’s	  Image	  of	  Woman:	  Between	  Saint	  and	  Whore?,”	  in	  Egon	  Schiele:	  Self-­‐Portraits	  and	  Portraits,	  eds	  
Agnes	  Husslein-­‐Arco	  and	  Jane	  Kallir	  (Munich:	  Prestel,	  2011),	  49.	  
600	  	  For	  example	  in	  his	  poem	  Tannenwald	  [Fir	  Woods],	  translated	  into	  English	  in	  Egon	  Schiele:	  Letters	  and	  Poems	  
1910–1912	  from	  the	  Leopold	  Collection,	  eds.	  Elizabeth	  Leopold,	  Rudolf	  Leopold,	  and	  Sandra	  Tretter	  (Munich:	  
Prestel,	  2008),	  37.	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   Unlike	  some	  of	  the	  other	  pregnant	  women	  Schiele	  portrayed,	  whose	  very	  misery	  
denotes	  them	  as	  alive,	  the	  subject	  in	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining	  could	  easily	  be	  a	  corpse.	  	  
The	  work	  is	  unfinished,	  and	  Schiele	  has	  chosen	  to	  represent	  the	  pregnant	  woman’s	  body	  with	  a	  
dark	  rusty	  red	  resembling	  dried	  blood.	  	  Her	  face	  is	  like	  a	  smooth	  clay	  mask	  –	  a	  mask	  of	  death–	  
with	  holes	  for	  eyes	  and	  a	  mouth	  and	  no	  nose.	  	  Arms	  and	  legs	  are	  spread	  akimbo,	  arms	  
amputated	  at	  the	  wrist	  and	  legs	  at	  the	  knee.	  	  We	  see	  engorged	  nipples	  like	  ripe	  plums,	  a	  hugely	  
swollen	  belly	  on	  a	  body	  that,	  otherwise,	  is	  typically	  Schielian	  in	  its	  emaciation,	  thick	  pubic	  hair	  
and	  the	  tops	  of	  dark	  knee	  stockings,	  which	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  subject’s	  origins	  in	  the	  profane	  real	  
world.	  	  	  
	   Schiele’s	  striking	  Female	  Nude	  (1910)	  (Fig.	  61)	  embodies	  the	  sinister	  complicity	  between	  
sex	  and	  death.	  	  This	  nude,	  unlike	  the	  pregnant	  one,	  seems	  individual,	  animated,	  even	  alluring:	  
her	  eyes	  wink,	  her	  body	  seems	  to	  undulate	  toward	  us	  and	  her	  hair	  –	  a	  rose,	  blue,	  and	  mauve	  
nimbus	  –	  is	  like	  a	  seductive	  halo.	  	  At	  first	  glance	  she	  looks	  like	  someone	  we	  might	  want	  to	  
touch;	  at	  second	  glance	  we	  notice	  that	  she	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  a	  corpse,	  that	  asymmetrical	  eyelids	  
hang	  loosely	  over	  empty	  eyes,	  that	  she	  is	  missing	  her	  arms	  and	  legs.	  	  The	  hand	  that	  seemed	  a	  
moment	  ago	  to	  be	  caressing	  her	  torso	  suggestively	  now	  looks	  rigid	  and	  claw-­‐like	  from	  rigor	  
mortis.	  	  Thus	  whereas	  in	  Nude	  Pregnant	  Woman,	  Reclining	  Schiele	  pictures	  the	  sexual,	  pregnant	  
woman	  as	  dead,	  in	  Female	  Nude	  he	  represents	  a	  dead	  woman	  as	  desirable.	  	  In	  Schiele’s	  visions	  
we	  see	  that	  death	  may	  be	  not	  only	  the	  result	  but	  even	  the	  object	  of	  the	  sexual	  drive.	  	  	  
	   Schiele	  shows	  dangerous	  sexuality	  in	  Male	  Lower	  Torso	  (Fig.	  62)	  as	  well.	  	  Discolouring	  
naked	  flesh,	  which	  we	  see	  only	  from	  the	  waist	  down,	  with	  a	  wounded	  palette	  of	  indigo,	  violet	  
and	  magenta,	  Schiele	  paints	  legs	  splayed	  exaggeratedly	  outward,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	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subject’s	  thinness	  and	  creates	  a	  large	  ‘V’	  shape.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  male	  lower	  torso	  could	  have	  
been	  meant	  to	  represent	  the	  full	  force	  of	  male	  sexuality,	  but	  instead	  Schiele’s	  battered	  and	  
emaciated	  flesh	  looks	  juvenile	  and	  flaccid.	  	  A	  profusion	  of	  long	  abdominal	  hair	  dwarfs	  a	  genital	  
area	  that	  is	  small,	  limp	  and	  ill	  defined	  –	  like	  empty	  little	  flesh	  bags.	  	  Thus	  the	  sexual	  body	  is	  here	  
threatened	  with	  pain	  and	  castration.	  	  While	  Schiele	  virtually	  collapses	  the	  genital	  organs	  in	  on	  
themselves	  he	  by	  contrast	  takes	  care	  to	  represent	  the	  fibula,	  or	  calf	  bone,	  which	  he	  paints	  with	  
a	  lighter	  rose	  wash	  that	  darkens	  into	  fuchsia	  and	  magenta	  at	  the	  base.	  	  This	  representational	  
strategy	  makes	  the	  bone	  look	  like	  it	  is	  resting	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  blood.	  	  In	  an	  image	  that,	  
compositionally,	  foregrounds	  the	  sexual	  organs	  Schiele	  shifts	  focus	  to	  the	  skeleton,	  which	  
threatens	  to	  burst	  through	  translucent	  flesh	  across	  which	  bruises	  bloom	  like	  dark	  flowers.	  	  	  
	   Schiele	  pictures	  himself	  doomed	  by	  Eros	  and	  Thanatos	  together,	  coiled	  tightly	  like	  a	  
snake	  about	  to	  execute	  a	  lethal	  strike	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  (1911,	  Fig.	  63),	  where	  he	  appears	  as	  a	  kind	  
of	  neutered	  vampire;	  and	  in	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Black	  Cloak,	  Masturbating	  (1911,	  Fig.	  64),	  he	  
likewise	  looks	  unsexed	  and	  inhuman.	  	  In	  this	  image	  of	  onanism	  Schiele’s	  hand	  completely	  
covers	  his	  penis	  and	  with	  the	  position	  of	  his	  fingers	  makes	  the	  scrotal	  sack	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  labial	  
fold.	  	  The	  paint	  application	  itself	  is	  streaky	  and	  scatological,	  and	  Schiele	  shows	  himself	  with	  an	  
ominous	  blankness	  of	  mien.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
One	  way	  of	  understanding	  Schiele’s	  tendencies	  toward	  inconsistent	  application	  of	  paint,	  
aggressively	  anti-­‐classical	  cropping	  and	  composition,	  the	  representation	  of	  pervasive	  skin	  
diseases,	  misshapen	  or	  missing	  genitalia	  and	  amputated	  limbs	  is	  as	  a	  strategic	  use	  of	  visual	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ugliness.	  	  Schiele’s	  specific	  approach	  to	  ugliness	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  alongside	  Nietzschean	  
thought,	  especially	  Nietzsche’s	  redemptive	  philosophy	  of	  Dionysian	  ugliness.	  	  	  
In	  his	  late	  notebooks	  Nietzsche	  opined	  that	  the	  “nihilist’s	  eye	  idealizes	  in	  the	  direction	  
of	  ugliness”601	  –	  but	  what	  does	  this	  mean?	  	  For	  Nietzsche	  there	  are	  two	  different	  types	  of	  
nihilism,	  which	  in	  turn	  dictate	  two	  types	  of	  ugliness.	  	  He	  says:	  “Nihilism.	  	  It	  is	  ambiguous.	  	  A.	  
Nihilism	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  increased	  power	  of	  the	  spirit:	  as	  active	  nihilism.	  	  B.	  Nihilism	  as	  decline	  and	  
recession	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  spirit:	  as	  passive	  nihilism.”602	  	  Each	  form	  of	  nihilism	  has	  a	  
corresponding	  kind	  of	  ugliness	  based	  on	  either	  a	  lack	  or	  a	  surplus	  of	  power;	  whereas	  passive	  
nihilism	  is	  decadent	  pessimism,	  and	  pessimistic	  ugliness	  signals	  a	  hatred	  of	  life	  itself,	  for	  
Nietzsche	  active	  nihilism	  is	  Dionysian	  affirmation	  –	  and	  Dionysian	  ugliness	  is	  part	  of	  the	  highest	  
affirmation	  of	  life	  and	  its	  powers.	  	  	  
	   In	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols	  (1889)	  Nietzsche	  noted	  that	  “the	  tragic	  artist	  is	  not	  a	  pessimist:	  it	  
is	  precisely	  he	  who	  affirms	  all	  that	  is	  questionable	  and	  terrible	  in	  existence,	  he	  is	  Dionysian.”603	  	  
Whereas	  Nietzsche	  has	  great	  contempt	  for	  those	  who	  would	  make	  of	  existence	  something	  
small	  and	  ugly,	  the	  Dionysian	  person,	  and	  particularly	  the	  artist,	  overcomes	  the	  preoccupation	  
with	  superficial	  beauty	  to	  instead	  pay	  homage	  to	  something	  more	  profound	  than	  pretty:	  the	  
creative	  will	  itself.	  	  In	  this	  view	  ugliness,	  sickness,	  disaster	  and	  decay	  are	  all	  simply	  transitory	  
phases	  of	  the	  total,	  timeless,	  protean	  power	  that	  is	  life	  itself.	  	  Nietzsche	  saw	  that	  the	  art	  of	  
becoming	  often	  requires	  us	  to	  embrace	  ugliness,	  pain	  and	  destruction	  on	  the	  path	  to	  richer	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  §22,	  emphasis	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existence	  and	  greater	  truth.	  	  He	  declared	  both	  that	  truth	  was	  ugly	  and	  that	  art	  saves	  us	  from	  
perishing	  of	  the	  ugly	  truth.	  	  Schiele	  shows	  us	  his	  ugly	  truths,	  but	  with	  artful	  style.	  
	   In	  the	  1909	  Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Ornamental	  Drapery	  Schiele	  had	  subtly	  evinced	  a	  
turn	  from	  conventional	  beauty	  toward	  the	  possibility	  of	  Dionysian	  ugliness.	  	  Using	  an	  
attenuated	  vertical	  composition,	  metallic	  paint	  and	  a	  sultry	  gaze	  out	  at	  the	  viewer,	  Schiele	  
seems	  to	  have	  constructed	  a	  typically	  pleasing	  image.	  	  He	  shrugs	  his	  shoulder	  out	  of	  the	  
ornamental	  drapery,	  which	  shrouds	  his	  genitals.	  	  His	  thin	  moustache	  and	  eyebrows	  are	  
precisely	  groomed.	  	  But	  ugliness	  is	  creeping	  in	  here:	  in	  the	  strange	  way	  Schiele	  purses	  his	  
mouth,	  in	  the	  use	  of	  agitated,	  curved	  lines,	  in	  the	  dark	  plants	  encroaching	  upon	  the	  image	  from	  
the	  frame.	  	  	  
	   In	  his	  Seated	  Nude	  (Self-­‐Portrait)	  (Fig.	  65)	  of	  the	  following	  year	  Schiele	  alights	  on	  the	  
combination	  of	  Dionysian	  ugliness	  and	  radical	  beauty	  that	  characterizes	  his	  most	  impressive	  
work.	  	  In	  this	  large,	  oil-­‐on-­‐canvas	  self-­‐portrait	  Schiele’s	  whole	  body,	  which	  is	  painted	  in	  
greenish-­‐yellow	  hues,	  seems	  as	  though	  it	  is	  being	  blown	  up	  and	  backward.	  	  He	  leans	  to	  one	  
side;	  his	  raised	  arms	  cover	  his	  mouth	  and	  frame	  his	  face;	  his	  hair	  streams	  out	  behind	  him.	  	  But	  
Schiele’s	  eyes,	  which	  glow	  vivid	  red	  like	  his	  nipples,	  are	  wide	  open	  –	  he	  stares	  down	  this	  unseen	  
force	  with	  a	  power	  of	  his	  own.	  	  There	  is	  a	  marvellously	  precise	  linearity	  to	  this	  and	  much	  of	  
Schiele’s	  other	  work,	  but	  what	  those	  deft	  lines	  are	  used	  to	  represent	  is	  often	  rather	  horrible.	  	  
The	  artist’s	  raised	  left	  arm	  in	  this	  painting,	  for	  example,	  shows	  extremely	  distorted	  edges	  and	  
warps	  that	  in	  real	  life	  would	  signal	  a	  serious	  sickness.	  	  But	  Schiele’s	  disturbed	  and	  disturbing	  
imagery	  of	  sickness	  takes	  on	  a	  different	  cast	  –	  albeit	  perhaps	  a	  no	  less	  dramatic	  one	  –	  if	  we	  





Selfhood	  involves	  constant	  becoming	  and	  periodic	  sickness;	  practicing	  selfhood	  in	  art	  involves	  
moments	  of	  monstrousness.	  	  Indeed	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  “exceptional	  states	  that	  
condition	  the	  artist	  –	  all	  of	  them	  profoundly	  related	  to	  and	  interlaced	  with	  morbid	  phenomena	  
–	  so	  it	  seems	  impossible	  to	  be	  an	  artist	  and	  not	  to	  be	  sick.”604	  	  Schiele’s	  black	  chalk	  and	  gouache	  
paint	  Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Grey	  with	  Open	  Mouth	  (1910,	  Fig.	  66)	  shows	  the	  artist	  himself	  as	  the	  
morbid	  phenomenon:	  his	  mouth	  slack	  and	  open,	  his	  limbs	  and	  penis	  amputated,	  with	  
proliferating	  hair,	  jutting	  cheek	  and	  hip	  bones	  and	  blank	  eyes,	  Schiele’s	  self-­‐image	  here	  is	  
dreadful	  and	  deathly.	  	  This	  is	  a	  cruel	  and	  ugly	  self-­‐portrait	  of	  the	  artist	  as	  a	  dirty	  corpse.	  
	   Schiele’s	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Nude	  (1910,	  Fig.	  67)	  is	  similarly	  cadaverous	  and	  frightful.	  	  His	  
flesh,	  rendered	  loosely	  in	  shades	  of	  brown,	  orange	  and	  red,	  appears	  to	  be	  decomposing,	  his	  
arms	  are	  amputated	  and	  he	  is	  exceptionally	  skeletal,	  a	  mere	  sliver	  of	  a	  being.	  	  Paint	  drips	  from	  
eyes	  of	  different	  colour	  and	  size	  and	  the	  nose	  is	  flat	  and	  unmodelled,	  halfway	  between	  a	  nose	  
and	  an	  alarmingly	  empty	  pit.	  	  Thin	  and	  brittle	  bones	  jut	  out	  painfully.	  	  The	  neck	  is	  very	  
unsightly:	  it	  is	  excessively	  long,	  has	  lumps	  near	  the	  base	  and	  shows	  exposed	  sinews	  and	  folds	  of	  
flesh	  that	  furthermore	  suggest	  organic	  decay.	  	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  element	  of	  
Schiele’s	  self-­‐presentation	  is	  the	  castration;	  he	  not	  only	  amputates	  his	  image	  right	  at	  the	  
genitals,	  but	  also	  scoops	  out	  the	  entire	  pelvic	  area,	  revealing	  only	  a	  shadowed	  hollow	  and	  some	  
spidery	  lines	  in	  a	  shaft-­‐like	  area	  beneath	  his	  hips.	  	  While	  it	  would	  perhaps	  be	  understandable	  to	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regard	  such	  relentlessly	  grisly	  imagery	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  Schiele’s	  hateful	  nihilism,	  Nietzsche’s	  
portrait	  of	  the	  Dionysian	  being	  suggests	  we	  interpret	  otherwise.	  	  He	  insists:	  
He	  that	  is	  richest	  in	  the	  fullness	  of	  life,	  the	  Dionysian	  god	  and	  man,	  cannot	  only	  afford	  the	  
sight	  of	  the	  terrible	  and	  questionable	  but	  even	  the	  terrible	  deed	  and	  any	  luxury	  of	  
destruction,	  decomposition,	  and	  negation.	  	  In	  his	  case,	  what	  is	  evil,	  absurd,	  and	  ugly	  
seems,	  as	  it	  were,	  permissible,	  owing	  to	  an	  excess	  of	  procreating,	  fertilizing	  energies	  that	  
can	  still	  turn	  any	  desert	  into	  a	  lush	  farmland	  …	  The	  desire	  for	  destruction,	  change,	  and	  
becoming	  can	  be	  an	  overflowing	  energy	  that	  is	  pregnant	  with	  future.605	  
Schiele’s	  early	  nudes	  indubitably	  make	  deliberate	  use	  of	  visual	  strategies	  of	  ugliness;	  
nevertheless	  both	  the	  cause	  and	  effect	  of	  such	  ugliness	  may	  look	  less	  unattractive	  if	  we	  frame	  
our	  looking	  with	  radical,	  Nietzschean	  ideas	  about	  beauty	  and	  Dionysian	  ugliness.	  	  	  
	   Regarding	  the	  tragic	  Dionysian	  artist’s	  embrace	  of	  precisely	  those	  aspects	  of	  life	  that	  
offend	  weary	  nihilists,	  who	  hate	  existence	  itself,	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  that	  	  
It	  is	  a	  question	  of	  strength	  (of	  an	  individual	  or	  of	  a	  people),	  whether	  and	  where	  the	  
judgment	  ‘beautiful’	  is	  applied.	  	  The	  feeling	  of	  plenitude,	  of	  damned-­‐up	  strength	  …	  applies	  
the	  judgment	  ‘beautiful’	  even	  to	  things	  and	  conditions	  that	  the	  instinct	  of	  impotence	  
could	  only	  find	  hateful	  and	  ‘ugly’	  …	  It	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  one’s	  feeling	  of	  power	  and	  well-­‐being	  
how	  far	  one	  can	  acknowledge	  the	  terrifying	  and	  questionable	  character	  of	  things	  …	  ‘Love	  
of	  beauty’	  can	  therefore	  be	  something	  other	  than	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  the	  beautiful,	  create	  
the	  beautiful;	  it	  can	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  very	  inability	  to	  do	  so.606	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As	  a	  symptom	  of	  strength,	  love	  and	  life,	  Dionysian	  ugliness	  can	  therefore	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  
of	  radical	  beauty,	  originary	  and	  potent.	  	  Art,	  likewise,	  is	  “an	  excess	  and	  overflow	  of	  blooming	  
physicality	  into	  the	  world	  of	  images	  and	  desires”607;	  it	  represents	  our	  animality,	  and	  excites	  
those	  impulses.	  	  	  
	   This	  understanding	  of	  the	  impulse	  toward	  and	  function	  of	  art	  actually	  sees	  pleasure	  in	  
the	  ugly	  insofar	  as	  it	  “still	  communicates	  something	  of	  the	  artist’s	  victorious	  energy	  which	  has	  
become	  master	  of	  this	  ugliness.”	  	  For	  Nietzsche	  such	  mastery	  can	  include	  “even	  a	  desire	  to	  
harm	  ourselves,	  self-­‐violation	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  feeling	  of	  power	  over	  ourselves.”608	  	  Moreover	  the	  
transformation	  toward	  animality	  and	  artistic	  self-­‐mastery	  is	  individual,	  and	  beauty	  looks	  
different	  to	  everyone	  because	  everyone	  experiences	  it	  differently.	  	  Nietzsche	  concludes:	  “The	  
beautiful	  exists	  just	  as	  little	  as	  does	  the	  good,	  or	  the	  true.	  	  In	  every	  case	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  the	  
conditions	  of	  preservation	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  man:	  thus	  the	  herd	  man	  will	  experience	  the	  value	  
feeling	  of	  the	  beautiful	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  things	  than	  will	  the	  exceptional	  or	  over	  
man.”609	  	  The	  exceptional	  person	  pushes	  past	  conventional	  understandings	  to	  perceive	  ugliness	  
and	  beauty	  in	  their	  own	  exceptional	  way.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Could	  Schiele’s	  art,	  which	  actually	  aims	  at	  ugliness,	  also	  save	  us	  from	  its	  threatening	  grasp?	  	  
Yes,	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  speaking,	  because	  it	  is	  only	  by	  accepting	  the	  negativity	  of	  our	  ugly	  selves	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that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  transform	  into	  creatures	  of	  radical	  beauty.	  	  And	  as	  readers	  of	  Nietzsche	  or	  
viewers	  of	  Schiele	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  do	  just	  this	  kind	  of	  self-­‐overcoming.	  	  In	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  in	  
the	  aphorism	  “In	  favor	  of	  criticism,”	  Nietzsche	  tries	  to	  convince	  us	  of	  the	  value	  of	  negation,	  or	  
criticism.	  	  He	  explains:	  “When	  we	  criticize	  something,	  this	  is	  no	  arbitrary	  and	  impersonal	  event;	  
it	  is,	  at	  least	  very	  often,	  evidence	  of	  vital	  energies	  in	  us	  that	  are	  growing	  and	  shedding	  a	  skin.	  	  
We	  negate	  and	  must	  negate	  because	  something	  in	  us	  wants	  to	  live	  and	  affirm	  –	  something	  that	  
we	  perhaps	  do	  not	  know	  or	  see	  as	  yet.	  –	  This	  is	  said	  in	  favor	  of	  criticism.”610	  
Not	  only	  does	  Schiele	  picture	  precisely	  this	  kind	  of	  skin	  shedding	  in	  his	  art,	  he	  also	  articulated	  
himself	  in	  poems	  and	  letters	  using	  similar	  imagery.	  	  Indeed	  Schiele	  could	  have	  been	  responding	  
to	  Nietzsche	  rather	  than	  his	  patron	  Dr	  Oskar	  Reichel	  when	  he	  wrote:	   	  
I	  bring	  forth	  out	  of	  myself	  always	  more,	  always	  something	  further,	  an	  endlessly	  brighter	  
shining,	  as	  far	  as	  love,	  which	  is	  everything,	  enriches	  me	  …	  I	  want	  to	  tear	  into	  myself	  so	  
that	  I	  may	  create	  again	  a	  new	  thing	  which	  I,	  in	  spite	  of	  myself,	  have	  perceived.	  	  My	  
existence,	  my	  decay,	  transposed	  to	  enduring	  values,	  must	  sooner	  or	  later	  bring	  my	  
strength	  to	  other	  strongly	  or	  more	  strongly	  developed	  beings	  …	  I	  am	  so	  rich	  that	  I	  must	  
give	  myself	  away.611	  
By	  exposing	  –	  spotlighting	  –	  the	  ugliness,	  sickness,	  and	  negativity	  he	  saw	  both	  within	  himself	  
and	  in	  those	  around	  him,	  Schiele	  was	  in	  fact	  practicing	  an	  art	  of	  revelation,	  catharsis	  and	  
overcoming	  that	  is	  likewise	  central	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  §307.	  
611	  In	  Comini,	  Schiele	  in	  Prison,	  35.	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   According	  to	  Nietzsche,	  the	  power	  of	  these	  transforming	  and	  transformative	  
relationships	  between	  the	  forces	  of	  destruction	  and	  creation,	  ugliness	  and	  beauty,	  negation	  
and	  affirmation,	  the	  death	  of	  an	  old	  self	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  new	  one,	  compels	  artists	  to	  mask	  
themselves	  and	  their	  creative	  concepts.	  	  He	  explains	  that	  “every	  profound	  spirit	  needs	  a	  mask;	  
more,	  around	  every	  profound	  spirit	  a	  mask	  is	  continually	  growing,	  thanks	  to	  the	  constantly	  
false,	  namely	  shallow,	  interpretation	  of	  every	  word,	  every	  step,	  every	  sign	  of	  life	  that	  he	  
gives.”612	  	  Thus	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  self-­‐protection	  the	  tragic	  Dionysian	  artist	  “finds	  all	  forms	  of	  
disguise	  necessary.”613	  	  	  
	   Schiele’s	  Sneering	  Woman	  (1910,	  Fig.	  68)	  masks	  herself,	  perhaps,	  as	  armament	  and	  
protection	  in	  a	  gambit	  to	  wage	  war;	  as	  Nietzsche	  notes,	  free	  spirits	  are	  warriors.614	  	  
Importantly,	  while	  the	  woman’s	  breasts	  are	  exposed	  above	  her	  crossed	  and	  folded	  arms,	  they	  
are	  not	  arranged	  “on	  display,”	  nor	  does	  she	  look	  vulnerable.	  	  This	  sneering	  young	  woman	  
seems	  almost	  to	  have	  torn	  off	  her	  shirt	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  mischievous	  antagonism;	  she	  gives	  the	  
definite	  impression	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  social	  class	  of	  proper	  ladies	  (indeed	  the	  subject	  is	  Schiele’s	  
younger	  sister	  Gerti)	  and	  of	  rejecting	  this	  legacy	  unashamed.	  	  The	  overriding	  sense	  of	  hostility	  is	  
pictured	  most	  clearly	  in	  her	  facial	  expression	  –	  her	  scornful	  mask	  of	  disgust	  is	  simultaneously	  a	  
frown,	  a	  sneer	  and	  an	  open-­‐mouthed,	  tongue-­‐lolling	  and	  abject	  objection	  to	  the	  world	  outside	  
the	  frame.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612	  Nietzsche,	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,	  “Part	  Two:	  The	  Free	  Spirit,”	  §40.	  
613	  Ibid.,	  “Part	  Nine:	  What	  is	  Noble?,”	  §270.	  
614	  Nietzsche,	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols,	  “Expeditions	  of	  an	  Untimely	  Man,”	  §38,	  “My	  conception	  of	  freedom.”	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   This	  mask,	  then,	  both	  signifies	  her	  own	  criticism	  and	  protects	  her	  from	  others’	  as	  she	  
transforms	  herself	  into	  something	  greater	  than	  negation.	  	  In	  this	  respect	  she	  is	  an	  embodiment	  
of	  Nietzsche’s	  “imperious	  and	  domineering”	  free	  spirit	  who,	  with	  a	  “not	  altogether	  innocent	  
readiness	  …	  to	  deceive	  …	  and	  to	  dissemble	  …	  enjoys	  the	  cunning	  and	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  masks	  …	  
for	  it	  is	  precisely	  through	  its	  protean	  arts	  that	  it	  is	  best	  concealed	  and	  protected!”615	  	  Further	  
forms	  of	  masking	  and	  transformation	  include	  the	  uneven	  washes	  of	  white	  paint	  applied	  to	  the	  
surface	  of	  Gerti’s	  skin,	  which	  give	  her	  a	  sickly	  appearance,	  the	  giant	  orange	  protuberance	  above	  
her	  head,	  which	  distorts	  hair	  and	  hat,	  and	  the	  haunting	  hint	  of	  a	  shin	  bone	  Schiele	  leaves	  
unpainted	  –	  another	  in	  his	  myriad	  reminders	  that	  life	  itself	  is	  merely	  a	  mask	  for	  death.	  	  With	  
these	  tokens	  Schiele’s	  sneering	  woman	  also	  opposes	  the	  misogyny	  of	  her	  culture,	  which	  tells	  
her	  that	  her	  fundamental	  impulse	  is	  toward	  self-­‐adornment	  –	  for	  although	  she	  masks	  herself,	  
she	  does	  not	  thereby	  seek	  the	  “appearance	  and	  beauty”	  to	  which	  Nietzsche,	  too,	  in	  his	  less	  
Dionysian	  moments,	  reduces	  women.616	  	  
	  
§	  
In	  Self-­‐Portrait	  Grimacing	  (1910,	  Fig.	  3)	  the	  paint	  itself,	  viscous	  and	  erratically	  applied,	  becomes	  
a	  kind	  of	  disguise,	  as	  does	  the	  use	  of	  distorted	  and	  often	  unappealing	  details	  such	  as	  purple	  ribs	  
and	  mismatched	  eyes	  and	  teeth.	  	  Schiele	  presents	  an	  unforgettable	  grimace,	  an	  alarmingly	  
hideous	  mask	  of	  rejection	  that	  functions	  both	  as	  an	  attack	  against	  a	  society	  that	  viewed	  this	  art	  
and	  artist	  as	  ugly	  and	  sick,	  and	  as	  an	  attack	  against	  himself	  insofar	  as	  he	  exaggerates	  just	  those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615	  Nietzsche,	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,	  “Part	  Seven:	  Our	  Virtues,”	  §230.	  
616	  Cf.,	  for	  example,	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,	  ‘Part	  Seven:	  Our	  Virtues,’	  §232,	  where	  he	  says	  of	  woman:	  “her	  great	  art	  
is	  the	  lie,	  her	  supreme	  concern	  is	  appearance	  and	  beauty.”	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qualities	  decried	  by	  the	  conservative	  viewer.	  	  The	  artist	  described	  his	  frustration	  with	  the	  moral	  
majority	  in	  Nietzschean	  terms:	  “The	  ‘many’	  are	  those	  who	  are	  dependent	  upon	  each	  other,	  –	  
the	  people.	  –	  The	  ‘few’	  are	  the	  direct	  leaders	  of	  the	  world	  because	  they	  introduce	  only	  that	  
which	  is	  new	  and	  are	  therefore	  repugnant	  …	  it	  is	  tactless	  to	  hold	  accountable	  a	  person	  with	  a	  
free	  soul	  and	  to	  level	  ‘moral’	  charges	  against	  him	  …	  whatever	  desires	  to	  hinder	  …	  development	  
is	  possessed	  by	  evil	  intentions.”	  617	  	  At	  times	  Schiele	  felt	  constrained	  by	  such	  evil,	  as	  in	  1910	  
when	  he	  wrote	  to	  his	  friend	  and	  future	  brother-­‐in-­‐law	  Anton	  Peschka:	  “I	  wish	  to	  leave	  Vienna,	  
very	  soon.	  	  How	  ugly	  it	  is	  here.	  	  Everybody	  is	  envious	  …	  and	  deceitful	  …	  there	  is	  only	  shadow	  …	  I	  
have	  to	  see	  new	  things	  and	  learn	  about	  them	  …	  [I]	  want	  to	  see	  light,	  the	  sun.”618	  	  	  
Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Hand	  to	  Cheek	  (1910,	  Fig.	  69),	  which	  could	  almost	  form	  a	  diptych	  of	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  Self-­‐Portrait	  Grimacing,	  also	  captures	  this	  tension	  impressively.	  	  Schiele	  tugs	  
at	  his	  face	  with	  palpable	  weariness	  and	  dismay;	  he	  looks	  infinitely	  disappointed	  but	  still	  takes	  
care	  to	  offer	  the	  viewer	  interesting	  and	  attractive	  visual	  elements	  –	  like	  the	  spiky	  pink,	  purple	  
and	  blue	  hair,	  or	  the	  flaming	  lines	  on	  ears,	  eyes	  and	  finger.	  	  Schiele	  was,	  as	  he	  himself	  
reiterated	  frequently,	  able	  to	  “see	  beauty	  in	  everything	  in	  the	  world”619;	  paradoxically,	  the	  
ugliness	  he	  saw	  and	  reflected	  in	  his	  art	  was	  part	  of	  this	  fundamental	  beauty.	  	  	   	  
	   Nietzsche	  observed	  that	  for	  the	  “eternal	  child,”	  even	  “the	  most	  solemn	  concepts	  which	  
have	  occasioned	  the	  most	  strife	  and	  suffering”	  become	  material	  for	  play	  and	  experimentation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617	  Schiele,	  Letters	  and	  Poems,	  127.	  
618	  Ibid.,	  13.	  
619	  Ibid.,	  127.	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Remarkably,	  in	  his	  own	  writings	  Schiele	  likewise	  referred	  to	  himself	  as	  an	  “eternal	  child.”620	  	  
What	  mattered	  for	  both	  was	  not	  the	  fact	  of	  suffering	  but	  how	  it	  could	  be	  transformed	  –	  
moreover	  both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Schiele	  approached	  this	  question	  with	  a	  stance	  of	  childlike	  
experimentation	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  body.	  	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  “every	  art,	  every	  philosophy	  
may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  remedy	  and	  an	  aid	  in	  the	  service	  of	  growing	  and	  struggling	  life;	  they	  always	  
presuppose	  suffering	  and	  sufferers.”621	  	  Thus	  for	  the	  Dionysian	  artist	  suffering,	  sickness,	  
ugliness	  and	  death	  can	  all	  be	  transformed	  into	  art,	  and	  thereby	  redeemed	  –	  as	  a	  revelation	  of	  
life	  itself.	  	  It	  is	  this	  embrace	  of	  the	  art	  of	  becoming,	  this	  eternal	  affirmation	  of	  eternal	  
transformation,	  that	  produces	  what	  Nietzsche	  refers	  to	  as	  “the	  great	  health.”	  	  	  
	   Nietzsche	  describes	  those	  who	  suffer	  from	  this	  “more	  audacious”	  kind	  of	  health	  as	  
“premature	  births	  of	  an	  as	  yet	  unproven	  future.”	  	  In	  “a	  world	  so	  overrich	  in	  what	  is	  beautiful,	  
strange,	  questionable,	  terrible,	  and	  divine,”	  such	  new	  beings	  can	  become	  “dangerously	  healthy,	  
ever	  again	  healthy.”	  	  This	  is	  “the	  great	  health	  –	  that	  one	  does	  not	  merely	  have	  but	  also	  acquires	  
continually,	  and	  must	  acquire	  because	  one	  gives	  it	  up	  again	  and	  again,	  and	  must	  give	  it	  up.”622	  	  
Nietzsche	  likens	  himself	  and	  other	  such	  premature	  births	  to	  Dionysus,	  as	  “Dionysus	  cut	  to	  
pieces	  is	  a	  promise	  of	  life:	  it	  will	  be	  eternally	  reborn	  and	  return	  again	  from	  destruction.”623	  	  The	  
vision	  of	  wellbeing	  that	  Schiele	  offers	  ultimately	  resembles	  Nietzsche’s	  great	  health:	  his	  oeuvre	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620	  For	  example	  in	  his	  poem	  Ich,	  ewiges	  Kind	  [I,	  Eternal	  Child],	  translated	  into	  English	  in	  I,	  Eternal	  Child:	  Paintings	  
and	  Poems,	  trans.	  Anselm	  Hollo	  (New	  York:	  Grove	  Press,	  1985),	  6,	  8.	  
621	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  §370,	  “What	  is	  romanticism?”	  
622	  Ibid.,	  §382,	  	  “The	  great	  health.”	  




enacts	  a	  process	  of	  becoming,	  often	  destructive,	  that	  concretizes	  the	  sacred	  in	  the	  
representation	  of	  the	  profane.	  	  	  
	   Seen	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  stark	  image	  of	  a	  twisted	  body	  in	  one	  Male	  Nude	  (Fig.	  
70),	  the	  spastic	  contortions	  in	  the	  self-­‐portrait	  in	  prison	  For	  Art	  and	  for	  My	  Loved	  Ones	  I	  will	  
gladly	  endure	  to	  the	  End!	  (1912,	  Fig.	  71)	  and	  the	  frenzied	  Dionysian	  dance	  of	  Nude	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  
Grimacing	  (1910,	  Fig.	  7)	  all	  document	  stages	  in	  the	  eternal	  cycles	  of	  great	  health.	  	  Like	  
Nietzsche,	  Schiele	  embodied	  an	  amor	  fati	  in	  his	  creative	  work	  that	  was	  absent	  from	  his	  life.	  	  The	  
work	  itself	  becomes	  the	  highest	  affirmation	  of	  existence;	  along	  the	  way	  every	  tragedy	  may	  
become	  joyous,	  every	  ugliness	  beautiful.	  	  For	  both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Schiele	  the	  “deification	  of	  the	  
body”	  leads	  to	  a	  state	  in	  which	  “the	  most	  sensual	  functions	  are	  finally	  transfigured	  by	  a	  symbol-­‐
intoxication	  of	  the	  highest	  spirituality”;	  indeed,	  the	  “highest	  and	  most	  illustrious	  human	  joys”	  
are	  those	  in	  which	  “existence	  celebrates	  its	  own	  transfiguration.”624	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  corporeal	  
art	  is	  therefore	  a	  form	  of	  reverence	  toward	  the	  inherent	  divinity	  of	  the	  body.	  	  Through	  
repeated	  acts	  of	  such	  reverence	  Schiele,	  the	  Dionysian	  artist,	  becomes	  himself:	  he	  becomes	  
himself	  by	  creating	  himself	  anew,	  again	  and	  again.	  	  	  
	   Schiele’s	  self-­‐portrait	  Kneeling	  Male	  Nude	  with	  Raised	  Hand	  (Self-­‐Portrait)	  (1910,	  Fig.	  72)	  
is	  an	  eloquent	  testament	  to	  such	  deification	  of	  the	  body,	  symbol	  intoxication,	  and	  continual	  
self-­‐creation.	  	  In	  an	  unusual	  frontal	  pose	  that	  is	  half	  defensive,	  half	  vulnerable	  Schiele	  paints	  
himself	  with	  a	  palette	  that,	  although	  characteristically	  anti-­‐naturalistic,	  is	  more	  rainbow-­‐	  than	  
wound-­‐toned.	  	  His	  face,	  raised	  leg	  and	  hands	  are	  a	  feverish	  red,	  his	  torso	  is	  a	  gangrenous	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  Ibid.,	  §1051.	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yellow,	  pubic	  hair,	  a	  rich,	  deep	  blue	  and	  his	  face	  has	  green	  and	  blue	  accents	  that	  appear	  as	  an	  
enigmatic	  eye-­‐mask	  around	  closed	  eyes.	  	  	  
	  
§	  
Schiele’s	  fears	  of	  death,	  sexuality	  and	  disease,	  his	  ambivalence	  about	  beauty	  and	  ugliness,	  both	  
his	  own	  and	  that	  of	  the	  world	  he	  was	  part	  of	  –	  all	  of	  these	  conflicts	  play	  out	  across	  the	  surface	  
of	  the	  skin	  and	  are	  transformed	  in	  Schiele’s	  radical	  nudes.	  	  Reinhard	  Steiner	  proposed	  that	  the	  
nude	  self-­‐portrait	  was,	  for	  Schiele,	  “the	  most	  radical	  form	  of	  self-­‐expression	  not	  because	  the	  
body	  is	  exposed	  but	  because	  the	  self	  is	  grasped	  entire.”625	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  what	  we	  see	  in	  
Schiele’s	  naked	  self-­‐portraits	  is	  the	  self	  not	  grasped	  but	  rather	  created	  –	  and	  through	  the	  body.	  	  
Being	  is	  not	  penetrated;	  becoming	  is	  embraced,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Dionysian	  dance	  of	  joyful	  
nihilism	  and	  self-­‐creation.	  	  	  
	   Such	  embodied	  Dionysianism	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  great	  health	  that	  results	  when	  we	  
“become	  those	  we	  are	  –	  human	  beings	  who	  are	  new,	  unique,	  incomparable,	  who	  give	  
themselves	  laws,	  who	  create	  themselves.”626	  	  Such	  health	  is	  often	  misidentified,	  according	  to	  
Nietzsche,	  “because	  we	  ourselves	  keep	  growing,	  keep	  changing,	  we	  shed	  our	  old	  bark,	  we	  shed	  
our	  skins	  every	  spring,	  we	  keep	  becoming	  younger,	  fuller	  of	  future,	  taller,	  stronger,	  we	  push	  our	  
roots	  ever	  more	  powerfully	  into	  the	  depths	  –	  into	  evil	  –	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  we	  embrace	  the	  
heavens	  every	  more	  lovingly,	  more	  broadly,	  imbibing	  their	  light	  ever	  more	  thirstily.”627	  	  Schiele	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  Reinhard	  Steiner,	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Midnight	  Soul	  of	  the	  Artist	  (Cologne:	  Taschen,	  2000),	  12.	  
626	  Nietzsche,	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  §335,	  “Long	  live	  physics!,”	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
627	  Ibid.,	  §371,	  “We	  incomprehensible	  ones.”	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uses	  this	  same	  metaphor	  of	  thirst	  in	  his	  poem	  A	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  in	  which	  he	  declares:	  “I	  am	  for	  me	  
and	  those	  to	  whom	  the	  thirsty	  drunkenness	  for	  freedom	  presents	  everything	  with	  me,	  and	  for	  
everyone	  as	  well,	  because	  everyone	  I	  love	  as	  well	  …	  I	  am	  among	  the	  most	  noble	  …	  I	  am	  human,	  
I	  love	  death	  and	  love	  life.”628	  
	   In	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Splayed	  Fingers	  (1911,	  Fig.	  73)	  we	  glimpse	  the	  promise	  of	  health	  
and	  beauty	  contained	  in	  these	  acts	  of	  becoming	  and	  self-­‐creation.	  	  The	  work	  shows	  Schiele	  
looking	  back	  over	  his	  left	  shoulder,	  his	  right	  arm	  raised	  with	  his	  hand	  in	  a	  characteristically	  
ambiguous	  and	  stylized	  gesture.	  	  Complex	  shades	  of	  forest	  green,	  rust,	  purplish-­‐brown,	  indigo	  
and	  light	  yellow	  are	  scattered	  so	  gently	  over	  the	  body	  that	  the	  figure	  itself	  appears	  almost	  
gossamer.	  	  Schiele’s	  look	  contains	  both	  haughtiness	  and	  vulnerability,	  and	  the	  white	  outlining	  
he	  used	  so	  frequently	  appears	  here	  more	  than	  ever	  as	  a	  halo.	  	  The	  Dionysian	  god	  and	  man	  tears	  
into	  himself	  so	  that	  he	  can	  recreate	  himself,	  eternally.	  	  Schiele	  here	  shows	  us	  one	  moment,	  in	  
the	  blink	  of	  an	  eye,	  of	  his	  becoming:	  he	  looks	  back	  briefly	  at	  what	  has	  been	  destroyed	  in	  
creation,	  before	  continuing	  his	  demiurgic	  odyssey.	  
	   For	  Nietzsche,	  writing	  was	  a	  way	  to	  metabolize	  the	  circumstances	  of	  his	  life;	  through	  
writing	  he	  could	  plumb	  his	  own	  depths	  and	  transform	  sickness	  into	  health,	  doubt	  into	  faith.	  	  
Writing	  allowed	  him	  to	  move	  from	  the	  passive	  nihilism	  he	  abhorred	  to	  the	  active	  nihilism	  of	  the	  
Dionysian	  artist.	  	  Schiele	  offers	  us	  similar	  experiments	  with	  his	  art	  and	  so,	  too,	  are	  their	  
Dionysian	  visions	  related.	  	  Both	  succumbed	  to	  sickness	  at	  a	  tragically	  early	  age,	  but	  their	  
oeuvres	  live	  on	  as	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  greatest	  health.	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  Schiele,	  Ein	  Selbstbild	  [A	  Self-­‐Portrait],	  Letters	  and	  Poems,	  53. 
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By	  moving	  past	  his	  own	  most	  superficial	  beauty	  and	  past	  the	  clever	  aesthetic	  formulas	  
around	  him	  into	  vital,	  transformative	  zones	  of	  powerful,	  pulsating	  and	  chaotic	  ugliness	  Schiele	  
created	  himself	  continually	  in	  the	  image	  of	  a	  far	  more	  radical	  beauty.	  	  By	  1914	  Schiele	  finally	  
smiles	  at	  his	  reflection	  (Fig.	  74).	  	  Even	  before	  that,	  though,	  during	  the	  years	  of	  great	  ugliness,	  
what	  he	  was	  really	  sketching	  out	  was	  love	  –	  for	  himself,	  for	  the	  world,	  for	  life	  itself.	  	  He	  created	  
his	  ugly	  art	  out	  of	  his	  love	  for	  life	  and	  its	  beauty.	  	  And	  in	  so	  doing	  he	  also	  created	  himself,	  as	  the	  
Dionysian	  artist	  whose	  affirmative	  gaze	  sees	  the	  power	  and	  possibility	  of	  life	  in	  death,	  health	  in	  




The	  monster	  stands	  among	  us	  as	  the	  messenger	  of	  a	  more	  real	  humanism	  
–	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  “Karl	  Kraus”	  
The	  confessional	  dynamic	  of	  Viennese	  psychology,	  art,	  and	  culture	  correlated	  with	  a	  larger	  
Germanic	  tradition	  of	  confession;	  indeed	  “Goethe,	  one	  of	  Freud’s	  favorite	  German	  authors,	  
famously	  referred	  to	  his	  own	  lifework	  as	  the	  ‘fragment	  of	  a	  great	  confession.’”	  	  Micale	  relates	  
this	  Germanic	  culture	  of	  confession	  to	  the	  medical	  history	  of	  hysteria,	  noting	  that	  “with	  Freud’s	  
early	  writing	  as	  well,	  autobiography	  …	  makes	  a	  dramatic	  reappearance.”629	  	  This	  notion	  of	  a	  
Germanic	  tradition	  of	  confession	  is	  another	  way	  to	  link	  figures	  discussed	  here,	  particularly	  the	  
self-­‐portraitists.	  	  In	  Vienna	  the	  compulsion	  to	  confess	  –	  an	  urge	  stained	  by	  its	  association	  with	  
sin	  –	  formed	  the	  foundation	  of	  what	  have	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  enduring	  aesthetic,	  psychological,	  
and	  philosophical	  investigations.	  	  Early-­‐twentieth-­‐century	  Viennese	  self-­‐representational	  
practices,	  particularly	  those	  that	  relied	  on	  strategies	  of	  ugliness	  and	  discourses	  of	  hate,	  seemed	  
to	  have	  had	  a	  cathartic	  function	  for	  those	  who	  were	  or	  felt	  persecuted,	  for	  those	  struggling	  
with	  a	  traumatic	  sense	  of	  identity,	  and	  for	  those	  lingering	  –	  as	  Freud	  framed	  it	  in	  his	  discussion	  
of	  the	  local	  suicide	  epidemic	  –	  at	  unpleasant	  stages	  of	  development.	  
We	  know	  that	  catharsis	  –	  from	  the	  Greek	  verb	  καθαίρειν,	  or	  kathairein,	  which	  means	  
“to	  purify,	  purge”	  –	  was	  originally	  a	  medical	  term.	  	  It	  became	  a	  theatrical	  term	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  
tragic	  drama	  Aristotle	  presents	  in	  his	  Poetics;	  when	  it	  was	  transformed	  again,	  in	  Vienna,	  into	  a	  
new	  medical	  practice,	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  framework	  was	  itself	  inflected	  with	  dramatic	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and	  aesthetic	  influences.	  	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  catharsis	  has	  an	  uncannily	  circular	  history,	  
replete	  with	  suggestive	  connections	  between	  medicine	  and	  theatre,	  embodiment	  and	  
performance.	  
Martha	  Nussbaum	  argues	  that	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  catharsis	  was	  actually	  a	  critical	  
response	  to	  Plato.	  	  Nussbaum	  notes	  that	  Aristotle	  “does	  not	  employ	  the	  word	  in	  any	  technical	  
sense,”	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  “‘getting-­‐clear’	  or	  ‘an	  improvement	  in	  understanding	  by	  the	  removal	  of	  
some	  obstacles	  to	  understanding.’”630	  	  Nussbaum	  explains	  further	  that	  Aristotle’s	  new	  
contribution	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  pity	  and	  fear	  produce	  a	  cognitive	  clearing-­‐up	  or	  cleaning-­‐up;	  this	  
contradicts	  the	  stance	  taken	  by	  Plato,	  for	  whom	  –	  following	  Socrates	  –	  “emotions	  such	  as	  fear	  
and	  pity	  are	  inherently	  messy	  and	  are	  the	  antithesis	  of	  cleanliness.”631	  	  “Socrates	  points	  out	  
that	  tragic	  poetry	  leads	  to	  fellow	  feeling	  (sumpaschontes)	  and	  ‘nourishes	  the	  element	  of	  pity	  [to	  
eleinon]	  in	  us,	  making	  it	  strong.’”632	  	  But	  for	  Socrates	  and	  Plato	  the	  right	  response	  to	  such	  fellow	  
feeling	  is	  “not	  enthusiasm,	  but	  disgust.”633	  	  In	  this	  harsh	  and	  punitive	  schema	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  
be	  is	  rational,	  autonomous,	  and	  unmoved	  by	  the	  suffering	  of	  others.	  	  To	  be	  irrational	  or	  
uncertain,	  emotionally	  vulnerable,	  or	  empathetic	  (the	  “fellow	  feeling”	  of	  sumpaschontes)	  is	  in	  
fact	  disgusting.	  	  Nussbaum	  concludes:	  “the	  idea	  of	  a	  catharsis	  produced,	  as	  in	  the	  Poetics,	  
‘through	  pity	  and	  fear’	  would	  have	  been	  deeply	  repellent	  to	  Plato.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  would	  sound	  to	  
his	  ears	  close	  to	  an	  oxymoron	  …	  tantamount	  to	  saying	  ‘cleaning	  by	  mud,’	  or	  ‘clearing	  up	  
through	  disgusting	  mess.’”	  	  By	  contrast,	  Nussbaum	  emphasizes,	  for	  Aristotle	  pity	  and	  fear	  “can	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be	  genuine	  sources	  of	  understanding,	  showing	  the	  spectator	  possibilities	  that	  are	  there	  for	  
good	  people.”634	  	  Indeed	  “the	  dramatic	  experience	  of	  these	  emotions”	  in	  tragedy	  “has	  a	  
therapeutic	  value	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  audience	  to	  understand	  better	  its	  own	  experiences	  of	  
fear	  and	  pity	  in	  their	  practical	  life.”635	  	  	  
Moreover	  “just	  as	  Plato’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  of	  the	  good	  person	  led	  him	  
to	  reject	  tragic	  pity,	  so	  Aristotle’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  real	  importance	  of	  philoi	  [those	  to	  whom	  
we	  are	  related	  in	  some	  way]	  and	  …	  eudaimonia	  [happiness]	  leads	  him	  to	  restore	  these	  reactive	  
emotions,	  and	  the	  belief	  structure	  that	  underlies	  them,	  to	  a	  place	  of	  honor.”636	  	  Mystery	  and	  
uncertainty	  may	  forever	  surround	  Aristotle’s	  Poetics	  –	  obscuring,	  too,	  the	  exact	  history	  of	  this	  
concept	  of	  catharsis.	  	  Nevertheless	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  unlike	  Socrates	  and	  Plato,	  Aristotle	  places	  a	  
high	  value	  on	  intersubjectivity	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  ethics	  of	  empathy.	  
We	  have	  seen	  how	  hysteria	  –	  the	  somatization	  of	  psychic	  distress	  –	  is	  deeply	  
intersubjective,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  hysteria	  relates	  to	  ambivalent,	  hateful,	  and	  ugly	  
Viennese	  representational	  practices	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  	  In	  both	  contexts	  we	  see	  the	  
intertwining	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  psychological	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  internal	  states	  through	  
corporeal	  exteriority,	  especially	  gesture	  and	  skin.	  	  While	  hysteria	  sustains	  cathexis	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  an	  illness,	  self-­‐portraiture	  can	  express	  it	  in	  a	  process	  more	  akin	  to	  catharsis.	  	  In	  his	  essay	  
“Attitudes	  and	  Gestures	  as	  Reflections	  of	  the	  Conception	  of	  Gender,”	  Alexander	  Klee	  considers	  
the	  significance	  of	  the	  hysterical	  inversion	  and	  dissolution	  of	  masculinity	  in	  Schiele’s	  practice	  of	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self-­‐portraiture.	  	  Klee	  argues	  that	  “Schiele’s	  portraits	  do	  display	  a	  new	  self-­‐image,	  a	  new	  
comprehension	  of	  sexuality	  …	  it	  is	  almost	  possible	  to	  speak	  of	  an	  ironizing	  and	  inversion	  of	  the	  
image	  of	  manhood.”	  	  He	  continues:	  “an	  ambivalent	  conception	  of	  gender	  can	  be	  discerned,	  in	  
which	  Schiele	  leaves	  open	  the	  disposition	  of	  his	  own	  sexuality.”	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Schiele’s	  self-­‐
portraits	  “are	  symptoms	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  image	  of	  manhood	  disintegrating	  between	  decadence	  
and	  modernity.”	  	  More	  profoundly,	  however,	  “in	  the	  impartiality	  and	  openness	  of	  his	  
representational	  form	  and	  his	  unsparing	  self-­‐examination,”	  Schiele	  created	  “a	  new	  image	  of	  
masculinity,	  released	  from	  the	  conventional	  ideas	  of	  gender	  roles.”637	  
These	  possibilities	  for	  catharsis,	  for	  release,	  for	  new	  representations	  and	  self-­‐images	  are	  
crucial,	  for	  at	  its	  most	  extreme	  the	  experience	  of	  traumatic	  identity,	  of	  socio-­‐somatic	  
meaninglessness	  or	  unbearable	  meanings,	  may	  lead	  to	  suicide.	  	  “The	  human	  subject	  always	  
maintains	  a	  relation	  of	  love	  (or	  hate)	  towards	  its	  own	  body	  because	  it	  must	  always	  maintain	  a	  
certain	  level	  of	  psychical	  and	  libidinal	  investment,	  or	  more	  technically,	  cathexis.”638	  	  Flesh	  is	  
significant,	  matter	  matters.	  	  Moreover	  while	  art	  alone	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  save	  people	  –	  such	  as	  
Gerstl	  –	  who	  are	  struggling	  with	  the	  unbearable	  weight	  of	  their	  own	  subjectivity,	  
representational	  practices	  do	  have	  great	  power,	  and	  with	  great	  power	  does	  come	  great	  
responsibility.	  	  Classical	  culture	  may	  have	  produced	  democracy	  but	  it	  also	  inspired	  Hitler’s	  
nightmarish	  fantasy	  of	  a	  thousand-­‐year	  Reich	  of	  beauty	  –	  a	  politico-­‐aesthetic	  vision	  that	  was	  
explicitly	  based	  on	  Hitler’s	  belief	  that	  a	  regime	  of	  classical	  art	  could	  not	  merely	  reproduce	  but	  
actually	  produce	  healthy	  bodies,	  clean	  minds,	  and	  a	  beautiful	  self	  and	  society.	  	  He	  marshalled	  a	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great	  deal	  of	  the	  antisemitism	  and	  hate	  we	  have	  seen	  here	  –	  recall	  how	  Hitler	  claimed	  that	  he	  
learned	  his	  future	  in	  Vienna	  –	  to	  create	  a	  doomed	  template	  for	  a	  supposedly	  “pure”	  society	  in	  
which	  weakness	  and	  ugliness	  would	  be	  tolerated	  in	  neither	  art	  nor	  life.	  
So	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  catharsis,	  hate,	  and	  ugly	  self-­‐representational	  practices	  it	  is	  
essential	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  notions	  of	  purity	  and	  purification.	  	  For	  the	  Nazis	  with	  
their	  cult	  of	  health	  and	  beauty,	  purity	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  absence	  of	  racial	  corruption,	  
physical	  and	  ideological	  infection,	  or	  modern	  degeneracy	  –	  the	  absence	  of	  ugliness.	  	  For	  
Aristotle	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  discussion,	  however,	  the	  usefulness	  of	  purification	  lies	  
precisely	  in	  this	  idea	  of	  cleaning	  through	  mud	  or	  disgusting	  mess.	  	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  this	  is	  a	  
purification	  that	  leaves	  us	  decidedly	  dirty	  –	  it	  is	  overcoming	  through	  sharing,	  health	  through	  
compassion,	  including	  compassion	  toward	  the	  hateful	  and	  ugly	  parts	  of	  each	  other	  and	  
ourselves.	  	  	  
Nussbaum	  emphasizes	  how	  “Aristotle	  also	  insists	  that	  the	  goodness	  of	  the	  person	  (to	  
spoudaious	  einai)	  is	  very	  important	  in	  inspiring	  pity.”	  	  The	  greater	  the	  person,	  and	  their	  
compassion,	  the	  greater	  their	  belief	  “that	  suffering	  is	  undeserved.”	  	  Aristotle	  suggests	  that	  all	  of	  
the	  following	  impediments	  and	  misfortunes	  may	  inspire	  such	  sentiment:	  “death,	  bodily	  assault	  
or	  ill-­‐treatment,	  old	  age,	  illness,	  lack	  of	  food,	  lack	  of	  friends,	  having	  few	  friends,	  separation	  
from	  one’s	  friends,	  ugliness	  (which	  impedes	  philia),	  weakness,	  being	  crippled,	  having	  your	  good	  
expectations	  disappointed,	  having	  good	  things	  come	  too	  late,	  having	  no	  good	  things	  happen	  to	  
you,	  having	  them	  happen	  but	  being	  unable	  to	  enjoy	  them.”639	  	  Nussbaum	  concludes	  that	  “just	  
as	  Plato’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  of	  the	  good	  person	  led	  him	  to	  reject	  tragic	  pity,	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  Nussbaum,	  “Tragedy	  and	  Self-­‐sufficiency,”	  274.	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Aristotle’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  real	  importance	  of	  philoi	  and	  other	  external	  goods	  for	  
eudaimonia	  leads	  him	  to	  restore	  these	  reactive	  emotions,	  and	  the	  belief	  structure	  that	  
underlies	  them,	  to	  a	  place	  of	  honor.”640	  	  My	  own	  investigation	  of	  ugliness,	  hatred,	  and	  self-­‐
representation	  in	  Viennese	  modernity	  has	  led	  me	  to	  similar	  conclusions	  regarding	  fear,	  fellow	  
feeling,	  catharsis,	  and	  compassion.	  	  We	  are	  all	  bound	  to	  linger	  at	  certain	  unpleasant	  stages	  of	  
development	  now	  and	  again,	  and	  our	  unpleasantness	  will	  inevitably	  leave	  its	  mark	  upon	  the	  
world.	  	  But	  such	  ugly	  marks	  represent	  an	  opportunity	  for	  love	  as	  much	  as	  for	  hate.	  	  Indeed	  
Nussbaum	  asks,	  regarding	  the	  “clearing	  up”	  of	  negative	  emotions	  through	  the	  “sharp	  
experience	  of	  pity	  and	  fear”:	  “is	  there	  anyone	  so	  good	  as	  not	  to	  need	  such	  reminders,	  such	  an	  











	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640	  Ibid.,	  276.	  











Fig.	  2.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  as	  a	  Warrior,	  1909,	  unfired	  clay	  painted	  with	  tempera,	  
36.5	  x	  31.5	  x	  19.5	  cm,	  Museum	  of	  Fine	  Arts,	  Boston.	  Available	  from:	  Museum	  of	  Fine	  Arts	  
Boston,	  http://www.mfa.org/collections/object/self-­‐portrait-­‐as-­‐a-­‐warrior-­‐64963	  (accessed	  
































Fig.	  8.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Portrait	  of	  Dr.	  Erwin	  von	  Graff,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  100	  x	  90	  cm,	  private	  
collection.	  Available	  from:	  Wikipedia,	  Egon	  Schiele,	  https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egon_Schiele	  




























	   Fig.	  13.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Fragment	  of	  a	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure,	  1904/1905,	  oil	  on	  
canvas,	  170	  x	  74	  cm,	  private	  collection.	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–





Fig.	  14.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Portrait	  of	  Alexander	  von	  Zemlinsky,	  July	  1908	  (in	  Gmunden),	  oil	  on	  
canvas,	  170	  x	  74	  cm,	  Stiftung	  Sammlung	  Kamm	  –	  Kunsthaus	  Zug,	  Switzerland.	  Signed:	  “Richard	  
Gerstl”	  Inscribed	  verso:	  “Richard	  Gerstl,	  IX,	  Nußdorferstr.	  35.”	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  





























Fig.	  20.	  Max	  Oppenheimer,	  The	  Deposition,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  present	  whereabouts	  unknown	  
(formerly	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  Dr	  Oskar	  Reichel,	  Vienna).	  From:	  Gemma	  Blackshaw.	  “The	  
Pathological	  Body:	  Modernist	  Strategising	  in	  Egon	  Schiele’s	  Self-­‐Portraiture.”	  Oxford	  Art	  Journal	  




Fig.	  21.	  El	  Greco,	  The	  Entombment	  of	  Christ,	  late	  1560s,	  oil	  and	  tempera	  on	  panel,	  51.5	  x	  43	  cm,	  
National	  Gallery	  –	  Alexandros	  Soutzos	  Museum,	  Athens.	  Available	  from:	  Wikipedia,	  National	  





















	   Fig.	  25.	  Reconstruction	  of	  Gerstl’s	  Laughing	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Full	  Figure.	  From:	  Raymond	  Coffer.	  
“Richard	  Gerstl	  and	  Arnold	  Schönberg:	  A	  Reassessment	  of	  their	  Relationship	  (1906–1908).”	  PhD	  






Fig.	  26.	  Photograph	  of	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  c.	  1905,	  in	  Schröder,	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  From:	  
Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  Bank	  Austria,	  





Fig.	  27.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  front	  of	  a	  Blue-­‐Green	  Background,	  summer	  1907,	  oil	  on	  
cardboard,	  100	  x	  72	  cm,	  Tyrolean	  State	  Museum	  [Tiroler	  Landesmuseum/Ferdinandeum],	  
Innsbruck	  (Inv.	  No.	  Gem.	  3112).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  










Fig.	  29.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  15	  September	  1908,	  pencil	  on	  paper,	  40	  x	  29.9	  cm,	  Vienna	  
Museum	  Karlsplatz	  [Historisches	  Museum	  der	  Stadt	  Wien].	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  













Fig.	  32.	  Richard	  Gerstl,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  no	  date	  (verso	  of	  15	  September	  Self-­‐Portrait),	  sepia	  on	  
paper,	  40	  x	  29.9	  cm,	  Vienna	  Museum	  Karlsplatz	  [Historisches	  Museum	  der	  Stadt	  Wien]	  (Inv.	  
115.288).	  From:	  Klaus	  Albrecht	  Schröder.	  Richard	  Gerstl:	  1883–1908.	  Vienna:	  Kunstforum	  der	  








Fig.	  34.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  c.	  1908,	  pen	  and	  Chinese	  ink	  on	  paper,	  18	  ×	  12.6	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  2).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  
http://www.schoenberg.at/index.php/en/schoenberg-­‐2/bildnerischeswerk/selbstportraits/002-­‐





Fig.	  35.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  c.	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  23	  ×	  17	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  10).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  





Fig.	  36.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Satire,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  31.3	  ×	  24.2	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  
Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  111).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  





Fig.	  37.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Critic	  I,	  1909/1910,	  oil	  on	  wood,	  45.1	  x	  31.1	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  112).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  	  





Fig.	  38.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Critic	  II,	  1909/1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  30.8	  ×	  23.5	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  
Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  113).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  	  









Fig.	  40.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Red	  Gaze,	  May	  1910,	  oil	  on	  cardboard,	  32.2	  x	  24.6	  cm,	  Arnold	  
Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  61).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  





Fig.	  41.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Brown	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  16	  March	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  32	  ×	  20	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  12).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  





Fig.	  42.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Green	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  23	  October	  1910,	  oil	  on	  board,	  33.2	  x	  24.7	  cm,	  
Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  15).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  




Fig.	  43.	  Arnold	  Schönberg,	  Tears,	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  29.3	  ×	  23.4	  cm,	  Arnold	  Schönberg	  Center,	  
Vienna	  (cat.	  no.	  77).	  Available	  from:	  Arnold	  Schonberg	  Center,	  





Fig.	  44.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  The	  Bearers	  of	  Dreams,	  colour	  lithograph	  from	  The	  Dreaming	  Youths.	  
1907,	  24	  x	  29.3	  cm,	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery,	  London	  (G.1978.PG.88.8).	  ©	  The	  Samuel	  Courtauld	  
Trust,	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery,	  London/DACS	  2003.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Courtauld	  Institute	  of	  Art,	  
Art	  and	  Architecture,	  http://www.artandarchitecture.org.uk/images/gallery/78a9c007.html	  











Fig.	  46.	  George	  Minne,	  Adolescent	  I,	  c.	  1891,	  marble,	  43	  x	  33.5	  x	  14.3	  cm,	  The	  J.	  Paul	  Getty	  
Museum,	  Los	  Angeles.	  Available	  from:	  The	  J.	  Paul	  Getty	  Museum,	  
http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/103998/george-­‐minne-­‐adolescent-­‐i-­‐belgian-­‐





Fig.	  47.	  George	  Minne,	  Kneeling	  Youth,	  1896,	  dated	  1905,	  pencil	  on	  paper,	  34	  x	  19.1	  cm,	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (293.1978).	  ©	  2015	  George	  Minne	  /	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  
(ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  SABAM,	  Belgium.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  





Fig.	  48.	  George	  Minne,	  Kneeling	  Youth,	  1898,	  plaster,	  80.8	  x	  19.8	  x	  45.2	  cm	  including	  base,	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (232.1962).	  ©	  2015	  George	  Minne	  /	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  
(ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  SABAM,	  Belgium.	  Available	  from:	  Shepherd	  Galleries,	  






	   Fig.	  49.	  Title	  Page	  &	  Dedication	  for	  Kokoschka’s	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope.	  From:	  Tobia	  G.	  
Natter	  and	  Max	  Hollein,	  eds.	  The	  Naked	  Truth:	  Klimt,	  Schiele,	  Kokoschka	  and	  Other	  Scandals.	  










Fig.	  51.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  illustration	  of	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope,	  1908–09,	  pencil,	  ink,	  
watercolour,	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  Museum	  of	  Art.	  Available	  from:	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  Museum	  










Fig.	  53.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  Poster	  for	  Murderer,	  the	  Women’s	  Hope	  (Pietà),	  1909,	  colour	  
lithograph,	  122.7	  x	  78.6	  cm,	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (343.1966).	  ©	  2015	  Artists	  
Rights	  Society	  (ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  Pro	  Litteris,	  Zurich.	  Available	  from:	  The	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  






	   Fig.	  54.	  Johann	  Amos	  Comenius,	  “Channels	  and	  Bones,”	  woodcut	  illustration	  from	  Orbis	  
Sensualium	  Pictus,	  1658.	  From:	  Claude	  Cernuschi.	  Re/Casting	  Kokoschka:	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics,	  







Fig.	  55.	  Nicolas	  Beatrizet,	  Anatomia,	  copperplate	  engraving	  from	  Juan	  de	  Valverde	  de	  
Hamusco’s	  La	  anatomia	  del	  corpo	  humano,	  1556.	  Available	  from:	  Der	  Neue	  Physiologus:	  
Enzyklopädie	  der	  Erfahrungen	  (website),	  http://www.physiologus.de/selbsthaeut.htm	  










Fig.	  57.	  Oskar	  Kokoscha,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  Hand	  on	  Chest	  (Selbstbildnis,	  Hand	  auf	  der	  Brust)	  [Poster	  
Advertising	  a	  Lecture	  at	  the	  Academic	  Union	  for	  Literature	  and	  Music,	  Vienna,	  26	  January	  
1912],	  1911–12,	  colour	  lithograph,	  92.4	  x	  55	  cm,	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  New	  York	  (378.1954).	  
©	  2015	  Artists	  Rights	  Society	  (ARS),	  New	  York	  /	  Pro	  Litteris,	  Zurich.	  Available	  from:	  The	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  German	  Expressionism,	  
https://www.moma.org/collection_ge/browse_results.php?criteria=O%3AAD%3AE%3A36737&






Fig.	  58.	  Oskar	  Kokoschka,	  The	  Painter	  and	  His	  Model	  II	  (with	  Der	  Sturm	  Poster),	  1923,	  oil	  on	  
canvas	  on	  board,	  85.1	  x	  130.2	  cm,	  Saint	  Louis	  Art	  Museum	  (910:1983).	  Bequest	  of	  Morton	  D.	  
May.	  Available	  from:	  Saint	  Louis	  Art	  Museum,	  
http://slam.org:8080/emuseum/view/objects/asitem/13738/55/displayDate-­‐





	   Fig.	  59.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Genius	  (Dead	  Mother	  II),	  1911,	  oil	  on	  wood,	  32.1	  x	  25.4	  cm,	  
presumed	  destroyed.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  












Fig.	  61.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Female	  Nude,	  1910,	  India	  ink,	  tempera,	  and	  watercolour,	  44.3	  x	  30.6	  cm,	  
Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  
Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  Publishing,	  








Fig.	  63.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait,	  1911,	  watercolour,	  gouache,	  and	  pencil,	  51.4	  x	  34.9	  cm,	  
Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  New	  York.	  Available	  from:	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  
http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-­‐collection-­‐online/search/483438	  (accessed	  




Fig.	  64.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  in	  Black	  Cloak,	  Masturbating,	  1911,	  gouache,	  watercolour,	  
and	  pencil,	  48	  x	  32.1	  cm,	  Albertina,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  




Fig.	  65.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Seated	  Nude	  (Self-­‐Portrait),	  1910,	  oil	  on	  canvas,	  152.5	  x	  150	  cm,	  Leopold	  
Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  









Fig.	  67.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self	  Portrait,	  Nude,	  1910,	  crayon	  and	  gouache,	  44.5	  x	  31	  cm,	  Leopold	  
Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  




Fig.	  68.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Sneering	  Woman,	  1910,	  gouache,	  watercolour,	  and	  charcoal	  with	  white	  
heightening,	  45	  x	  31.4	  cm,	  Wien	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  
Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  




Fig.	  69.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Hand	  to	  Cheek,	  1910,	  chalk	  and	  watercolour,	  44.3	  x	  30.5	  
cm,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  Reinhard	  Steiner.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Midnight	  Soul	  of	  the	  










Fig.	  71.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  For	  Art	  and	  for	  My	  Loved	  Ones	  I	  will	  gladly	  endure	  to	  the	  End!,	  1912,	  
watercolour	  and	  pencil,	  48.2	  x	  31.8	  cm,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  
Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  





Fig.	  72.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Kneeling	  Male	  Nude	  with	  Raised	  Hand	  (Self-­‐Portrait),	  1910,	  black	  chalk	  
and	  gouache,	  62.1	  x	  44.1	  cm,	  Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  
Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  





Fig.	  73.	  Egon	  Schiele,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Splayed	  Fingers,	  1911,	  pencil	  and	  gouache,	  53	  x	  29.1	  cm,	  
Leopold	  Museum,	  Vienna	  (Inv.	  1383).	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	  





Fig.	  74.	  Egon	  Schiele	  in	  front	  of	  a	  mirror	  (double	  self-­‐portrait),	  c.	  1914,	  photograph,	  Egon	  
Schiele	  Archive,	  Albertina	  Museum,	  Vienna.	  From:	  	  Peter	  Vergo	  and	  Barnaby	  Wright,	  eds.	  Egon	  
Schiele:	  The	  Radical	  Nude.	  London:	  The	  Courtauld	  Gallery	  in	  association	  with	  Paul	  Halberton	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